The writing is sharp…always likely to grab the reader’s attention with something new. The study of ethnicity and indeed of neoliberalism will never be the same after the publication of this book.
Applies To: John Comaroff
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Ethnicity, Inc.
The politics of cultural identity, far from receding with the modernity, appears to have taken on new force in the wake of the cold war — especially with the triumphal rise of neoliberal capitalism on a global scale. This has yielded many efforts to explain the continued salience of ethnicity in a “new” world order that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was widely predicted to dissolve difference in the face of global flows of people, objects, currencies, signs, styles, desires. Less attention, however, has been paid to a subtle shift in the nature of ethnicity: its commodification. This lecture is devoted to showing that, increasingly, ethnic groups across the planet are beginning to act like corporations that own a “natural” copyright to their “culture” and “cultural products” — framed in terms, also, of heritage and indigenous knowledge — which they protect, often by recourse to the law, and on which they capitalize in much the same way as do incorporated businesses in the private sector. Why is this occurring? What are its political, economic, social, and ethical consequences? How is it transforming the nature of ethnicity and citizenship in the nation-state? And what are its theoretical implications for understanding such foundational social science concepts as culture and identity? It is these questions, finally, that Ethnicity, Inc. is addressed. In Ethnicity, Inc. anthropologists John L. and Jean Comaroff analyze a new moment in the history of human identity: its rampant commodification. Through a wide-ranging exploration of the changing relationship between culture and the market, they address a pressing question: Wherein lies the future of ethnicity? Their account begins in South Africa, with the incorporation of an ethno-business in venture capital by a group of traditional African chiefs. But their horizons are global: Native American casinos; Scotland’s efforts to brand itself; a Zulu ethno-theme park named Shakaland; a world religion declared to be intellectual property; a chiefdom made into a global business by means of its platinum holdings; San “Bushmen” with patent rights potentially worth millions of dollars; nations acting as commercial enterprises; and the rapid growth of marketing firms that target specific ethnic populations are just some of the diverse examples that fall under the Comaroffs’ incisive scrutiny. These phenomena range from the disturbing through the intriguing to the absurd. Through them, the Comaroffs trace the contradictory effects of neoliberalism as it transforms identities and social being across the globe. Ethnicity, Inc. is a penetrating account of the ways in which ethnic populations are remaking themselves in the image of the corporation—while corporations coopt ethnic practices to open up new markets and regimes of consumption. Intellectually rigorous but leavened with wit, this is a powerful, highly original portrayal of a new world being born in a tectonic collision of culture, capitalism, and identity.
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Tessa Diphoorn Array
The Truth About Crime meets the expectations one may have of Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff: a book that is captivating, theoretically insightful and comprehensive, and appealing to scholars across disciplines interested in power, crime, and social (dis)order. Drawing from and expanding upon some of their previous work, this book is a valuable addition to a large body of scholarly work aimed at unraveling the intricate dynamics of crime, citizenship, and authority in contemporary South Africa and beyond.
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Dolly Kikon Array
“The Truth About Crime offers a powerful account about crime, policing, and the modern state. The book is a “criminal anthropolgy” that guides the reader towards understanding what precisely is different or new about crime and punishment in modern societies. Recognizing how crime and policing have become constitutive of our everyday lives, Jean and John L. Comaroff trace how crime – in particular policing as a core function of the criminal justice system – are constitutive of contemporary life. With special attention on the United States and South Africa, the book is theoretically sharp and expansive, and consolidates their previous work on law, disorder, governance, citizenship, and the post colonial state. It is an important contribution that offers scholars across the fields of law, criminology, anthropology, political science, sociology, and human rights a clear understanding about the social production and increasing fear of lawlessness and criminality in societies.”
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The Truth About Crime
In this book, renowned anthropologists Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff make a startling but absolutely convincing claim about our modern era: it is not by our arts, our politics, or our science that we understand ourselves—it is by our crimes. Surveying an astonishing range of forms of crime and policing—from petty thefts to the multibillion-dollar scams of too-big-to-fail financial institutions to the collateral damage of war – they take readers into the disorder of the late modern world. Looking at recent transformations in the triangulation of capital, the state, and governance that have led to an era where crime and policing are ever more complicit, they offer a powerful meditation on the new forms of sovereignty, citizenship, class, race, law, and political economy of representation that have arisen.
To do so, the Comaroffs draw on their vast knowledge of South Africa, especially, and its struggle to build a democracy founded on the rule of law out of the wreckage of long years of violence and oppression. There they explore everything from the fascination with the supernatural in policing to the extreme measures people take to prevent home invasion, drawing illuminating comparisons to the United States and United Kingdom. Going beyond South Africa, they offer a global criminal anthropology that attests to criminality as the constitutive fact of contemporary life, the vernacular by which politics are conducted, moral panics voiced, and populations ruled.
The result is a disturbing but necessary portrait of the modern era, one that asks critical new questions about how we see ourselves, how we think about morality, and how we are going to proceed as a global society.
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A Correction Presents
A Correction: Theory from the SouthJohn Comaroff is Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology at Harvard University. Before joining the Department of African and African American Studies, John Comaroff was the Harold H. Swift Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. He is also an Honorary Professor of Anthropology at the University of Cape Town, and an Affiliated Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation. His current research in South Africa is on crime, policing, and the workings of the state, on democracy and difference, and on postcolonial politics. His authored and edited books include, with Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (2 vols), Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, Modernity and its Malcontents, Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa, Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Ethnicity, Inc., Zombies et Frontières A l’Ere Néolibérale, Theory from the South: or, how Euro-America is evolving toward Africa, and The Truth Abouth Crime: Policing and the Metaphysics of Disorder. With Jean Comaroff he is currently completing The Return of Khulekani Khumalo, Zombie Captive: Law, Imposture, and Personhood in Postcolonial South Africa, and co-editing Chiefship and the Customary in Contemporary Africa.
Jean Comaroff is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology at Harvard University. Jean Comaroff was educated at the University of Cape Town and the London School of Economics. After a spell as research fellow in medical Anthropology at the University of Manchester, she moved to the University of Chicago, where she was remained until 2012 as the Bernard E. and Ellen C. Sunny Distinguished Service Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, and Director of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory. She is also Honorary Professor at the University of Cape Town. Her research, primarily conducted in southern Africa, has centered on processes of social and cultural transformation – the making and unmaking of colonial society, the nature of the postcolony, the late modern world viewed from the Global South. Her writing has covered a range of topics, from religion, medicine and body politics to state formation, crime, democracy and difference. Her publications include Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People (1985), “Beyond the Politics of Bare Life: AIDS and the Global Order” (2007); and, with John L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (vols. l [1991] and ll [1997]); Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (1992); Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism (2000), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (2006), Ethnicity, Inc. (2009), Theory from the South, or How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa (2011), and The Truth About Crime: Policing and the Metaphysics of Disorder in South Africa. In the pipeline is The Return of Khulekane Khumalo, Zombie Captive: Law, Imposture, and Personhood in Postcolonial South Africa. Also in process is an edited collection, Chiefship and the Customary in Contemporary Africa. A committed pedagogue, she has won awards for teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and has worked to enable college students to study abroad, especially in Africa.
A Correction: Podcast
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The Wealth of Ethno-nations
The significance of ethnicity – of ethnicity understood as a foundational basis for forging selfhood and collective identity, feelings of primal attachment and shared affect, political claims to rights and the protection of interests, even for national belonging – has grown visibly over the past few decades. Needless to say, the phenomenon itself is hardly new.1 As a slippery, polyvalent concept of collective being, it had already troubled Max Weber (1968, 387ff.) a century ago – although, as a common noun, it only appeared in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary in 1961 and entered the anthropological lexicon relatively recently (Surak 2010, 152; Comaroff and Comaroff 2011, 68-72). What has been especially striking of late, however, has been its explosive entry into the market place. Of course, the merchandising of cultural difference – of the emblems, effects, capacities, and embodiments of “otherness” – dates back deep into to the mists of time. But the commercialization of culture and the corporatization of identity, the two constitutive elements of what has come to be referred to as “ethnicity, inc.,” have intensified greatly across the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century with the triumph of the maret as the ur-ideological nexus of world-making. Nor is it just that such things as heritage tourism, the sale of vernacular musics and art, or the financialization of the exotic have expanded rapidly in scale. It is that ethnic identity itself has been repurposed, taking on more objectified, commodified form. In so doing, it has animated novel species of value, claims to sovereignty, territory, and property, kinds of sociality and sensibility, and claims to distinctive skills.
More than a decade ago, in Ethnicity, Inc. (2009), we explored the impact of these transformations on peoples and populations across the globe: on the sense of personhood, sociality, ownership, and belonging they conjured into existence, on the emotive energies they engendered, and on the conscience collective they shaped. We tried, in other words, to plumb the impact of the commodification of difference in terms that went well beyond reducing ethnicity, inc. to the rise of global neoliberalism: terms that addressed the reifying, rationalizing effects of the commerce in things, qualities, and people – and, simultaneously, the slippages, spillages, and mutations spawned by that commerce. In short, we argued that the commodification of ethnic and national identity appeared to be generating new social and productive relations, revitalized affiliations, refigured aspirations, all of them with consequences yet to be fully determined. Nor is this occurring in a vacuum: it is part and parcel of an epoch in which the very essence of personal and political subjectivity, of economy and society and culture, of nation and state, has been under radical reconstruction; an epoch, also, in which the growing salience of identity is manifesting itself in the changing nature of labor, in the transnational migration of ethnically-marked workers in pursuit of livelihoods, and in the emergence of new, culturally-assertive diasporic networks and communities.
The commodification of identity and, in particular, the imbrication of ethnic enterprise in the changing global order raised a number of critical questions. Would, could, the identity business deliver on the empowerment it appeared to promise, especially where received forms of livelihood, local work, and security were under threat? And, if it did, for whom? How sustainable were the relations of production, distribution, investment, and ownership it conjured into existence? When and where did that business fail to take root or flourish. At stake, too, were the sorts of ambitions authorized by identity-as-business – and how they might relate to other kinds of ethno- politics, including those inflamed by violence. Even more pressing was the question of whether ethnicity, inc. was a passing phenomenon at this particular historical conjuncture, or part of an enduring shift in the economic, judicial, expressive, and existential nature of cultural identity. And, equally relevant here, a related matter. To what extent has ethnicity, inc. masked another side, a dark underside, of identity-in-the- market: the devaluation and discounting of ethnically marked labor, especially that of unskilled migrant workers – in response to demand in the extractive, agri- and service industries – with their own affective and material investments in the identity economy?
These questions pose another one, one that remains significant. Does the stress on the economics of ethnicity underplay its continuing political significance? After all, is it not the case that any assertion of ethnic self-determination, not to mention the incorporation of ethnic groups,2 takes shape within the overarching sovereignty of the nation-state and its legal Lebensraum (Surak 2010, 156-7)?3 Or, indeed, that any claim to recognition made in the name of identity is always, in the first instance, a political act? This, to be sure, echoes a core assumption of much anthropological and sociological theory-work on ethnicity; also the practical consciousness of a great deal of activism. But the framing of the question in these terms – which, in the spirit of liberal orthodoxy, treats the political and the economic as discrete institutional domains – misconstrues the very essence of ethnicity, inc.: that, in the new order of things, the political, the economic, the social, and the cultural dissolve into each other, mediated by the juridical, itself the frame of reference that validates economic rights and political claims. Put another way, even when the assertion of difference is voiced purely as a matter of politics, even when it disavows the economic, it always carries material, moral, affective, and jural entanglements along with it, whether or not they are made audible or visible.
In the age of deregulation, in sum, when capital subdues labor and statecraft is largely shaped by the demands of the market, it is impossible any longer to treat “the political” as a discrete domain unto itself. The identity economy, we shall argue, is at once a political economy, a moral economy, a cultural economy, an affective economy. What is more, nation-states, themselves ever more corporate in form and function, have been drawn deeper and deeper into that economy. Many of them now brand themselves, actively market their intellectual property and creative capacities, celebrate an essential ethno-national character, and assert their putative cultural homogeneity against difference. In the upshot – even when they are constituted, ideologically, as civic, liberal democracies – nations have come increasingly to resemble ethnic groups writ large, especially those ethnic groups that have incorporated themselves, commodified their cultures and human capital, and entered assertively into the identity business.
But we are running ahead of ourselves.
The Enduring, the Emergent, and the Unforeseen
Far from being a passing phenomenon, a conjuncture purely of the short-run, corporate identity has continued to manifest itself widely among peoples marked by their difference. All available evidence affirms the fact that populations that self-define as bioculturally distinctive have increasingly come to regard themselves as rights- bearing, asset-holding entities, their material and immaterial cultural products resources by law in the same way as is true of any limited liability company (Meiu, Comaroff, and Comaroff 2020). In the age of mass production and planetary circulation, moreover, commodities locally produced, and authenticated under the sign of indigeneity, tend to acquire added value – and, as they are interpolated into the economic mainstream, sometimes serve to revitalize struggling communities and defunct industrial margins (Colloredo-Mansfield 2011).
Some culturally assertive, well-established ethno-corporations have continued to grow into major businesses, ever more firmly situated in the global economy; vide the Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. (STOFINC.com), whose income in 2019 was $853.84m,4 whose asset value is estimated to have risen to $12bn, whose brands now cover a wide range of industries, and whose holdings currently pay an annual dividend of $128,000 to every man, woman, and child in the Seminole Nation.5 Nor, it appears, are they the biggest or fastest growing Native American business in the USA. That honor, it is said, belongs to the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux of Minnesota; their entertainment operations and diversified holdings are reported to yield a yearly distribution of approximately $1m to every member of the four hundred and eighty strong community.6 In South Africa, famously, the Royal Bafokeng Nation – or Bafokeng, Inc. (e.g. Cook 2011; Kriel 2010), the object of a fair bit of anthropological attention – has expanded its financial and business interests, as have other ethnic mega-firms all across the world. And between them and those that struggle to eke out a sparse living through selling culture, are any number caught somewhere in the middle, striving to incorporate successfully and command a niche in the existential business of marketing products and skills under the sign of their identity.
At the same time, a number of fine-grained ethnographies have begun to address the inverse situation: that in which corporate ethnicity fails to emerge where it might be expected to fluoresce. Such in the case, for instance, in Australia (Darian- Smith 2020); its government has largely crushed the autonomous efforts of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples to trade their internationally known, highly valued arts – itself part of what many see to be an oppressive “cultural backlash against minority peoples” – by subsuming them into national tourist industry (ibid., 241-2). This points to the significance of the state in the process of ethno-incorporation. Australia is not alone in discouraging indigenous populations – by means coercive or constitutional or managerial, for reasons stated or unstated – from entering into the moral and material economy of the market on their own account. By contrast, others have actively encouraged ethnic enterprise and even incorporation – like the USA, where the Indian Reorganization Act (1934) and Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971) made “Recognized Tribes” into legally-founded corporations,7 although many have ended up in brute poverty. For identity to be minimally viable, and to become the stuff of enterprise, some validation of a legally-recognized right to difference must exist in the wider political context. Or be assertively claimed – all the more so since, otherwise, it risks being devalued, racialized, discounted.
But it is not just state action that may intervene in processes of incorporation and the commodification of identity. There are also cases of endogenous refusal, not least when ethno-populations mistrust the market, believing that alienating their cultural products, their labor, or their knowledge, may lead to alienating themselves from their identity and its core values. Hence the long-time unwillingness of the Navajo and Hopi to join the Native American world of “reservation capitalism,” which only dissipated in the face of deep economic crisis.8 There are contexts, as well, in which the very idea of incorporation or the commodification of culture – indeed, even the assertion of ethnicity – provokes frank ambivalence. This is true of Roma, who are scattered all across (especially Eastern) Europe. A significant proportion of their number appear to doubt whether, in fact, they have customs or an identity in common; some actually hide that identity for fear of evoking a long history of stigmatization. Or worse. This is in spite of strong encouragement, coming from UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and sundry other protagonists, for them to “reclaim” their intangible heritage in the form of language and culture; also in spite of efforts by the activist Romani Movement to assert not just a collective identity, but “non-territorial nation” status (see e.g. Petrova 2003; Covrig 2004).9 And so we have, today, such entities as the Romani Cultural and Arts Company (http://www.romaniarts.co.uk/), registered in 2009, but as a non-profit, itself an ambivalent entry into the world of ethnic incorporation – a half way house, of sorts, on the road to ethnicity, inc.
It goes without saying that some populations evince a simple lack of inclination – rather than outright refusal or indecision – to incorporate themselves and/or market their cultures. Moreover, ethno-business, at base, requires something to sell, something that others can be persuaded to buy. Many ethnic groups simply do not have anything much to merchandise. The ecology of cultural production excludes them from the wherewithal to engage in the identity business, except perhaps from their availability as relatively unskilled, even abject, labor. Where they do engage, however, and do so actively, the marketing of culture-as-commodity, its objectification and enclosure, is seldom free of argument. More often than not, it sparks bitter dispute and invariably requires careful choreography to disambiguate the messages it conveys. This is a point persuasively made by Tatiana Chudakova (2020) in respect of the contested effort to market Buddhist merit in Buryatia, eastern Siberia, and by Finola Kerrigan, Jyotsna Shivanandan, and Anne-Marie Hede (2012) on the ongoing struggle of the Incredible India Campaign to brand the kaleidoscopic, volatile, hybridizing cultural commonweal of the world’s largest democracy. It is also evident in Andrew Graan’s (2013) analysis of the fractious local response to efforts by Macedonia’s rulers to refigure Skopje as a historic European capital.
These accounts illuminate some of the complexities involved in ethno- commodification: in the symbolic and material labor invested in making and retailing the tangible stuff of difference, thus to transform identity into capital. They also underscore the fact that the more power it packs, the more the process of incorporation is likely to become the object of argument. And the fact that, when it does, it brings into sharp focus latent ambivalences over the financialization of culture itself. This is not in the least surprising. For those who see themselves as sharing it, “a” culture, duly reified, has transcendent value. It is taken to be above the market, beyond price, vested with existential, timeless worth. And yet culture, sui generis, has never been entirely outside of the market or beyond price. As a form of monopoly capital, moreover, it promises to yield recognition, rights, royalties, and returns to those who “own” it. But only if and when it is rendered into – its relative worth determined by – a currency of universal valuation. Monetized, that is. And sold.
Rudi Colloredo-Mansfield (2011) has sought to cast further light on the kinds of activity on which ethno-commodification depends. Bringing cultural objects to the market and securing a sustainable niche for them, he shows, rides on, among other things, the intensification of local production, the mastery of new technologies and expertise, and mobilizing external sources of investment and merchandising. The viability of ethno-commerce, he adds, is often threatened from within by efforts to privatize shared vernacular knowledge, skills, or hereditary status – and from outside by those who seek to profit from that commerce by investing in it on exploitative terms. Conversely, the intellectual property law used by individuals or sub-groups to appropriate (i.e., “enclose”) shared cultural practices and possessions can also be deployed in the name of the ethno-commons to protect joint heritage from its privatization.
Colloredo-Mansfield (2011, 53) makes another important claim: that, rather than being regarded as discrete or opposed spheres, commerce and the commons frequently “grow…up together.” Like the gift and the commodity, we would add, ground zero of economic anthropology. The very idea of the commons in its contemporary sense, he suggests, is a consequence of market development, not a vestige of precapitalist relations. Hence the conviction of many resource activists that, if the business success of ethnopreneurs can be sustained, it would enhance their power, on behalf of the collective good, to limit the potential damage wrought by commodification, especially at the hands of outsiders. Not coincidentally, it is primarily against the rapacious tendencies of global capital that indigenous movements have grown up all over to champion stewardship of the commons: many local communities have taken a strong stand against the commercial erosion of their territories and, with it, the basis of a secure local livelihood. Witness, in this connection, the quest of the population of Haida Gwaii to preserve the custody of their terrain in British Columbia, Canada (Weiss 2018). Or the eight-year-long battle of Saami (also rendered Sami or Sámi) reindeer- herding cooperatives in northern Finland to retain control of their historic grazing lands (Sanders 2015).
This strange symbiosis of market and ethno-commons is evident, too, in contemporary development discourse. For some time now, and increasingly, marketing strategists have stressed the competitive advantage of rooting translocal production, even of mainstream commodities in locally grounded sites, as Apple, Inc. has done in Cupertino, California, for instance. This is said to confer on them a distinctive “geographical indication,” or GI, a tag recognized by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to denote “the possess[ion] of qualities or a reputation…due to [their] origin.”10 In enhancing product identity, “geographical indication” is thought, in prospect at least, to invigorate the local cultural terroir and its generativity (Colloredo- Mansfield 2011, 51) – as though it were ethnicized. But not always. In practice, resort to GI may be, and often is, patently tenuous. Michele Fontefrancesco (2012), for example, notes that the “crafting of locality” in Valenza, Italy – where distinctive jewelry is manufactured in ostensibly traditional fashion – is belied by the rigid enforcement of techno-scientific norms from outside. In the age of finance capital and deregulation, the narrative of the commons and commonality is often just that: a narrative that, with ever greater intensity, romances vernacular authenticity, productivity, creativity, and togetherness while still being commandeered by those who control the means of manufacture and marketing. Meanwhile, the policies of more traditional development agencies, those aimed at populations on the margins of established economies, display a newfound emphasis on the capacity of inalienable heritage to generate alienable value. In the upshot, they have taken to urging people/s marked by their difference to regard alterity itself as a species of unlimited monopoly capital, an “abundant,” profitable source of wealth waiting to be harvested (see Hirsch 2020).
The very intangibility of ethno-cultural heritage enables and enriches the rhetoric of value without limit, of the conjuring of money from nothing (cf. James 2015). To the degree that it does, investors and developers also have continued to push financialization, encouraging competitive ethnoprise and the recognition of indigeneity as a site of abstract investment capital (Nakassis 2013, 118), however uncertain it may be to yield returns of any magnitude. All too often, the discourse of natural abundance reverberates cynically, often alchemically, in marginal environments, environments already stripped of other assets or employment opportunities. In such places, as noted in Ethnicity, Inc. (2009, 41-42), the concept of “human capital” can take on ever more unnerving concreteness. Not only their culture or their natural habitat, but the very bodies of ethnic subjects increasingly become the source of exploitable – and for venture capital from outside, sometimes highly profitable – value in the form of branded raw material: for genomic and pharmaceutical research (Abu El-Haj 2012; Benjamin 2015; Petryna 2009), for “natural” prowess in sports,11 for innate musicality (Copeland n.d.), military force (May 2020), and exotic sexuality (Meiu 2017; 2020), or for other aptitudes and skills, including taxing physical labor.
It seems clear, then, that, over the past several decades, ethnicity, inc., has been on the rise in many places, some of them unexpected. Such is the story of the Griqua, a marginal population in the South African interior (see Schweitzer 2015), who, at one point in their history, were said scarcely to exist and who have based their “reinvention of indigeneity…[and] the commodification of [their] ethnic history and culture” in a struggle for land rights (Zips 2015). Or, half way across the world, in Tibet, where, Martin Saxer (2013, 201) tells us, being Tibetan “serves as a commodity or asset . . . [as] actors engage, willingly or not, in the economy of Tibetanness.” Some mass media have picked up on the global story: the Vancouver Sun, for one, published a report in early 2018 under the title “The Rapid Growth of Ethnic Economies.” These economies, it said, had increased dramatically in both geographical scatter and visible incidence over the previous few years.12 We could go on ad infinitum: the phenomenon, patently, has entered the realm of the new normal.
This is not to deny, as we have already made plain, that the spread of ethnicity, inc., founded conjointly on the commodification of culture and the incorporation of difference, has been very uneven, that it has sometimes been flatly repudiated, iconoclastically redeployed, or paid no heed. Moreover, it has had positive effects for some and steep downsides for many others, typically along pre-existing lines of inequality; worst yet, it has reaped brute exploitation where marginalized populations have nothing to sell but their ethnically-branded labor power in a market in which the commodification of difference meets the logic of racial capitalism (Maldonado 2009). But at base, there is no question that ethnicity, inc. – as a constructed sociological, political-economic, affective, and ethical reality – has sunk deep roots and, however haphazardly, is spreading. Nor only spreading. It’s framing logic is also extending itself further and further into the heartland of collective conscious and material life. Just as it is radiating out horizontally across the geoscapes of the planet, so is it upscaling vertically, to more embracing forms of being in the world – including nationality, which itself appears to be becoming ever more ethnicized. And in both its horizontal and its vertical extensions, identity, inc. is interpolating itself deeper and deeper into the contours of the labile, constantly mutating global economy. In fact, the strident efforts by marketers everywhere to invest commodities, producers, and brands with a distinctive essence, to particularize, exoticize, and root them in a given terroir, underlines a core feature of the identity economy: the more that culture is made marketable, the more the commodity itself is rendered cultural, thus to resonate with the desires of identity-seeking consumers. Commodification is, indeed, a queer process
Ethno-Economics: Scaling out, Scaling up
Perhaps the most immediate expansion of the reach of ethnicity, inc., is to be found in its original locus classicus: ethno-communities in postcolonial states and former settler colonies, emergent “nationalities” in postsocialist societies, and culturally marked minorities in (more or less) liberal democratic polities. Here, where they are positioned to do so, ethnic corporations tend to make claims for political and legal recognition as they widen their horizons in pursuit of business opportunity, some of it an intensification of older kinds of commerce, some of it new: in, among other things, heritage, eco-, and thanatourism (“dark tourism,” e.g. Hartmann 2014; Light 2017);13 in enclaved enterprises such as gambling and licensed big-game hunting (e.g. Cattelino 2008; Yatsuka 2018); in mining, forestry, transport, and communication (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009); in the marketing of indigenous knowledge, arts and crafts, ritual performances, music and vernacular theater (ibid.), even in “living museums” that offer menus from which visitors may purchase culture at “fixed prices” (Zips 2018, 22).
In Africa, moreover, there is now wide acknowledgment of the “rebirth” of the “kingdom of custom,” the sovereign terrain of indigenous rulers, a number of whom – like the King of the Royal Bafokeng Nation (above, p.00) – have emerged as powerful corporate figures, even CEOs (Comaroff and Comaroff 2018). The liberalizing thrust of structural adjustment policies, under the Washington Consensus, played a significant role in this turn of events. It actively encouraged the devolution of aid and investment away from national capitals toward so-called “local communities,” thereby (re)legitimizing their rulers as their sovereign representatives – with fiduciary jurisdiction over their often considerable material and cultural interests (Comaroff and Comaroffibid.; Geschiere 2018). It is no wonder that many of these rulers have become skilled dealers in ethnic patrimony, willing real estate and labor brokers with mining companies, and adept venture capitalists on their own account (e.g. Coyle 2018; J. Smith 2018). Or that, emboldened by a mix of authority at once corporate and customary, some have taken to challenging the sovereignty of the state (e.g. Buthelezi and Skosana 2018). These cases illuminate, yet again, the entanglement of politics and economy at work in ethnicity, inc,: how it may potentiate unprecedented inflows of value and, in so doing, reconfigure “traditional” modes of empowerment – while opening the door to new, or repurposed, vectors of inequity, exclusion, even despotism (Darian- Smith, 2020).
Outscaling: From the Country to the City
As it has continued to move beyond its “traditional” terrain at a quickening rate, identity- based enterprise has become ever more caught up in the force-fields of mainstream regional and national economies. Where the commodification of culture takes shape at the interface with state-level institutions – and the local meets its exteriors – it often gives rise to remastered categories of subjectivity and belonging.
Take two examples.
One concerns a process of emerging ethnopreneurial citizenship in the tourist industry of mainland China. In a village in the southwest, reports Mengqi Wang (2012), people who identify as Buyi (or Boutei) have responded to government development initiatives by establishing a museum that has turned their everyday household goods into protected cultural artifacts. There is nothing new in this, but, as Wang shows, the attempt to make the village itself into a timeless open-air diorama of traditional culture has been undermined by the very process of museumization. For the largely script- based rendering of Buyi life as ossified essence to be consumed by outsiders, itself an act of “internal orientalism,” has thrust their micro-universe into the currents of national history. And economy. In the upshot, the villagers have begun to live these scripts both in their daily interactions and in their dealings with the state, enabling them to become energetic agents of their own commercial enterprise – thereby proving, too, that “they needed to be traditional first…if they want to be modern and ‘developed’” (ibid, 452). In the Age of Ethno-commerce, like so many others elsewhere, they find themselves pushed to be both at once to qualify for recognition and its returns. Thus does locality extends itself outward in time and space. Of course, “the local” can only be recognized as such, and take on meaning, in relation to other localities, other geographies, beyond itself; it is never given, never simply “there,” always produced (Appadurai 1995).
The other example dates back a decade or so to Bogotá, Colombia. At the time, the local Asociación de Cabildos Indigenas, an organization of urban ethnic groupings, was trying to form a coalition of Kichwa, Ambika-Pijao, and Muiscas; these ethnic communities are not legally recognized as such under the Colombian constitution because they lack their own territories. Their objective? As Ati Quigua, a well-known activist leader, explained to anthropologist Diana Bocarejo (2007; 2015),14 they wished to build an “indigenous shopping mall” in order to “generate resources, income and sustainable projects.” But “what would an indigenous mall actually look like?,” asked Ms. Bocarejo, given that the plan was to have the mall also house all the usual major stores in a somewhat conventional, high-end retail palace. To “symbolize indigeneity,” replied Ms. Quigua. But there was more to it. As a Kichwa notable added, the point was to “have a…space where we can display our cosmology…[I]t will narrate the history of the place, there will be small plazas where we will do, as they say in North America, our pow wow, what we call a minga’,” a vernacular term that refers to collective ceremonial work. There would also be theaters in which to “perform our dances, our rituals…where people,” not least tourists, ”can be with us.” Where better for commodified custom and custom-made commodities to converge, and to infuse each other, than an urban shopping mall in the regional and national capital? Where better “to anchor and fix modern indigeneity”? (Bocarejo ibid.)
As far-flung as these two cases are, they exemplify processes of identity management found increasingly across the planet: processes of scaling outward upward, that is, in which the material assertion of collective being and the commodification of culture transcend the local, seeking to realize themselves in worlds beyond their own visible horizons. When this happens, when ethno-incorporation takes root, expands its reach, and asserts itself, it may challenge state sovereignty and national belonging, not least by (re)fashioning and claiming the primacy of bioculturally based citizenship. And styling themselves as “nations” in their own right: hence the Seminole Nation, the Great Sioux Nation, the Royal Bafokeng Nation, the Griqua Nation, to mention just a few. Of this, more in a moment.
The interpolation of ethnic subjectivity into the conscience collective of the larger body politic, and its materialization in regional, national, and global economies, has also become a rapidly growing concern of the mass-marketing industry; palpably more so than it was in the early years after the millennium. The emerging practices of this industry are revealed in a burgeoning literature on ethnicity and advertising. Shalini Shankar’s (2012; 2015) studies of merchandising to Asian Americans in the US, for instance, suggest that mainstream copywriters – not themselves Asian American – engage in a complex set of identitarian marketing strategies. They aim to fashion common brand identities in ways that reconcile received stereotypes of a homogenous Asian identity with the internal diversity of the population categorized as Asian- American, thus to embrace “their” difference in the market at large. The overriding aim of their messaging is to transform this population into targeted consumers for their products; this by way of a process of “racial naturalization” that makes them visible as fully-fledged citizens on the endemically-plural but putatively inclusive US cultural landscape (Shankar 2015, 15).
As minority populations come to constitute lucrative target markets in their own right, ethnic publicists, as distinct from mainstream marketeers, seek to sell their cultural products back to those populations as much as to others. Arlene Dávila ([2001] 2012), one of the first scholars to explore ethnicity inc. in North America, wrote of the ambiguous implications of this endeavor in Latinos, Inc., which explores the multibillion- dollar Hispanic advertising industry in the US. Insider efforts to harness the potential of the Latin American “nation within a nation” (ibid., 4) and to brand its diversity, she notes, have turned out to be only a little less reductive, homogenizing, and exoticizing than the exertions of mainstream marketers – thereby abetting the tendency of the latter to render the Latino population marginal to the larger (i.e., white) consumer public. Not surprisingly perhaps, the reception by Hispanic Americans of these vernacular marketing strategies has been deeply ambivalent. They have provoked estrangement, anger, bemusement – and vigorous debate not merely about the politics of Latino identity, but also about the perverse pleasures of consumer recognition. Like other instruments of merchandising, advertising seeks to mobilize the creativity of market forces as an abstract form of capital, one that has the capacity, in and of itself, to generate value. As such, it has emerged as both a means and an object of collective action. Not surprisingly, then, the argument of images within Latino marketing has become complicated, ironic, and ever more sophisticated as widening cultural and class diversity among Hispanics resists stereotypy or encompassment. And as “Hispanic business,” like “Asian American” business, becomes more and more entangled with the wider US and the transnational economy.
Again, much the same may be said of the outscaling effects of ethno-marketing on other culturally-defined populations, east and west, north and south.
Upscaling: From Ethno- toward Nationality, Inc.
Talk of the Hispanic “nation within a nation” points, in turn, to the upscaling of the identity economy; specifically, to Nationality, Inc. This phenomenon has gained a good deal more visibility, traction, and scholarly attention of late, all the more so as nationhood has itself become more explicitly ethnicized; all the more so too, perhaps, as, in counterpoint, many ethnic groups – recall the Seminole, the Sioux, the Bafokeng, and the Griqua – style themselves as nations. Orthodox political theory, famously, assumes the reverse (Tamir 2019, 425-6). It takes ethnicity-as-polity to be a primordial form of association, derived from “‘hot” attachments of ancestry and blood relations – and destined, with the advent of modernity, to give way to “cooler” ties of solidarity, vested in a social contract and rational-legal authority (e.g., R. Smith 1986; Kamenka 1975). Critics have long been skeptical of this evolutionary telos and the ideal-typical opposition on which it rests. In some contexts, ethnicity, inc. and nationality, inc. merge seamlessly into one another. This is especially so in those polities that actually see themselves as ethnonations, polities whose citizens, ostensibly united in blood and soil, language, culture and faith, are held to share a unique, primal substance. Germany, Israel, Russia, Malaysia, and post-socialist Eastern European countries, among others, are often given as examples, although the matter is more complicated, since ideology, sociology, and demography do not always line up seamlessly with one another. But even modern civic nations, as Benedict Anderson (1983, 7) reminds us, hold to the fantasy of cultural homogeneity and shared heritage, a fantasy that also is often racially-inflected – and, in any case, grows in part out of the suppression of their ethnic undersides, their local “tribalisms.” Even in western Europe, heartland of the liberal democratic state, ethnic and civic nationalism typically infuse each other (Tamir 2019), their difference, despite often shrill claims to the contrary, more a matter of degree than kind (Weber 1968, 925; Povinelli 2006, 197; Tilly 1990). What is more, nation-states of both sorts long foreshadowed ethnicity, inc., having acted, almost from the first, as proto-corporations, concrete abstractions that possess sovereign territory, invest themselves in signs of distinction, and marshal their economic and cultural interests by recourse to law and war.
Ethnicity and nationalism, to be sure, are political artifacts of a broadly similar sort (Weber 1968, 392), both being mythopoetic fictions and imagined communities (Anderson, ibid.) sustained by idioms of genealogy and family. And mobilized under the sign of existential solidarity, exclusivity, and a commonweal. The former, moreover, is seldom ever erased by the latter: nationhood is a perpetual work-in-progress – a “daily plebiscite,” as Ernest Renan (1992) once famously quipped,15 a “cry of passion, a tug of war against reason,” noted Ernest Gellner (1965, 149; in T amir 2019, 422) – not least because heterogeneity almost always remains present to trouble it. This is most overtly so in postcolonies, whose histories have left them with a legacy of “tribalism” invented or exacerbated by the violent divisiveness of colonial rule (Mafeje 1971). But, with the turn to the political logic of neoliberalism – its celebration of deregulated economic interest over collective solidarity, privatization over a social contract, rights over responsibilities, locality over centralization – the sovereignty of civic nation-states has increasingly been challenged by claims made against it in the name of biocultural difference.
That challenge has provoked energetic push-back framed in emphatically ethnonationalist terms: hence Brexit in a Britain formerly known as Great; hence, too, the Trumpist call, amidst the ebbing global hegemony of the USA, to “Make America Great Again,” a coded euphemism for “white ethnic”; hence the appeal, in a Russia devoid of the Soviet Empire, of Russkii, broadly understood as Russian ethnic culture, language, and “traditional” values (Blakkisrud 2016);16 also the assertive rise of Hindutva, an exclusionary Hindu nationalism, in India (Basu 1996); and the strident efforts of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) to essay “Germany [only] for the Germans.”17 These populist movements, and there are many more, have been fueled by the worldwide increase, under economic and political duress, of migration and other kinds of traffic across state boundaries; they speak to a crisis of coherence, of solidarity, of the ability actually to imagine community amidst fragmentary interests and impulses. Referred to by Anna Triandafyllidou (2021) as “neo-tribal nationalism,”18 this push-back invokes the homogenized nation-as-identity, claiming to defend the integrity of its culture, heritage, autochthony, and patrimony against difference-as-dissolution. As one observer put it in explaining the attraction of Brexit for so many Britons, “[it asserted] “a sense of rightful ownership”19 amidst, in the phrase of another, “the anger that some genuine British identity – remembered or misremembered – was being drowned within the shallow waters of the European Union…”20
It is in this context that the contemporary salience of nationality, inc., as a distinctive, late modern phenomenon, is to be understood. While the state might always have been a corporation in the broadest sense of the term, in recent times it has become corporate sensu stricto: a metabusiness, so to speak. It acts an und für sich, subcontracting and franchising out its operations to the private sector, financializing its biogenetic endowment, its intellectual property, and its other assets, commodifying its collective Geist to attract commerce, and creating a conducive fiscal environment for its stake-holder citizens. No longer simply a custodian of the treasury or a guarantor of the welfare of those citizens, government under “neo-liberal political rationality” (Brown 2003) has largely relinquished its role as a mediator among “class and sectarian interests” in the cause of a greater public good (Harvey 1990, 108). It is itself ruled by the logic of the market (Foucault 2008; see above).
As the state mimics a holding company, as the aforementioned line between politics and economics gives way, as the social contract is translated into the language of stake-holding, so nation branding becomes a potent vehicle of collective representation and so-called “world-making.” Increasingly, ruling regimes are told by their subjects: “market us” (Graan 2013, 281). Increasingly, the market is where the alchemy of legitimation and vitalization lies. And so heads of state become businessmen, and some businessmen become heads of state, be they Silvio Berlusconi or Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron or Cyril Ramaphosa, Mark Rutte or Tihomir Oreškoviæ.21 On occasion, countries that lack a CEO-president call for their leaders to act like one: in Kenya, when Mwai Kibaki was elected in 2002, he was told “we want [you] to operate like the chief executive of a company and…ensure that the country ‘makes profit.’”22 The convergence between CEOs and presidents, suggests Tom W.C. Lin (2014, 1351f.), is not surprising: the two “form a double helix of executive power” at the center of contemporary economy, law, and society. This, he adds, is itself “reflective” of “the convergence of the public sphere of government and the private sphere of business,” along with the “trend towards the privatization of government functions” (p.1353). Hence the “construct of the President as CEO” (p.1354; emphasis added). And the nation as a brand to be managed and marketed, its being-in-the-world to be monetized.
From Ethnic to Nation Branding . . . and Its Undersides
As it seeks to recast twenty-first-century nationhood in the mold of the commodity form, nation branding echoes and extends the cultural and material logic of ethno- commodification. Now highly developed, widely theorized, thoroughly fetishized, the former is an analogical projection of the latter into the digital era. Yet conjuring the civic nation in ethnic terms always involves addressing a challenge. Because civic nationhood lacks the essential and essentializing coherence that ethnicity presumes, it has to assert homogeneity, fraternity, and a sense of affective connection in the face of social difference, cultural heterogeneity, and internal dissent; in the face, also, of the fact that the metaphors of kinship and genealogy on which nations draw tend to stretch thinly across their typically diverse scapes.
This is why politicians, confronted by forces that pull against national integrity – global capital, world religions, transnational movements and migration, the planetary electronic commons, border-breaching social media, and the like – invoke the emotive power of autochthony: of inalienable belonging rooted in a homeland by virtue of birth (Geschiere 2009). And why branded, culturally-authenticated commodity images are enlisted in essaying and enacting the value, and values, of nationhood. Ours, after all, is an age in which trade is taken to be the prime engine and index of wealth; in which diplomacy is displaced by professional marketing and the enchantments of advertising (Coombe 2012; Marsh and Fawcett 2011); in which the international order, formerly composed of more-or-less bounded national economies, melts into a largely boundless emporium for transacting the emblematic objects of national je ne sais quoi; in which patriotism may be explicitly asserted in shopping for homegrown brands, even in places where one might not expect it – like China, for instance, currently “undergoing a consumer brand revolution,” encouraged by the state, in which a nationalistic “young generation is…actively looking for brands that align confidently [with] Chinese identity.”23
Recent work on nation branding makes clear quite how pervasive it has become.
Professional ad men and women have grown adept at hyping their “indispensable” ability to engender esteem, trust, and investment potential for their client nation-states, especially in uncertain times.24 They point to an array of triumphal achievements: how stagnant, strife-torn Tatarstan elevated itself from the dreary Russian periphery by rediscovering a masterful medieval history and sense of ethno-national purpose; how Cape Verde, an arid archipelago off the African coast, became an attractive “melting pot of cultural flavour”; how the minuscule West Indies polity of St Kitts and Nevis became the world’s most patronized and popular – but far from the only25 – purveyor of citizenship (and second passports) acquired in exchange for a hefty investment in local real estate or donation to the country’s Sustainable Growth Fund.26
As this suggests, branding promises to exceed ordinary means and ends. In so doing, it is like the transformative magic of ritual. But is it ever unambiguously efficacious? It is never without excess, argues Constantine Nakassis (2013), never without a surfeit of meaning, always open to contestation, redeployment, even parody. As semiotic confections, brands invariably run up against other signs circulating in the world – and, in the process, often spawn unexpected associations. We have seen how, in the case of Latino, Inc., efforts to interpolate ethnic consumers by marketing “their” culture seldom take place without friction, often producing doubt, dispute, or censorship. Nation branding, like ethnic branding, traffics in a double abstraction. On one hand, it calls into being a collective identity, a tangible imagining, the very stuff of fetishism. On the other, it turns the content of that identity into a currency, a species of capital (ibid., 117). But as a medium of investment and speculation, its alchemic capacity to animate commodities and produce wealth is open to demystification the moment it fails to deliver.
And it has failed to deliver quite visibly of late, in tandem with recurring economic crises, rising rates of mass debt, and government-by-austerity. As often as not, states find it hard to back up hype with substance, thus to make good on the vaunted power of commodity images to stimulate production and/or consumption – especially where marketing seeks, by means magical and mimetic (Mazarella 2017), to breathe life into postindustrial urban wastelands and postcolonial or postsocialist peripheries. Efforts to brand and market Malta some years back, to cite one vivid example, were declared a “total failure,” and a costly one at that.27 Romania, to cite another, is said to have had a long history of unsuccessful attempts to sell itself and its cultural products.28 This, of course, presumes that success and failure are actually measurable in a meaningful way, itself a dubious claim (see e.g. Browning 2016).
Some ethno-nations brand themselves without relying on the ad industry to market their putatively unique capacities and commodities. Take, for instance, the Philippines. In 2008, an essay appeared in Nation-Branding.info urging the state not to employ expensive “market gurus.” Better to establish its own brand by directly selling its culture with more real substance, with its “true spirit and essence,” to the world, in order to “add value to practically everything associated” with the Philippines. In their own words, “Filipinos ARE the brand.”29 In 2011, the government formed a National Branding Council to “shape the…brand” And to create a “stronger [sense of] nationhood and national pride.”30 Of all the things that the Philippines offers in its own branded self- image, however, perhaps the most notable is “caring for others.” It is taken to be “innate in the Filipino culture,” embodied in malasakit (empathy).31 As a Manila newspaper put in, in 2017, “[b]eing a caregiver is not only a matter of profession …[It is] about deep love, respect and care to someone of old age or anybody else who needs treatment…This is something rooted in Filipino culture and an identity as a Filipino.”32 And something that has been steadily financialized. The country relies heavily for its economic well-being and social reproduction on remittances from migrant laborers employed abroad – not least from the very many women in the care sector, for which the Philippines has become known globally.33 The assertion of their culturally-validated expertise in this sector is also an effort to dignify and valorize low-paid service work.
As this suggests, it is not just cultural objects that have come to embody ethno- nationality in the global market place. So, in many contexts, has ethnically-indexed labor power. Indeed, it is here that the underside of ethnicity-in-the-marketplace becomes visible: in the long history of mobilizing difference as a critical mark of contrasts in human capacity and worth. Simply put, different ethno-racial populations are held to have dissimilar skills and capacities for work – menial or managerial, blue or white collar, cerebral or physical – and are deployed, managed, and remunerated in the planetary division of labor accordingly. Hence the bleak, often violent history of capital accumulation founded on brute ethno-racial exploitation, a.k.a., racial capitalism (Robinson 1983); hence, too, the long history of (more or less coerced) translocal labor migration. With the ever more complex division of productive labor across the world in the age of liberalization, with rising planetary inequality, and with mutating global supply chains, the flow of people on the move in search of wage work has been dramatically intensified. So, also, have the efforts of nation-states – both the exporters and the recipients of labor – to interpolate themselves into, and profit from, the traffic. Migrant workers stereotypically coded in ethno-national terms, patently, vary in their situation in labor market hierarchies, ranging from, for example, high-level Indian computer technicians and Pakistani doctors through professional Fijian soldiers to lowly paid, abject Mexican fruit pickers and Uyghur cotton workers; both of the latter, the fruit and cotton pickers, being part of a planetary pattern in which an overburdening percentage of debased agricultural work is done by ethnically-marked migrants.
It is into this context that Filipino care work fits. In 2006, the Manila Bulletin, one of the country’s most widely read publications, posted a prominent ad featuring then president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and a woman named Mary Joy Bunil, both dressed in super-hero capes, along with 30 other women in maids’ uniforms (Guevarra 2014:130). Highlighting “the latest Philippines export commodity, the Supermaid” (italics added), the commercial portrayed these women as a “different kind of domestic worker.” It cited malasakit and repeated the claim that a special skill in caring for others is “innate” in Filipino culture. But the prominence of Filipino workers at the frontlines of transnational domestic and residential labor – which reflects a “crisis of care” across the world, especially in the Global North (Hochschild 2000) – has a less happy face to it. Filipino female labor migration, patently, is not new. It dates back to the time of US colonization in the early 1900’s. However, ethno-nationally driven labor brokerage has grown exponentially since 1970’s, using gendered and racialized tropes to sell migrant carers as preferred domestic workers – not least because they are notoriously vulnerable, being frequently unprotected by national labor standards, and hence open to exploitation and abuse (Nasol and Francisco-Mernchavez 2021).
The Philippine state is not alone in relying heavily for its economic well-being and social reproduction on the underside of its ethno-national brand, its exported, culturally- certified labor power. To the contrary, it illuminates a much more widespread phenomenon; vide the cases of, among others, India and Pakistan, the nations of Central America, and much of West Africa. Nationality, inc., especially but not only among the poorer polities of the planet, is frequently Janus-faced. Nation-states seek to sell their commodity image and branded cultural products on one set of global markets while, simultaneously, augmenting their coffers from the remittances of subjects who alienate their ethno-nationally validated labor power on other, equally global markets elsewhere.
Coda
Ethnicity and nationality, inc., then – primed by their commodity-branding, by the logic of the market in goods and labor, and by prevailing political, material, and social rationalities – seem here to stay, be it as accomplished social facts, active aspirations or unrealized fantasies. So, too, are other modes of incorporation that replicate them in substance and/or spirit. To be sure, the temporalities and trajectories of the identity economy lead in all directions. They run from nation to ethnicity, ethnicity to nation, and both to many other species of imagined community: locality, region, religion, race, and so on. All alike are vested in the commodification of culture and the presumption of shared essence – manifest in material and immaterial property, in human capital and labor.
But the identity economy is itself a symptom, not a cause. So, too, are the forms of commodification and incorporation in which it is imbricated. The rise of that economy is a corollary of the rush to financialize life itself. And to financialize the different forms of sociality, solidarity, and affect, of cultural affinity and conscience collective, in which life invests itself. It scarcely needs saying any more that our bodies, our selves, our quotidian activities, our very being world are all under threat of being reduced to a greater or lesser cash value; this in times in which trust in most forms of civic community – beyond the most immediate “hot” ties of blood and soil, and perhaps faith – have been . As the contemporary world places ever more pressure on us to become entrepreneurs of ourselves, both individually (as “me”) and collectively (as “we”), are encouraged to see our human capital lying in an essentialized personhood mediated by, among other things, race and class, gender and generation, sexuality and ethnicity. That is not all we are, patently, not by a very long way. Nonetheless, in these, the early decades of the twenty-first century, identity increasingly appears as an economy – and, reciprocally, economy appears irreducibly caught up in identity.
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Preface: Lawfare
Lawfare, as both a concept and a species of political practice, has exploded over the past decades, from the late twentieth century into ours, the twenty-first. Google it, and 1,590,000 results come up in less than half a second.1 Despite this digital overload, a comprehensive history of the term is yet to be written, although many different points of origin, from the 1950s onward, are mentioned in the strikingly diffuse literature that has grown up around it.2 Lawfare proliferates definitions at a giddy rate, some of which cling to the metaphorical, while others hue close to the literal, the empirical, the tactical. Nor is this surprising. These differences reflect a plethora of ideological orientations, alike right and left – and, even more, a wide range of political, juridical, material, moral, and particularly military ends.
Of course, unnamed, the phenomenon has a deep past. To take just one example, a British missionary to colonial Southern Africa wrote, in 1887, that local chiefs believed the most fearsome weapons of “the English mode of warfare” to be “‘papers’ and agents and courts.” This, added the evangelist, “was said with contempt” (Mackenzie 1887,1:80). Indeed, alongside the more obviously violent instruments of colonization, the quotidian deployments of the law – of treaty and title, of proclamation and legislation, of contract and covenant, of judicial commissions and the like – introduced indigenous peoples everywhere to the structural violence inherent in the sovereign rule of Empire. In some parts of the colonial world, like West Africa and South Africa, it spawned indigenous cadres of lawyers, some of whom used their learned skills against ruling regimes (and against their proxies, among them, local chiefs and kings). Today lawfare has a name: a name whose different denotations and connotations, most of them hinting of menace, point to the illegitimate use of coercion under the licit sign of the jural. And much else besides.
The extent to which lawfare has entered into public discourse is staggering. In the USA, for instance, Lawfare – a blog put out by the Lawfare Institute of the Brookings Institution – claimed in 2015, in The New Lawfare, that it had 490,000 “users,” up 90% from the year before; those users, it said, included the Justice Department, the Pentagon, the Senate, the State Department, the CIA, and the White House.3 Three years earlier, Harvard Law Today called Lawfare “essential reading for leading thinkers on law and security”; indeed, “de rigueur for…[anyone] influential in the galactic scheme of things.”4 Of late, its content seems all over the map, both geographically and topically. On 21 July 2020,5 Lawfare offered material and commentary on, among other things, digital contact tracing, a US cyberspace report, a decision of the European Court of Justice, US-China technology policy, and national security news. It is not easy to establish, from this melange, what is intended to be specifically relevant to lawfare and what refers to the affairs of law at large. But the implicit stress on security does press itself on the roving eye.
Nor is Lawfare alone in this new American scholarly marketplace: the brand is widely shared and growing. Already in 2010, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law published a special edition, “Lawfare!” – note the exclamation – itself the yield of a “symposium [of] experts meeting to explore the concept” at Case Western Reserve University School of Law in September that year.6 Even more than Lawfare, the Brookings blog, this initiative was heavily devoted to the relationships among lawfare, war, and security. Not surprisingly, it included an essay by Charles J. Dunlap (2010), the doyen of this scholarly genealogy (see e.g. Dunlap 2001; also Kittrie 2016:4ff.); that is, the idea of law as a weapon of war, or, more precisely, a weapon of weak enemies “using legal principles dishonestly” to defeat the the USA (ironic emphasis added). This take on the concept – its negative association with legal efforts to counter the “righteous” conduct of war by the strong against those whom it would defeat – has had its critics. Among them, notably, are David Luban (2010) and Scott Horton (see also Jones 2016),7 who argues that lawfare used in this sense, specifically as propagated by the scholarly and policy progeny of General Dunlap, is a “dangerous game” and a threat to democracy (p.179). His point is echoed, implicitly, by the Democracy Fund, which supports another, different Lawfare Institute whose self- appointed mandate is the protection of the US constitution and its democratic order.8 Luban and Horton might have added to their critique of lawfare that American administrations have regularly stretched the limits of legality in acting against insurgent enemies, real or imagined; drone killings, water boarding, and other forms of torture, all regarded as repugnant in the civilized world, come to mind – all of them laundered by law to serve the purposes of US military “necessity.”
Lawfare, then, in its military-security oriented American sense, speaks as though it were primarily a weapon of the weak against the powerful – and ought to be understood by scholars and statespersons as such – while the powerful, states and global capital alike, often deploy it to their own ends against whomever they take to be a threat; in the case of the USA, this includes other foreign powers, among them China.9 A notable non-state example is something that calls itself the Lawfare Project (www.thelawfareproject.org/; www.the lawfare project.org/who-we-are). It is dedicated to “defend[ing] the civil and human rights of the pro-Israeli community”; also to combating “‘Islamist lawfare’…as a weapon of war “ and, more generally, to fighting against “militant Islam” or anyone anywhere who might act against Jews. Its work, say its New York based lawyers, “spans the globe.” To parody Hobbes, human existence today appears to have become a matter of “the law of all against all.” The judicialization of almost everything, even of life itself, makes that parody an uncomfortable reality.
But – and this is where the present volume appears as a critically important intervention on the subject – there are very different ways of understanding lawfare, as Craig Jones (2016; see above) points out. Their geopolitical source is, largely at least, the global south, most notably but not only, South Africa and Brazil. In South Africa, a growing scholarly literature is emerging (see e.g. Le Roux and Davis 2019; Corder and Hoexter 2017); it seeks to conceptualize the phenomenon in its various forms, historicize it, and analyze its effects on law and society. But more strikingly, the term now appears regularly in the national print and electronic media; it has become an colloquial usage, part of the public sociology of everyday life. What is more, its diffusion into public discourse makes plain the fact that, as an organic phenomenon, it has taken on many modalities, many means and ends, all the more so as a culture of rights and the juridification of politics has come to suffuse civil society – although, as Zanin, Teixeira, and Valim stress in this volume, “lawfare should not be confused with the judicialization of politics,” sui generis. It is a more specific, particular species of practice. Its two dominant modalities, however, contrast hegemonic lawfare, perpetrated by powerful states, corporations, non-governmental organizations, religious organizations, ethnic groups and the like, with insurgent lawfare, a Lilliputian form deployed by “little people” against those who oppress, exploit, or otherwise violate them, their rights, their property, their being-in-the world. The latter, self-evidently, is the less common form, and in tournaments of legal force, “little people” are less likely to prevail; there are many places, one scarcely need mention, where they have no access at all to the instruments of the law. Yet this is not always the case, and, where they do have access, they do not always lose – even against more powerful antagonists (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:26-31).
It is deep into hegemonic form that Lawfare: An Introduction takes us. Its authors, Cristiano Zanin Martins, Valeska Teixeira Zanin Martins, and Rafael Valim – at whose initiative a global southern Lawfare Institute (www.lawfareinstitute.com) was founded in São Paulo and launched in London in 2017 – of fer an unsparing, important treatment of the phenomenon. Their scholarship has a strong activist component, in major measure motivated by a commitment to the rule of both law and justice. It has also been honed by their legal struggle on behalf of former President Lula against the violent legal excesses of a right wing Brazilian regime that did everything it could to sentence him to political and social death. Part conceptual and analytic, part empirical – it discusses cases in the global north as well – the book treats lawfare not as a metaphor, but as an exceptionally complex species of political practice whose brute analogy to war explains a great deal; like war, “its purpose is the delegitimizing, harming, or annihilating an enemy – and not only in military contexts, but in a late modern world of the “law of all against all.” Those nineteenth-century African chiefs who understood law as “the English mode of warfare” were prescient. For them, too, lawfare was not a metaphor. It was, indeed, an instrument of annihilation. A hundred and forty years later, that “mode of warfare” is becoming planetary. Lawfare: A Introduction is an essential guide to its inner workings, its rationalities, its effects.
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Reflections on the Political Theology of Conflict
I.
Is war, civil or uncivil, simply politics by other, primarily necro-violent means? Or is there more to it than this suggests? Is politics simply war, civil or uncivil, by means of the suspension of immanent violence? The dialectical entanglement of politics and conflict, of which war is typically taken to be the epitomizing instance, is a Clausewitzian cliche as old as social thought itself. But it continues to raise theoretical questions of considerable moment, questions eternally momentous, all the more so as regimes across the planet go to war – by means military, material, social, juridical, carceral, architectural, even sonic1 – in violence against their own citizens, typically under the righteous sign of legitimate power. The essays in this volume address those theoretical questions in the sort of way that historians and anthropologists prefer: by situating them deep in the fabric of lived worlds, past and present, thus to play out a counterpoint between the concept and concrete, between the facts as we apprehend them and the analytic terms in which we make sense of them. They do so, moreover, with recourse to the kind of comparison favored by classical anthropology for purposes of theory building– exemplified most explicitly here perhaps by the chapters on “Constant Crisis” and “The Contingent State.”
A word, therefore, on comparison as a strategy in the production of knowledge.
According to legend, Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, the mythic anthropologist of the twentieth century, once said of his discipline, “[It has] only one method…, the comparative method – and that is impossible.” Evans-Pritchard never actually committed this to print (Needham 1975:365), but that has not stopped it from being cited ad infinitum for the best part of the past seventy years. If he did say it, he would probably have intended it to apply to history as well, since he viewed the two disciplines as more alike than different, both being truth-producing, “ideographic” arts rather than fanciful “nomothetic” sciences. His take on the impossibility of a comparative method was to be echoed by the likes of Edmund Leach (1961), much against the flow of a structural functionalist tradition that, after another of its founding fathers, A.R. Radcliffe- Brown (e.g.1951:15 et passim), went so far as to define anthropology as a “[branch of] comparative sociology.” The argument over comparison, in short, has a long history.2 It continues into the present, if in transmuted, rather more nuanced terms than those of the past (see e.g. Jensen 2011), terms that make clear the extent to which the value attributed to comparison depends on epistemic orientations to theory-work: on the ways in which we regard the social, the ontological, the human, the natural, the perspectival, the cultural – note, all adjectives rather than nouns. In this volume, however, resort to comparison lies in a more straightforward impulse. It is to seek the sorts of similarities and differences, the continuities and ruptures across both time and space – Scandinavia and Africa or Afghanistan, for instance, distantiated by both continents and centuries – that trouble old truisms and call for fresh perspectives; perspectives out of which theory does not arise in and of itself, but which seed the analytic grounds in which it may be cultivated. In short, the comparative gesture here does not set out to yield the species of nomothetic knowledge to which (some of) our anthropological forebears aspired. It does the opposite, unsettling received certainties in order to insist on new kinds of theory-work. We shall see, in due course, whether and precisely how it succeeds in this undertaking.
II.
Since I have broken into the content of this volume by invoking two of its dominant themes – theoretically, the dialectical counterpoint of politics and war, methodologically, the optic of space-time comparison – it makes sense to begin with the chapter that fuses them most closely: the one by Orning and Vigh on “constant crisis.” The argument of the piece, at its most general, arises out of a critique of orthodox modernist political theory. It makes two overarching claims, two theses, both of very broad philosophical, historiographic, and analytic reach, each addressed with reference to the similarities and dissimilarities between their focal cases, medieval Norway and contemporary Guinea-Bissau. The first has to do with the manner in which conflict – and, by extension, war – is conceptualized; specifically, with its ontological grounding in the nature of the human and the social, sui generis. The second relates to the evolution of political society; specifically, to the received, and still widely sustained presumption that world history follows a “natural,” teleological trajectory, a progress, from archaic, decentralized communities (“tribes”) toward the florescence of the modern, centralized state form and, by extension, the Westphalian model of sovereignty (see Afsah and Benham, infra).3 Let us take each in turn, noting that, for Orning and Vigh – and this is a critical, and cogent, dimension of their thesis – the two phenomena they interrogate, endemic conflict and the history of political society, exist in close counterpoint with each other, each constantly making and remaking the other, albeit in non-linear, sometime tensile ways.
For Orning and Vigh, conflict is not a “chaotic rupture of social order.” Neither is it a state of exception, let alone, following Durkheimian functionalism, symptomatic of pathological public disorder. It is an ordinary, endemic condition of being, and intrinsic, therefore, to political life, either immanently or manifestly. Shades here of the classic Simmelian tradition in sociology (Simmel 1903, 1955; Coser 1956); to wit, where Marx saw contradiction, especially class contradiction, to be the motor of history, Simmel treated conflict in much the same way, suggesting that a “harmonious [society]…is not only impossible empirically, but would also display no essential life-process and no stable structure” (1903:491). Similarly, for the African context, to which medieval Scandinavia is compared here, Max Gluckman’s Order and Rebellion (1963) famously held that, in “tribal” societies, conflict is endemic, the deus ex machina of political life. For Gluckman and his colleagues in the Manchester School of anthropology (see e.g. Turner 1957), “constant crisis,” if we take this term as a synonym for the immanence of conflict to political society, underlay social reproduction tout court. Indeed, there is a long tradition of comparative sociology and anthropology – again, note the evidentiary force of the comparative here – to substantiate Orning and Vigh’s thesis. And to support their effort to de-link conflict from crisis, a functionalist equation that takes the former to be the pathological precursor of the latter; indeed, to argue, with them, and with the likes of Simmel, Coser, Gluckman, and many others, that conflict does not negate or interrupt order but is a condition of its possibility, “an essential part of the social fabric…more structure than event.”4 To be sure, the “normalization” of crisis has become a burgeoning focus of social theory, recasting it less as an empirically verifiable state of social and economic, material and moral, political and ecological breakdown than as a more or less recursive (“constant”) narrative of rupture, of imminent apocalypse, against which to conjure calls to action. Hence Janet Roitman’s Anti-crisis (2013), a compelling reflection and extension of Reinhard Koselleck’s landmark Critique and Crisis (1988), the thrust of whose thesis, translated for present purposes, is that, far from being an objectively measurable objectifiable condition, (constant) crisis is a product of the age of Enlightenment critique; the critique, that is, which emerged, in a new age of political freedom, as bourgeois reason turned its censorious gaze on the history of the present and adjudged its defects and deformities to be, well, critical. What Orning and Vigh add to this rich discursive vein is to show that there is a much longer history to the sorts of “nervous politics” that underlie the apprehension and articulation of crisis. Or, at least, to the sense of precarity that inheres in the recursive presence of conflict in everyday political life.
It is one thing to accept that conflict is an endemic, recursive, perennial phenomenon, present even when absent; that it is productive of the practices and institutions of political society; that war, its most violent, most intensified manifestation, is less an aberration or an interruption than merely one end of a continuum wrought by what we may call “the dialectic of ordinary crisis,” the ongoing interplay, that is, of dis/order. But it is quite another thing to explain what motivates conflict and gives it its material and meaningful form. Or even where to look for an answer. In ontology? In historical sociology? In human psychology? In the contingency or conjunctural force of the chance event? In the structure of some or other duree? Somewhere else? Let us defer this thorny issue for a moment and turn to Orning and Vigh’s second thesis, which is also argued by Sigurdsson and Vigh (infra) in their essay, with reference to a very insightful analysis drawn from Iceland and Guinea-Bissau.5
This thesis relates to segmentary politics and the historical dynamics of de/centralization. Weberian theory in its various forms, it is commonplace to note, sees the evolution of political society as a teleological progress from less to more centralized, simpler to more complex systems: from archaic tribes ruled by “traditional” authority to nation-states governed by “rational-legal” authority. This is itself a corollary of the post- Enlightenment conception of modernity, which measures civilization, and its forms of rationality, in terms of ever greater functional refinement – in other words, complexity – such that the more highly developed a political or economic or legal order, the more specialized its structures and offices, its roles and institutions. As Peter Corning (2004:11) puts it, “political evolution has been inextricably linked to the synergies that have inspired the ‘progressive’ evolution of complex social systems.”6 Deviations from this trajectory, whether wrought by civil war or economic depression, by social pathology or cultural beliefs, are, concomitantly, taken to signal antimodernity, retrogress, or historical stasis. It hardly need be said any longer that, in this ideologically-fraught grand narrative, Africa – “our” contemporary, non-coeval, proto- medieval ancestors, so to speak – represents the archaic, the savage polarity of decentralized, stateless communities; Euro-America, by contrast, its modern, civilized endpoint. This is despite the fact that Africa, Hegel’s (1956) and Trevor-Roper’s (1965) putatively historyless continent, had a large number of elaborate empires a very long time ago; indeed, long before the medieval Europe it is supposed to resemble.
Orning and Vigh – again, with strong analytic support from Sigurdsson and Vigh (infra) – argue vigorously against this evolutionary orthodoxy, rejecting the notion that political history moves lineally from backward, anarchic, decentralized, “stateless” polities to modern, centralized ones, unless interrupted by dysfunctional reverses.7 Both medieval Norway and modern Guinea-Bissau, they show, contain within them both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies that manifest themselves, in various proportions to one another, at different times. Or, as Sigurdsson and Vigh stress, simultaneously for 12th-13th century Iceland and, once again, for contemporary Guinea- Bissau. These societies, despite their spatio-temporal distance from one another, share a number of critical characteristics: (i) highly labile political networks, (ii) dominated by patrons who condense power in themselves, more or less enduringly, by (iii) accumulating “friends” and followers – some of them kin, some of them neighbors, many of them clients – who (iv) offer their loyalty and labor in battle and/or domestic production in return for protection and other material benefits which, (v) if not given, may lead them to move on to other patrons. In the Icelandic case, Sigurdsson and Vigh add, conquest by a Norwegian king eventually tucked these patrimonial arrangements into a hierarchical structure, imposing a second order dialectic between centripetal monarchial power and the centrifugal pull of local patrons. The conclusion, nonetheless, is clear: the historical trajectory of political society in all these cases, the African, the Icelandic, and the Scandinavian, is neither unidirectional nor repetitively cyclical. Nor does it follow the sort of oscillating equilibrium classically described by Leach (1954) for Highland Burma,8 where the Shan state and the scattered, egalitarian, pattern of stateless gumlao communties are said to have represented the endpoints of a perennially plied continuum, moving first in one direction, then the other.
But what, then, propels these polities through time, giving them their manifest shape and internal construction? The answer, for Orning and Vigh, lies in their segmentary dynamics which, they say “are adaptive and problem solving phenomena”; or, to phrase this in less Durkheimean functionalist, more contemporary Foucauldian terms, productive of sociopolitical forms. These dynamics, dynamics of fission and fusion, yield shifting assemblages of power, albeit in different ways in medieval Scandinavia and contemporary Guinea-Bissau. What is common to them, however, is that, in both, political figures, seek to extend their power by consolidating and sustaining alliances, coalitions, and networks around themselves, which they seem best able to do under conditions of external threat; echoes here of the reliance on “crisis” as a source of political mobilization and centralization. But consolidation carries, within it, counter- tendencies toward factionalism, civil war, and decentralization; hence the immanence of conflict, even when it is absent. But, and this is critical to their thesist, decentralization does not mean disorder or breakdown. Decentralized polities, they insist, “are governed by their own logic.”
That said, Orning and Vigh appear to find the motor for (non-linear, non- evolutionary) swings in the labile shape of sociopolitical formations largely in political contingency. In a world whose social composition conduces to the constant need to manage relations, alliances, and affiliations – as is the case in medieval Norway9 and contemporary Guinea-Bissau – it is “situational practices” and “shifting assemblages,” they suggest, that produce and sustain centralization. Or subvert it by eroding concentrations of power. This is where their account differs from those of Leach (1954) in Burma or of ours in South Africa (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:Chapter 4), although more in degree than in kind. Both Leach and we argue that the counterpoint of centralization and decentralization is not merely the product of contingent political action and reaction; that it is motivated by structural contradictions inherent in both centralized and decentralized political orders, contradictions that express themselves simultaneously in economic, political, social, and ideological terms – thus to prime the sorts of contingent practices that sediment into (more or less de/centralized, more or less un/stable) political arrangements. A parenthesis here, however: where, for Leach, as noted above, this yields a pattern of oscillating equilibrium, we seek to show for Africa that dialectical systems may simultaneously evince cyclical and linear – though not necessarily teleological – trajectories through time and across space.
There is no need to dwell on the details here. The point is simply to underscore that there are different theoretical points of departure in addressing the history of political formations – and that, among them, Orning and Vigh have chosen one that focuses less on dialectics and the contradictions internal to those formations, more on dynamics and the contingency of situational, segmentary-driven practices. About such matters, reasonable minds may disagree. But one thing is significant: however we may approach its explanation, Orning and Vigh’s stress on the endemic coexistence of centralization and decentralization – as two moving tendencies rather than types of polity,10 each with its own internal logic, each with its capacity to yield to historical change – has resonances that far exceed the limits of medieval Norway or contemporary Africa. Hence, again, the methodological point of comparison. Those resonances, for example, are to be seen in the USA, whose political system inscribes a tension, fought perennially, between the same two tendencies: it expresses itself in recursive struggles between the federal administration and the states, between social democratic liberals and neoconservative libertarians; and, sometimes, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Nor is the US alone in this respect: in the UK, the devolutionary impulses of the “Celtic fringe” refuse to go away, all the more so as Brexit is about to tear Britain out of the European Union.
This returns us, finally, to the question I left hanging earlier. Given that we recognize its endemic pervasiveness and its historical productivity, how do we explain the immanence of conflict, its causes and consequences? Does the answer lie in ontology, in human psychology, or in sociology? In the intrinsic nature of the human or the exigencies of the political? Other essays in this volume, to which we shall return, answer this question in their own ways. For their part, Orning and Vigh suggest that, whatever its momentary motivations, conflict arises out of political sociology: out of segmentary processes that, in turn, sediment into political formations which may persist for longer or shorter duration before they, too, are transformed. The theoretical challenge, then, is to account for the relationship of the former to the latter, of process to formation. We have seen how Orning and Vigh address this relationship in non- teleological terms: power is accumulated (and, to a greater or lesser degree, centralized) in would-be sovereigns through “situational practices” directed at the creation of coalitions and alliances, i.e. “shifting assemblages,” which hold together until sundered by segmentary forces arising out of political competition between leaders. The resultant conflict, in turn, could, often did, give way to civil war, thus to reconfigure the political landscape, rendering it either more or less centralized, depending on historical circumstance. The point is similarly made in Sigurdsson and Vigh’s essay. For them, recall, patrimonial politics hinged on patrons who forged quite volatile networks of friends and followers (in other words, “shifting assemblages”) largely through the pragmatics of everyday exchange and reciprocity (in other words, “situational practices”), thus to concentrate power in themselves; power that, nonetheless, was relatively precarious and could, under adverse conditions, dissipate very quickly and recenter itself elsewhere.
But, self-evidently, form requires meaning: brute power, to congeal into a political formation – into sovereignty, if you will – demands a cultural scaffolding: an order of signs with reference to which it can authorize itself. It is by this means that “savage” warlords become sovereigns, that local patrons become potentates, that marauders become monarchs; in other words, that state formation proceeds. But where, exactly, do we look for the production of that order ot signs and meanings?
III.
One place is suggested by Orning and Rosén in their compelling analysis of Sverres Saga, a legend focused on Sverre Sigurdsson, King of Norway in the late twelve century, on his “mobilization of resources, and on his capacity for fighting competitors and ensuring dominance and respect among the population.” Superficially a story of war, one that has attracted a large scholarly literature, it is treated here not as an historical source but as a mandate, an ideological manifesto for contemporary kingship. By reading it in this way, Orning and Rosén avoid tired debates in historiography over the extent to which such mytho-epics may be plumbed for their facticity (see e.g. Orning 2015:1).11 Instead, they plumb the saga, very effectively, for the semiotic foundations of an emerging political formation: one which, by embracing a diverse population into an imagined civil society centered around a monarchy, creates the conditions of possibility for civil war – which, by definition, requires a sovereign citizenry within which violent conflict may occur.
Orning and Rosén isolate six focal elements in the saga which, they argue, anticipates Hobbes’s conception of the state, thereby constituting Sverre’s polity as proto-modern and Sverre himself as a “modern man.” Slightly paraphrased those elements are: a bounded territory under the sovereign; a “people,” envisaged as a political-legal community situated within that sovereign territory – and taxed, a theme extensively developed by Rosén and Vogt (see below); a “time of rule” that bespeaks permanence rather than cyclity; the sanction of transcendent authority, in which the monarch stands between God and man; a separation between kingship-as-office and king-as-person; and, subsuming it all, an order of centralized governance. In positing these elements as the founding ideological principles of a new form of political society, Orning and Rosén conclude, medieval Nordic myth lays out the terms of a species of sovereign state power whose echoes would last until the present day.
An anthropological note here. Ever since Malinowski (e.g. 1948) wrote of myth as a “charter,” it has been commonplace to read epics like the Sverres Saga for what they tell us about the ways in which the worlds whence they come are conceptualized – and, more importantly, justified as normative, authoritative orders. The six elements in this one are found fairly widely in the mythological narratives of African kingdoms as well. So, too, are some of the other themes in the Sverre legend, which, as we are told, liken him to the biblical King David: that his progress toward the kingship takes him from being a mercenary to a monarch, from a guerilla to the leader of a national army, from outlaw and unpopular usurper to the sovereign embodiment of the law (cf. also Rosén and Vogt, infra); that his passage is divinely inspired and foretold in dreams, themselves a vehicle of communication from the sacred to the secular, between which he becomes at once mediator and medium; that his career is marked by the apparently miraculous, not least in besting a much stronger contender-enemy; that, along the way he overcomes resistance, turning popular peasant protest into personal popularity by winning hearts and minds. And so on. All of these elements, in one or another variants, are integral tropes of the fantasy of sovereignty, even if the route to state formation and political authority, in practice, may be rather different. But what is most striking about
Sverre Saga, read by someone totally unfamiliar with it, is that relates, in mythic form, the substance of Orning and Vigh’s thesis on the dialectics of centralization and decentralization, representing them as endemically co-present tendencies at the core of political history: the centrifuge of forces pulling away from Sverre’s authority – forces that constantly threaten to undo all of the six elements on which that authority was erected – amount to a camera obscura of the established sovereign order over which he comes to rule. In short, the Saga may indeed inscribe a mandate, and a manifesto for a new sovereign polity. But it also carries within it notice of its own antithesis, thus to gesture toward the limits, and the potential unraveling, of sovereign power. Interestingly, parallel African mythologies often do much the same thing: they point darkly to the forces, particularly those unleashed when a ruler violates the normative expectations surrounding his office, that might end in his removal – and, in extremis, the dissolution of the body politic.
But is this a story of proto-modernity? And does Sverre emerge as a Modern Man? Or is it merely a generic story of the conditions of possibility of political society? Orning and Rosén, I believe, are justified in seeing the Sverre Saga as a foreshadowing of contemporary sovereignty. But that may be because it tells, in a Nordic medieval version, a story whose general lineaments are as old and as new as the ages, as much a story of Scandinavia as of indigenous Africa, past and present. And many other places besides. Which makes it no less compelling. Quite the opposite: read as they have read it, it gives cogent support to their dialectical, as opposed to a teleological, take on political history.
But, while Sverres Saga tells us about the production of kingship and political order, as mandate, it does not take us very far into the practical causes and effects of conflict, of war and peace. Or of the pragmatics of state formation. Which is where we move next.
IV.
Like Orning and Vigh, Afsah and Sigurdsson start out their essay on “Peace and War” – my paraphrase, with apologies to Tolstoy – by remarking on the constitutive oppisition at the core of theories of conflict and, concomitantly, of political society: “man as either quintessentially aggressive or pacific,” by nature selfish or social, primordial homo economicus or law-abiding homo juralis. And like Orning and Vigh, they transcend the dualism by exploring the conditions that give rise to conflict12 – which, again, they ascribe to social, material, ecological, and cultural determinations, rather than to ontology – and establish the means and the meanings through which its resolution, peace, may be produced. Peace, in turn, they remind us, may take a variety of forms, from the mere cessation of hostility to the attainment of the ‘good life’ built on stable institutions, social order, and a functioning state – although the last, the state, may itself be ambivalently regarded, as it is so widely today, being at once a guarantor of security and infrastructure and an incursion on individual and social freedom/s Indeed, Old Norse, as it happens, has three distinct, polysemic terms for peace, each of which connotes a quite different state of being in the world.
For present purposes, however, it is to conflict, and especially to war, that this essay draws our analytic attention. Here, again, a caveat. It is not always clear how Afsah and Sigurdsson differentiate between the two, at times appearing to treat conflict and war as similar species of practice separated only by scale, at times as phenomenally distinct modes of engagement. Of course, if, after Carl Schmitt (1996), politics is to be treated generically with reference to drawing the line between friend and enemy, there may well be a theoretical, or at least a philosophical, point in sustaining this ambiguity; vide, too, Achille Mbembe’s (2003) treatment of “necropolitics,” a concept that, in essence, treats all politics as war by other means, thereby to erase the difference between various kinds of social conflict over the exercise of power.13 However, anthropologically and historically-speaking, the two are self-evidently not the same, even in situations, like the ones described by Sigurdsson and Vigh for medieval Iceland and contemporary Guinea-Bissau, which may muddy surface distinctions between them.14
Like politics, in short, war is a specific genus of conflict – although war itself, patently, is not all of a kind. Indeed, Evans-Pritchard (1940), famously, and in unremarked resonance with Schmitt, argued that, in segmentary polities, the line between war and law expresses a basic principle in the social grammar of conflict, tout court: within a polity, conflict is, normatively at least, addressed by legal means, beyond its borders, by military confrontation. The line between a polity and its exteriors, in other words, demarcates the difference. When law gives way to war, or vice versa, that line is redrawn. In this logic, feud, being balanced killing, is the undecidable midground, which might either be contained by law or give way to war; civil war, by extension, is the process by which the balanced blood-letting of the feud generalizes, thus to rupture the body politc or, if one side wins, to contain hostilities by radically altering post-conflict politico-jural relations.
As this suggests, peace, in its various inflections, may stand in contrast to war – its pragmatic and poetic caesura – but it can and does coexist with conflict in many of its other modalities; among them, resort to legal actions, rhetorical and reputational battles for hearts and minds, the competitive extension of economic and social patronage, ritual and occult affray, and so on and on, depending, as Afsah and Sigurdsson observe, on prevailing cultural means and ends. (In many parts of precolonial and colonial Africa, for example, it was commonly said that “we marry our enemies,” the politics of affinity being a zone of social combat through which power, measured as “wealth in people,15 was often consolidated – and even kingdoms made; in this respect, see, on the rise of the Swazi state, Bonner 1982, and, more generally, on “wealth in people” in patrimonial societies, Sigurdsson and Vigh, infra). To complicate matters yet further, war itself may be subsumed into law: note the recent literature on “lawfare” in the USA and elsewhere, which argues that legal instruments may be weaponized, literally, to have some of the same effects as military encounters.16 The wider implication? That the presence or absence of war, civil or other, does not in itself negate the thesis that conflict is everywhere endemic to political society – productively, dialectically so – or that it may occur, in its many non-military forms, coevally with conventional warfare.
But what of war itself? Does it yield to an evolutionary trajectory, if not necessarily to a telos? To this question, Afsah and Sigurdsson appear to give an affirmative answer, basing it once more on a comparative methodology – which, in this instance, begins in Iceland in the 12th and 13th centuries and Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th. They suggest that, because Iceland was characterized by a small population, not much to fight over, rudimentary weapons, and a culture that stressed the resolution of differences, warfare was inherently restricted in scope. Similarly Afghanistan: although it had a centralized state and a monarch, its harsh terrain placed effective limits on interference alike from the outside world or from government; as a result, conflict there, too, was circumscribed, being confined to feuds – over land, water, honor, sexual impropriety, and the like – which, reminiscent of Gluckman’s (1963) “cycle of rebellion,” reaffirmed prevailing social arrangements (cf. also Afsah and Benham, infra). Afsah and Sigurdsson acknowledge that combat in stateless societies can be deadly, but suggest that the anatomy of these societies, the fact that they are founded on kinship and personal loyalties, would reduce enmity and the ferocity of fighting within them. And therefore both the body counts and social dislocation occasioned by outbreaks of violence. As weaponry grew in quantity and capacity for carnage, as war economies expanded, as states sought to act more intrusively, and as the population of such societies became more complex – in Afghanistan, more ethnically diverse – so war turned into something different in kind. From, as they put it, being “ritualistic” and constrained by spiritual and ethical taboos, only moderately destructive, socially and technologically contained, and inward looking, it became much more deadly, more highly weaponized, politically instrumentalized, and state-centric – often, moreover, involving external actors and new resources.
While this typology, to its credit, recognizes the simultaneous significance of sociological, cultural, and material determinations in structuring war, it does appear to suggest a radical opposition – and, by virtue of its citations, an evolutionary one – between types of military conflict: types, that is, that correspond, functionally, to simple (more or less decentralized) and complex (more or less centralized) societies. As an aside, one cannot but wonder where or how Sigurdsson and Vigh’s highly nuanced account of war in medieval Iceland, pre- and post the imposition of the Norwegian monarchy, and in contemporary Guinea-Bissau might fit into both the typology and its sociological correlates. But, to return to Afsah and Sigurdsson, they add, apparently after Turney-High (1991), that “it is war that imposes functional differentiation and thereby transformed stateless societies into states.” This raises two immediate issues. The first is logical: on one hand, we are told that the form of war follows from the form of society, but then, to close the circle, that the historical form of society follows from the form of war. Unless some dialectical process is posited to account for this, or for how it is that these two propositions coexist, it appears to be tautological. The second is theoretical: if in small scale societies conflict is by its nature socially reproductive, as we are told it is, when and under what conditions does it change its nature, break its own limits, and have the capacity to transform those stateless societies into states? Under external conditions of the sort that intervened in Afghanistan? If so, war is not the cause of the transformation at all, but the intervening force between (still to be specified) exogenous causes and an endogenous effect. But is the story not yet more complex? After all, how do we account for the celebrated rise of the Zulu military empire in a political ecology of dispersed clans under Tshaka in the early 19th century? This was a largely endogenous process that involved not just a technical invention and a new strategy of combat – the replacement of the conventional throwing spear with a stabbing assegai and an attack formation that mimicked the aesthetic of bovine horns – but, much more importantly, depended on the creation of a new social structure, new marital and gender arrangements, age organization, and the like. Or the conquest states of East Africa, like Rwanda-Burundi, which involved not just combat, but the superimposition of the Tutsi cattle economy over the Hutu agrarian economy, a dominant over a subordinate mode of production?
But these are not the only questions. While differences in the scale of warfare seem self-evident, are the diacritica associated with each of the two types – let’s call them “restricted” and “complex” for convenience – so clear? Take, for one thing, the notion that wars of restricted scale are “ritualistic” while complex, state-centric ones are “political” in their objectives. Modern, complex warfare hardly lacks ritual and religious dimensions. Indeed, Lévi-Strauss (1964:7f) opens his study of totemism – for Durkheim ([1912]1995:93), “the most primitive and simplest religion” – by juxtaposing the phenomenon among Native Americans, Brazilian Indians, and soldiers of the 42nd Division of the US army during World War I, for whom both identification with and a mystical connection to their totemic marker had almost all the characteristics of “tribal” belief systems.17 A century later, American fighting forces are widely reported to have been “pervasively Christianized” (Kaye 2008; Comaroff 2009:204); note, also, that the second Gulf War was styled by the Bush administration as a “crusade” on the part of a Christian nation against an enemy whose “fundamentalist” religion is widely portrayed as intrinsically violent and warmongering. Religion on the Battlefield (Hassner 2016), often in elaborately ritualized guise, it seems, is to be found in modern armies around the world. In short, to suggest that only “restricted” warfare is “ritualistic” rather disfigures the concept of ritual.
Likewise the contention that only “complex” wars, those between advanced states, are politically motivated. This, surely, presumes a Eurocentric notion of politics. After all, if we may return to Evans-Pritchard (1940) once more, segmentary combatwas the established mode of politics among the Nuer and people like them: it was the given means of not just of dealing with conflict, but also of regulating relations of power, property, and people among lineage corporations in a stateless society. What is more, fighting between them and the neighboring Dinka over water, animals, and pasture was, and remains, no less political for the two polities than is, say, contention over the US- Mexican border for the US and Mexico – involving, in both cases, the conditions of material survival and sovereign control over life and death. Similarly the epic biblical confrontation between David and Goliath. While their encounter may have been the most limited form of warfare imaginable, just two warriors each standing metonymically for a nation, this was also a battle for dominion over people and place, for theological hegemony, and for the kingship of a united Israel (see e.g. Alter 1999).
Nor is “restricted” warfare always constrained by the fact that it may range kin against each other. To the contrary, among decentralized polities Central Africa, for example, or the mid-size chiefdoms of Southern Africa, some of the most bitter, deadly struggles have long been between close members of office-holding lineages – even when, to the Eurocentric eye, there may not have been large stakes to fight over. These struggles, I stress again, are profoundly political: they decide access to high office, with all that goes with it in the form of land, labor, tribute, spiritual power, and social loyalties. In this respect, they echo those six mandated elements of kingship contained in the Sverres Saga (Orning and Rosén, infra); although Southern and Central African political theologies go further, perhaps, in insisting that, reminiscent of the Two Bodies of the King (Kantorowicz 1957), a living incumbent of chiefship is required to meet the demands of good government normatively required of his position – or face the consequences, typically removal, occasionally worse (Comaroff e.g. 1978). Historically- speaking, civic conflicts in these polities, occasionally very violent and usually led by competing candidates for office, have not always ended in the social reproduction of the communities concerned. Often over the past centuries, in fact, they have led to social rupture and division, although, in the short run, the splintering groups have tended to replicate the internal structure of the parent polity. Not always, though: sometimes polities have fragmented in the process, only becoming more or less centralized again when political, economic, and other conditions are conducive to the possibility.
Mention here of the stakes involved in conflict of various kinds raises a critical question, only glancingly addressed thus far: what is the role of materialities, specifically of property, in theorizing civil war, political life, the dynamics of centralization and decentralization, and, by extension, processes of state-formation?
V.
This is a matter cogently taken up by Rosén and Vogt in their essay on civil war and private ownership across Norway and Denmark during the High Middle Ages. That epoch, they argue, saw the genesis of a mutually constitutive connection between, on one hand, political sovereignty and civil war, and, on the other, the institution of property; the possession of assets being a necessary condition for any regime of taxes, duties, and levies – on which, in turn, the sustenance of sovereign military force depends. The equation is straightforward: political sovereignty offers the protection of persons and their belongings in return for the legal right to exact the fiscus on which to found the exercise of a monopoly over legitimate violence. Herein, for Rosén and Vigh, lies a materialist, rather than a philosophical or ontological, grounding for the social contract, and, with it “the political-legal bedrock of the European nation state project”; a project, Afsah and Benham (infra; below) remark, that has rarely been wholly fulfilled in modern history; indeed, one whose aspiration has almost always exceeded its realization
Returning to Sverres Saga, which they read for different but complementary purposes than do Orning and Rosén (see above), Rosén and Vogt isolate five ways in which property enters into the calculus of sovereignty, political coercion, and war: via taxation, appropriation and confiscation, plunder, burning, and gift-giving. Each of these species of action is shown to be a mode of mobilizing property relations for sovereign ends, sometimes under the everyday conditions of governance, sometimes in moments of suspension and/or emergency: burning and confiscation, for example, are two means of punishing non-compliant populations; gift-giving, an exchange of loyal recognition for sovereign grace and favor. The general principle, here, is that “sovereignty overrides private ownership,” yet holds the key to the sovereign-subject relationship. However, one axial distinction among these species of political action is especially critical: that between tax and plunder, with, one would think, appropriation as a point of mediation between them. For Rosén and Vogt, as I have already intimated, taxes were indispensable to civil war not just because they financed the fighting. They could also be its contingent cause, the spark that ignites combat and everything that follows from it. From this vantage, “the practice of taxation in the Nordic civil wars was a ‘propeller’ of the institution of private property.” But if the latter bespoke a transaction between sovereign ruler and propertied subject, it was rendered meaningful by contrast to plunder, a mode of brute extraction through conquest, with no exchange value, no transaction whatever. Here lies the difference. Tax is the prerogative of kings, plunder that of warlords. Or of organized crime, as Charles Tilly (1985) might have put it, either prior to, or in refusal of, the establishment of political dominion over the vanquished. Plunder negates property, tax recognizes, even constitutes, it. As the midpoint between them, appropriation, like plunder, is non-transactional, but unlike it, is typically justified under the sign of the common good.
Herein, then, lies Rosén and Vogt’s materialist understanding of the social contract, its embeddedness in the dialectical relationship between political sovereignty and war. It is, as I have said, a compelling, aesthetically-tight formulation. And one that raises a number of testing and important – but, I emphasize, friendly – theoretical questions about all of the terms on which it is founded.
The first, and perhaps most obvious, is whether there is more to the social contract, and to the relationship between sovereign and subject than the material exchange of tax (and loyalty) for the protection of private property – and, by extension, the person of its owners? What, for example, of the sacred dimensions of that relationship? Recall that the mediation between the monarch and God was one of the clauses of the mandate of kingship that Orning and Vigh read from the Sverres Saga. The numinous dimensions of sovereignty, in many political cultures, are inseparable from the material; the presumption being that material life depended on the beneficence of deities with whom only a monarch could intercede. And what of the law? In many polities, too, after the Mosaic model, the ruler is thought of as a law giver, and if not that, its sovereign protector and its ultimate justice. Take Southern African chiefs and kings, by way of comparison. As noted earlier, they, too, have historically engaged in warfare, not all of it “ritualistic” or limited in its deadly violence; slaves and subjects, cattle and domestic goods, and women and their children were also often spoils of battle. The forms of polity over which they ruled, for the most part, had neither tax regimes, nor monetary systems, nor private ownership, sensu stricto. Land was allocated under usufruct arrangements and other property was held not privately but by social groupings; this even in societies whose kinship systems, like those of medieval Scandinavia, tended, because of their endogamous marriage practices, toward the bilateral (see above). Here the social contract lay in a more generalized relationship. Subjects, the ruler’s “wealth in people,” gave him their loyalty and tribute, a transactional offering like tax – it took the form of agricultural produce, bovine stock, and/or labor – yet said to be voluntary in substance.18 Reciprocally, monarchs brought the law. Among Tswana, for example, the chief was known as setlhaba molao, “the summit/apex of the law,” and by the singular noun for the (plural) name of the polity embodied by his office;19 note, in this respect, the point made by Afsah and Benham (infra), that, “throughout Islamic state theory…the establishment of justice [was] the ruler’s chief task.” But that is not all: Tswana sovereigns were responsible for the accomplishment of bogosi yo bontle (“good/beautiful government), the falling of rain, ancestral benefaction, economic well-being, and the conduct of war, in many cases, fought by age regiments.20 When a ruler did not deliver, when he violated his side of the transactional relationship either by acting autocratically or failing to meet the demands of bogosi yo bontle, he stood in danger of replacement, despite holding his position by ascription; as this suggests, there were mechanisms for the public evaluation of the performance of an incumbent, measured against the prescribed ideals of his office.21 All this, incidentally, contrasts starkly with Afghanistan (Afshah and Benham, infra; also Afsah and Sigurdsson, above), where the king, a primus inter pares, interfered almost not at all with his subjects: there was “not any constructive desire to establish governance, let alone statehood,” and kingship was “defined negatively by not encroaching…”
The point? That the conduct of war and its relationship to sovereignty depends on the prevailing political economy, its ideological scaffolding, and its social constitution. In some contexts, taxation may be the transactional currency of that relationship, in others not. In sum, it may be a sufficient basis of the bond between sovereign and subjects – and where it is, it does seem to privilege private property — but it is not anecessary one. What is more, taking Rosèn and Vogt’s point a step further, their very suggestive proposition – that it is in the articulation between sovereignty, war, taxation, and private property that the social contract and the modern nation state project finds its genesis – could perhaps also do with a friendly amendment: in as much as the transactional relationship between sovereign protection and private property may provide the material core around which the social contract comes to be woven, that contract appears to complete itself as it takes on the other dimensions of sovereignty – the numinous, the juridical, the governmental – thus to conjure into being the two bodies of the king. And the shift, as it were, from warlord to monarch, clients to citizens. Perhaps it also matters to those citizens what sovereigns use their taxes for, as many rulers have found, to their cost and to their advantage, over the course of history.
A second question here, one that relates back to several other of the essays discussed above. Rosèn and Vogt offer an exceptionally sensitive account of the immanent tensions involved in the transactional relationship between sovereigns and subjects, basically, in balancing the equation between extraction and protection; although, following what I have just said, it is possible that this equation is mediated by the other collective values that a ruler bestows on his followers. When that equation turns from the positive to the negative, when the extractive dimension of the relationship comes to be seen as too burdensome, might it result in a counter-pressure toward decentralization? Under what conditions? In other words, does the triangulation of sovereignty, taxation, and private property at the core of the social contract, as Rosèn and Vogt have argued, also contain within it the dialectical interplay of centralization and decentralization? The contemporary version of this in Anglo-America, interestingly, has been the erosion of the “administrative state” as citizens prove ever more reluctant to pay taxes (e.g. Monbiot 2018:3). If that argument can be persuasively made – and extended to take into the equation the other (numinous, legal, governmental) dimensions of sovereignty — it would make a strong case for seeing civil war in the Nordic High Middle Ages as an optic through which to theorize the material and sociocultural origins of the modern social contract, and the European nation state project, in new and productive ways.
One final question in this respect, however. When, precisely, does protest and resistance against a ruler become a civil war? When is civil war both civil and war? The delicate balance of which Rosèn and Vogt speak may indeed be upset when sovereign extraction is felt to be unduly onerous, sparking tax revolts and mass uprisings. But this is not yet civil war. The latter, it seems, requires an opponent, an aspirant or extant sovereign, around whom opposition may congeal, thus to bring into force the segmentary principle of which Orning and Vigh write. And, with it, an aspiration to make, and/or sustain, a state. Which brings us to the last piece of our comparative conversation.
VI.
How, then, does the aspiration to state-making – however it may be mandated in the mythic or the cultural – actually become “the” state in its accomplished form? And what form, exactly? These are the questions that lie behind Afsah and Benham’s very insightful essay. It begins with a salutary reminder that “the” state, past and present, is not a singular, definite article; that it varies widely over space and time, rarely conforming, as we noted earlier, to the Westphalian model; that reading European political history with hindsight appears to give it “an ‘inevitable’ trajectory,” a false “inner logic.” Nonetheless, they add, this model has “become universalized.” And so it remains. Which, in turn, conduces to two problems. The most immediate is that it makes “political life in many non-Western societies” – bluntly, the majority of societies across the world – “only imperfectly comprehensible through the analytical lenses developed for the rational, bureaucratic state”; lenses, they might have added, that, by continuing to posit “tradition” and “modernity” as binary ends of an imagined historical arc, still pervade academic political science.
The second, equally serious problem is that this Eurocentric ideal, itself unevenly realized in the global north, has become the measure against which the “success” of states elsewhere is commonly assessed. It is a conceit that devalues forms of political life – wrought, especially, in the complex interplay of governance, capital, and civil society – that diverge from those of the West; this even as, in the Age of Authoritarian Populism, northern polities appear to becoming ever more like, well, some African and Latin American ones. It is also the case that relatively dysfunctional “modern” states, such as the US,22 which resemble the Westphalian original more in their outer form than in their inner workings, are not said to have failed; this notwithstanding, among many other things, rampant corporate capture, the politicization of the judiciary and the bureaucracy, an increasingly unaccountable, profiteering executive, widespread police violence, perennial breaches of human rights, a fiscus in irrecoverable debt, and a legislature that repeatedly refuses to answer to the will of the majority. Which begs the question: for whom precisely are all or any of these polities successes or failures? African states, like a number of states in the north, “succeed” brilliantly for some, yet not for the vast majority. Another name for this is inequality. As we all know, the election of the most controversial, wealthiest president in US history was engineered by appeal to the deterioration of effective government and living standards for “ordinary” Americans; echoes, here, of Ariana Huffington’s Third World America (2010). It is an appeal that currently resonates with many millions of voters, for whom Washington D.C. has indeed failed. Miserably.
What are often referred to as “failed states,” in short, may actually be something else, a distinctive formation, albeit one with many variants, uneven proportions, and multiple trajectories: one in which sovereign authority is not founded, materially, on a scaffolding of fiscal taxation and other regulatory frameworks, but on rentier governance – wherein, more or less coercively, capital (internal, external or both, criminal or legal)23 finances a ruling regime, its treasury and its means of violence, in return for the “right” to profit, especially from enclaved extraction, illicit commodities, and services no longer provided by the state. In this dispensation, moreover, the latter, the state, sustains the forms of a centralized political structure but, willingly or not, devolves many of itsfunctions, and a major measure of control over its economy, to the private sector;24 hence the coexistence here of centralization and decentralization – each a condition of each other’s possibility – at times in collaboration, at times in tensile complementarity, at times in violent conflict.
It is this sort of formation that, with two caveats, Afsah and Benham describe for contemporary Afghanistan, by contrast to Scandinavia from the 12th century onward; the caveats being that, in their specific case, they stress organized criminal capital and see it as undermining governmental authority rather than engaging government in a Faustian bargain. Either way, it is a formation that, in all its variants, lacks the institutional bases of settled social and economic order and, consequently, is prone to “constant crisis” and immanent civil war (cf. Orning and Vigh, infra); all the more so since it yields high returns on investment in “shadow economies” that blur the line between the lawful and the unlawful. As Afsah and Benham themselves put it, “criminal elements capture elements of the state, but also state organs begin to engage in criminal extraction,” to the extent, and here they quote Cockayne and Pfister (2008:14), that it becomes “hard to distinguish…what is legal and what is criminal… [since] government entities and criminal organizations come to resemble each other functionally, providing similar services – especially protection – financed by similar rents and taxation arrangements.” This is true not just of criminal organizations. It applies, too, to those transnational corporations that have become ever more state-like as they strike similarly Faustian bargains with ruling regimes – and diffuse their operations into the same or similarly il/licit “shadows” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2016). These sorts of arrangements, founded on rentier governance and shadow economies, are found, as I have already intimated, in several parts of the antipodes, including Guinea-Bissau (see above), whose quite comparable inner workings under existing global conditions, to close another circle, may also account for the dialectics of de/centralization there. And in other contexts as well, not all of them in the global south.
Afsah and Benham’s very useful, synoptic genealogy of Euro-modernist etatism makes a number of other critically important points. Among them, for example, is the observation, echoed in some of the other chapters as well, that the counterpoint of centralization and decentralization with which we have been so centrally concerned here occurs not only in respect of polities at large, but also at different levels within them, an insight eminently worth pursuing further.25 For present purposes, however, I should like to end with the most general conclusion that arises from their comparative account. It has important implications for the political history of the present. And, like all good history, also of the future.
While Afsah and Benham admonish against adducing an “inner logic” from the history of the longue duree, preferring to stress contingency over teleology, they do appear to derive a political health warning from the broad sweep of their account. Although Afghanistan is an extreme, even singular example of countries caught up in “constant conflict,” its predicament, they offer, suggests that “the implications for state- formation in contemporary times are dire.” Their overarching point is that the genesis of stable political order in medieval Scandinavia, itself a harbinger the Euro-modernist polity, arose with the steady production of local wealth, which necessitated a legitimate state structure that, in return for taxation, afforded security and protection, the rule of law, and an established regulatory framework (i.e. a proto-bureaucracy); therein lay a mutually beneficial contract between sovereign and subject. But in recent times, they argue, this arrangement has “broken down” in those many places characterized by endemic conflict and – my gloss, not theirs – misnamed “failed states,” which evince some or all of the diacritica listed a moment ago: “shadowy,” more or less criminal economies founded on extraction and illicit commodity production, augmented by privatized violence; the involvement of non-local actors in those economies; the entanglement of the state and capital, both operating across the murky lines of the il/legal; the displacement of taxation regimes, along with the administrative and juridical functions of state, by rentier government; the evacuation of the social contract and, with it, the bases of order.
Some theorists might go further than Afsah and Benham in arguing that these are symptoms of a growing tendency in global political life, a tendency made manifest in the currently rising tide of rightwing movements and antiliberalism, neo-nationalism and xenophobic racism, de-democratization and authoritarian populism; that, far from “getting to Denmark” – the phrase invoked in describing how Europe arrived at modern liberal democracy – much of the planet may actually be edging, uneasily and unevenly, toward Afghanistan or Guinea-Bissau. Or, if not quite there, given that the arc of history is always laced with the unexpected, then to other places palpably distant from medieval Scandinavia and the political future it once heralded; this as states almost everywhere, again by ideological choice, capture, or compulsion, increasingly outsource their operations, including the means of violence. Which feeds yet further the perennial, capricious play of centralization and decentralization, etatism and devolution, at the heart of political economies as they enter headlong into the history of the here-and- now. It is a history, ironically, that, in its latest twists and turns, makes “modern” liberal democracy look fairly “traditional,” a figment of the nostalgic imagination, when read against the emerging “new normal” at the front ends of the global present. And then, again, perhaps not.
VII.
A brief concluding note to round off this reflection.
By recourse to the comparative method they share, the foregoing chapters, a collective tour de force if I may say, accomplish handsomely what their authors set out to do: to trouble old, yet enduring truisms about the nature of political life and civil war, conflict and state-making, order and disorder, thus to open up new avenues of theory- work for the social sciences. They establish, once and for all, the poverty of teleological theory at the core of so much etatist history; the allusion here being to E.P. Thompson’s Poverty of Theory, a magisterial critique of another species of over-determined teleology.26 In so doing, they show that the pathway from medieval Scandinavia, through Guinea-Bissau and Afghanistan, to the global present is anything but a March toward Modernity, an inevitable progress from decentralized to ever more centralized, ever more functionally specialized, ever more techno-rational political systems. Not only do they demonstrate that conflict, at once endemic and imminent, is neither pathological nor dysfunctional. They also make plain why it has to be read as a primal, intrinsic motor of all political life. And of the social, economic, and cultural practices in terms of which political life manifests itself. What is more, they explain how it is that those contrapuntal, segmentary tendencies of centralization and decentralization at the dialectical core of social existence – note again, tendencies not types, nor stages in an evolutionary arc – are co-present throughout the history of the longue duree, each conditioning the other, albeit in different proportions and in different ways.
They remain co-present in the contemporary moment, a historical conjuncture in which more and more states, increasingly corporate in motivation and disposition, appear to be devolving their own operations progressively – or retrogressively, depending on ideological orientation – into the private sector; this either by virtue of political theology or so-called “state capture” or a mix of both. It is also a conjuncture in which ruling regimes enter new forms of un/civil war: wars against those they deem terrorists and criminals and illegal immigrants, against drugs and poverty and those embraced in their clutches, against “others” marked by race and religion – wars fought, at once by militarized police and by governmental technologies, using means of violence sometimes slow and sometimes implosive, sometimes confrontational and sometimes capillary. This comparative exercise, in sum, has yielded a number of very broad, very compelling lessons about the past, the present, and the possible futures of a world well beyond medieval Scandinavia, Iceland, Guinea-Bissau, or Afghanistan, indeed a world now often referred to, tellingly, as “neo-medieval.”
-

After Labor
Concern has been steadily mounting, across the globe, that a “world without jobs” is fast approaching. And that wage labor as we know it is disappearing. “Work,” it seems, “is not working, for ever more people, in ever more ways.”1 But there is little agreement about how, why, where, or in what measure this is actually happening. Or what might take the place of mass employment as the grounding of economy and society in the foreseeable future. Why do we – scholars, citizens, politicians, people at large – seem congenitally unable to think beyond a universe founded on wage labor, both proletarian and white collar? After all, capital has always striven to free itself of a dependency on that labor to the greatest extent possible – to the degree, as it is now becoming more commonplace to note, that wage work has been an ideal rather than an actuality for many, perhaps most, people at most times across the planet.
The implication? That paid employment has always been more or less precarious, always a living anachronism, always threatened by the possibility of erasure. Why, then, has it remained so central both to popular and to theoretical understandings, alike left and right, of life under capitalism (Denning 2010), all the more so amidst anxieties about its immanent demise? To be sure, work has been said to “dominate and pervade everyday life – especially in Britain and the US – more completely than at any time in recent history.”2 So what exactly is unique about the contemporary moment? As we fail to conceptualize an age after labor, we seem ever more to be haunted by nightmares of our own redundancy, by surreal images of a world in which value is produced by other means – or by workers who are simultaneously living-and-dead, present-and-absent, human-and-nonhuman: zombies, robots, mutant species, and other assorted humanoids. What does this tell us about the afterlife of homo faber?
Might we enrich our answers to these critical questions by moving beyond the Archimedean limits of Euro-America? The latter may be the source, and the ultimate horizon, of so much of our theory-work on capital and labor. But, we shall argue, a more comprehensive history of global capitalism must embrace the enduring entailment of the Euromodern world in its antipodean others – the source, after all, of much of its animating energies as well as labor power in its most precarious, most devalued, most dehumanized forms. It is a history, we shall see, whose southern past the north appears to be re-living in this, as in so many other, respects (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Beck 2000).3
II.
In the late 1999’s, we wrote about the sudden appearance of zombies in the South African popular imagination (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). While it was foreshadowed in local figures of predatory evil, this specter took late modern shape at a particular moment, a moment when the already fragile infrastructure of black male working life had been threatened, quite abruptly, by a radically shrinking labor market. There was a cruel irony here: wage work, or at least a large proportion of it, was made superfluous at just the time when decolonization was supposed to transform the racial capitalism of apartheid into a social order that promised fair pay and a better life for all. The “transition to democracy” coincided here with a worldwide wave of neoliberal reform: reversing the high point, in the global north, of state-centered social welfare, regulation, and redistribution after World War 2 (see below), propertied elites sought to reassert their class interests against the rising power of labor on a planetary scale by pushing to liberalize capital, to open up free trade, to give the market full reign, and to champion the private sector (Harvey 2005).
As part of a rising hegemony, Western development agencies, under the so- called Washington Consensus, pressured governments in debt-strapped, emerging economies to outsource the functions of state, to open their borders to corporate capital, to accede to its demand for flexible, minimally protected labor, and to encourage processes of financialization – with dire consequences for most ordinary citizens (see e.g. Stiglitz 2002). In the upshot, post-authoritarian societies like South Africa experienced democratization as an ambiguous mix of enfranchisement and dispossession, simultaneous in- and exclusion; this as their new administrations sought to square liberal political freedom with the effects of mandatory laissez faire. In point of fact, global processes of deregulation had been gaining traction in such contexts since the 1970’s. But they accelerated appreciably in the 1990’s, when the dramatic decline in employment was accompanied by a surge of so-called “jobless growth.” As The Economist put it of South Africa, “the economy is doing nicely – but at least one person in three is out of work.”4
It was then that public talk about the intervention of an army of surrogate workers became audible: talk of an “invasion” of abject migrants (makwerekwere) who would take on any degrading job, and, more tentatively and even more abjectly, of ghostly beings raised from the dead, who toiled in a nocturnal economy for their avaricious owners. Zombies (dithotsela; also diphoko), specters that lacked speech and the animating qualities of personhood, bodied forth in popular rhetoric, song, media, even magistrate’s courts and industrial conflicts (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a). They bore testimony to an occult force that appeared to exist “by sucking living labor” (Marx 1976:342; see also Carver 1998:14).5
Thus it was that wage work, at once valorized and rendered superfluous by the changing shape of the industrial economy, returned again in phantasmic guise, making inchoate threats to the established bases of human existence. Zombies, of course, have been a ghostly presence, a “profane illumination” (Benjamin 1978:179) one might say, throughout the long history capitalist modernity. Their historic associations with the predations of slavery and colonial extraction migrated into the US vernacular, probably during the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1943, where they were transmogrified by the insatiable culture industry into the “scientifically-reanimated, undead”: cannibalistic consumers – rather than ravaged producers – who became versatile figurations, across the world, for various sorts of late modern monstrosity, predation, and horror.6 Not least, in this regard, were the rapacious effects of ever more arcane modes of accumulation; hence, in recent times, the circulating tropes of “voodoo economics,” “zombie banks,” and “zombie companies” (Kane 1992; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012:40);7 South Africa’s deeply indebted electrical supplier, Eskom, said to be “the world’s largest power utlility,” has been described as a “state-owned zombie apocalypse.”8 Adds Aditya Chakrabortty from the UK, “The undead maraud around our popular culture,” but “[they are] also us. Britain in 2018 is stalked by zombie ideas, zombie politicians, zombie institutions.”9
As the product of ghoulish greed, the zombie bears uncanny resemblance to other recent figures of proletarian undoing, like the genetically engineered “equisapiens” of Boots Riley’s luminous allegory of capitalist alchemy, Sorry to Bother You (2018). The human component of this hybrid species is not left to chance: it is black and male. In writing about racial capitalism Hylton White (n.d.), draws on Moishe Postone’s (1980) argument about anti-semitism and the figuration of the abstract power of capital: if Jews appear as the “racial body of money,” as “will without labor,” blacks are “labor without will…labour-in-itself: a brute biological force in need of mastery.” Riley’s “horse people” are the artifacts of WorryFree, a corporation that, in the words of critic Jordan Miner, is in the business of creating “creatures that are only valuable because of the extra labor” – the horse power – “they can produce.” Robots, he adds, “aren’t as efficient.”10 Shades here of the “animal spirits” that have appeared, variously, in theorizing the essence of man under capitalism, from Marx (1976:229ff), who associated them with the force that “heightens the efficiency” of the worker, to Keynes (1936:161-2), who saw them as “[the worker’s] spontaneous urge to action.”
The robot, patently, is the other great nemesis of homo faber in these times. A recent study, tellingly titled, “‘You’re Fired,’ Says the Robot,” describes the prevalence, in the American workplace, of “technophobia,” an anxiety-related syndrome centered on new technologies, most notably robotics and artificial intelligence (McClure 2018). Similarly anguished is a 2018 op-ed essay by the Vice Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg.11 It features a prominent picture of the “first humanoid robot in South Africa” (Figure 1): the deceptively endearing “Pepper” has a map of Africa on its white metallic chest12 and the national colors around its neck. It stares intently into the eyes of its creator, a brown man, who apprehensively returns its gaze. Labor locks eyes with its mechanical replacement, whose artful, anthropomorphic form seems surplus to functional requirement. Like the zombie, the android, a robot in human form, re- presents, as a dialectical image, the figure of proletarian laborer both in the honor in the breach. Even as it is being rendered redundant, we remain entrapped in the fetishistic logic of wage work. It appears perpetually to come back, in archetypal human form, if only an agonistic measure of its effacement: an “estranged recognition” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2011:149), perhaps, of the fact that “it is capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed in direct relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working population…” (Marx 1976:782; Denning 2010).
III.
In one of his last essays, “Critical Theory and the Historical Transformations of Capitalist Modernity,” Moishe Postone (2017a:148ff) reiterated his long-standing disagreement with what he termed “traditional Marxism.” It concerned the role of labor under capitalism. Rather than the means by which humans transform nature to their purposes at all times and in all places, labor, he insisted, is a “form of mediation” peculiar to capitalism (p.149). Put more plainly, capitalism is an historical formation, one “in which labor” – proletarian labor, that is – is the iconic source of surplus value, and “the primary constituter of the social world” (Jay 1993:183). Marx’s own project, added Postone, was a critique of proletarian labor aimed not at its realization in unalienated, meliorated guise, but at its total overcoming. Read from this vantage, capitalism could not be transcended by way of a more equitable distribution of the fruits of industrial manufacture or by the collective seizure, on the part of workers, of surplus value. Both would leave existing relations of production intact.13 They would leave intact, too, the so-called “treadmill” that drives forward the process of accumulation and, hence, the contradiction at the core of capitalist modernity: that, with technological and other advances, proletarian labor becomes “increasingly anachronistic” (Postone 2017b:50), increasingly irrelevant to the generation of wealth or to brute productivity – and yet it remains essential to the economic system of which it is a constitutive part. And to its endogenous sense of how value is to be created.
Thus it is that, historically, capitalism “ceaselessly generates what is ‘new,’ while regenerating what is the ‘same’,” moving beyond the necessity of proletarian labor while continuing to assert its indispensability (2017b:48,50). While it may produce the possibility, out of its own internal workings, of giving way to other kinds of social system, to different social formations, it seems systematically to prevent their realization. Thus it is, too – and here we add our own gloss on Postone’s statement of the contradiction, and its anticipation in Marx’s concern with the deskilling, devaluation, and demise of labor14 – that, as wage work comes under threat, it typically returns in refigured, re-imagined, dehumanized forms. Among them, as we note in our opening fragments, are the specters of the zombie, the android, the mutant: the laborer who requires no pay, whose toil is pure surplus value, who has the bodily form of a human worker but none of the needs. A ghostly figure of human labor under erasure this, one that simultaneously retains its original meaning, says Derrida, yet is “rub[bed] out” (Anderson 2012:4; cf. Derrida 1976:61; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:290). But the zombie, an illumination from the suppressed underside of the long story of capitalism, also makes evident something more: the invisible story of disenfranchised, racialized labor born of historic plunder and imperial dispossession. Labor ab initio deemed deskilled, devauled, archaic. And frequently, wageless.
IV.
Modern conceptions of work, whatever their provenance, tend toward the metaphysical. However prosaic and utilitarian their definition of material production, they draw on the suppressed theological roots of liberal thought that takes labor to be a defining attribute of human being, the capacity that permits the species to separate itself from nature, acquire property, make history, and reach for the gods. Marx (1976:127) was not alone in seeing labor as the essence of an “exclusively human” ability, a mindful practice. But, like Postone after him (above, p.0), he also insisted that, in its prevailing proletarian form, it is the unique product of capitalism; an historical paradox this, given, as we noted earlier, that capital, under the sign of producing value, has always sought to free itself from its dependency on wage work by alienating and discounting it, by maximizing the surplus extracted from it, by quite literally dehumanizing it.
This paradoxical proposition – that labor is essential to the ontology of human life under capitalism, and yet is undone, at the same time, by the conditions under which it has evolved – is critical to any understanding of the history of the past in the present. And to contemporary debates about the nature of work and its futures.15 Not only was wage employment, for the most part, a consequence of dispossession but, in the world at large, wagelessness has always been more common than paid labor (e.g. Denning 2010; Broad 2014:214). That said, Romantics early and late have insisted on a vision of toil that transcends instrumental function: it is artful, ethical, redemptive (Hughes 2007). Liberal and Marxist thinkers, too, have evinced a sense of its intrinsically moral aspect (Weeks 2011:12; Muehlebach 2012). But they have tended to sustain a more restricted, normative conception of work as a materially productive, remunerated activity. Feminists, by contrast, see this normative conception as irredeemably masculinist, blind to the essential productivity of unpaid domesticity and its contribution to the generation of wealth (Federici 1975; Coulson et al 1975; Beneria 1981).16 Scholars of racial capitalism (Wolpe 1972; Alexander 1979; Robinson 1983), moreover, have shown how the structural articulation of gender and race has served to devalue and debase black labor by shifting the costs of its reproduction onto women, often rural women, operating mainly outside the market economy. Not only does this suggest that waged and unwaged toil are interdependent and alike socially necessary; hence the coining of hybrids like “peasantariat” (e.g. Parson 1984) or “semi-proletariat” (e.g. Wallerstein 1976; Broad 2014:220f.) to describe colonial class formations. It also makes plain that modes of defining and classifying occupations are always ideological, mobilizing intersecting axes of difference (race, gender, age, civic status) and types of activity (skilled/unskilled, kin/market-based, affectivel/material) to prioritize, rationalize, and discriminate in the name of accumulation (cf. Bear et al 2015; Yanagisako 2012). Self-evidently, capital, colonial and metropolitan, past and present, has always been more diverse in its modes of operation than hegemonic narratives are wont to suggest. But the more general point is that the history of capitalism has reenacted, perennially if in different manifestations, the contradiction at its core, asserting the centrality of labor while discounting and disappearing much of it.
As we shall see, the proliferation of occupations, skills, and kinds of compensation attendant on the restructuring of capitalist production from the late twentieth century onward plays out much the same contradiction, the same counterpoint, in a different key. The labile routines, flexible (even “zero hour”) contracts, and deregulated modes of accumulation that comprise lives and livelihoods in the contemporary moment (Bear et al 2015; Calvão 2016) – their uncertainties, their precarities, their ruptured temporalities – may seem unprecedented. In the age of the “gig” economy, of rampant financialization, rising self-employment, and the waning market for formal jobs, they may appear to have emancipatory possibilities. Hence their celebration by “post-workists” (Frase 2016) seeking a “[life] beyond the colonizing power” of formal employment (Frayne 2015:67) and the daily grind of “bullshit jobs” (Graeber 2013); also by those who claim that more fluid, expansive, “intelligent” forms of labor might provide the basis for a new commons (Hardt and Negri 2004:109), a new “grammar of the multitude” (Virno 2004). But much of what look to be new sorts of occupation actually go back a long way – often unmarked, unremarked, unremunerated – only to return in the here-and-now in renamed, rebranded guise. The “flexibility” and “casualization” associated with the neoliberal moment merely puts a techno-economistic gloss – in the ostensible cause of efficiency, growth, profit, even creative disruption – on forms of job insecurity, piece work, un- and underemployment, corporate-friendly contracts, and the scanting of labor protections integral to the longue duree of capitalism (cf. Broad 2000); this notwithstanding its talk of the dignity of the wage. Take, for instance, emergent categories like “affective” and “immaterial” work. They may acknowledge feminist demands for recognition of the unwaged, largely invisible labor of domesticity, nurture, and social reproduction. But they also tend to sentimentalize the very nature of that labor. Which is deeply ironic, since it is precisely their sentimentalization – their “elevation” to the decommodified domain of the “priceless” – that has been key, historically, to the feminization of womens’ activities, their literal de-valuation, and their confinement to the “sacred” space of the home (Fedirici 2008; Bear et al 2015). What remains clear, however, is that being recognized as bona fide labor has not ensured that they are remunerated at anything remotely commensurate to the value they produce or the time invested in them.
In summary, then, what all this points to is a convergence of two processes whose entailment underlies the latest chapter in the unfolding relationship between capital and labor, its intrinsic contradiction, its working out in the “new” global economy – and our reading of this moment, both in theory and in its historical realization. One of those processes lies in the morphing planetary geography of labor. By recommissioning the structures of colonial extraction, corporate capital – facilitated by (more or less “captured”) states almost everywhere – has (re)constructed commodity chains in such a way as to decentralize, distanciate, fragment, and render mobile its sites of operation (cf. Broad 2014). [See brands and their surfeits; Nakassis] Already in the 1970’s, this was anticipated in what was called the New International Division of Labor (NIDL; Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980), a concept criticized at the time for ignoring the persistence of older metropolitan structures and their interpolation with emergent forms, but recently recuperated to take account of the intensified implications of techno-advanced, translocal manufacture on a global scale (Starosta 2016).17 As a result, what had hitherto been proletarian jobs in the nations of the north have migrated to southern reaches: postcolonial worlds erected on a mix of occasional (“flexible”?) contract work in the formal economy and various modes of value production in so-called informal economies (Hart 1973). Much of this activity, past and present, has been centered on the household and its surrounds, on extended (sometimes corporate) kin ties and feminized labor,18 on close social and religious networks, and on locality; a good deal of it involves petty commodity production, micro-marketing, “putting out” for industry elsewhere, and “penny capitalism” of one or another sort (e.g. Tax 1953), often implicating creative credit management (James 2015; see below). These are worlds in which material deficit imposes on individuals and families, especially women, an onus for multifaceted survival strategies. Such strategies, perforce, often include taking the cheapest, least protected, most insecure, most casualized employment made available by capital under conditions of maximal deregulation; this while simultaneously operating in the labile, flexi-environment of the informal sector. Here, at the frontier of “the race to the bottom,” both corporate capital and its rogue competitors – think blood diamonds, coltan, endangered species, narco-commerce – experiment most violently in their efforts to extract optimal returns. Consequently, fabrication tends to be reduced to its most elemental, to one operation in the commodity chain, paid minimally for each productive act and for nothing else. And likely to move on abruptly to another elsewhere, with little notice, if conditions favor doing so. As these sites open up for business, jobs and makeshift infrastructure migrate to them, putting northern labor in competition with, and displaced by, their more abject, more vulnerable antipodean counterparts.
This is where the second process enters the mis-en-scene. As the attenuation of the proletarian labor market has made itself felt in the global north – with our caveat that its economies have never been anywhere near fully proletarianized, always heavily dependent on transient workers and unpaid, feminized toil – there has arisen a lively facsimile of the informal sectors of the south. This creeping informalization, as formal work gives way to diverse kinds of casualization, is partly subsumed by the growing “gig” economy, partly by other “economies” to be described in detail later: such things as the sharing economy, the caring economy, the artisanal economy, the intimate economy (below, p.000ff.). These are neither proletarian nor regularly waged. They depend on deploying the vitalism of the human body, its capacities and it properties, as micro-capital that may be put to the purposes of accumulation: activity centered on the household and, more generally, the private sphere, thus to erase, ever more, the line between sites of production and reproduction, male and female, work and home, normatively separated with the rise of industrialization. And so the infrastructure and accoutrements of the domestic domain – cars, rooms, private computers, smartphones, the kitchen table – are turned into assets that yield disposable income, as may be hospitality and intimacy itself. And so everything becomes capital, in prospect or in practice, everything the object of financialization, including, maybe most of all, the neoliberal self. Of course, many of these tendencies toward the informal, broadly conceived, have always existed, more or less overtly if unmarked, in northern contexts as well. What has changed is their proportionate relation, in labor demographics, to formal wage employment, alike proletarian and white collar, domestic and migrant; their recognition as a measurably significant part of material, social, psychic, and ethical life; and, as we shall see, their partial reappropriation, through various sorts of so-called “platform” business, back into the formal sector that spun them off. In all these respects, patently, the global north is coming more and more to resemble the global south (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012), living its history, so to speak, as Secondhand Time (Alexievich 2017). Another instance this, perhaps, of Rancière’s (1999:113) claim that, under prevailing global conditions, we live the suppressed secrets of modernity shamelessly, unhidden; in this instance, to restate it in slightly different terms, the contradiction that modern capitalism is erected on the elemental necesssity of labor which, at the same time, it seeks constantly to devalue and displace to the point of redundancy.
This contradiction – played out recursively over the past centuries and across the entire world – is also manifesting itself, with rising intensity, in the experiential and political fabric of everyday life in the present continuous.
Thus, on one hand, almost everywhere, public discourse continues to speak as though a waged population remains the norm. Labor as the fons et origo of economy and society – the prime basis of social value, the first and last source of human dignity, the core of material and civic existence – has lost little of its idealized purpose. “Ironically, while the ‘age of work’ seems to have come to an end,” observe Cedarström and Fleming (2012) in Dead Man Working, a darkly provocative reflection on the zeitgeist of our times, “working has assumed a total presence – a ‘worker’s society’ in the worst sense of the term – where everyone finds themselves obsessed with it.”19 If anything, growing anxieties about its precariousness have heightened its psychic centrality: a compulsive preoccupation with employment drives mainstream political manifestos, visions of education, and criteria of self-worth.20 Even the finance sector, where value is accumulated by means and instruments of ever greater abstraction – this by distancing itself as far as possible from manufacture and service, indeed from the commodity economy tout court, to which it denies any anchorage or point of reference – harks back to the language of labor: it refers to what it traffics in as “products,” as though they were commodities yielded by honest toil, to the profits it yields as “earnings,” and to itself as an “industry.”
This is hardly surprising: “Work is the primary means by which individuals are integrated not only into the economic system, but also into the social, political, and familial modes of cooperation,” notes Kathi Weeks (2011:8). It is ”a basic obligation of citizenship.” And, ethically if not legally, also something akin to a right. Hence statesmen everywhere speak in the promissory language of “bringing back jobs” in received proletarian and white collar guise; Donald Trump’s notorious fixation, in 2016 and after, on reviving the largely defunct US coal industry is symptomatic of the nagging impasse between the idealization of blue collar production in America and its cynical decommissioning – its simultaneous presence and ever more blatant erasure under pressures of profitability.21 For their part, voting publics respond by taking promises of job creation seriously; low unemployment is regularly invoked as both an objective and an achievable measure of effective governance – even if a job does not yield an income, a matter to which we shall return.
To be sure, whatever form it may take, however it may metamorphose, wage labor endures, with almost uncanny persistence, as the perceived basis of species-being. In the USA, notes Derek Thompson (2015), “[i]ndustriousness has served as America’s unofficial religion since its founding. The sanctity and prominence of work lie at the heart of the country’s politics, economics, and social interactions.” Similarly in Britain, argues Joanna Biggs (2015:264), where labor gives life meaning “when religion, party politics and community fall away.”22 And not only in these places. Employment, a.k.a. “decent jobs” for its citizenry, is typically portrayed as the most critical function of the nation-state everywhere; hence the millennial prominence, in government manifestos – left and right, north and south, east and west – of putting “the people” back to work, despite the repeated failure to do so.23 Cyril Ramaphosa put it front and center in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) to South Africa on 7 February 2019: “jobs” was the single most repeated word, used thirty-three times in a seventy-nine minute speech.24 Every previous president, in every SONA since 1994, has done the same thing, if not with the same stress-by-repetition.
On the other side of the contradiction is the rising apprehension that “the end of work” is already at hand, never again to be reversed. Almost quarter of a century ago, economist Jeremy Rifkin’s The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era (1995) echoed that apprehension. It argued that “worldwide unemployment would increase as information technology eliminated tens of millions of jobs in the manufacturing, agricultural and service sectors,” with a “devastating impact…on blue-collar, retail and wholesale employees.” It also resonated with the fear that “the workplace would become ever more stressful,”25 that corporate managers and knowledge workers might benefit but that the middle class would shrink, many of its jobs, perhaps proportionally more than proletarian ones, replaced by screens and machines.26 Rifkin’s thesis was greeted with a measure of scholarly skepticism (see e.g. Caffentzis 1998 [2001]), among other things for its techno-determinism, for over-reading the effects on the job market of the factors he had identified while ignoring others, and for relying on a simplistic, normative conception of employment. But, like Richard Sennett’s (1998) account of changes in the structure of work-and-career at the hands of “corporate re- engineering”27 under the “new capitalism” – also Ulrich Beck’s bleak “destandardization of work” (1992) and the demise of “work society” (2000) – it captured a dawning American nightmare.
That nightmare is epitomized by a spreading rustbelt, where the flight of industry, the technicization of what remains, and the concomitant eclipse of labor have become iconic of economic, social, cultural breakdown. Hence the terrifying images, conjured up by the culture industry, sociological futurism, and social media, of haunted, cityscapes bereft of the assembly line and the punch card, dotted with derelict stores, boarded up schools, delapidated homes, and abandoned churches, criss-crossed by windswept, empty streets. In sum, a cadaver left behind as industrial capital moves away and what Soules (2014) has termed “zombie urbanism” takes its place, turning decay into revenant assets through financialization and the displacement of production to yet more precarious, exploitable elsewheres across the planet.
The anxiety that work is becoming anachronistic, that is under terminal threat, is anything but new. Like the fact of widespread wagelessness, it is as old as modernity itself. In the late sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth 1 refused to patent a knitting machine because it imperilled the jobs of “young maidens who obtain their daily bread” by handcraft;28 in the early 1800’s, English Luddites attacked the stocking frames that looked to devalue their skill and their livelihoods (Thomis 1970); and, in 1862, grain shovelers in the Port of New York demanded protection against the onslaught of elevators that rendered them redundant (Spann 2002:140). Similarly almost a century later: “Austerity policies, low wages and automation…were also of concern in the 1950s,” a Union Perspective Blog noted in 2015. But the head of the United Auto Worker’s Union, confronted by robots newly placed on the vehicle production line, had his own rather laconic response. He is said to have asked Henry Ford II, in 1952, “Henry how are you going to get [those] robots to buy your cars?”29
Economists might speak of the “Luddite fallacy,” insisting that, rather than displacing skills or destroying occupations, new technologies merely realign existing divisions of labor, often to positive effect. But this hardly accounts for the social and existential dislocation – and the capricious trade off of lives, careers, and futures – occasioned by the radical reorganization of work. Witness, most recently, the felt effects across the world of casualization, outsourcing, and mechanization; of the polarization of employment markets within and between nations; and of the reduced quality of so many waged jobs. Hence Cedarström and Fleming’s “dead man working”; it evokes precisely the sort of fear-inducing zombification with which we began. In what Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) call the Second Machine Age, artificial intelligence and “brilliant” machines have changed the name of the game: they have colonized even some of the most creative, most intuitive professions – from medical diagnostics through criminal detection to musical composition – formerly assumed to be reserved for “humans only” (Thompson 2015). Recall here the fate of horses, once regarded as second only to homo sapiens in their indispensability to divers forms of material production.30 No species, it seems, has the cunning, capacities, or nobility to be secure from the relentless quest for better, more worry-free returns on labor time. Remember, here, those indentured equisapiens from the spooked imagination of Boots Riley (above, p.00): corporate capital might yet find the body of the post-worker, in whole or in part, more lucrative than a mechanical alternative.
Since the 1990s, as our opening fragment suggests, angst about the impact on wage labor of the knowledge economy and of robotics – as well as other AI and techno-developments – has taken on hyperbolic proportions. A widely publicized report by McKinsey Global Institute (2017),31 for example, based on research in forty-six countries, has it that 800m jobs will be lost to robotics alone by 2030; less cited is a passage (p.3) adding that this does not necessarily mean mass unemployment, allowing for shifts in population demography – and, as Thompson (2015) notes for Youngstown, Ohio, iconic in the US for the end of work, the move of the unwaged into other forms of occupation. In equally agitated vein, an Oxford University study forecast, in 2013, that “machines might soon be able to perform half of all US jobs” (ibid.). The anxieties provoked by all this, filtered through social media, are especially acute at the already marginal edges of industrial workforces: among people of color, immigrants, those with limited knowledge capital and digital literacy. Thus a lively, all female YouTube discussion on “Black People vs. Robots,” curated in January 2019 by Data for Black Lives.32 Debate dwelled on the particular vulnerability of African American women, whose gains in personal service jobs since the 1970’s – in sales, transit, bank- telling – have proved especially vulnerable to automation. No sooner had these gains been realized, it was noted, than they were lost again; shades here of the newly enfranchised black South African laborers after apartheid, recognized and reduced to redundancy in a single stoke. The value calculations that drive investments in new technologies seldom factor in the social or material costs of human disposability, let alone their psychic effects. Typically, the loss of work – like falling wages and reduced pensions and other benefits33 – is blamed instead on the inefficiency, or the “unreasonable” wage demands, of the workers themselves.
The precarity of workers at the margins, their structural impermanence in the formal economy, links them to other historically mobile wage laborers: migrants, currently the object of moral panic pumped, in many quarters, by neonationalist politics. Alike in Europe (see e.g. Pijpers 2006), the USA and UK,34 and the global south (e.g. Gordon 2014), these “transients” are popularly thought to seize the jobs of deserving citizens – despite the fact that they are essential to the reproduction of national economies, as Brexit Britain, circa 2019, is fast discovering.35 [Lack of labor is actuall driving emchaniszation in the US, where it is held by ovserers to be less efiicient than human labor. Primed in large part by nostalgic imaginings of homogenous, sovereign political communities, secured against the negative effects of global laissez-faire, these visions evoke a world that never really existed: societies composed of gainfully working members, each according to their abilities. But metropolitan Europe and the US – indeed, capitalist econom ies from their beginnings, as Cedric Robinson (1983) so carefully showed – have always rested on their seamy, suppressed undersides: their shadowy, unfree workers (Calvão 2016), a mass of paupers, in a technical sense, sans permanent jobs or independent means of subsistence (cf. Jones 1971).These were not enslaved and colonized populations abroad, but the semi-indentured back home, usually people from the edges of empire who have been kept well away from sites of secure, formal employment in both industrial and post-industrial times. [as one observer from agribusinee recently obsreved: farm work/food production across the world is in the hands of immigrants.] This reinfoces yet again the fact that it is leess naked economic determinism, but the complex ideological cast of modern captalism that is a key driver: capital strives to free itself from human labor by non-human productive means. The obsession with robotics…even where humans are more efficient…[NYT)
How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers – addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?
How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers –addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?
How, then, is the contradiction at the core of the relationship between capital and labor – in both its theoretical/historical and its experiential/pragmatic registers – addressed and resolved in the these, our troubled times? Why do received forms of work, rendered anachronistic, redundant, and/or surplus to contem porary requirement, nonetheless remain their elemental (“ontological”?) significance at the core of late modern capitalism? And why do they keep returning, often in metamorphosed, sometimes spectral, guise. How, more broadly, are we to think an anthropology of labor under capitalism for the twenty-first century?
V.
A historical parenthesis at this point, albeit a rather important one. It comes again courtesy of Moishe Postone (2017b:40-1) who, following Piketty (2014) and others, reminds us that the history of inequality, over the past century, has not been linear. To the contrary, it has fluctuated visibly, in consonance with other economic indices. After a period of deepening inequality in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there came a period, around the middle of the twentieth, during which it was sharply reduced, only to be followed by a reversal from the early 1970s: a resurgent, ever more extreme skewing of wealth and political power. This trajectory, he notes, was global, its three periods marked by a distinctive trend in average rates of economic growth: relatively low and slow in the first, more than doubled in the second, and decreasing palpably in the third. The pattern is clear: both growth and per capita GDP rose, especially in the middle phase, as wages increased and levels of inequality dropped; conversely, both have waned as wages have stagnated and levels of inequality risen. Since 1973, Postone adds, standards of living have fallen observably for the majority of Americans – and, he might have added, for many across the planet, both north and south – as income gaps have widened. That optimal second period, post-World War 2, is the one associated, in the archaeology of capital, with state- centric Fordism, underpinned by a Keynesian ideology of economic management. And by sanguine imaginings, at least partly realized, of a world of full employment, workers’ rights, and comprehensive social welfare, extending to the protection of citizens against joblessness, homelessness, ill-health, and indigence.
A quick look at employment figures in this respect – figures that, as we shall argue, are to be read as much for what they hide as for what they reveal – is indicative. In the USA, for example, joblessness in the second half of the 1960s, when much more of the active population was counted than is the case today, never rose higher than 3.8%. In the early years of the Reagan administration, as the Fordist era gave way to the neoliberal, it rose above 8%; 10.8% in 1983.36 What is more, the African- American unemployment rate appears to have been roughly double that of whites for for those late twentieth-century decades.37 Likewise the UK, whose figures for 1945 to 1971 varied between 1.2% and 2.7%; it averaged a slightly higher 3.12% between 1952 and 1967. In 1983, under Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party, by sharp contrast, it reached a startling 12.9% (McGaughey 2018:5) – with blacks even more likely to suffer joblessness than in the US at the time.38 This is all the more striking in light of the fact that, in 1978, the Conservatives had unleashed an election slogan, designed by admen Saatchi and Saatchi, that proclaimed “Labour Isn’t Working.”39
Tellingly, the history of trade unions in the USA and UK echo these trends, although it is as well to keep in mind that a large proportion of the population working without formal wages has never been included in them (Denning 2010). In 1954, 34.8% of all American wage and salary workers were union members, a figure that went down to 20.1% in 1983, soon after the attack on labor by the Reagan administration. It now stands at 11.3%.40 The power of the British unions, at its height in the 1960s and 1970s, was radically eroded during the 1980s at the behest of rising Thatcherism and its corporate backing. As archives released thirty years later show, it set out quite explicitly to “crush” these politically influential organizations41 – although revisionist conservative media prefer to attribute their demise to globalization,42 while another, more technical, view has it that the high inflation of the 1970s created a superfluity of labor that greatly weakened them.43 The ironies here are unmistakeable.
If growth and GDP are taken to be significant indices of material well-being, both the US and the UK were at their healthiest during times when jobless rates were at their lowest, labor unions at their strongest, and inequality at its most attenuated; times, also, when the vision prevailed of an international order of new “developing” nations, aspiring to forge liberal modern economies and democratic societies in the aftermath of colonialism. Of course, there are any number of contingencies that affect fluctuations in employment and inequality, among them inflationary cycles, recessionary pressures, market “corrections,” and political upheavals. But our point does not lie in the specificity of these numbers. It lies in the fact that they speak, if tacitly, to a historical consciousness that recalls the post-W orld War 2 decades, in respect of national economies and societies, in a particular way.
Those post-World War 2 decades – the coming-of-age years of the still powerful “baby boomer” generation – sustains a paradigmatic presence in the sociological imagination. This, in many ways, was the moment at which liberal democratic modernity, as retrospectively remembered, reached its zenith: at which talk of the Great Society, in its various global northern variants, appeared most persuasive; at which poverty and insecurity seemed to recede in the face of the norm of lifelong employment; at which the struggle for civil rights and the recognition of difference, most notably in respect of race and gender, looked like it had made permanent advances. But hiding in the plain sight, just off camera, there lurked persisting forms of exclusion, inequity, and injustice: in the impoverished black ghettos of US inner cities, for example, and the bleak estates of Northern Ireland; in the poorer reaches of immigrant England, the target of xenophobic outbreaks; in the violent theaters of neoimperial warfare in Southeast Asia and in innumerable other places. Recall that Martin Luther King was in Memphis, in early 1968 before his assassination, in support of a strike of African American sanitation workers, protesting their deadly dangerous, poorly paid, minimally protected jobs.
Some saw, in these sites of immiseration, near and far, the possibility of popular struggle against the structures of capitalist power across the West; to wit, C. Wright Mills’ “Letter to the New Left” in New Left Review of September-October, 1960, and the subsequent rise of mass socialist and black power movements. But the superpowers themselves were avidly pursuing Cold War proxy battles for control over nominally independent postcolonial nations, the latter increasingly peripheralized by those setting the terms of international commerce; at the same time, those powers also took pains to crush dissent at home, ascribing it to “foreign interference” attendant on Cold War antagonisms and/or to communist provocateurs. And all the while, in tandem, there was a mounting resurgence of conservative forces that decried any kind of welfare state regime – in the US, New Deal liberalism, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, labor driven socialism – as an unfortunate and dangerous development that undermined individual freedom and pointed towards totalitarianism (Goldwater 1960). And so ended the post-war period, with its aspirations to etatist social democracy. From the 1970’s onward, as we noted earlier, those conservative forces were to capture the political center and push ideological orthodoxy in a contrary direction. Capital responded to the gains made by organized labor and civil rights activism in Euro-America in the mid-twentieth century by devising new free trade mechanisms under a “program of global restructuring…oriented toward altering labor markets and the organization of work” (Broad 2014:215). And so the long, dialectical struggle between capital and labor entered its latest chapter: wherever it could, the former, embodied in an ever more powerful corporate sector, pushed for privatization, deregulation, labor-free financialization, reduced legal liability, and policies of austerity at home – and reconfigured, flexibilized, outsourced production abroad, to places where workers were more abject and less protected.
Still, for all the reverses that have occurred since, the postwar conjuncture continues, in critical respects, to be the normative template against which social expectations tend to be measured, even as the gap between those expectations and reality grows with every passing year. And so it remains plausible to speak, in the future perfect tense, of mass employment and the possibility of secure salaried work for all (see below, p.00) – undergirded by a modernist mythos honed in an age in which labor seemed to approach the most equitable pact possible with capital, in which, as we have said, the liberal idyll appeared within reach. It is a mythos that lingers even as, for more and more people, its promise disappears into the realm of the unreachable, the unreal. And gradually, especially for rising generations, the unthinkable.
Which takes us back into realities present, into the present continuous now almost fifty years in the making, a neo-present without a foreseeable denouement.
VI.
Simply put, how, then, are we to read the planetary geography of labor, its empirical lineaments, in the here-and-now? Has work really come to the “end” of (its) history? Self-evidently, many people do still toil in the manufacturing and service sectors of both the global north and the global south. And, with ongoing shifts in the ecology of production, new jobs are created. The low official unemployment figures for most Euro-American nation-states – which we are soon to deconstruct – make that much plain, even if they do not speak to the nature of those jobs.
[[In the global south, long home to a thoroughly racialized colonial capitalism, extractive industries, factories, and sweatshops continue to hire people who have no alternative but to be exploited, people whose labor has never been remotely “free,” whose effective indenture has displaced a rising proportion of Euro-American wage earners. As this reminds us, the imbrication of the south and the north in this respect – long written into the deep history of empire – has intensified since the 1970s with the space-time compression of the global economy (Harvey 1990); specifically, with the increasing velocity and brutality with which capital has taken to extracting labor, land, and resources (mostly) from debt-strapped postcolonies rendered accessible and vulnerable by so-called “structural adjustment.” Hence, for example, the indivisible the link, as Fedirici (2008) notes, between the post-industrial computer worker in Silicone Valley and the pauperized digger of coltan, essential to digital technology, in war-torn Eastern Congo; and, more extemely, the disemployed US garment worker and the lowly child laborer in Cambodia.44 ]]
At the same time, as we have intimated, the mechanization, modularization, and dispersal of wage work has served its devaluation by allowing production to be parceled out, geographically: in the age of the “planetary labor market,” observes Mark Graham,45 “millions of jobs can now be done from almost anywhere on Earth,” even at the level of the micro-task. enabling firms to take advantage of what has been called “the global reserve army” on a “per-click” rather than a per-person basis. Employees in remote reaches of rural Central Africa may work in some of the twenty-first century’s most advanced tech industries, carrying out routine tasks – like basic data recognition and classification – that machines cannot yet perform. These workers are components of an overall process about which they are told practically nothing, including the fact that the very tasks they are performing are likely soon to render them and their kind redundant. And while, in theory, the flexibility of geographies of production could distribute the opportunity to work across the world, in practice, says Graham, they exert “huge downward pressure on wages and working conditions” everywhere; Kaushik Basu (2016:3) – just one voice in a fast growing literature aptly dubbed “Globalization, Labor Markets, and Inequality” (Dadush and Shaw 2012a; a) – refers to this effect of planetary articulation as “labor-linking.” It is no accident, in this light, that the make-shift, open-air factory described by Graham is located deep in the Central African countryside: long histories of violent extraction in colonial contexts, as we have already intimated, have always been the underside of the Euromodernist romance of free labor. Postcolonial work often survives, in the age when labor migrates with less friction than people,46 because African workers are often still cheaper than machines. Even quite highly skilled workers, as Nina Sylvanus (n.d.) shows, may remain less costly to capital than their robotic replacement – as they are in African ports,47 where, unlike in, say, Hamburg or Rotterdam, crane operators have not been substituted by nonhuman “solutions.” At least not for now.
In other words, partly because of the globalization and reorganization of productive work, partly because of the way that capital has come to redefine its relationship to labor and technology, secure, emplaced employment in advanced industrial societies – the sort on which, ideologically at least, livelihoods, social benefits, long-term career trajectories, and local communities were thought to be founded until fin de siècle – has given way everywhere, north and south, to a quite different regime. Whether more or less people are actually “employed” (whatever that may mean today),48 whether there are more or less jobs (however they may be defined), the corporate capture of the state, financialization and deregulation, the rising hegemony of the market, and the re-articulation of the planetary economy have led to an ever greater proportion of received forms of work likely to migrate abruptly to more exploitable sites, to be mechanized, to be casualized, to be reduced to piecemeal (“per unit” or “per click”) operations – or, in the case of extractive industries, to be displaced when its products, like diamonds, are made by new synthetic means.49 Either way, as it has become commonplace to note, real remuneration under the new regime tends either to be largely static or liable to downward pressure,50 open to wage theft by corporations or labor brokers, and perennially uncertain.51 Which compels workers, class and race and gender and generation notwithstanding, to become entrepreneurs- or contractors-of-the-self: responsibilized, risk-bearing persons, possessed of their species being-as-capital; neoliberal subjects, that is, of the sort characterized by Foucault in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) – and as anticipated in the post-Keynesian economics epitomized early on by Gary Becker’s Human Capital (1964).
For those who find it difficult to remain in the conventional workforce, or to find a “traditional” job – rising numbers across the world, uncounted in national statistics (see below), have stopped trying – the pursuit of alternate means of securing an income presents itself as a matter of brute survival. This may be especially so in the global south, although it is increasingly true of the north as well; after all, “of those who are employed, 60% world-wide are in temporary, part-time or short-term work with falling wages” (Fouksman 2017a:28). In South Africa, for example, according to The Economist, a startling 870,000 formal sector jobs were lost in 2009 alone despite solid economic growth;52 this in the wake of the severe attrition of the labor market over the longer run (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Yet wageless black South Africans, around 27% of whom are officially unemployed,53 have found creative ways to husband Money from Nothing (James 2015), and, even more, to make a living, albeit often a spare one, from an astonishingly wide range of activities (Steinberg 2013);54 Furthermore, as research has repeatedly shown, most of them sustain a strong desire to find employment and thereby join the salariat (e.g. Ferguson 2015:40; Fouksman 2017b:4; Dubbeld n.d.:22; cf. Barchiesi 2007); this amidst ongoing public debate, echoed in other countries too, over the politics of distribution, the social necessity of cash transfers, and the un/desirability of a basic income grant for citizens who, argues James Ferguson (2015), are owed a “rightful share” of the national wealth (see also Fouksman 2017a:30).55 To wit, many proponents of these distributional transfers – or, as they are now being called in Italy, “citizens’ income” – link them to re-entry into the job market or into petty entrepreneurialism (a.k.a. self-employment), and hence celebrate them as an answer to the “end of work;”56 although, for his own part, Ferguson (2015:20) has it that “wage work…is not going to return.” Perhaps in proportion to its eclipse, wage labor, it seems, is being morally revalued as it is materially devalued. The former, its moral value, as we have noted, has its roots in the theological inscription of labor in the very fabric of modern capitalism; it appears to sustain itself, even to wax, in the age of the Moral Neoliberal (Muehlebach 2012; see above). Contemporary personhood, as this suggests, remains deeply invested in the dignity of work and the socio-psychological significance of an earned income (see e.g. Somavia 2015; Fouksman 2017b:4), all the more so as large numbers of (especially young) people in many parts are suspended in what has come widely to be known as “waithood,”57 a concept first developed in relation to one of Europe’s southern peripheries and now commonly used across the world.
[In the past, development economics tended to have a negative view of the informal economy, the so-called second economy, as impeding economic growth; they tried to merge the informal into the formal; in recent years the informal econ has been rebranded and revalorized as a “hidden engine…of growth” (Boyd on WIPO). Likewise, the World Bank now writes of artisanal mining, still criminalized in many parts of the world, as job creating. However, Emma Stuart et al say that “informal is the new normal”]
And so rising numbers of people across the planet, extruded for one or another reason from formal employment, turn to an ever expanding range of practices that conjoin entrepreneurialism and the capitalization of the self to auto-employed labor in the cause of (more less hand to mouth) primitive accumulation. Thus it is that there has been an explosion of adjectives attached to the noun “economy”; to name just a select few, the artisanal economy, the sharing economy, the caring economy, the affective economy (what Arlie Hochschild [1979] called “emotion work,” aka immaterial) economy, the cultural economy, the criminal economy – some of them subumed under the collective rubric of the “gig” economy. And in each case, the term “economy” may itself be replaced by “labor,” thus to describe the species of activity now commonly associated with it. Each, moreover, has commanded a burgeoning literature of its own, both scholarly and popular. This is not the place to review them in detail. For present purposes, some synoptic sketch notes will do.
Take the artisanal economy. “Artisans,” according to an article published in 2015 by Forbes,58 constitute “a sector now equivalent to the world’s fourth-largest economy,” with the “fourth largest workforce,” although it did not say quite how such a quantum might be calculated; it added a quote by then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to the effect that artisans are a “terrific” “place to begin” looking for “innovative way to help developing countries flourish,” as though they are a new historical phenomenon, unknown in the global south. Still, if has become a “type of entrepreneurship…widely acknowledged as an engine for poverty reduction and economic development.” And so history has been turned on its head: what modernity sought to drag domestic economies away from has become a panacea for reversing the devastation left in the wake of modernization. And, according to Derek Thompson (2015), not just for the global south: it was, he noted, one of the futures for the likes of Youngstown, and other northern cities devastated by the latest chapter in the history of capital.
What is more, an international NGO industry – another sort of entrepreneurial “economy” in itself, one that employs an immaterial army of to manage post-work across the planet – has grown up in support of the artisanal “sector.” NGO’s like the Alliance for Artisan Enterprise (also Artisan Alliance), whose home page claims that the “artisan sector is the second-largest employer in the developing world after agriculture, worth over $32 billion every year.”59 The Artisan Alliance is “hosted” by the Aspen Institute and is sponsor of “a new #ChooseArtisan campaign to bring attention to the importance of the creative economy” (our italics) – which, adds the Forbes article, is a “pathway out of poverty for millions of households.” But it ends a little more soberly, with the “serious roadblocks” that face artisans, such things as under- capitalization, disadvantages of scale, illiquid inventories, ephemeral and unpredictable demand, inability to tap into supply chains and formal markets, and so on and on. All of which tends to ensure that the artisanal economy remains an economy of the poor, producers whose products, if they are successfully sold, continue to accrue profits to people other than themselves. Like IKEA, which “collaborates with rural artisans around the world to create limited-edition collections that are sold in its stores.” Needless to say, we do not know how its profit sharing arrangements, like so many “fair trade” retail marketing contracts, are structured.60 Nonetheless, across the world, artisanal economies are often touted as a panacea for the flight from wage labor into entrepreneurialism – and are often a resort for those who find themselves suddenly un- or under-employed, with few other choices – although, of course, what they obscure is the fact that artisanship is simply labor without a wage, labor with the risk that the commodities produced by the unwaged entrepreneur of her- or himself has also to be marketed, a process for which that producer takes all the risks, and bears allthe costs, involved.
Or take the sharing economy, made globally visible, and typified, by the rise of such megacorporations as Uber and Airbnb. It is a largely “platform” economy in which self-employed laborers deploy their “under-utilized assets” and “flexibile schedules” – i.e. unused, unpaid, unwanted labor time – effectively to become “independent contractors” engaged in “the peer to peer based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing access to goods and services, co-ordinated through community-based online services” (Hamari et al. 2015:2047). What sorts of operations (eBay? Craigslist?) actually fall within this definition, or cognate ones – and in what sense digital mega-firms are “community-based” – is a matter of some discussion (Yaraghi and Ravi 2017:4-5). Still, the explosion of this economy, whose projected revenue growth from $14bn in 2014 to $335bn by 2025 (PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC] 2015:14), another occult statistic since such things are hardly knowable, appears to have reached deeply into accommodation and hospitality, transportation and delivery, consumer goods, cash lending, labor swaps; this to the extent that a report by PwC (2015), which defines the sharing economy quite capaciously (p.5) and offers a detailed analysis of who uses it and for what purposes, reports that 51% of US respondents to their survey said that they were likely to be providers and 71% consumers in this economy within two years, i.e. by 2017. For PwC, the rise of this economy is a potential threat to labor, rather than a panacea for those rendered precarious by the new capitalist economy (p.29):
“One of the more controversial aspects of the sharing economy is the impact it has on the labor force, and the perceived shift toward contract-based employment…For some, this is regarded as a benefit, enabling workers to earn wages on their own time and their own terms. For others, it heralds an era of depressed earnings and greater reliance on welfare and other government subsidies. 78% of adults said they expected that in 30 years, working multiple jobs would be the new normal for wage earners.”
The last sentence, however, is its own corrective: PwC’s informants appear to understand that it is their current status as employees in secure, income generating employment that is under threat, making their entry into the sharing economy, past or potential not a problem, but a solution. But one thing is clear: across the globe, the horizons of this economy, however it ought best to be named and characterized – whether it involves government supplied low cost housing in a South African black township being rented to tenants as its owners relocate to a shack in the backyard or a retired chef in a Singapore high-rise using his dining room as a chic restaurant to entertain “guests” – appear to be expanding rapidly as ordinary people across the planet find it necessary or desirable to recommission their possessions or their labor power in the cause of yielding an income.
Thus far, the sharing economy has rested in turning into assets the means of domestic reproduction and everyday life. This, of course, is not new. It has precedents in many parts of the world, especially in the global south – among them, for example, the shebeens of black South African townships during the apartheid years, where, in the absence of private space or family around them, migrant laborers treated the homes of their owners as something akin to a shared “living room,” a place to eat, drink, and socialize around the figure of the female host. It is simply that the practice has spread, especially in the north, and become more explicitly a strategy of accumulation by turning non-commodified objects and services into commodified ones. More recently, however, the sharing economy has stretched away from the domestic into the finance sector, with a major explosion, across much of the world, of peer-to- peer [P2P] lending and debt-based crowdfunding (a.k.a. “crowdlending”), usually brokered through on-line “platform” companies, some of which – in light of the high risk/high return nature of the practice, now referred to as an “industry” – have evinced very sharp cycles of accumulation and implosion;61 sans platforming and the internet, as those familiar with the global south know very well, P2P lending has long-standing foreshadowings in rotating credit groups across colonial and postcolonial Africa (e.g. Ardener 1964; James 2015) and in Islamic finance (Sadr 2017); also Japan, where it is said to go back to the thirteenth century (Izumida 1992).
From sharing to caring, of course, is a relatively short step. The caring, or affective economy, likewise, has become newly revalued as a domain of labor. As we have already noted, feminist critique has long pointed out that unremunerated domestic work and household production, done largely by women – but also, in “traditional” African cultures, by youths (e.g. Meillassoux 1981) – has classically gone unrecognized for what it has always been: an unrecognized, unwaged toil, rendered a free good by a patriarchal, gerontocratic ideology of kinship, family, and matrimony. In recent years, however, many of the forms of labor associated with (uncommodified) care, much of it invested in intergenerational kinship ties, have become a source of paid activity. [Filipino’s across the world; Israel only as example] Hence, for instance, the 30,000 Filipino women who look after the elderly and infirm in Israel (Liebelt 2011) – “Israel’s Invisible Filipino Work Force”62 – whose incomes support their own families back home, thus displacing the work of domestic life, and its reproduction, into the global labor market. A very global market, one that extends far beyond Israel: in Canada, to take another example, a program to import Filipinas to care for children brought almost 24,000 in 2014 alone.63 What is more, public discourse in the Philippines invests the export of its carers with cultural heft. Hence a Manila newspaper: “Being a caregiver is not only a matter of profession… [It is] about deep love, respect and care to someone of old age or anybody else who needs treatment…This is something rooted in Filipino culture and an identity as a Filipino.”64 Thus do culture and selfhood fuse into a brand that is born in the form of putatively unalienated labor that seeks, as it takes on the guise of a commodity, to become a form of monopoly capital. [LONG HISTORY; state labor export policy, with legal and diplomatic mechanisms; on 4 continents; see essay of Filipino state policy in relation to labor exports, M. Scott Solomon. ADD Cape Verde, women migrants in domestic reproduction]
Of course, the line between care and other forms of commodified service can be rather murky; vide Luise White’s Comforts of Home (1990), a study of prostitution in colonial Kenya, which makes the point that “the work of prostitutes” which did not carry the stigma here that it did in Euroe, “was family labor” (p.2) their relationships with their male customers both “intimate and stable” (p.1). Hence the title of the volume, which describes a phenomenon common in other parts of urban Africa – especially those that were host to large populations of single proletarian migrant men; recall South African shebeens, mentioned a moment ago – and made famous in popular culture by the jazz opera, King Kong, in which Miriam Makeba played her debut role as the keeper of “Back of the Moon”65 – which were widely treated as homes away from home. Given the explosion of the caregiving market in many diverse directions across the world – not coincidentally, the anthropology of care has become its own burgeoning scholarly market of late (see e.g. Alber and Drotbohm 2015) – there are many other instances that come to mind, but perhaps none so remarkable as growing Japan’s “rent-a-family” industry (Batuman 2018),66 a commodified service in the supply of care described as “human affection through the form of the family” (pp.51, 57). Companies like Family Romance will supply substitutes for almost any conceivable role, not least to provide “the comforts of home” (p.59): doppelgangers for a divorced parent for an emotionally wrought teenager, a deceased spouse and daughter for a lonely widow, an overweight mother fearful of appearing at school events and embarrassing her child, a bridegroom for a totally staged, fake wedding to appease impatient (proto-grand)parents, a wife’s lover from whom an aggrieved cuckold demands an apology, children for neglected elders and vice versa, and so on, and on. The industry, which appears to have spawned a great deal of prose fiction, has a deep archaeology, as Batuman (ibid.:58) reminds us, and not only in Japan: “people throughout human history have been paying strangers” – typically strangers of less elevated socioeconomic status – “to fill roles that their kinsfolk performed for free.” Or were expected to and, either out of necessity or preference, did (and increasingly do) not. The vast majority of white South African families during the apartheid era devolved (as many still do) some of the intimate functions of motherhood and wifehood to lowly-paid black carers, “maids” as they were known (Cock 1980, Gaitskell et al. 1983) – and dealt awkwardly with the affective ties that grew up as a result. It was an awkwardness expressed once in the cruelly ambivalent treatment of these women less than fully human, certainly not adult, and yet as faux “members of the family,” servants who could be terminated at a whim; Francis Nyamnjoh (2005) refers to the highly exploitative relationship between “maids and madams” (Cock, ibid.) tellingly in light of our present concerns, as “mutual zombification.” [Bougeois families have long paid underclass others to raise their families in the most intimate domains of the domestic; wet nurses, nannies etc]
The Japanese case is quite different, of course, in the nature of the contract and the conditions that have given rise to it; it attaches to the high end of the caring, affective economy, not to its indentured extremes. According, again, to Batuman (2018:57f), the rise of immaterial labor here, in this form, is owed largely to two things: changes in the post-World War 2 economic sociology of the country, which has seen the rise of single person (including older) families, a withering of the extended household, and, with “the deregulation of the Japanese labor market,…the erosion of the salaryman lifestyle”; and a spreading Foucauldian postmodernism that imagines everything to be constructed, including the affective relationships associated with intimate domesticity, thus allowing “the alchemy of the marketplace [to] transform strangers into loved ones” (p.58). And so the affective economy creates a domain of employment that returns an older form of unwaged, intimate labor as respectable, paid domestic work, less a new phenomenon than the re-cognition and re-tooling of something that has always existed as a species of devalued, proto-indentured work. [across the world there have always been paid companions; here it extends into the family and close kinship, a line typically drawn elsewhere to differentiate it from kinship; kinship highly relevant here under advanced capitalism, more so than in many places.]
To which there is yet a further twist. Japan, it appears, lies at the frontier of the expansion of the affective economy into…robotics which, if it ever comes about, will displace the labor of humans in this sector with machines: robot lovers and wives, the largely masculinist anti- or post-human fantasy. Nor will “she” be merely a sexual service provider. She will interact with “owner, understand him, entertain him, offer him companionship, thus to encourage the relationship with her to “develop into love.”67 Unless and until switched off, thereby accruing to the “virtual love industry” the huge advantage of partners, made to desired specification, but sans the usual irritations of living with a spouse. [MARRIAGE rates everywhere dropping; its too expensive; the movie in Shoplifting] Which, some believe, would well suit the culturally inflected needs of the 45% of Japanese men who, according to a state survey in 2011, have no interest in finding a live female partner.68 All of which resonates wth David Levy’s visionary Love and Sex with Robots (2008), which predicts, well, sex and love with robots, culminating in marriage by 2050 – thus, presumably, eliminating spouses from the domain of unremunerated intimate and domestic labor, and rendering redundant their waged human replacements, only to have them return in humanoid form, once the machine age version of an African brideprice has been paid.
The notion of a specifically Japanese proclivity for solving the problem of social isolation by recourse to commodified intimacy, like the presumptive inscription of Filipina caregiving in a primordial Fijian sensibility, opens a opens a bridge to yet another growing species of labor: that accruing to cultural economies, to what we have called, elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009), Ethnicity, Inc., a phenomenon that has expanded in some contexts in direct proportion to the loss of wage work (p.11ff.). This phenomenon, too, comes in many guises. In so far as it inflects emergent forms of employment – some of it, of course, manifest in, and articulated with, the rising artisanal economy – it expresses itself in an appeal to essentialized potencies and capacities that are said to inhere in an ascriptive identity: Australian Aboriginal art work, Zulu pottery, Lanna Thai massage, Peruvian Shipibo shamanic medicine, Himalayan Sherpa mountain guidance, Roma divination and fortune telling, Nepalese Limbu weaving, Chinese Miao silver smithing. In many instances, these activities involve self-employment and entrepreneurial engagement; some ethno-providers of goods and services represent themselves as deeply “traditional – indeed, exotically “other” – albeit in strikingly digital-savvy ways as they sell their skills and wares on their own account. Others are employed in the corporate sector for a wage: San (Bushmen) game trackers in the safari industry, “nimble fingered” Bengali tea pickers, Zapotec textile producers, Maori and Samoan rugby players. [This capitalizes on the abundance of culture; money from nothing – ie cultural resources – see Eric Hirsch]
Again, none of this is new. There has long been ethnic and national branding, simultaneously inside and outside the market, simultaneously essentialized and commodified, simultaneously alienable and inalienable. What is notable, however, appears to be the scale with which ethno-prise, amidst a rising consumer appetite for “authenticity,” is increasing the demand for ethnicized labor. On occasion, moreover, that labor has interpolated itself into inter/national imaginaries. Note the case of Fiji. Simon May (n.d.) shows how, in the context of a growing world market for private military power, indigenous Fijians assert a “form of cultural distinctiveness,” founded on their claim to be a “fighting people,” in order “to secure positions for themselves as…contractors within the supply-chain of outsourced warfare” – most notably, in the British army. The means of violence, it seems, is an integral part of the expanding cultural economy. And not only in its licit forms.
Which brings us to another context in which entrepreneurialism of the self, primitive accumulation, and labor conjoin increasingly outside the formal sector: what is sometimes referred to, with more than a hint of racism, as the “black” economy, which stretches, with considerable plasticity, from petty hustling to violent crime. Across Africa, for example, what sometimes begin as hustles often end up as recognized, more-or-less il/licit, jobs in the so-called “informal sector.” These include everything from “car guarding” and “personal security” in South Africa (Steyn et al. 2015) through professional trickery in Nigeria (Hibou 1999 [MORE specific]), kukiya- kiya (“making do”) in Zimbabwe (Jones 2010), and débrouillage (“getting by,” “managing”) in the Francophone west,69 to coastal piracy and high-end smuggling in the Chad Basin (Roitman 2005, 2006). Despite its “informality,” this sector has a major, well-recognized impact on GDP, [NB OF ARTISANAL/SMALL MINING ON GDP/GNP] on the socio-material and moral landscapes of the continent, and on the viability of many nation-states, a good number of which seek now to levy taxation on its enterprises (Dube and Casale 2017).70 Hustling, of course, has a large presence in the global north as well, some of it close to the engines of finance capital and the state (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), but much of it minor, nestling along the fringes of the “formal” economy.
At its “darkest,” the informal sector merges into criminal or “shadow” economies, which offer a wide, and growing, range of job opportunities across the world; the image of the “shadow,” and of “criminal specters,” having gained considerable purchase in the florescent literature on the anthropology of crime, criminal states, and the murky line between the legal and illegal in the in the contemporary age of global capitalism (see e.g. Ferguson 2006; Reno 1995, 2000; Roitman 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:16ff; cf. Derrida 1994:83). And, for a disturbingly large number of people, their sole means of survival. Thus, for example, as Levitt and Venkatesh (2000:755) note,72 recent studies of US street gangs – which remark their dramatic corporatization since the late twentieth century (e.g. Taylor 1990)73 – indicate that many of their “members pursue financial activities in response to alienation from legitimate labor markets” (our italics). Levitt and Venkathesh go on to compare average earnings in the drug trade with those in the formal sector: marginally higher, much riskier, motivated less by income in the present than by the prospect of future riches (ibid.). And, of course, the relative ease of finding work. This, we stress, is not to imply that the criminal economy is founded purely on, or shaped purely by, economic necessity or inequality, although such claims are quite often made. Unemployment, as Jonny Steinberg (2000:1f.) has pointed out, is far from the only explanation for law-breaking. People enter into this economy – or resist doing so – for a wide variety of reasons. Our point, simply, is that, along with other “post-work” spheres of human activity, it provides a site, at once material and social, into which people who would otherwise have lived their lives out in the wage labor force might interpolate themselves; or, if rational choice theorists (e.g. Becker 1968; Posner 1981) were to be believed, might choose to enter, basing their decision on a risk-return calculus like any other. [UNDERCLASSES have always lived this way – Dickensian London/ SA: people “choosing not to join the formal economy”]
In public perception, of course, and in much normative sociology, criminal activity is taken to be the opposite of work; as if human endeavor requires a moral imprimature to be regarded as labor, sensu stricto. And yet for many of those who partake of it, crime is work. Serious, skilled work. There is an unforgettable moment in Mark Gevisser’s Lost and Found in Johannesburg (2014) when, trapped in a brutally violent house invasion, he reports, verbatim, the words of one of the armed attackers: “This is our job. This is how we do our work. You go to your work and we go to our work…You must respect us or we will kill you” (p.250). Less a case of honor among thieves than the honor of thieves. And the dignity of their labor. Also its requisite professionalism. Thus a Johannesburg detective laughs at an inept pair of carjackers, naifs who lacked the necessary proficiency for successful hit: “F—ing amateurs. They didn’t even know what they were going to say” to their intended victim (Altbeker 2000:27). Sometimes, as Paswane Mpe (2000:1) reminds us, this line of business has its own heroic celebrity, by now a Benjaminian (1978:281) cliche: the abiding, if perhaps ambivalent, admiration for the sheer artistry, the accomplished performance, evinced in the clever heist, the daring robbery, the slick take-down of a reviled personage; the assailants in the attack to which Gevisser was a participating witness referred to themselves, proudly, as “heroes [with] guns” (ibid.). In the criminal economy, as this boast implies, the revolver or the knife or the club, relatively cheap objects, are the only required means of production – or, more accurately, of redistribution. At its non-violent end, the chosen tools of trade may be a cheap laptop, a cell phone, counterfeit plastic, a stolen uniform. Criminality-as-labor, self-evidently, offers many points of access, many techniques of extraction, many sources of primitive accumulation. [Hijack Stories: “step away from my associate,” said to a cop] [Criminal behavior in colonial contexts seen as critique of racialized social exploitation, and a form of redistribution; from the much critted Primitive Rebels to Van Onnselin’s Regiment of the Hills.]
Not everyone extruded from the formal sector is able to enter into one of these economies, be it artisanal, sharing, caring, cultural, criminal, or whatever. People who no longer sustain the prospect of earning an income may nowadays find themselves caught up with corporate capital not as labor but as more-or-less dehumanized commodities: as objects from which value is extracted under regimes of radical privatization and financialization, regimes that look, systematically, to profit from anything and everything. [Capital always finds new places to go, more assets to harvest.] Perennial as it has always been to capitalism (Luxemburg 1951:452ff.), primitive accumulation in its postmodern guise, ever more all-consuming (Harvey 2005), seems especially prone to a necropolitics; the “subjugation,” that is, “of life to the power of [social, if not physical] death” (Mbembe 2003:39). To wit, necrocapitalism, as Bannerjee (2008) and others call it,74 expropriates unto itself the very necessities of existence: water, air, food, shelter, security, land, infrastructure, culture. Indeed, the corporate capture of these things has spawned what are now referred to as “living politics” (Chance 2017), the “politics of life” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012:159f.; cf. Agamben 1998:10), “vital politics” (e.g. Povinelli 2016; Muehlebach 2017)75 – all terms for collective action against the (necro?) capitalization of, and profiteering off, assets long held to inhere in citizenship and the social contract, in people’s sovereignty, civil society, and the commons. Specifically, the elemental bases of life itself (Simmons 2016).
Perhaps the most dramatic instance of the transformation of human labor into human life as commodity is to be found in the carceral subject. There is no need here to recapitulate the literature – most developed in the US but echoed elsewhere – on the “penal state” (e.g. Simon 2007; Garland 2013) and “carceral capitalism” (e.g. Wang 2018). Suffice it to say that it ties the fluorescence of neoliberalism to the warehousing of previously working, now disposable people (especially Blacks, Hispanics, but also indigent Whites) in “correctional” facilities (Herivel and Wright 2003), leveraged largely through a “war” on the criminal economy (Wacquant 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2016); to the maintenance, in addition, of segregated urban environments, creating zones – ghettos, favelas, banlieus, projects, townships – of containment (Beckett and Herbert 2010; Smith 2013; cf. Massey and Denton 1993) and “hyperpolicing” (e.g. Tibbs 2010); to the practice of “governing through crime” populations said to be uncivil and worse (Simon 2009; cf. Foucault 1977); to the “farming” of fines from the poor, itself a source of their spiraling, unaffordable debt and high rates of imprisonment (Stillman 2014:5); to the more or less permanent elimination of convicted felons from the labor market. It is by these and other means, disenfranchisement among them, that citizenship is annulled, rights removed, humanity negated. And the formerly employed reduced to a corporeal reservoir from which surplus value may be gleaned. In times past, penality carried with it, at least ideologically, the promise of rehabilitation and a return to the workforce. Not any more. In many places, crime and punishment are about permanent exit, social death, zombification – thus to make the prisoner’s body, sans sentient civility, an instrument of accumulation.
How? Well, for one thing, by privatizing prisons, parole, and other institutions of the criminal justice system – or, more often, outsourcing their operations – which licences carceral corporations to charge the public purse for accommodating, feeding, guarding, and providing other “facilities” to inmates; this at the same time as making the latter pay, often extortionately, for basic goods and services76 – all at minimum cost to themselves. The culture industry, epitomized in the USA by Orange is the New Black (dir., Jenji Kohan 2013-present), offers vivid ethnographic illustration of quite how comprehensive, and profit-seeking, is the business-managerial treatment of convicts and their bodies. Not surprisingly, there is plenty of evidence to the effect that firms operating in the prison-industrial complex lobby actively to keep captive populations as large as possible; the paroled population, as well, from whose supervised “freedom” hefty returns are also to be earned. At the same time, prison labor itself, often thought to be a prime site of exploitation, is a rather limited enterprise: in most correctional facilities relatively few do productive work for the private sector. Most who toil at all do so menially, usually servicing the institution itself (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2016:44).77 It from working on them, sustaining them in a condition of relatively spare life, that money is to be made.
The point need not be labored. The carceral subject-as-object is just one instance of a growing economy in which humans, reduced to their bodies, are commodified in the cause of neo-primitive accumulation; “neo-,“ since this, too, is far from new. Per contra, it has a history as long as history itself, in which modern slavery and racial capitalism are epochal moments from whose effects a good part of the planet is still having to recover. Its twenty-first century forms, alike, do not require to be spelled out. Trafficking, in all its hydra-headed guises, is said to be a “pandemic…[from] which no country is immune”: according to UNICEF, there are 21m people being trafficked around the world, yielding annual profits of $32bn.78 Contemporary slavery, says one authoritative source, embraces some 40.3m people today;79 in 2016, estimates varied from 21m (International Labor Organization) to 46m (Global Slavery Index).80 Migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers also present themselves as embodied, for-profit opportunities to those who deal, legally or otherwise, in transporting, managing, and servicing displaced persons. To be sure, the categorical distinctions separating different types of exploitable subjects are often murky, porous. But, more to the present point, in the world “after labor” it is the line between the working and the worked-on that draws our attention, a line that tends increasingly to be crossed in one direction – away from the former toward the latter. Which returns us to the paradox: if this is so, if conventional forms of wage labor are disappearing, or morphing in so many directions, how do we explain the low official unemployment rates in so many places – or, almost everywhere, the fairly common presumption, indeed blind faith, that economic and social problems may be resolved, alchemically, by “creating more jobs”?
VII.
Once again, let us distinguish between the empirical, the conceptual, and the phenomenological dimensions of the paradox.
Take the first first. Empirically-speaking, as we have already said, there has never truly been a time of full employment. Or anything near it. The ideology-speak that continues to pretend to the possibility (see e.g. Stiglitz 2003:292f.; Schmid 2008:vii) – and/or claims that, under felicitous conditions, it has been “achieved”81 – wilfully ignores the fact that capital has always sustained, more or less c/overtly, a “reserve army of labor” (Marx 1976:781 et passim);82 or that, as Cedric Robinson (1983:24) insists, slavery and indenture has always been a critical element of capitalist production in and beyond Europe, and that, along with discounted, insecure immigrant labor, were a significant proportion of national proletariats. Nor is this all. As Kasmir (2018) observes, even at the height of Fordism in the US, the ur-case of this ideology- in-action, “whole segments of the population were excluded” from the workforce. As she and others have intimated, the precarity of the poor and the pigmented, the domestic and the disabled, the marginal and the migrant – those, in short, unembraced by organized labor and discounted as unemployable – may have become a scholarly preoccupation of late (after Butler 2004; cf. e.g. Standing 2011). But it has been an immanent feature of the history of capitalism all along, epitomized by racially-saturated colonial contexts like South Africa. What is more, Michael Denning (2010) recalls, Marx himself observed that the “wageless,” having been expelled en masse from work, were rendered invisible to political economy, indeed to polite society, from the first. This was especially so in the global north, we would add, during the post-World War 2 years, the heyday of Keynesian hegemony (above, p.00), when, in Denning’s words, “the wage [as] the source of capitalist ideolog[y],” of its notions of freedom and equality and the good life, were most palpably fetishized – thus to obscure the fact that wageless life is not a side effect, but “the starting point in understanding the free market,” past and present.
Herein lies a critical element in the resolution of the paradox: its empirical erasure at the hands of the ostensibly value-free pragmatism of formal economics and modernist political discourse; specifically, of its occulting of reality by recourse to statistical reason.83 Put it this way: if, in a population, a significant percentage of those who lack employment are made to disappear from sight by literally discounting their very existence, the remaining proportion, those who do have jobs, will, statistically- speaking, appear concomitantly large. Under these conditions, there is no army of jobless people to be concerned about, nor does the “end of work” seem imminent. Per contra, full employment looks to lie well this side of the horizon of possibility and of public policy – thus to sustain the dignity of labor, and an honestly earned paycheck, as the mythic cornerstone of the good life.
Thus in the USA, for example, the official unemployment rate hovers below 4% at present, which conjures the illusion of a largely working population. But this figure only takes into account those who are positioned to look for work and are doing so. It ignores entirely the “employment-population ratio.”84 The latter, by contrast, embraces everyone of working age, including those who are no longer in the formal job market: those who, unable to find anything else, have taken themselves out of it to enter into other – recall, artisanal, sharing, caring, affective, cultural and criminal – economies; or those who are prevented from entering employment by virtue of disability, injury, imprisonment, forced retrenchment, early retirement, custodial responsibility for others, and so on; or those who have simply become unavoidably indigent. In April 2018, this ratio was just 60.3%; in other words, almost 40% of the able bodied citizenry of America, their sociological profiles highly predictable, were not in waged jobs. These figures, trust them or not, come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.85 The discrepancy between the employment-population ratio and official jobless numbers, which are the ones most touted in the political sphere and the academy, derives, in major part, from the uncounted carceral population; the mass of primarily Black and Hispanic inner city residents to whom the formal economy is effectively closed; people, mainly women, compelled by the lack of state welfare to look after others; and laid-off laborers in places from which manufacturing and extractive industries have decamped.
Nor is the US alone in the way it dis/counts. In the U.K, according to a study undertaken at Sheffield Hallam University, “unemployment is three times [more] than the official count,”86 notwithstanding the fact that this much-heralded count, 3.9% at the time of writing, is the lowest since the pre-Thatcherite Labour Party administration of the mid-1970s. The Hallam study echoes both public discourse – which acknowledges that “there is more hidden unemployment than suggested by the official statistics”87 – and scholarly accounts. In respect of the latter, economist David Blanchflower (2019), in his forthcoming Not Working, puts it bluntly: “don’t trust low unemployment numbers… Standard economic measures are often blind” to the very large numbers who are radically “underemployed or have simply given up trying to find a well-paying job”; extraordinarily, 55% of all jobs created since 2008 are part-time, that is, in the gig economy. He adds, also, that “wages have fallen more [in the past decade] than ever in recorded history” – and that the self-employed, who boost the myth of “rosy employment figures,” earn significantly less those in paid jobs.88 Another case, this, of hiding the radical transformation of contemporary labor, of its structural demography, in a form of occult numeration that, simultaneously, makes phenomena reappear as they disappear, rendering them at once absent-and-present in the moment of their re- presentation. Likewise Italy, often said to be a southern nation in the global north (Wagner 2017; Dainotto 2011; Cassano 2012),89 where the official unemployment rate is 10.5%, where migrants who work for “hunger wages…in conditions of slavery” are blamed for almost everything and are the object of rising racist violence,90 and where a large slice of the population is “employed in the black [economy]”: the Minister of Labor in its Five Star Movement (M5S) government has actually referred to the uncounted millions living below the poverty line and “on the margins of [the] country,” as “invisible people.”91 The nations of the global south, in general, register rather higher levels than do the USA or the UK; hence our comments earlier about those both officially recognized and publicly discussed in South Africa, whose “expanded” rate – the rough equivalent of the US employment-population ratio – was 37 percent in 2018. Either those nations are less intent to hide their historically low formal employment rates behind a statistical fig leaf, or more of their able bodied adults persist longer in looking for wage employment.
There is another way to make the paradox disappear empirically. It is, in addition to discounting significant numbers of those excluded from work, by “add[ing] more people into the employed category without changing anyone’s actual status.”92 There are two obvious ways of doing this. The first is to count radically under- employed people as if they were properly employed, going as far as to take in those who do barely any work at all. Statistics South Africa, for instance, counts persons those who did wage work for no more than a hour in the week before its quarterly labor force surveys,93 So does the USA, which also includes those who, while formally having a job, were not necessarily doing it for one or another recognized reason.94 As this suggests, so-called “non-standard workers” – who labor on flexitime, under highly temporary and fragile arrangements, or under that oxymoronic absent-presence, the zero-hour contracts,– may inflate formal numbers by a significant margin: along with the self-employed, they made up a full 39% of the entire European Union workforce in 2016 (European Commission 2018:19). At the other extreme are those in a regular position who are paid insufficient to subsist on, and have, therefore, to hold multiple jobs; school teachers and menial service workers in the US come immediately to mind. They are counted just once, hence to enshrine the idea that it is formal employment, under whatever conditions, that is significant, rather than a livelihood – a point to which we shall return.
The second way of making the paradox disappear by making more people appear to be employed is to redefine labor so broadly as to include basically any form of social productivity, be it mental or manual, waged or unwaged, formal or informal, even licit or illicit. This is what the European Commission on the Future of Work, Future of Society (2018:7,19) comes close to doing in the cause of recognizing unpaid exertions as a worthy basis of the dignity classically associated with wage labor: “Traditional concepts of work,” it says, “must be rethought to take in a much broader array of ‘non-standard employment,” including “a range of unpaid contributions to our societies…” Nor is the European Commission alone in this. Finding value in unpaid labor has become a common ideological theme of the twenty-first century, argued alike by feminist and critical race theorists, theologians, neoliberal ethicists, and many others besides. And so not only is the paradox made to disappear empirically by only discounting those who are recognized as officially to be counted, but also conceptually by including more or less anything in the category of value-producing enterprise – and asserting, thereby, the sustained ethico-theological centrality of work as the core of human being in the new age of capitalism. It also contributes to the erasure of “the end of work” from the phenomenology of social experience. For the unemployed, it is not a structural feature of contemporary capitalism that besets them; it is the contingent misfortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time: Youngstown or Flint or the coal towns of Kentucky or factory-shuttered towns of northern England. Or other places from which jobs have migrated. But, if we take this conception of labor, the circle is closed: all those “new” economies in the global north, those long established informal economies of the global south – all those species of activity which have flourished anew with the “end of work” – are embraced within it.
But, while it may be disappeared empirically and conceptually by these means, phenomenologically-speaking, the paradox – the fact that wage labor remains at the elemental core of capitalism, and of species being under its political theology, yet appears as an anachronism, at its historical “end” – has not gone away. Nor have the anxieties, even the social panic, that it provokes. If anything, those anxieties keep reappearing, underscored symbolically by the figures of the zombie, the robot, and the posthuman mutant – and politically in populist promises of job creation and the like. Formal statistics may pretend to low unemployment rates – and my be claimed by politicians as proof of the positive effects of their policies – but experience tells otherwise. Not merely that work is dispersing itself into distant geographies and new temporalities, but also into the yawning disconnect between a job and an income.95
Again, we have anticipated the point.
– Recall David Blanchflower (2019; see above, fn.00), who says what amounts to the same thing in pointing out that the illusion of high employment rates in the UK in the past decade or so – he might have added that it applies to much of the world – has been sustained by a palpable drop in real wages and by the rise in underemployment counted as though it were employment, Put another way, if a significant proportion of people cannot subsist beyond the poverty level on their pay, there opens up a significant gap between a job and an income. This is precisely what has happened in many places: people who have jobs, either paid or self-employed, who are earning below the minimal needs for life and who, therefore, need more that one source of income to survive, are fundamentally misrepresented by official employment figures, whose very real predicament they hide. As Steven Shaviro, among very many others notes – this in a review of Lisa Adkins’s The Time of Money (2018) – “[w]ages are no longer sufficient to meet household needs, even if women as well as men enter full time into the workforce,”96 thus forcing almost everyone to accumulate debt. Given the number of people who hold jobs or work for remuneration insufficient unto their needs, national employment rates would need to be far in excess of 100% even to approach something akin to full employent; the gap between jobs and incomes hides the real state of inequality and material well-being. And disappears the contradiction between capital and labor from visibility by sustaining the illusion that most people have jobs either in the formal or in the gig economy – an illusion that is less untrue than it hides precisely what it reveals, i.e., that capital is succeeding, in significant measure, in erasing labor, replacing it by technology, outsourcing it into the gig universe, and the like, while celebrating a neoliberal economy in which everyone is at once an entrepreneur of themselves, a contractor of their own energies and capacities, and/or a commodity.
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Eminent husband-and-wife anthropologist named Visiting J Y Pillay Professors
By Jiang Haolie
Eminent anthropologists Professors Jean and John Comaroff, renowned for their joint work in African Studies and anthropology as a husband-and-wife team, were recently named Visiting J Y Pillay Professors at Yale-NUS College. The Professorship is part of the J Y Pillay Global-Asia Programme, which was established to honour Professor J Y Pillay, a pioneer who made ground-breaking contributions to Singapore as a top civil servant and corporate leader.
Describing the J Y Pillay Professorship as “greatly meaningful”, both Comaroffs effusively shared that they were very honoured to be its recipients. Prof Jean also praised the Professorship’s important role in building important links across global communities of researchers and attracting academic talent to Singapore as well as to Southeast Asian research.
Commending the Comaroffs as “outstanding scholars”, Professor Joanne Roberts, Executive Vice President (Academic Affairs), expressed delight at the Comaroffs being awarded the Professorship. “It is wonderful for our students and faculty to get the opportunity to learn from them,” she said. It matches well with our goals of having visiting professorships bring in world class scholars and also, where possible, to have these visitors broaden and diversify the scope of our offerings.”
In their short time teaching and interacting with the Yale-NUS community, both professors remarked that they were profoundly impressed by the dynamism, intelligence and talent of Yale-NUS students and faculty, describing the students as approaching classes with “maturity, entrepreneurial spirit and intellectual vibrancy”. Prof John said, “Jean and I love to challenge students. Our classes are not easy. Yet, our students have dealt well with complicated ideas and joined in very thoughtful discussions.”
Both Comaroffs were also convinced that the College’s Anthropology faculty and students are well-placed to take the lead in the reinvention and renewal of anthropology as a discipline here. Prof Jean noted that Yale-NUS, while small, has access to the larger research community at the National University of Singapore, affording it an immense advantage. She added that its position in Singapore offers opportunities to reflect on modernity and postcoloniality.
“You have all the virtues of youth and experimentation! Everything is possible!” Prof Jean remarked. Prof John also pointed out how Yale-NUS’s philosophy of decentring academia might contribute to shifting the postcolonial axis of anthropological discourse “from the vertical to the horizontal” – giving increasing voice to the subaltern, thus to shift knowledge-production and its authority away from the west. Altogether, Yale-NUS, according to both Comaroffs, also contributes to the ongoing renewal of liberal arts and science education around the world.
The Comaroffs also spoke enthusiastically about the relevance that Singapore has for their own research on Africa – from the Asia-African axis to our shared postcolonial experiences. In their assessment, Yale-NUS’ youthful dynamism was also emblematic of Singapore and its place in the global order. In this regard, Singapore, according to Prof Jean, is emerging as the chosen model for other nation-states, including ones in the Global North; this because of the way in which it has managed a whole host of issues such as development, education, employment and environmental issues. “It’s like the metropole looking to a [former] colony for inspiration” – a delicious irony and reversal of relations, Prof John noted.
While they have spent decades living and researching on the African continent, the Comaroffs are no strangers to Singapore or to Yale-NUS. Their son, Joshua Comaroff, is an Assistant Professor of Social Sciences (Urban Studies) here at Yale-NUS and – together with his partner, Ms Ong Ker-Shing – was also involved in the landscape design of the campus. When the Comaroffs are not in the classroom, they spend their time playing with their Singaporean grandchildren or eating delectable local dishes. “You can’t be in Singapore and not be eating really well!”, quipped Prof John, who singled out laksa and otah-otah as two of their guilty favourites.
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Brave Noir World
Crime stories – in literature, art, film, theater, music – are now a global vernacular. Their popularity reflects the modernist fascination with the promise that detection — part intuition, part empirical reason – can unravel the mysteries of human evil, wrest law from lawlessness, return order to an unruly social world. But this history also bred a rogue, noir genre, ever more intent on questioning that order, and the very possibility of setting crime apart from innocence.
In fact, the political economy of crime-as-representation seems to be undergoing a transfiguration. Not that the older modernist genre has disappeared: mythic supercops, CSI techno-magicians, and preternatural sleuths still solve the mystery and bag the felon. But the rising new noir is more given to ironic, open-ended explorations of late modern scapes, their dreads and discontents. Its protagonists display a desire for, yet distrust in, criminal justice, a sense of the impossibility of its mandate, the unreliability of its truth-claims.
Ernest Mandel (1984) first noted this shift. With the rise of capitalism, he argued, the criminal became the antisocial enemy of bourgeois property and civility; his nemesis being the upright, crusading detective. His late modern counterpart, harking back to social bandits of earlier times, is less antisocial than entrepreneurial. Enjoying ambivalent popular admiration – think Tony Soprano, Omar Little, Walt White — he plays on both the erosion of bourgeois values and the growing entanglement of big business, government, and criminality; the cynical cops and vigilantes who pursue him are themselves more skeptical of the idea of an “absolute good,” more likely to breach the lines of il/legality. This changing economy of representation is perhaps most evident in television and film, especially in post-totalitarian, postcolonial societies, where changing ethico-legal regimes highlight the relativism of the law.
In South Africa, for instance, a vibrant filmic tradition is being repurposed for post-apartheid times. Johannesburg, epicenter of a history of colonial extraction and pulse point of the national pysche, is itself widely viewed as a crime scene. If, under apartheid, white media were haunted by fears of black terror, ordinary Africans were ruled by what Bloke Modisane famously dubbed “the banditry of the law,” in whose wake a lively strain of black crime writing took shape. Centered on the fabled Drum Magazine, it blurred the line between fiction and reportage, drawing on the Harlem Renaissance, gangster genres of the 1930s, and cinema noir to forge its own granular realism. Drum was preoccupied with the luminous figure of the outlaw, or tsotsi. Its sassy heroes foreshadowed the provocative postcolonial culture – youthful, black, urbane, roguish, chic – canonized in a novel genre of movies at the century’s end.
That culture was termed mapantsula, also the title of the nation’s earliest ant-apartheid feature film (1988), a Bildungsroman shot in Soweto that throbbed with “township jive.” It depicted the life of a petty thief ironically named Panic, a cool, streetwise hustler who disavowed formal politics for a defiant ethic of his own as he robbed wealthy, white beneficiaries of the racist regime. The film probes the moral ambiguity of life after colonialism, and also after liberalism: the limits and legitimacy of the law, the changing map of power in a world of deregulated capital. Mapantsula anticipates criminal life in the global postcolony, gesturing forward to the edgy genre of Jozi Noir, which would include features like Tstotsi, Gangster’s Paradise: Jerusalema, and Hijack Stories, productions that explore the often scary freedoms of the neo, noir world.
Tsotsi (2005), Oscar winner for Best Foreign Language Film in 2006, is based on a novel by Athol Fugard, in which a young thug finds unlikely salvation. It opens with a game of craps: life is determined by a roll of the dice, the odds still stacked against the black underclass. Tsotsi, orphaned by AIDS, has come of age in a colony of street kids, living amidst the detritus of the modern city. A cold-hearted killer, he makes a cut-throat living off an urban ecology in which nothing matters but money and survival. One day he jacks a BMW, only to find a bright-eyed baby in the back. Given Tsotsi’s world, the odds are not favorable for a triumph of the good. His eventual decision to honor life at its most vulnerable – he returns the baby to its parents – sits uneasily with the dispassionate alienation, and sardonic realism, of the life-story portrayed in the film.
Gangster’s Paradise: Jerusalema (2008) is an altogether more charged coming-of-age allegory. Jerusalema, the New Jerusalem, is Johannesburg, vortex of a postcolony most of whose black citizens now have law without order, desire without means. Lucky Kunene is a sharp township kid who cannot afford Business School, but sets about becoming a wise-guy of another sort. He extends the techniques of carjacking into the realm of inner-city real estate: his crew seize crime-ridden buildings owned by slumlords who exploit their pitiably poor tenants. Here the criminal economy finds a home in the ruins of the former metropolitan center, producing new kinds of wealth-in-property, indistinguishable from legitimate business. Again, the film draws it’s mise en scéne from life: Kunene, on whom the story is based, is in reality one of Jozi’s most notorious hoods. In the 1990’s, he perfected a scheme to jack apartment blocks from their rapacious owners, his thugs “ridding” the properties of drug dealers, pimps, and hookers, and winning over the residents.
In doing the same thing, the fictive Kunene becomes the proprietor of the “Hillbrow People’s Housing Trust.” A hoodlum philosopher, he juggles references to Donald Trump and Karl Marx. “Can capitalism be made to yield new forms of ‘win-win,’ post-racial redistribution?” The fictive Lucky presumes a universe in which one makes one’s own Luck. He is eventually apprehended, only to outsmart the police: Jerusalema looks for justice beyond the limits of the law. Like Tsotsi, it brooks no easy conclusion. The film ends with the bandit hero citing Marx: “After every revolution comes a new order,” he intones, “but before that comes opportunity.”
Movies like this are part of an intertextual, multimedia conversation that flows expansively through TV drama, talk radio, stand-up comedy, advertising, investigative journalism, and hiphop. A distinct visual aesthetic is part of this impulse, purveyed by seductive commodity-images that mix look, sound, allure, and cunning. It is a quality made flesh by those noir stars who play cynical picaros, like Rapulana Seiphemo. Seiphemo featured as Lucky Kunene, had a role in Tsotsi, and acted the charismatic hood in Hijack Stories (2000), a film that focuses more explicitly than any of the others on the ways in which crime fiction informs, and is informed by, ordinary experience in South Africa. Like other examples of this genre, it depends heavily on the sensibility of a streetwise black cast. The film opens with a man in a sharp business suit, leaving a store for his luxury car – to be set upon by gun-toting thugs. At its most terrifying moment, the scene is abruptly cut. We have been watching another kind of shooting: a TV show about a fictional township hood. Hijack Stories is about the interplay of violence and image, method acting and gangsterism, legitimate and criminal labor. The story is assertively postcolonial: it follows the quest of a young, educated black actor, Sox Moraga, who sets his heart on landing a role in a popular gangsta series. The very one, in fact, being filmed in that first scene of the Hijack Stories.
Sox is the offspring of the new South Africa, his parents having left the township to raise him in the sanitary suburbs of Johannesburg. Street thugs call kids like him “Mandela se goeters,” Mandela’s stuff/playthings. But it is not these cosseted “coconuts” who draw women, drive fancy cars, and capture the popular imagination. It is flashy hoodlums. Sox is too soft to “do township” with conviction. So he returns to the hood to “learn the moves” from gang-leader Zama – literally, “take a chance”– played by Seiphemo Rapulana. Disdainful of Sox’s desire to derive profit by mimicking a tsotsi, Zama gives him a lesson he will never forget. Crime is a skilled performance, one whose glamor inheres in its risks, and the film explores the dangerous erotics of a criminal mode of production. A profitable hit fuels orgies of consumption, in which the value “liberated” – the cash, cars, drugs, designer goods – circulates with sensuous abandon. All is fair in this “winner-takes-all” economy, driven by an endless interplay of incitement and consummation.” Racketeering, once again, is merely an intensified form of all risky business, one performance among many. The only real crime, here, is to misjudge the moves. Drawn into the game as a voyeur, Sox is all but undone by it. Meanwhile Zama goes to the TV studio to audition in his stead – and secures the role. It is the robbers, not the cops, who grasp the truth about life in the new, noir world.
Taken together, these movies make the point that, just as there is little to set criminal labor off from its legitimate counterpart, or truth from fiction, there is also little to restrain the mutual hijacking of life and image, of civic order and uncivil underworld, that has always been with us. And continues to be, albeit in reconfigured, hyperbolic form.
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Southern Futures
Published in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 38(2):365-76, 2018
Keith Hart and John Comaroff in conversation with Ravinder Kaur
RK: The 2013 Human Development Report entitled The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World offered an optimistic account of the ‘rise’ of the Southern nations long seen as ‘lagging behind’ the Northern industrialised nations. Celebrating the “unprecedented scale and speed” of this rise, the uplifting narrative pitched Asia, Africa and Latin America as having “move(d) up the development ladder” at a moment when the “developed economies had stopped growing during the 2008-9 financial crisis.” Thinking through, and against, this narrative, how can we critically theorise the notion of ‘rise’ that has become shorthand for this dramatic transformation in the sign of the South?
Keith Hart For some time now I have been writing a book, Africa’s Coming Revolution: Prospects for economic development. It began as a critique of Afro-pessimism a decade ago. Since then “Africa rising” has become a commonplace of media and even some academic discourse. I believe that Africa could now overcome historic handicaps that were both endogenous and externally imposed. But this will entail prolonged struggle to replace 54 nation-states with federated political units employing economic strategies conducive to that end. I locate Africa’s historical trajectory as a play in three acts from 1800 to 2100, a period when world society is being formed. If it is not, there will be no 22nd century. In the 19th century this process was driven by European imperialism fuelled by by a European population explosion from 1830 to 1930. By 1900, Europeans controlled 80% of the inhabited land surface. Europe itself then had 25 % of the world population, three times Africa’s. Today, Asia accounts for 60 % of the world’s population, Africa 15 %, and the Americas, Europe, Russia, Australasia, and Oceania 25 %.
The projections for the end of this century are quite extraordinary. The UN projects that Africa will then account for 40 % of the world’s population; Asia, 42 %; and the rest just 18 %. And Europe will have only 6 % of the world’s population. So in the space of a couple of hundred years, Europe will have gone from 25% to 6 % of the world’s population, and Africa from 7.5 % to a projected 40 %.
If world society was formed in the 19th century by European imperialism, the principal event of the 20th century was the anticolonial revolution, whereby peoples coerced into a European- dominated world society now sought their own independent relationship to it. In the case of Asia, one can argue that this anticolonial revolution was completed, but not in Africa. The question then arises, what can we expect in the 21st century given these extraordinary demographic shifts and the likely changes in the balance of regional power? I’m not proposing Africa rising or suggesting that their demographic preponderance, which is so recent and so large, adds up to anything positive or negative. I do, however, argue that the world will have to come to terms with the fact that two out of five human beings will live in Africa by the end of this century, and that this will pose a challenge to the racialized world order that has evolved over centuries in which Africans have consistently been classified on the bottom rung. The question that I’ve been posing since I was a graduate student in the 60’s, is whether and how Africa might be able to establish a more equal relationship to the rest of the world on the basis of these developments. My other question concerns the political forms that will dominate the coming century. Some of the largest countries are already federal – Russia, the United States, India, China, Brazil and so on – and I would argue that one of the features of our world has already been established as a movement towards regional trade federations. So, could Africa make a move in that direction and under what circumstances? It’s not as if Africa doesn’t have regional trade federations already, in the form of ECOWAS, SADC and others, but it’s a question of how effective they might be in renegotiating relations with the world economy. The main obstacle Africans face to improving their situation under these conditions is the political system that predominates there at this time. In most cases African countries are governed by political elites who depend far more on foreign powers than on their own people for their political economy and even legitimacy.
At the core of my book is a concern with the possible forms for the development of markets in Africa in the coming century. My basic assumption is that Africa is now labouring under structures that are analogous to the old regime before the French Revolution, and that African economic progress will depend on a series of liberal revolutions there; so we have to understand how the classical liberal revolutions overthrew old regimes in the United States, Germany, Italy, France and elsewhere. I’ve spent a good deal of my time analysing the dynamics of these revolutions, and I’ve concluded that, in every case, a major component was the participation of significant sections of capital. For example the shippers of Nantes and Bordeaux in the French Revolution and the industrialists of Milan and Turin in the Italian revolution. Some elements of capital, along with political powers, such as the Prussians in the case of German unification, are essential to establish forms of market integration from which Africans, I imagine, would benefit.
These conditions should release African political energies in a piecemeal way, not immediately at the continental level. Of course parties, such as the United States, China, France and other countries will also influence these outcomes. But the fundamental question I raise is: What political means, based on various historical analogies as well as on knowledge of Africa today, might be available for Africans to derive some benefit from this demographic explosion and its likely economic consequences?
John Comaroff: As always, with his characteristic critical flair, Keith provokes us to think on a very broad canvas across both space and time — which I appreciate alike for political and intellectual reasons. Let me start with a couple of your questions and provocations, Ravinder, and work back to some of the issues that Keith has raised. First of all, I believe that we are living at an historical juncture of rupture, recalibration, reconfiguration. This is a moment in the global history of capital fraught with contradiction and indeterminacy, with violence and inequality – with a counterpoint, that is, of violent inequality and an inequality of violence – whose effect has been to bring the human condition itself into question: as ever more humans become disposable, as the material well-being of ordinary people is increasingly chipped away by falling real incomes and rising debt, as the environment is damaged beyond repair, as infrastructure erodes, as the public sphere and the commonweal are cut back in order to make ever more safe space for the market and its forms of privateering, the social reproduction of the world we once knew is anything but certain. One might infer that all this calls for a radical re-analysis of the history of the present and of the futures that it portends. But ours is an age in which it is very difficult to talk about solutions to anything – or, at least solutions that go beyond technical patches, beyond fixes of the very short run — a situation exacerbated by a fear of dominant narratives, of historical explanation writ large, of theorizing the Big Picture. The flight of the social sciences in the Global North from theory tout court underscores the importance of the sort of challenge with which Keith is confronting us. Our own discipline, anthropology, has fallen into a form of neo-empiricism that romances the local and the contingent and ignores the structural and the global; sociology has been suffering its own, parallel crises of identity, epistemology, and representation; and economics stands accused of taking flight into ever more abstract, ever more abstruse mathematical modelling, detached from anything that resembles the living world. All of which makes it plain that the Courage to Theorize, upper case, to ask the Big Questions, is in short supply right now, at a time when it is as critically necessary as it has ever been. Perhaps even more so.
One advantage of looking at the world over a three hundred year span is that it enables us to see that we may have entered an Age of Revolution not unlike the one between 1789 and 1848, the one that gave us much of what we have come to think of as the modern social sciences and their conceptual repertoire(s), the one that put us on the path to liberal democracy, the one that eventuated in the modernist nation-state. This second Age of Revolution began, symbolically – historically, its roots go back a good while – in 1989, with 11/9, the end of the Cold War, and the coming into visibility of a New World Order. Notoriously, for some, this heralded the End of History, the Triumph of Global Capitalism over any other imaginable social-economic order; it was also a time when the global south appeared to be democratizing, when global optimism was on the rise, when 11/9 had not yet given way to 9/11 and the de-democratization of the global north under the sign of security. Whatever else that moment marks, it also heralded a new chapter in the history of social critique – named in the various “post-s” – and in a crisis of representation for the social sciences, which discovered, even though some of its practitioners refused to admit it, that most of their analytical concepts, concepts that derived from modernity and its disciplines, from the disciplining of modernity, worked no longer. To be sure, we can no longer think of concepts like culture, society, economy, or nationality in the ways that we have done for the past 200 years. Little has been put in its place. We have largely evacuated our analytical repertoire as we retreat into neo-empiricism. This, I think, is a direct product of fear of master narratives, a fear of big theories, big determinations. The great utility in critique resides precisely in taking risks. The courage to do so, of course, means accepting that history will surely prove us wrong in the long run. Yet we need to ask the big questions: What does this new age of revolution consist of? Thus far it has accumulated a language, albeit not a theoretically-driven one, a language speaks of market fundamentalism, of neoliberalism, and the like, terms that hover with very clear denotation, but almost no connotation. We have a real problem in social science of the relationship, the rupturing, between sign and referent. We use terms that we refer to generally by fiat and by caveat. We invariably put concrete abstractions like ”neoliberalism” and teleological assertions like ”Africa Rising” in scare quotes, because we are not actually sure what we’re talking about when we speak of them – precisely because their conception remains murky, multivalent, ideological.
The point about theorizing from the South — theorizing from Africa, or India, or Brazil — is not because “better” theory comes from there, but because the South experiences global forces in a particularly edgy way. In fact, in this Age of the Global, all theory is authored in North-South collaborations. Every one of us is, in one or another personified sense, a North- South collaboration. There are no theorists sitting comfortably in the Punjab or in Cape Town who are uncontaminated by, or uninformed of, the North. We’re all collaborations. The question, though, is what does a perspective from the south direct us to by way of questions?
Take the question of “Africa Rising?” It is not, although it is often thought to be, an issue of Afro-optimism or pessimism, negativity or positivity. It is about understanding the global economy. Experientially speaking, that understanding is entirely perspectival. If you’re a banker sitting in New York who wants to invest in property and get a 60 % return on your capital, and you happen to figure out that this is more likely if you buy real estate in Luanda or on Victoria Island, Lagos – whose markets are currently more buoyant than that of Manhattan — Africa is indeed rising. Utopically so. From the perspective of those who suffer capital, however, the current “scramble for Africa” calls to mind Walter Rodney’s “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.” For all the profit to be made from real estate and agribusiness in Africa, more people appear to be dying of starvation, more to go hungry; this in spite of a report put out a couple of years ago by the World Health Organization pointing to the fact that the agricultural return on world agribusiness the year before was enough to feed the planet 2.4 times. In other words, we haven’t even begun to address the issues of redistribution that might make the planet a liveable place for much of its population. More immediately, from the perspective of those Africans who are excess to the requirements of global capital, those who are disposable and effectively excluded from its economies, Africa is not rising at all. For them it is darkly dystopic place. Concomitantly, from an analytic perspective, it is the relationship between the utopic and the dystopic that ought to be entertaining us – and detaining us as a theoretical problem at the very core of the New Global Order, of its long future.
It is this the long story, I think, that Keith wants us to pay attention to. Now, I’m not sure whether we are in the midst of an agrarian revolution or not, I haven’t thought about it enough to pass judgement on the point. But it seems to me that, in effect, what has occurred in the Global South — and this, as I was trying to say, is what Theory from the South is about — is that it has become a harbinger of the history of capital at large. If we think about the current moment in that history as “neoliberal” – again, the scare quotes, the admission of uncertainty about what we may mean by this, beyond an emphasis on the market, on the retraction of the state in favour of the private sector, on the displacement of risk and responsibility from government to citizen, and so on – Africa only fits in part. But what it does point to is that, as an economic ideology-in-formation, “neoliberalism” requires negations, exceptions, non- neoliberal spaces in its midst in order to realize itself. Take the USA: in order to sustain the myth of the market and the success of a form of capitalism that prioritizes finance, the service sector, and entrepreneurialism over manufacture, it has created the fantasy of low unemployment, now officially under 6%. But this doesn’t count its enormous carceral population nor those huge numbers in inner cities, most of them people of color, who have given up on job-seeking entirely. When one adds these figures, the USA has more or less the unemployment rate of your average African country. What is more, it lives with the illusion that a job yields an income; many jobs, even those paid at or marginally above minimum, do not pay sufficient to live on, leaving those who have them requiring two or more to survive. (Which means, ironically, that the USA would require a job rate of well over 100% to have a population that is adequately income’d.) In other words, America can only be neoliberal, viably, to the degree that it sustains a structured universe in which many people are disposable, many permanently under-employed. Only that sort of sociology supports an economy based on finance capital and the global outsourcing of production. America believes it’s a classless society. In a sense that is true: its working class is in Cambodia, in Johannesburg, in Mexico City and its (class-less?) lumpen proletariat is incarcerated, either in prisons or in the ghetto gulags of its inner cities. So we’ve created a sociology “at home,” again, that we only dimly understand, that we barely see. In the Global South these things become extremely visible. You can’t live in Johannesburg or in Cape Town without confronting, every day, the dystopic and the utopic. They live closely together, inseparably intertwined. South Africa is simultaneously neoliberal, preliberal, liberal, and postliberal, all rolled up, in very odd proportions, into one [formation]. It is not alone in this, of course. The utopic ideal of our times uses the terms of market fundamentalism and deregulation to describe itself. Which it does so to produce effects — and those effects, in turn, create a sociology. That sociology, just like the sociology of modernization theory, is both a model for and a model of “reality,” at once an analytic epistemology and an ideological aspiration. As a model of, it provides a pseudo-scientific lexicon to describe the world that it has created in its image; as a model for, it renders that world normative, and departures from it as pathological, deviant, subversive. The same is true of the other social sciences Neoliberal economics is not science. It is an ideologically-founded re-description of the world, as it ought to be according to the Chicago School, in quasi-technical and mathematical terms. The broader point here is that, if we are to understand “Africa Rising,” we have to take on Keith’s issue. What kind of world is a changing Africa producing, what kind of Africa? We already see the emergence of different legal systems, heavily inscribed in what is now being called ”the new governance”; governance, that is, in major part outsourced from the state into labile collaborations of the private, the public, and the interstitial sectors between — of which there are many. It has also produced a doppelgänger economy, an economy that hovers in the domain the alegal, of the il/legal, that we don’t yet fully understand. An enormous proportion of the value production of Africa does not occur in the licit economy at all. It occurs in illicit economies. Organized crime, after all, is the shadow of the contemporary state, and it’s more powerful in Africa than we often appreciate. Indeed, in many African contexts, “the” state is merely a client of organized crime. All of which is to note that, in speaking of “Africa Rising?” we stress the question mark – and avoid the declarative voice.
A few things are to be said about the question of hope and euphoria in the narrative of “Africa Rising?” My daughter was a homeless activist in the US for a long time. A Marxist, she would come home in tears because the people she was trying to radicalize — often Vietnam veterans, people who had not worked for a long time and were absolutely without hope of employment or any sort of future — would say to her, “You know, really, I’m down on my luck. All I need is a suit, all I need is a break, and it will be fine. America is the best country in the world.” The Emersonian dream situates itself deeply even amongst the poorest of Americans, the most hopeless Americans. Hope is a very complex phenomenon: it doesn’t reside in opportunity. In fact, often, the inverse. Hence millennial capitalism and its promise of salvation for all: if we get it right, if we allow the market to develop a strong national economy, all will be well. This is exactly what is being fed by market fundamentalism: if we only open up markets, everybody in the end is going to be better off. And, of course, any number of statisticians in the US will tell you that this is what has actually happened – despite the fact that, all the while, Gini coefficients are rising and real incomes for most people are falling. So much for the discourse of hope. It tends to be largely a petty bourgeois and bourgeois discourse. If you talk to kids with guns in South Africa, they talk about extraction. Hope for many of them lies in the brute power of a weapon. Why wait for a job that isn’t coming when there are much more direct ways of extracting value in a market where violence and crime pay, in which the market in violence is just another market, and criminals are merely rational actors optimising their interests in the most effective possible way. To be sure, crime, including white collar crime, is one of the more profitable spheres of activity in the South African economy at all its levels. Nor, once more, only the South African economy. Which is why understanding it is so fundamental to understanding the emerging global order – and “neoliberalism.”
Ravinder Kaur: The recent push to reimagine the South in its commodity form – emerging markets – allows us to witness the yet unfolding history of neoliberalism. If this hints at the mobility of capital and its capacity to transmutate in ever new forms in its search for cheap labour and resources, then it also discloses the underbelly of millennial capitalism that is as much predicated on the discourse of hope and optimism as on the invisibility of the poor and the marginalised. In what ways might we rethink the critical concepts of sovereignty, security, territory and even revolution in the world of markets?
Keith Hart: The twentieth century generated a contrast between reform and revolution which often led to extreme political conflict. In my own work I have often rejected the notion of an abrupt change between opposite versions of society, focusing rather on how what people are already doing in the cracks, as it were, might be given a new direction and emphasis. But the events of 2011-12 (the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street) led me to question this line and to take revolution seriously again. I never bought the idea that the 1960s and 70s were a revolutionary moment, but the world began to move in the 80s and this movement is far from finished, as John pointed out earlier. Revolutions however are inseparable from war. Each of the major revolutions involved their societies in decades of war and the world wars of last century were catalytic of the anti-colonial revolution, for example. The question is whether and how the current crisis will unleash another world war. If it does, all our assumptions about market dominance will go out of the window, the world economy will shrink, countries like China would go fast into reverse and could even break up. The decades of financial imperialism and global migration from the 1880s led to a very different version of world society after 1914. The Russian economy grew by an average 10% a year from 1890 to 1913. It was the China of its day, but look what happened next.
Related to this, we talk glibly about capitalism, but it’s not obvious to me that capitalism exists anymore, if it ever did. The bourgeois revolution was aimed at particular political forms of property, in which power came from rights of distribution In fact, it’s from this system that the phrase, ”if you want to get ahead, get a gun” comes. The whole point of the bourgeoisie revolution was that it was supposed to shift the sources of wealth and power away from property, politically protected access to rents, to profits based on making stuff in markets cheaper and more effectively than your competitors. For some decades now the chief source of accumulation, revenue to capital if you like, is no longer production for profit; for example Big Pharma in the United States derives from patents granted by Congress a sum in excess of the total value of Medicare. Goldman Sachs was able to use its influence in the White House and the Treasury to get back a 100 % on what it lost through AIG, plus all the other transfers of taxes. Sony, which you might think makes its income from selling entertainment machines, gets 75 % of its revenue from DVDs, which is a form of intellectual property and must be enforced. Of course, it’s also the case that militarism is on the rise, in support of accumulation. So one of the questions that I am pursuing in my book is whether capitalism, especially in Europe and North America, has reverted to a system of rent-seeking that pre- existed the bourgeois revolution itself, and as we know, capitalism in its traditional sense is relocated, especially to Asia, so that what you now have in Brazil and China and India, is something very similar to les trente glorieuses of the post-war period when European and North American countries essentially built welfare states to try and provide some kind of security for the people who’d been drawn into wage employment. Each of these BRICS in its own way, whether you want to call it a welfare state or not, is in the process of trying to do something to secure the livelihoods and interests of the people who’ve been drawn so rapidly into urban commodity production. So the notion of capitalism in its traditional sense only exists in these countries; it no longer exists in the United States or most European countries, and it’s within that framework that I ask what are the forces lining up against each other in a continent like Africa? This leads us back to the notion of revolution. All the classical revolutions involved their countries in wars for three or four decades. The Russian Revolution also provoked a massive series of invasions and extended wars. The Haitian Revolution that my mentor, C L R James wrote about provoked invasions by all the world’s power. The British sent an army of 60.000 men to Haiti to put down the slave revolution, and every one of them died there. This was in the middle of the Napoleonic Wars. Its loss set back the war effort in Europe for five years when Wellington eventually assembled an army of that size. I agree with John, we would probably have different periodizations. I have looked at the whole period from 1776 to the present and it is clear that there are periods of three or four decades each which consist essentially of war and revolution, 1776 to 1815, 1914 to 1945. It is worth raising the point that we may well be, and there are good historical grounds for suggesting it, on the edge of such a period ourselves now. It sounds like scaremongering to say it just like that, but most people here have never been anywhere near a war. I actually was born in one. The houses around me were blasted into smithereens, one in three houses had been demolished where I lived after the war. The British economy only reached the level of 1939 in 1956 (1939 was the Great Depression) and the place was devastated. Nobody was doing anything about it, there was no money and I couldn’t wait to get out. We often ask now if the problem is: are we going back to the 1930s. We should rather ask, are we going back to 1914? The Americans and the Europeans are being pushed by the BRICs, and the only means of competition and resistance they have is military. I was speaking at the World Bank in 2006, and an air force colonel from the Pentagon asked me out for a coffee. He said: “you Europeans have stolen our moral high ground. The Chinese have stolen our manufactures. All we’ve got left is the weapons. I guess it’s double or quits.”
John Comaroff: Let me return here to the question of grand narratives of history. There is no longer a grand narrative, but there ought to be critical space for creating multiple grand narratives which argue with one another. It is what we lost with the end of the Cold War and the de-Marxification of the Western academy. Before then, the scholarly world was redolent with argumentation, almost to the point of cacophony. Some of it was noise, but much of it was productive. It didn’t matter which positions were right or wrong; of course, none were either in any simple, absolute sense. But the fact of argumentation itself was fundamental to understanding the world, its contradictions and its forms of violence, the value it was capable of producing and the destruction it often wrought. I think that what Keith is saying is that we have to have that sort of argument again, one over the nature and future directions of world history is. It doesn’t matter if we differ over the details. It matters that we take on the question. After all, one of the features of the “neoliberal” moment, whatever else it is, is its tendency to dehistorize history, to live entirely in the continuing present. Presentism becomes, as it were, the only tense of contemporary thought. Market fundamentalism has no real long run, only short runs. Which has all sorts of implications.
Keith Hart: I think that one of my original contributions is to revive the notion of liberal revolution as a form of insurgency and emancipation. Liberal revolutions are not the kind of revolution that dominated the 20th century, which were worker, peasant, socialist revolutions in the main. A lot of contemporary discourse to some extent addresses the notion of freedom and it is clearly connected to markets, a particular notion of democracy and so on. The US still stands as the global symbol for this successful, liberal revolution.
John Comaroff: You’re absolutely right to raise this possibility, to think about decolonizing the hegemonic idea of revolution that prevailed during the 20th century. The answer is very difficult. There are certainly parts of Africa in which there is still aspirational talk about social redistribution under a social democratic regime; in which it is commonly said that rampant neoliberalism – and yes, the term is commonly invoked in many parts of the continent — has produced many more problems than it solved. If it [i.e. neoliberalism] were to work its putative magic, we would all like to be bankers. And we would all be successful entrepreneurs. But it has not. Hence the widespread desire for the return of the state — in its uncorrupted form. But there is also another capitalism-as-fantasy that takes its symbolic imagery not from America, but from the likes of Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew has reappeared as a powerful trope after 9/11 and the Patriot Act. This is when suddenly, in the USA and in parts of Africa, one heard voices that said: “Well, America has become every bit as authoritarian as Singapore, but without the benefits; in Singapore at least you’re probably going to get a job, healthcare and housing, none of which is guaranteed in America. There are now African chiefs who regularly go to Singapore with the intention of rebuilding their chiefdoms on the Singaporian model. This is where, I think, if I may say, Keith, the issue that you have raised [implicitly], and have glossed over, is “What kind of politics goes with the form of capitalism brought about by liberal revolution? This is a big question. I am less hopeful for a liberal revolution…
Keith Hart: No, I am not optimistically predicting a liberal revolution. I am saying that the antidote to the old regime is a liberal revolution. I have absolutely no idea if or how it would take place. That’s why I’m not saying anything about Africa Rising either.
John Comaroff: I take your point. What I was trying to say, though, is that we have not addressed the various political alternatives that are seeking to forge relations with [neoliberal] capitalism. Nor are these merely political models. Because politics is relocating itself in law all over the place, they are also legal regimes. We have to analyse contemporary capitalism not merely as economy, but as politico-legal economy, and understand the possibility of liberal social revolutions in those terms.
Ravinder Kaur: So how can we possibly recover the political in this particular form of capitalism of which techno-friendly, authoritarian Singapore has become a popular sign?
Keith Hart: Our first task is question the usefulness of terms like capitalism and neoliberalism is the questions we want answers to are basically political and require a nuanced approach to history. I find it convenient to juxtapose African societies today with some what goes under the omnibus label of an Old Regime. In the course of examining what liberal revolutions were supposed to be and have become, I have been led both to interrogate blanket usage of a term like capitalism and to select elements that I find useful for thinking about what lies ahead for Africans. John has provided some stimulating images of how we might think of developments in the US, South Africa etc, with an emphasis on crime. I have recently published an article called “Why the informal economy has taken over the world” which focuses on how neoliberal deregulation has led to the criminalization of corporate capitalism. These are all rather partial analyses offering much overlap between us. But I do not equate the US today with its 18th century origins even if its myth does. Georg Simmel in “The metropolis and mental life” offers a brilliant commentary on how notions of freedom had evolved from the 18th century to around 1900. I will just mention, however that the original driver of liberal revolutions was freedom of movement and trade. Our current disposition the same claim, but it is false. Then the mass of ordinary people were pegged down into the ground, impeded in their everyday lives and in their movement, so that they could be leeched off. These conditions are not universal now, but my bet is that they describe how many Africans suffer today. In Africa not only are there 54 states trying to get what they can off travellers across their borders, but everywhere you move, you are subject to predation from local thugs. A car produced in China costs 5000 dollars to make and ship to Tanzania. That same car costs 4000 dollars to get from Tanzania to Kampala (under 1000 km). And if you look at all those revolutions, the Italian, the German, the American and so on, what they were most concerned about was expanding and freeing up a home market which could then be protected from some of the larger players in the world at the time. Many Africans traveling over paths that they have used for centuries are routinely criminalized and harassed not only at national borders, but at many other points in between. At some stage I’m assuming some kind of political movement will tap into that sense of humiliation and restriction that Africans routinely have to endure. For any notion of revolution, we need a theory of what is likely to get people to move and fight on an effective scale. I can’t claim to know that now, but I do believe that the present situation is intolerable and I will take my chances on whether what I have to say resonates with that.
I earlier hinted that Africa’s demographic expansion has only one precedent: Europeans in the 19th century. (Although Asia in the 20th century might be another). I also pointed out how Europe’s population has collapsed since. The idea that the game is up for Europe is not usually discussed at conferences there. Europe is on the way down, it can’t reproduce itself, can’t even defend itself and it hasn’t got a coherent economic strategy. They hate the people who come there to work for their pensions. In an article called “The Rise and Fall of Europe,” I reminded readers that the Europeans launched two world wars and they could easily drag us into another or at least into a global equity meltdown when their currency collapses. I’m not interested in radical solutions for their own sake (?), but I think that how China, India, and Brazil handle this particular moment in their own political economy, and whether it leads to a significant breakdown or to some kind of positive way forward, is of immense significance for the rest of the world. The other important question is whether the Americans can be prevented from unleashing the third World War.
John Comaroff: Can I pick up the question? I think there are two pieces to it. One is basically an activist issue, which is how one creates a politics appropriate to the historical moment. The other is a political-sociological one, i.e., what is actually emerging in the Global South under the impact of the various forms of economy that are taking shape in that part of the world. This latter question is complicated because so much of ordinary political life has shifted away from the conventional structures and processes, away from elections, away from political parties, into various forms of people’s movements. I don’t only mean new social movements but a very wide range of forms of social action and association. This takes us back to the eternal question of sovereignty: what has occurred across the Global South is a radical shift in the nature of sovereignty. We are used to sovereignty being a vertically structured, emanating from and centred monopolistically in the state. Across much of Africa, sovereignty has lateralized: states control part of the landscape, but other parts are controlled by organized religion, by organized crime, by enclaved corporate structures, by ethnic groups, and so on, all of which mimic the state to a greater or lesser degree. We live in an age which inverts Charles Tilly’s famous thesis that the modern state arises out of organized crime, mimicking its forms as it legitimizes its authority over the use of force and the extraction of taxes. Nowadays organized crime, organized religion, ethnic groups and the like mimic the state and create simulacra of it. They create simulacral legal systems, creating administrative systems, systems of extraction (a.k.a. taxation), and so on. Where this happens, a patchwork of sovereign domains emerge. These tend to become the sites in and through which local politics are vectored, in which social movements demand basic services, in which people demand jobs, in which they speak the language of redistribution. The precise terms vary depending, depending on context. For example in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, they’re about access to the proceeds of extraction; in parts of Tanzania, about piracy as a mode of redistributing wealth. As demands for rights and redistribution vary, so they create different species and spaces of politics. Now, the big question for activists is: Can those politics be mobilized? How exactly? For what? Ultimately, an anti-politics directed against the state makes no sense in most places, because that it is not in the state where power is actually concentrated. If power is deflected into the corporate world, into organized crime or religion or ethnicity – and especially when these things are transnational — fighting the state is futile. And even when the struggle is directed the state, it is often best fought by legal rather than conventional political means, since they are more likely to be effective. Not always, of course, and maybe not even often. But sometimes. Those fights, though, are a very complicated business, because lawfare, to have any chance of succeeding, involves difficult strategic decisions; decisions about, for one thing, jurisdictions, since geo-legal regimes are not all alike for purposes of fighting ones battles; decisions also about what species of the law to which to appeal in making claims and righting wrongs – tort law, say, or constitutional protections for minorities, or intellectual property statutes, or human rights jurisprudence, although this last, despite popular stereotypes is usually a very weak instrument with which to fight for anything much. To complicate matters, these various legal instruments have different purchase in different jurisdictions, globally speaking. In fact, the emerging maps of political struggle these days are not usefully orientated around the international systems of nation- states, but around legal jurisdictions. So, for example – this is an example that actually happened – you happen to be an indigenous (“Indio”) group in Nicaragua whose land is being taken away from you by a Korean lumber company under an agreement with the Nicaraguan government, appeal to a Nicaraguan court would be less effective that appeal to the Inter-American court. (The indigenous group, which deployed a very subtle legal argument in the effort to regain their territory, won their action in that court.) This is where the judicialization of politics becomes complicated. But it is becoming more and more ubiquitous, as people’s movements of various sorts across the world are turning to lawfare to fight their causes.
Keith Hart: That’s excellent, John. If we could merge your knowledge of law with mine of economy, we might have something. I was too glib in my initial responses. I have drawn a lot, personally and collectively from political forms and movements coming out of Latin America, including from the World Social Forum in 2001, which I’ve been part of for fifteen years in terms of developing alternative approaches to research and activism. But there’s a particular label that came out of the 1990’s, after the lost decade in Latin America, called popular economy, and the idea of popular economy is important, because first of all, it involves, normatively, alliances between urban informal workers, peasants and so on, but also elements from large organized political life, including progressive regimes, the unions and so forth, so these are coalitions that cross-cut notions of the state and capital and organized labour, peasantries and informal workers and so on, and they have been implemented, I think, quite successfully in various countries, including Brazil and Bolivia. So I think that Latin America is still a very powerful source of creative insurrection, new political ideas and organizations. Certainly, I have learnt a great deal from them. Indeed the whole alter- globalization movement the idea of mobilizing globally for a different vision of the world, all of this has been developed most effectively in Latin America.
Insurgency or insurrection is not revolution and Tahrir Square is the best recent example of that. On the other hand, C. L. R. James wrote about and studied revolution all his life, and I agree, obviously we can’t, as Heraclitus said, step into the same river twice, but I think we can profitably study the history of revolutions. For example, “Marxism and insurgency” which is on marxists.org, is a letter written by Lenin to the party in September 1917, where he explains why he was now urging the Bolsheviks to support a general revolutionary movement, and in July he had opposed the idea. It’s an extraordinary letter because he also lays out there the general conditions, in his view, for taking this step. Of course, what happened in between was that the Russians had pulled out of the war and there were all these people coming back from the front, mixing with the soviets in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and he thought this was a good time to go. In fact by October the revolution was a done deal. This was someone who in January in Zurich addressed the Swiss young comrades and said he did not expect a revolution in his lifetime. Or read Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, which is 1300 pages and takes place over nine months, from February to October. Some meetings, in which he took part, take forty pages. So, I can’t imagine any other way of thinking about revolution than by engaging in historical analysis. The power of contingency is too great for us to rely only on abstract analysis. James used to say that, in any country, there are only ever maybe 40.000 activists that is people who dedicate their lives to political change. Everyone else just wants to keep what they’ve got. And he said that’s a good thing, we don’t want a society where everyone is like me, living to turn everything upside down all the time. But he also argued that there are revolutionary moments which he had studied closely, when people who before would do anything not to jeopardize what they’re trying to hold on to, suddenly discover that they’ve lost most of it and at that point, people in general begin to move and accept coordination by the activists. So, I agree with you on your general issue about neo-empiricism, John. I have taken the view, which is a Braudelian line, that the way to go is to be empirical, but to expand the range of what you’re writing about. As for whether or not this can be sustained, I’m sure that nobody in his right mind would ever consider my book to be adequately researched and supported, but it’s like Kant said in his anthropology, what we need is horizon thinking, backed up by vivid anecdotes that are nearer to the lives of our audience. And this is not a question of finding either theoretical or empirical proofs for a general idea or an expanded empirical account. Since this is probably going to be the last time that I have the floor today, I would like to say how rewarding it has been to be in your company.
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Lecture: Interrogating the Global Dis/Order
New York – In 2018, John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff spoke at The New School for Social Research about
“Crime, Sovereignty, and the State: the Metaphysics of Global Disorder.” “The Global South” has become a shorthand for the universe of non-European, postcolonial peoples; it is that half of the planet about which, conventionally, the “Global North” spins theories. Rarely is it seen as a source of explanations for world historical processes, past or present, let alone as the source of those processes. Yet, as much of the northern hemisphere experiences increasing fiscal inscrutability and rising inequality, state privatization, crime and corruption, ethnic conflict, authoritarian populism, and other “crises,” it looks as though it is evolving southward, so to speak. Is this so? Might the relation of “north” and “south” be more a matter of complementary inequity, more a construct of the dialectical imagination, than a hard-and-fast empirical reality? In this seminar, we shall reverse the usual order of things, addressing a range of familiar themes in order to theorize them anew from the “eccentric location” of the “south,” broadly conceived: among those themes, neoliberalism and its futures; the changing relations among capital, the state and governance; democracy, authoritarian populism, and new forms of political life; the fetishism of the law and the judicialization of the public sphere; the paradoxes of twenty-first century nationhood and its jurisdictions; new magical economies; the crisis of liberalism; the meaning of crime and the metaphysics of disorder; and the present and future political economy of identity. This re-imagining of the contemporary global dis/order renders key problems of our time at once strange and familiar, giving an ironic twist to the evolutionary pathways long assumed by social scientists.
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Interrogating the Global Dis/Order
New York – In 2018, John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff spoke at The New School for Social Research about “Crime, Sovereignty, and the State: the Metaphysics of Global Disorder.” “The Global South” has become a shorthand for the universe of non-European, postcolonial peoples; it is that half of the planet about which, conventionally, the “Global North” spins theories. Rarely is it seen as a source of explanations for world historical processes, past or present, let alone as the source of those processes. Yet, as much of the northern hemisphere experiences increasing fiscal inscrutability and rising inequality, state privatization, crime and corruption, ethnic conflict, authoritarian populism, and other “crises,” it looks as though it is evolving southward, so to speak. Is this so? Might the relation of “north” and “south” be more a matter of complementary inequity, more a construct of the dialectical imagination, than a hard-and-fast empirical reality? In this seminar, we shall reverse the usual order of things, addressing a range of familiar themes in order to theorize them anew from the “eccentric location” of the “south,” broadly conceived: among those themes, neoliberalism and its futures; the changing relations among capital, the state and governance; democracy, authoritarian populism, and new forms of political life; the fetishism of the law and the judicialization of the public sphere; the paradoxes of twenty-first century nationhood and its jurisdictions; new magical economies; the crisis of liberalism; the meaning of crime and the metaphysics of disorder; and the present and future political economy of identity. This re-imagining of the contemporary global dis/order renders key problems of our time at once strange and familiar, giving an ironic twist to the evolutionary pathways long assumed by social scientists.
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The Legalization of Everyday Life
The Legalization of Everyday Life: Reflections on Law/fare, Politics, and the History of the Present. Interview with Andrea Kretschmann, Special edition on “Wissen im Recht,” (eds.) Andrea Kretschmann, Caroline Voithofer, and Christoph Stoll. Juridikum 2:257- 63, 2018.
John Comaroff is the Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African-American Studies and of Anthropology, and Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies, at Harvard University. Before moving to Harvard in 2012, he held a Distinguished Professorships at the University of Chicago and a Research Professorship at the American Bar Foundation; he is also an Honorary Professor at the University of Cape Town. Besides his influential work on African and African-American societies and post-coloniality, much of it co-authored with his wife Jean Comaroff, he is known for his publications on the role of law in capitalist societies. With books such as “Rules and Processes. The Cultural Logic of Dispute in and African Context”1, “Law and Disorder in the Postcolony“ 2, and his works on law and witchcraft3, he has gained a high profile also beyond anthropology, in the field of law & society. For the special juridikum issue on „Knowledge in Law“ Andrea Kretschman has interviewed John Comaroff regarding the contemporary role of the law and its significance for lay people.
Kretschmann: John, in your writings over the past decade, you have made the point that, almost globally, we have seen processes of judicialization reach into ever more domains of life, both ordinary and epic. Why have you been so insistent on this, and do you continue to think it true? To what historical forces do you attribute this tendency?
Comaroff: Yes, I do think that the reach of judicialization into ever more domains of public and private life is, and continues to be, an essential feature of the world in which we live. The reason that I have been so insistent on this is that I believe it to be symptomatic of something that runs way beyond, or rather beneath, the surfaces of everyday social, economic, and political life; indeed, it runs to the essence of “life itself” – that favored phrase of contemporary theory-work – determining, among many other things, who lives, who dies, and under what elemental conditions. At core, we are seeing, unfold before us, the unraveling of the classical liberal social contract and, with it, the notion of a commonweal, of ethical civility, even of society, sui generis; this last a dying modernist abstraction that has given way to keywords like “the network” and ciphers like “the community,” neither of which have any intrinsic meaning beyond the metaphorical. The process is uneven in both its temporality and its locations, but it seems an unmistakeable corollary of the social tendency that tends, these days, to be dubbed, loosely, “neoliberal”; loosely because, sensu stricto “neoliberalism” does not refer to an ahistorical “formation,” an ordinary noun, an accomplished state of being in the world. To the contrary, it is a shape- shifter, describing a broad historical trajectory, a more or less polymorphous, more or less integrated concatenation of elements – again, practical and ideological, moral and material, cultural and cognitive – moving through time, transforming itself to the siren call of the moment as it is acted in and upon, conceptualized, and actualized. Its economic diacritica, as it has become commonplace to observe, lie in deregulation, financialization, and privatization; in the withdrawal of welfare and other (worker, consumer, citizen) protections; in rising inequality and dropping real incomes for all but the very rich – there is a radical aporia these days between a job and a livable income, the former ever less likely to assure the latter – along with the increasing impetus on individual citizens to take responsibility for their own well-being, for the risks and uncertainties they face, for the cost- benefit choices they make.
In this world, it is the logic of the market, rather than morality or sociality or culture, that perforce organizes – and, yes, constrains – our conceptual horizons and everyday practices. Apart from some obvious concomitants of this historical shift, like the de-democratization of the polis almost everywhere, the citizen-subject is no longer contractually entitled to constitutional or social protections, only to legal entitlements for whose realization s/he is also responsible. To be sure, the lingua franca of the neoliberal moment is the language of rights and the rule of law. We, as human beings – in an age seen ever more as post-human – have become the embodied fusion of homo juralis and homo economicus. Under these conditions, the primary recourse open to people for purposes of protecting their personhood, their property, and the benefits of citizenship, or for seeking compensation for violation or injury, is by asserting those rights. At least in theory. Which is why the juridical has come to saturate our imaginings; as a fetish, it appears – and I stress appears – to have the capacity to bring about a more equitable world, to be a means to just ends. Law, ultimately, is a currency of commensuration, a vehicle, like money, for asserting, negotiating, and transacting the value of contested relations, commodities, bodies, even being-in-the- world. And like all currencies, it is unequally distributed: some people have greater access to it than do others, some are more protected by it than are others, some are better placed than others to use it to their own benefit – even though “in principle” we are all equal before the law. Or, more accurately, unequally equal.
The tendency to take refuge in the law, to turn to it as a means of intimidation, justification, or self-protection – itself evidence of the increasing ubiquity of judicialization – has infected social and political life in the USA as never before. Rarely a week goes by without Donald Trump and his administration threating suit or appealing to the courts for something or other, either personal or governmental; or conversely, being threatened with suit or taken to court. It is a process that has become a daily drama, modeled, of course, on the grotesque spectacle “reality” TV. But it has real effects, all the more so since, at least in its governmental dimensions, many of the suits involve attacks on the rights of citizens – especially poor citizens, people of color, and immigrants – while, at the same time, defending corporations for their violations of the environment, of the health and safety their workers and customers, and so on; violations, as I said a moment ago, that may involve life or death. It is not hard to find examples: the legal exoneration of businesses that poison water supplies and soils, with fatal consequences; or the denial, by limiting medical insurance, of access to life-preserving care; or the immunity given to private security and state police when they kill young, unarmed black men. Nor is this confined to the USA. My own homeland, South Africa, for example, while not as extreme as the USA in the violence it deals out to its own citizens, is equally prone to judicialization. So, too, is Brazil: witness the fight in recent years for political control conducted by its right wing through the criminalization of leaders of the Workers’ Party – culminating if the parliamentary coup against President Dilma Rousseff and the indictment of ex-President Ignacio Lula – all of it effected through lawfare, the commissioning of the violence inherent in the law for political ends.
Kretschmann: What effects has the legalization of everyday life for the individuals?
Comaroff: The saturation of public discourse with talk of rights of all sorts has, I believe, insinuated a sense of legal consciousness into citizens everywhere, both as individuals and as the bearers of collective identities. Nor only citizens, even more so those who lack the rights of citizenship by virtue of being undocumented migrants, refugees, criminalized subjects, displaced persons. Not everyone, of course: cognizance and consciousness of legality obviously varies. And it has its exclusions. But, as Guiseppe Dalla Torre, a leading Catholic intellectual, suggested just before the millennium in a Vatican journal, a “culture of legality” has come to dominate our age, an age in which humanity knows itself increasingly as homo juralis. In many parts of the world, there is an almost autonomic tendency to respond to any sense of violation or injury – however slight, however varied – by turning to the language of the law in contemplating remedy. This tendency is stoked by mass media in all its registers: fantasy, fiction, drama, documentary, comedy, commentary, all of which give disproportionate time and attention to matters il/legal. There is no doubt, either, that the capillary spread of legal consciousness and the popular sense of a “right to rights” has been exacerbated by the proliferation of legal NGOs that seek to give access to “justice” to people who would otherwise not have it; also, in many nation-states, by the growing criminalization of race and poverty, the “get tough on crime” impulse to incarcerate for ever more petty offences, the spread of legal institutions and, to repeat myself, recourse to lawfare for a wide variety of political ends.
At the same time, as noted earlier, access to the law, in practice, is anything but equal. For all the efforts of NGOs, social activist lawyers, and the like, structural lines of social inequality replicate themselves in the degree to which ordinary legalities – and, more dramatically, lawfare – favor the rich over the poor, capital over labor, the powerful over the disempowered; as Carlos Fuentes once said, it is power that begets rights not rights that beget power. But not always. In our Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Jean Comaroff and I document examples of insurgent lawfare, cases in which minorities of one kind or another have deployed available jurisdictions and jurisprudence – or have had them deployed in their name – to secure rights, recompense, restitution, and recognition for their claims. The processes involved are rarely straightforward, however: sometimes “little people” win legal decisions, only lose out as those judgments are not implemented. In short, while lawfare yields the possibility of political transgression and transformation, realpolitik and the facts of social structure typically intervene between law and justice.
Kretschmann: Do the effects you describe interact with changes of the individuals’ perception of law? How do their knowledge and meaning of the law changes in parallel to the process you describe, and how their use of the law?
Clearly, the social effects of the neoliberal turn in reconstituting the citizen-subject as a fusion of homo economicus and homo juralis – a radically individuated persona in a historical formation founded less on a moral order or a social compact than on rhizomatic networks of contractual relations – is dialectically entailed in the forms of legal consciousness and action that pervade our world in the early twenty-first century.
Kretschmann: Taking into account rising legal consciousness in so many parts of the world these days, what judicial protections or legal rights can citizens, individually or collectively, deploy to address social, economic, moral, and cultural privation, violation, or exclusion – and with what effects?
Comaroff: This is an important question, since it is a more technical one than it seems. The reflex answer nowadays is to invoke human rights (HR) in one or another form; this itself being a manifestation, a fusion in the neoliberal moment of the rising fetishism of the law and the global turn to HR – whose genesis lies, mythically, in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration (UDHR) of 1948, the terms of which, translated into more than 500 languages, are flouted much more frequently by ruling regimes across the globe than they are respected. Without disputing the political and ethical importance of a focus on human rights in an increasingly anti-liberal age, they tend, in practice, to make for weak legal remedies. Indeed, in many nation-states, there is no effective HR jurisprudence, per se, under which to make claims against anything or anyone. It is always critical, in the individual or collective pursuit of justice, to appeal to the strongest form of jurisprudence and the most capacious, most sympathetic jurisdiction available. The specifics depend on context, obviously. We all know about forum shopping and the effort to fight suits – be they civil or criminal – in politically, culturally, and ideologically favorable jural environments. Which is why recent US presidents and parties have expended so much effort to stack the federal judiciary with partisan-compliant judges, judges who might be expected to deliver the “right” decisions. The issue of jurisprudence is more complicated: across the planet, in both intra-national and international actions, canny litigators pay a great deal of attention to framing their suits with reference to the kinds of “hard” law most likely to be effective for their purposes. Does one indict a warlord or a former regime for murder, for genocide, for mass rape, for a crime against humanity, for property violations? Does one sue the defendant/s in question also in a civil suit for reparations, the restoration of land, the repatriation of the remains of the dead? I could go on ad infinitum: the routes through the means of the law – through its geography and jurisprudence, its institutions and horizons, its normative practices and its ends – are always highly variable. But the way in which those routes are navigated can, and do, make a huge difference.
This is especially salient for social movements, not least movements that essay the cause of those who (or which) ostensibly have rights but do not act or speak for themselves: fetuses, animals, religious deities, the environment, inanimate objects. Both the strategic reading and the tactical deployment of legal geographies – of the institutions or jurisdictions or jurisprudence likely to prove conducive to juridical action/s – are often critical in accomplishing socio-political ends. At the same time, of course, the prescribed norms of juridical processes everywhere – prevailing procedural practices, rules of evidence, questions of standing – limit the ways in which the law may be engaged for those ends. Jean Comaroff and I published an essay in one of our books a few years back entitled “History on Trial”. It argues that, more and more these days, to make historical claims for recognition and/or for rights of various sorts, ethnic and religious groups, as well and others who see themselves as afflicted by collective injury, find it necessary to take to the courts to validate those claims; without legal ratification, recognition and rights alike remain immanent, unrealized, an abstraction awaiting concretization. But recourse to the law has its costs and constraints. It requires framing a narrative that the judiciary can cognize and address, one that must perforce pare down their history – which they typically tell themselves in the “thick” terminology of trials and trauma and tribulations, of resistance and redemption – to the “thin,” redundant-free language of facts and rules. Frequently, litigants seeking to reclaim their past from the violations they have suffered object loudly to having to reduce and translate their story, one that they desperately desire to have heard, to the bare bones necessary to win their struggles in court. It is a tough experiential and existential bargain. After all, the law is not necessarily their battleground of choice. Resort to it, even when successful in material and political terms may have deep affective, ethical, and aesthetic downsides.
Kretschmann: When you are talking about an increase of recourse to the law and of political struggles in law, caused by a spread of legal consciousness and a popular sense of a “right to rights”: would you characterize this as an increase of emancipatory struggle against the background of increased opportunity of addressing the state? Or rather as a shift from the political sphere towards the sphere of the law?
Comaroff: Again, a complicated issue. To take the second part of the question first: the judicialization of politics, in its many forms, appears as a shift of collective action from the political to the legal domain. But what it suggests, I think, is the erasure of the line as we have long conceived of it in Euromodernist liberal thought; or, more accurately, it points to a morphing of that line into a new alignment in which political ends seek out legal means, not least because of the persistent impression – itself a corollary of its fetishization – that the law has the capacity, the numimous power, to bring about enforceable ends. Of course, the line between the political and the legal, wrapped up together in the political theology of sovereignty, has always been more a membrane than a moat: a porous, translucent filter, sometimes enforcing real or imagined spheres of distinction, sometimes a conduit between different species of collective action and their legitimation. In the contemporary moment, it has become more of the latter than the former; hence the conduct of so much that we have long of as normatively “political” by an almost autonomic turn to the institutions of the law. The first part of the question refers to the extent to which the judicialization of political struggle, and rising legal consciousness, has emancipatory potential, especially for those who assert a “right to rights” against the state. The deployment of legalities by the disempowered against the powerful – we refer to it, in Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, as “insurgent lawfare” – does have emancipatory potential. It has opened up possibilities and sites of social action to populations for whom mass politics have proven ineffective. Indigenous Brazilian Indians, for example, have won cases in the country’s highest courts against the state. So, a couple of years back, in the Constitutional Court of South Africa, did Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shack dwellers’ movement against a government long bitterly hostile to it. There are plenty of other examples. But many have failed as well. It is a well-worn truism that the law tends, proportionately, to favor the politically and financially well-resourced. At the same time, are many NGOs and activist lawyers skilled in insurgent lawfare that, increasingly and with gradually increasing success, are taking up the cause of those who claim recognition, rights, and recompense hitherto denied them. What, in sum, the latter- day judicialization of politics has done is to create another domain of emancipatory praxis. Like all such domains, however, it is not one in which things are easily accomplished. As this implies, it behooves social movements to come to understand the theory and practice of insurgent lawfare – a much more complex species of politics than may first appear – if they are to exploit and expand its emancipatory potential, and to address its dangers and downsides and difficulties, in the cause of righting the wrongs of an increasingly unequal, structurally violent, and unfree world.
Kretschmann: Thank you very much for the interview, John.
Prof. Dr. John Comaroff is Professor Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African-American Studies and of Anthropology, and Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies, at Harvard University; jcomaroff@fas.harvard.edu
Dr. Andrea Kretschmann is scientific researcher and leader of the department “Crisis and Constitution of Societal Orders” at Centre Marc Bloch, affiliated institute of Humboldt University of Berlin; andrea.kretschmann@cmb.hu-berlin.de
1Comaroff/Roberts 1981. Rules and Processes. The Cultural Logic of Dispute in and African Context, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
2Comaroff/Comaroff 2006. Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 3Comaroff/Comaroff eds. 1993. Modernity and its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Comaroff /Comaroff, eds. 1999. Occult economies and the violence of abstraction: Notes from the South African postcolony, in: American Ethnologist 26 (2), 279–303.
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Southern Futures
RK: The 2013 Human Development Report entitled The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World offered an optimistic account of the ‘rise’ of the Southern nations long seen as ‘lagging behind’ the Northern industrialised nations. Celebrating the “unprecedented scale and speed” of this rise, the uplifting narrative pitched Asia, Africa and Latin America as having “move(d) up the development ladder” at a moment when the “developed economies had stopped growing during the 2008-9 financial crisis.” Thinking through, and against, this narrative, how can we critically theorise the notion of ‘rise’ that has become shorthand for this dramatic transformation in the sign of the South?
Keith Hart For some time now I have been writing a book, Africa’s Coming Revolution: Prospects for economic development. It began as a critique of Afro-pessimism a decade ago. Since then “Africa rising” has become a commonplace of media and even some academic discourse. I believe that Africa could now overcome historic handicaps that were both endogenous and externally imposed. But this will entail prolonged struggle to replace 54 nation-states with federated political units employing economic strategies conducive to that end. I locate Africa’s historical trajectory as a play in three acts from 1800 to 2100, a period when world society is being formed. If it is not, there will be no 22nd century. In the 19th century this process was driven by European imperialism fuelled by by a European population explosion from 1830 to 1930. By 1900, Europeans controlled 80% of the inhabited land surface. Europe itself then had 25 % of the world population, three times Africa’s. Today, Asia accounts for 60 % of the world’s population, Africa 15 %, and the Americas, Europe, Russia, Australasia, and Oceania 25 %.
The projections for the end of this century are quite extraordinary. The UN projects that Africa will then account for 40 % of the world’s population; Asia, 42 %; and the rest just 18 %. And Europe will have only 6 % of the world’s population. So in the space of a couple of hundred years, Europe will have gone from 25% to 6 % of the world’s population, and Africa from 7.5 % to a projected 40 %.
If world society was formed in the 19th century by European imperialism, the principal event of the 20th century was the anticolonial revolution, whereby peoples coerced into a European- dominated world society now sought their own independent relationship to it. In the case of Asia, one can argue that this anticolonial revolution was completed, but not in Africa. The question then arises, what can we expect in the 21st century given these extraordinary demographic shifts and the likely changes in the balance of regional power? I’m not proposing Africa rising or suggesting that their demographic preponderance, which is so recent and so large, adds up to anything positive or negative. I do, however, argue that the world will have to come to terms with the fact that two out of five human beings will live in Africa by the end of this century, and that this will pose a challenge to the racialized world order that has evolved over centuries in which Africans have consistently been classified on the bottom rung. The question that I’ve been posing since I was a graduate student in the 60’s, is whether and how Africa might be able to establish a more equal relationship to the rest of the world on the basis of these developments. My other question concerns the political forms that will dominate the coming century. Some of the largest countries are already federal – Russia, the United States, India, China, Brazil and so on – and I would argue that one of the features of our world has already been established as a movement towards regional trade federations. So, could Africa make a move in that direction and under what circumstances? It’s not as if Africa doesn’t have regional trade federations already, in the form of ECOWAS, SADC and others, but it’s a question of how effective they might be in renegotiating relations with the world economy. The main obstacle Africans face to improving their situation under these conditions is the political system that predominates there at this time. In most cases African countries are governed by political elites who depend far more on foreign powers than on their own people for their political economy and even legitimacy.
At the core of my book is a concern with the possible forms for the development of markets in Africa in the coming century. My basic assumption is that Africa is now labouring under structures that are analogous to the old regime before the French Revolution, and that African economic progress will depend on a series of liberal revolutions there; so we have to understand how the classical liberal revolutions overthrew old regimes in the United States, Germany, Italy, France and elsewhere. I’ve spent a good deal of my time analysing the dynamics of these revolutions, and I’ve concluded that, in every case, a major component was the participation of significant sections of capital. For example the shippers of Nantes and Bordeaux in the French Revolution and the industrialists of Milan and Turin in the Italian revolution. Some elements of capital, along with political powers, such as the Prussians in the case of German unification, are essential to establish forms of market integration from which Africans, I imagine, would benefit.
These conditions should release African political energies in a piecemeal way, not immediately at the continental level. Of course parties, such as the United States, China, France and other countries will also influence these outcomes. But the fundamental question I raise is: What political means, based on various historical analogies as well as on knowledge of Africa today, might be available for Africans to derive some benefit from this demographic explosion and its likely economic consequences?
John Comaroff: As always, with his characteristic critical flair, Keith provokes us to think on a very broad canvas across both space and time — which I appreciate alike for political and intellectual reasons. Let me start with a couple of your questions and provocations, Ravinder, and work back to some of the issues that Keith has raised. First of all, I believe that we are living at an historical juncture of rupture, recalibration, reconfiguration. This is a moment in the global history of capital fraught with contradiction and indeterminacy, with violence and inequality – with a counterpoint, that is, of violent inequality and an inequality of violence – whose effect has been to bring the human condition itself into question: as ever more humans become disposable, as the material well-being of ordinary people is increasingly chipped away by falling real incomes and rising debt, as the environment is damaged beyond repair, as infrastructure erodes, as the public sphere and the commonweal are cut back in order to make ever more safe space for the market and its forms of privateering, the social reproduction of the world we once knew is anything but certain. One might infer that all this calls for a radical re-analysis of the history of the present and of the futures that it portends. But ours is an age in which it is very difficult to talk about solutions to anything – or, at least solutions that go beyond technical patches, beyond fixes of the very short run — a situation exacerbated by a fear of dominant narratives, of historical explanation writ large, of theorizing the Big Picture. The flight of the social sciences in the Global North from theory tout court underscores the importance of the sort of challenge with which Keith is confronting us. Our own discipline, anthropology, has fallen into a form of neo-empiricism that romances the local and the contingent and ignores the structural and the global; sociology has been suffering its own, parallel crises of identity, epistemology, and representation; and economics stands accused of taking flight into ever more abstract, ever more abstruse mathematical modelling, detached from anything that resembles the living world. All of which makes it plain that the Courage to Theorize, upper case, to ask the Big Questions, is in short supply right now, at a time when it is as critically necessary as it has ever been. Perhaps even more so.
One advantage of looking at the world over a three hundred year span is that it enables us to see that we may have entered an Age of Revolution not unlike the one between 1789 and 1848, the one that gave us much of what we have come to think of as the modern social sciences and their conceptual repertoire(s), the one that put us on the path to liberal democracy, the one that eventuated in the modernist nation-state. This second Age of Revolution began, symbolically – historically, its roots go back a good while – in 1989, with 11/9, the end of the Cold War, and the coming into visibility of a New World Order. Notoriously, for some, this heralded the End of History, the Triumph of Global Capitalism over any other imaginable social-economic order; it was also a time when the global south appeared to be democratizing, when global optimism was on the rise, when 11/9 had not yet given way to 9/11 and the de-democratization of the global north under the sign of security. Whatever else that moment marks, it also heralded a new chapter in the history of social critique – named in the various “post-s” – and in a crisis of representation for the social sciences, which discovered, even though some of its practitioners refused to admit it, that most of their analytical concepts, concepts that derived from modernity and its disciplines, from the disciplining of modernity, worked no longer. To be sure, we can no longer think of concepts like culture, society, economy, or nationality in the ways that we have done for the past 200 years. Little has been put in its place. We have largely evacuated our analytical repertoire as we retreat into neo-empiricism. This, I think, is a direct product of fear of master narratives, a fear of big theories, big determinations. The great utility in critique resides precisely in taking risks. The courage to do so, of course, means accepting that history will surely prove us wrong in the long run. Yet we need to ask the big questions: What does this new age of revolution consist of? Thus far it has accumulated a language, albeit not a theoretically-driven one, a language speaks of market fundamentalism, of neoliberalism, and the like, terms that hover with very clear denotation, but almost no connotation. We have a real problem in social science of the relationship, the rupturing, between sign and referent. We use terms that we refer to generally by fiat and by caveat. We invariably put concrete abstractions like ”neoliberalism” and teleological assertions like ”Africa Rising” in scare quotes, because we are not actually sure what we’re talking about when we speak of them – precisely because their conception remains murky, multivalent, ideological.
The point about theorizing from the South — theorizing from Africa, or India, or Brazil — is not because “better” theory comes from there, but because the South experiences global forces in a particularly edgy way. In fact, in this Age of the Global, all theory is authored in North-South collaborations. Every one of us is, in one or another personified sense, a North- South collaboration. There are no theorists sitting comfortably in the Punjab or in Cape Town who are uncontaminated by, or uninformed of, the North. We’re all collaborations. The question, though, is what does a perspective from the south direct us to by way of questions?
Take the question of “Africa Rising?” It is not, although it is often thought to be, an issue of Afro-optimism or pessimism, negativity or positivity. It is about understanding the global economy. Experientially speaking, that understanding is entirely perspectival. If you’re a banker sitting in New York who wants to invest in property and get a 60 % return on your capital, and you happen to figure out that this is more likely if you buy real estate in Luanda or on Victoria Island, Lagos – whose markets are currently more buoyant than that of Manhattan — Africa is indeed rising. Utopically so. From the perspective of those who suffer capital, however, the current “scramble for Africa” calls to mind Walter Rodney’s “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.” For all the profit to be made from real estate and agribusiness in Africa, more people appear to be dying of starvation, more to go hungry; this in spite of a report put out a couple of years ago by the World Health Organization pointing to the fact that the agricultural return on world agribusiness the year before was enough to feed the planet 2.4 times. In other words, we haven’t even begun to address the issues of redistribution that might make the planet a liveable place for much of its population. More immediately, from the perspective of those Africans who are excess to the requirements of global capital, those who are disposable and effectively excluded from its economies, Africa is not rising at all. For them it is darkly dystopic place. Concomitantly, from an analytic perspective, it is the relationship between the utopic and the dystopic that ought to be entertaining us – and detaining us as a theoretical problem at the very core of the New Global Order, of its long future.
It is this the long story, I think, that Keith wants us to pay attention to. Now, I’m not sure whether we are in the midst of an agrarian revolution or not, I haven’t thought about it enough to pass judgement on the point. But it seems to me that, in effect, what has occurred in the Global South — and this, as I was trying to say, is what Theory from the South is about — is that it has become a harbinger of the history of capital at large. If we think about the current moment in that history as “neoliberal” – again, the scare quotes, the admission of uncertainty about what we may mean by this, beyond an emphasis on the market, on the retraction of the state in favour of the private sector, on the displacement of risk and responsibility from government to citizen, and so on – Africa only fits in part. But what it does point to is that, as an economic ideology-in-formation, “neoliberalism” requires negations, exceptions, non- neoliberal spaces in its midst in order to realize itself. Take the USA: in order to sustain the myth of the market and the success of a form of capitalism that prioritizes finance, the service sector, and entrepreneurialism over manufacture, it has created the fantasy of low unemployment, now officially under 6%. But this doesn’t count its enormous carceral population nor those huge numbers in inner cities, most of them people of color, who have given up on job-seeking entirely. When one adds these figures, the USA has more or less the unemployment rate of your average African country. What is more, it lives with the illusion that a job yields an income; many jobs, even those paid at or marginally above minimum, do not pay sufficient to live on, leaving those who have them requiring two or more to survive. (Which means, ironically, that the USA would require a job rate of well over 100% to have a population that is adequately income’d.) In other words, America can only be neoliberal, viably, to the degree that it sustains a structured universe in which many people are disposable, many permanently under-employed. Only that sort of sociology supports an economy based on finance capital and the global outsourcing of production. America believes it’s a classless society. In a sense that is true: its working class is in Cambodia, in Johannesburg, in Mexico City and its (class-less?) lumpen proletariat is incarcerated, either in prisons or in the ghetto gulags of its inner cities. So we’ve created a sociology “at home,” again, that we only dimly understand, that we barely see. In the Global South these things become extremely visible. You can’t live in Johannesburg or in Cape Town without confronting, every day, the dystopic and the utopic. They live closely together, inseparably intertwined. South Africa is simultaneously neoliberal, preliberal, liberal, and postliberal, all rolled up, in very odd proportions, into one [formation]. It is not alone in this, of course. The utopic ideal of our times uses the terms of market fundamentalism and deregulation to describe itself. Which it does so to produce effects — and those effects, in turn, create a sociology. That sociology, just like the sociology of modernization theory, is both a model for and a model of “reality,” at once an analytic epistemology and an ideological aspiration. As a model of, it provides a pseudo-scientific lexicon to describe the world that it has created in its image; as a model for, it renders that world normative, and departures from it as pathological, deviant, subversive. The same is true of the other social sciences Neoliberal economics is not science. It is an ideologically-founded re-description of the world, as it ought to be according to the Chicago School, in quasi-technical and mathematical terms. The broader point here is that, if we are to understand “Africa Rising,” we have to take on Keith’s issue. What kind of world is a changing Africa producing, what kind of Africa? We already see the emergence of different legal systems, heavily inscribed in what is now being called ”the new governance”; governance, that is, in major part outsourced from the state into labile collaborations of the private, the public, and the interstitial sectors between — of which there are many. It has also produced a doppelgänger economy, an economy that hovers in the domain the alegal, of the il/legal, that we don’t yet fully understand. An enormous proportion of the value production of Africa does not occur in the licit economy at all. It occurs in illicit economies. Organized crime, after all, is the shadow of the contemporary state, and it’s more powerful in Africa than we often appreciate. Indeed, in many African contexts, “the” state is merely a client of organized crime. All of which is to note that, in speaking of “Africa Rising?” we stress the question mark – and avoid the declarative voice.
A few things are to be said about the question of hope and euphoria in the narrative of “Africa Rising?” My daughter was a homeless activist in the US for a long time. A Marxist, she would come home in tears because the people she was trying to radicalize — often Vietnam veterans, people who had not worked for a long time and were absolutely without hope of employment or any sort of future — would say to her, “You know, really, I’m down on my luck. All I need is a suit, all I need is a break, and it will be fine. America is the best country in the world.” The Emersonian dream situates itself deeply even amongst the poorest of Americans, the most hopeless Americans. Hope is a very complex phenomenon: it doesn’t reside in opportunity. In fact, often, the inverse. Hence millennial capitalism and its promise of salvation for all: if we get it right, if we allow the market to develop a strong national economy, all will be well. This is exactly what is being fed by market fundamentalism: if we only open up markets, everybody in the end is going to be better off. And, of course, any number of statisticians in the US will tell you that this is what has actually happened – despite the fact that, all the while, Gini coefficients are rising and real incomes for most people are falling. So much for the discourse of hope. It tends to be largely a petty bourgeois and bourgeois discourse. If you talk to kids with guns in South Africa, they talk about extraction. Hope for many of them lies in the brute power of a weapon. Why wait for a job that isn’t coming when there are much more direct ways of extracting value in a market where violence and crime pay, in which the market in violence is just another market, and criminals are merely rational actors optimising their interests in the most effective possible way. To be sure, crime, including white collar crime, is one of the more profitable spheres of activity in the South African economy at all its levels. Nor, once more, only the South African economy. Which is why understanding it is so fundamental to understanding the emerging global order – and “neoliberalism.”
Ravinder Kaur: The recent push to reimagine the South in its commodity form – emerging markets – allows us to witness the yet unfolding history of neoliberalism. If this hints at the mobility of capital and its capacity to transmutate in ever new forms in its search for cheap labour and resources, then it also discloses the underbelly of millennial capitalism that is as much predicated on the discourse of hope and optimism as on the invisibility of the poor and the marginalised. In what ways might we rethink the critical concepts of sovereignty, security, territory and even revolution in the world of markets?
Keith Hart: The twentieth century generated a contrast between reform and revolution which often led to extreme political conflict. In my own work I have often rejected the notion of an abrupt change between opposite versions of society, focusing rather on how what people are already doing in the cracks, as it were, might be given a new direction and emphasis. But the events of 2011-12 (the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street) led me to question this line and to take revolution seriously again. I never bought the idea that the 1960s and 70s were a revolutionary moment, but the world began to move in the 80s and this movement is far from finished, as John pointed out earlier. Revolutions however are inseparable from war. Each of the major revolutions involved their societies in decades of war and the world wars of last century were catalytic of the anti-colonial revolution, for example. The question is whether and how the current crisis will unleash another world war. If it does, all our assumptions about market dominance will go out of the window, the world economy will shrink, countries like China would go fast into reverse and could even break up. The decades of financial imperialism and global migration from the 1880s led to a very different version of world society after 1914. The Russian economy grew by an average 10% a year from 1890 to 1913. It was the China of its day, but look what happened next.
Related to this, we talk glibly about capitalism, but it’s not obvious to me that capitalism exists anymore, if it ever did. The bourgeois revolution was aimed at particular political forms of property, in which power came from rights of distribution In fact, it’s from this system that the phrase, ”if you want to get ahead, get a gun” comes. The whole point of the bourgeoisie revolution was that it was supposed to shift the sources of wealth and power away from property, politically protected access to rents, to profits based on making stuff in markets cheaper and more effectively than your competitors. For some decades now the chief source of accumulation, revenue to capital if you like, is no longer production for profit; for example Big Pharma in the United States derives from patents granted by Congress a sum in excess of the total value of Medicare. Goldman Sachs was able to use its influence in the White House and the Treasury to get back a 100 % on what it lost through AIG, plus all the other transfers of taxes. Sony, which you might think makes its income from selling entertainment machines, gets 75 % of its revenue from DVDs, which is a form of intellectual property and must be enforced. Of course, it’s also the case that militarism is on the rise, in support of accumulation. So one of the questions that I am pursuing in my book is whether capitalism, especially in Europe and North America, has reverted to a system of rent-seeking that pre- existed the bourgeois revolution itself, and as we know, capitalism in its traditional sense is relocated, especially to Asia, so that what you now have in Brazil and China and India, is something very similar to les trente glorieuses of the post-war period when European and North American countries essentially built welfare states to try and provide some kind of security for the people who’d been drawn into wage employment. Each of these BRICS in its own way, whether you want to call it a welfare state or not, is in the process of trying to do something to secure the livelihoods and interests of the people who’ve been drawn so rapidly into urban commodity production. So the notion of capitalism in its traditional sense only exists in these countries; it no longer exists in the United States or most European countries, and it’s within that framework that I ask what are the forces lining up against each other in a continent like Africa? This leads us back to the notion of revolution. All the classical revolutions involved their countries in wars for three or four decades. The Russian Revolution also provoked a massive series of invasions and extended wars. The Haitian Revolution that my mentor, C L R James wrote about provoked invasions by all the world’s power. The British sent an army of 60.000 men to Haiti to put down the slave revolution, and every one of them died there. This was in the middle of the Napoleonic Wars. Its loss set back the war effort in Europe for five years when Wellington eventually assembled an army of that size. I agree with John, we would probably have different periodizations. I have looked at the whole period from 1776 to the present and it is clear that there are periods of three or four decades each which consist essentially of war and revolution, 1776 to 1815, 1914 to 1945. It is worth raising the point that we may well be, and there are good historical grounds for suggesting it, on the edge of such a period ourselves now. It sounds like scaremongering to say it just like that, but most people here have never been anywhere near a war. I actually was born in one. The houses around me were blasted into smithereens, one in three houses had been demolished where I lived after the war. The British economy only reached the level of 1939 in 1956 (1939 was the Great Depression) and the place was devastated. Nobody was doing anything about it, there was no money and I couldn’t wait to get out. We often ask now if the problem is: are we going back to the 1930s. We should rather ask, are we going back to 1914? The Americans and the Europeans are being pushed by the BRICs, and the only means of competition and resistance they have is military. I was speaking at the World Bank in 2006, and an air force colonel from the Pentagon asked me out for a coffee. He said: “you Europeans have stolen our moral high ground. The Chinese have stolen our manufactures. All we’ve got left is the weapons. I guess it’s double or quits.”
John Comaroff: Let me return here to the question of grand narratives of history. There is no longer a grand narrative, but there ought to be critical space for creating multiple grand narratives which argue with one another. It is what we lost with the end of the Cold War and the de-Marxification of the Western academy. Before then, the scholarly world was redolent with argumentation, almost to the point of cacophony. Some of it was noise, but much of it was productive. It didn’t matter which positions were right or wrong; of course, none were either in any simple, absolute sense. But the fact of argumentation itself was fundamental to understanding the world, its contradictions and its forms of violence, the value it was capable of producing and the destruction it often wrought. I think that what Keith is saying is that we have to have that sort of argument again, one over the nature and future directions of world history is. It doesn’t matter if we differ over the details. It matters that we take on the question. After all, one of the features of the “neoliberal” moment, whatever else it is, is its tendency to dehistorize history, to live entirely in the continuing present. Presentism becomes, as it were, the only tense of contemporary thought. Market fundamentalism has no real long run, only short runs. Which has all sorts of implications.
Keith Hart: I think that one of my original contributions is to revive the notion of liberal revolution as a form of insurgency and emancipation. Liberal revolutions are not the kind of revolution that dominated the 20th century, which were worker, peasant, socialist revolutions in the main. A lot of contemporary discourse to some extent addresses the notion of freedom and it is clearly connected to markets, a particular notion of democracy and so on. The US still stands as the global symbol for this successful, liberal revolution.
John Comaroff: You’re absolutely right to raise this possibility, to think about decolonizing the hegemonic idea of revolution that prevailed during the 20th century. The answer is very difficult. There are certainly parts of Africa in which there is still aspirational talk about social redistribution under a social democratic regime; in which it is commonly said that rampant neoliberalism – and yes, the term is commonly invoked in many parts of the continent — has produced many more problems than it solved. If it [i.e. neoliberalism] were to work its putative magic, we would all like to be bankers. And we would all be successful entrepreneurs. But it has not. Hence the widespread desire for the return of the state — in its uncorrupted form. But there is also another capitalism-as-fantasy that takes its symbolic imagery not from America, but from the likes of Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew has reappeared as a powerful trope after 9/11 and the Patriot Act. This is when suddenly, in the USA and in parts of Africa, one heard voices that said: “Well, America has become every bit as authoritarian as Singapore, but without the benefits; in Singapore at least you’re probably going to get a job, healthcare and housing, none of which is guaranteed in America. There are now African chiefs who regularly go to Singapore with the intention of rebuilding their chiefdoms on the Singaporian model. This is where, I think, if I may say, Keith, the issue that you have raised [implicitly], and have glossed over, is “What kind of politics goes with the form of capitalism brought about by liberal revolution? This is a big question. I am less hopeful for a liberal revolution…
Keith Hart: No, I am not optimistically predicting a liberal revolution. I am saying that the antidote to the old regime is a liberal revolution. I have absolutely no idea if or how it would take place. That’s why I’m not saying anything about Africa Rising either.
John Comaroff: I take your point. What I was trying to say, though, is that we have not addressed the various political alternatives that are seeking to forge relations with [neoliberal] capitalism. Nor are these merely political models. Because politics is relocating itself in law all over the place, they are also legal regimes. We have to analyse contemporary capitalism not merely as economy, but as politico-legal economy, and understand the possibility of liberal social revolutions in those terms.
Ravinder Kaur: So how can we possibly recover the political in this particular form of capitalism of which techno-friendly, authoritarian Singapore has become a popular sign?
Keith Hart: Our first task is question the usefulness of terms like capitalism and neoliberalism is the questions we want answers to are basically political and require a nuanced approach to history. I find it convenient to juxtapose African societies today with some what goes under the omnibus label of an Old Regime. In the course of examining what liberal revolutions were supposed to be and have become, I have been led both to interrogate blanket usage of a term like capitalism and to select elements that I find useful for thinking about what lies ahead for Africans. John has provided some stimulating images of how we might think of developments in the US, South Africa etc, with an emphasis on crime. I have recently published an article called “Why the informal economy has taken over the world” which focuses on how neoliberal deregulation has led to the criminalization of corporate capitalism. These are all rather partial analyses offering much overlap between us. But I do not equate the US today with its 18th century origins even if its myth does. Georg Simmel in “The metropolis and mental life” offers a brilliant commentary on how notions of freedom had evolved from the 18th century to around 1900. I will just mention, however that the original driver of liberal revolutions was freedom of movement and trade. Our current disposition the same claim, but it is false. Then the mass of ordinary people were pegged down into the ground, impeded in their everyday lives and in their movement, so that they could be leeched off. These conditions are not universal now, but my bet is that they describe how many Africans suffer today. In Africa not only are there 54 states trying to get what they can off travellers across their borders, but everywhere you move, you are subject to predation from local thugs. A car produced in China costs 5000 dollars to make and ship to Tanzania. That same car costs 4000 dollars to get from Tanzania to Kampala (under 1000 km). And if you look at all those revolutions, the Italian, the German, the American and so on, what they were most concerned about was expanding and freeing up a home market which could then be protected from some of the larger players in the world at the time. Many Africans traveling over paths that they have used for centuries are routinely criminalized and harassed not only at national borders, but at many other points in between. At some stage I’m assuming some kind of political movement will tap into that sense of humiliation and restriction that Africans routinely have to endure. For any notion of revolution, we need a theory of what is likely to get people to move and fight on an effective scale. I can’t claim to know that now, but I do believe that the present situation is intolerable and I will take my chances on whether what I have to say resonates with that.
I earlier hinted that Africa’s demographic expansion has only one precedent: Europeans in the 19th century. (Although Asia in the 20th century might be another). I also pointed out how Europe’s population has collapsed since. The idea that the game is up for Europe is not usually discussed at conferences there. Europe is on the way down, it can’t reproduce itself, can’t even defend itself and it hasn’t got a coherent economic strategy. They hate the people who come there to work for their pensions. In an article called “The Rise and Fall of Europe,” I reminded readers that the Europeans launched two world wars and they could easily drag us into another or at least into a global equity meltdown when their currency collapses. I’m not interested in radical solutions for their own sake (?), but I think that how China, India, and Brazil handle this particular moment in their own political economy, and whether it leads to a significant breakdown or to some kind of positive way forward, is of immense significance for the rest of the world. The other important question is whether the Americans can be prevented from unleashing the third World War.
John Comaroff: Can I pick up the question? I think there are two pieces to it. One is basically an activist issue, which is how one creates a politics appropriate to the historical moment. The other is a political-sociological one, i.e., what is actually emerging in the Global South under the impact of the various forms of economy that are taking shape in that part of the world. This latter question is complicated because so much of ordinary political life has shifted away from the conventional structures and processes, away from elections, away from political parties, into various forms of people’s movements. I don’t only mean new social movements but a very wide range of forms of social action and association. This takes us back to the eternal question of sovereignty: what has occurred across the Global South is a radical shift in the nature of sovereignty. We are used to sovereignty being a vertically structured, emanating from and centred monopolistically in the state. Across much of Africa, sovereignty has lateralized: states control part of the landscape, but other parts are controlled by organized religion, by organized crime, by enclaved corporate structures, by ethnic groups, and so on, all of which mimic the state to a greater or lesser degree. We live in an age which inverts Charles Tilly’s famous thesis that the modern state arises out of organized crime, mimicking its forms as it legitimizes its authority over the use of force and the extraction of taxes. Nowadays organized crime, organized religion, ethnic groups and the like mimic the state and create simulacra of it. They create simulacral legal systems, creating administrative systems, systems of extraction (a.k.a. taxation), and so on. Where this happens, a patchwork of sovereign domains emerge. These tend to become the sites in and through which local politics are vectored, in which social movements demand basic services, in which people demand jobs, in which they speak the language of redistribution. The precise terms vary depending, depending on context. For example in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, they’re about access to the proceeds of extraction; in parts of Tanzania, about piracy as a mode of redistributing wealth. As demands for rights and redistribution vary, so they create different species and spaces of politics. Now, the big question for activists is: Can those politics be mobilized? How exactly? For what? Ultimately, an anti-politics directed against the state makes no sense in most places, because that it is not in the state where power is actually concentrated. If power is deflected into the corporate world, into organized crime or religion or ethnicity – and especially when these things are transnational — fighting the state is futile. And even when the struggle is directed the state, it is often best fought by legal rather than conventional political means, since they are more likely to be effective. Not always, of course, and maybe not even often. But sometimes. Those fights, though, are a very complicated business, because lawfare, to have any chance of succeeding, involves difficult strategic decisions; decisions about, for one thing, jurisdictions, since geo-legal regimes are not all alike for purposes of fighting ones battles; decisions also about what species of the law to which to appeal in making claims and righting wrongs – tort law, say, or constitutional protections for minorities, or intellectual property statutes, or human rights jurisprudence, although this last, despite popular stereotypes is usually a very weak instrument with which to fight for anything much. To complicate matters, these various legal instruments have different purchase in different jurisdictions, globally speaking. In fact, the emerging maps of political struggle these days are not usefully orientated around the international systems of nation- states, but around legal jurisdictions. So, for example – this is an example that actually happened – you happen to be an indigenous (“Indio”) group in Nicaragua whose land is being taken away from you by a Korean lumber company under an agreement with the Nicaraguan government, appeal to a Nicaraguan court would be less effective that appeal to the Inter-American court. (The indigenous group, which deployed a very subtle legal argument in the effort to regain their territory, won their action in that court.) This is where the judicialization of politics becomes complicated. But it is becoming more and more ubiquitous, as people’s movements of various sorts across the world are turning to lawfare to fight their causes.
Keith Hart: That’s excellent, John. If we could merge your knowledge of law with mine of economy, we might have something. I was too glib in my initial responses. I have drawn a lot, personally and collectively from political forms and movements coming out of Latin America, including from the World Social Forum in 2001, which I’ve been part of for fifteen years in terms of developing alternative approaches to research and activism. But there’s a particular label that came out of the 1990’s, after the lost decade in Latin America, called popular economy, and the idea of popular economy is important, because first of all, it involves, normatively, alliances between urban informal workers, peasants and so on, but also elements from large organized political life, including progressive regimes, the unions and so forth, so these are coalitions that cross-cut notions of the state and capital and organized labour, peasantries and informal workers and so on, and they have been implemented, I think, quite successfully in various countries, including Brazil and Bolivia. So I think that Latin America is still a very powerful source of creative insurrection, new political ideas and organizations. Certainly, I have learnt a great deal from them. Indeed the whole alter- globalization movement the idea of mobilizing globally for a different vision of the world, all of this has been developed most effectively in Latin America.
Insurgency or insurrection is not revolution and Tahrir Square is the best recent example of that. On the other hand, C. L. R. James wrote about and studied revolution all his life, and I agree, obviously we can’t, as Heraclitus said, step into the same river twice, but I think we can profitably study the history of revolutions. For example, “Marxism and insurgency” which is on marxists.org, is a letter written by Lenin to the party in September 1917, where he explains why he was now urging the Bolsheviks to support a general revolutionary movement, and in July he had opposed the idea. It’s an extraordinary letter because he also lays out there the general conditions, in his view, for taking this step. Of course, what happened in between was that the Russians had pulled out of the war and there were all these people coming back from the front, mixing with the soviets in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and he thought this was a good time to go. In fact by October the revolution was a done deal. This was someone who in January in Zurich addressed the Swiss young comrades and said he did not expect a revolution in his lifetime. Or read Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, which is 1300 pages and takes place over nine months, from February to October. Some meetings, in which he took part, take forty pages. So, I can’t imagine any other way of thinking about revolution than by engaging in historical analysis. The power of contingency is too great for us to rely only on abstract analysis. James used to say that, in any country, there are only ever maybe 40.000 activists that is people who dedicate their lives to political change. Everyone else just wants to keep what they’ve got. And he said that’s a good thing, we don’t want a society where everyone is like me, living to turn everything upside down all the time. But he also argued that there are revolutionary moments which he had studied closely, when people who before would do anything not to jeopardize what they’re trying to hold on to, suddenly discover that they’ve lost most of it and at that point, people in general begin to move and accept coordination by the activists. So, I agree with you on your general issue about neo-empiricism, John. I have taken the view, which is a Braudelian line, that the way to go is to be empirical, but to expand the range of what you’re writing about. As for whether or not this can be sustained, I’m sure that nobody in his right mind would ever consider my book to be adequately researched and supported, but it’s like Kant said in his anthropology, what we need is horizon thinking, backed up by vivid anecdotes that are nearer to the lives of our audience. And this is not a question of finding either theoretical or empirical proofs for a general idea or an expanded empirical account. Since this is probably going to be the last time that I have the floor today, I would like to say how rewarding it has been to be in your company.
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The Legalization of Everyday Life
John Comaroff is the Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African-American Studies and of Anthropology, and Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies, at Harvard University. Before moving to Harvard in 2012, he held a Distinguished Professorships at the University of Chicago and a Research Professorship at the American Bar Foundation; he is also an Honorary Professor at the University of Cape Town. Besides his influential work on African and African-American societies and post-coloniality, much of it co-authored with his wife Jean Comaroff, he is known for his publications on the role of law in capitalist societies. With books such as “Rules and Processes. The Cultural Logic of Dispute in and African Context”1, “Law and Disorder in the Postcolony“ 2, and his works on law and witchcraft3, he has gained a high profile also beyond anthropology, in the field of law & society. For the special juridikum issue on “Knowledge in Law“ Andrea Kretschman has interviewed John Comaroff regarding the contemporary role of the law and its significance for lay people.
Kretschmann: John, in your writings over the past decade, you have made the point that, almost globally, we have seen processes of judicialization reach into ever more domains of life, both ordinary and epic. Why have you been so insistent on this, and do you continue to think it true? To what historical forces do you attribute this tendency?
Comaroff: Yes, I do think that the reach of judicialization into ever more domains of public and private life is, and continues to be, an essential feature of the world in which we live. The reason that I have been so insistent on this is that I believe it to be symptomatic of something that runs way beyond, or rather beneath, the surfaces of everyday social, economic, and political life; indeed, it runs to the essence of “life itself” – that favored phrase of contemporary theory-work – determining, among many other things, who lives, who dies, and under what elemental conditions. At core, we are seeing, unfold before us, the unraveling of the classical liberal social contract and, with it, the notion of a commonweal, of ethical civility, even of society, sui generis; this last a dying modernist abstraction that has given way to keywords like “the network” and ciphers like “the community,” neither of which have any intrinsic meaning beyond the metaphorical. The process is uneven in both its temporality and its locations, but it seems an unmistakeable corollary of the social tendency that tends, these days, to be dubbed, loosely, “neoliberal”; loosely because, sensu stricto “neoliberalism” does not refer to an ahistorical “formation,” an ordinary noun, an accomplished state of being in the world. To the contrary, it is a shape- shifter, describing a broad historical trajectory, a more or less polymorphous, more or less integrated concatenation of elements – again, practical and ideological, moral and material, cultural and cognitive – moving through time, transforming itself to the siren call of the moment as it is acted in and upon, conceptualized, and actualized. Its economic diacritica, as it has become commonplace to observe, lie in deregulation, financialization, and privatization; in the withdrawal of welfare and other (worker, consumer, citizen) protections; in rising inequality and dropping real incomes for all but the very rich – there is a radical aporia these days between a job and a livable income, the former ever less likely to assure the latter – along with the increasing impetus on individual citizens to take responsibility for their own well-being, for the risks and uncertainties they face, for the cost- benefit choices they make.
In this world, it is the logic of the market, rather than morality or sociality or culture, that perforce organizes – and, yes, constrains – our conceptual horizons and everyday practices. Apart from some obvious concomitants of this historical shift, like the de-democratization of the polis almost everywhere, the citizen-subject is no longer contractually entitled to constitutional or social protections, only to legal entitlements for whose realization s/he is also responsible. To be sure, the lingua franca of the neoliberal moment is the language of rights and the rule of law. We, as human beings – in an age seen ever more as post-human – have become the embodied fusion of homo juralis and homo economicus. Under these conditions, the primary recourse open to people for purposes of protecting their personhood, their property, and the benefits of citizenship, or for seeking compensation for violation or injury, is by asserting those rights. At least in theory. Which is why the juridical has come to saturate our imaginings; as a fetish, it appears – and I stress appears – to have the capacity to bring about a more equitable world, to be a means to just ends. Law, ultimately, is a currency of commensuration, a vehicle, like money, for asserting, negotiating, and transacting the value of contested relations, commodities, bodies, even being-in-the- world. And like all currencies, it is unequally distributed: some people have greater access to it than do others, some are more protected by it than are others, some are better placed than others to use it to their own benefit – even though “in principle” we are all equal before the law. Or, more accurately, unequally equal.
The tendency to take refuge in the law, to turn to it as a means of intimidation, justification, or self-protection – itself evidence of the increasing ubiquity of judicialization – has infected social and political life in the USA as never before. Rarely a week goes by without Donald Trump and his administration threating suit or appealing to the courts for something or other, either personal or governmental; or conversely, being threatened with suit or taken to court. It is a process that has become a daily drama, modeled, of course, on the grotesque spectacle “reality” TV. But it has real effects, all the more so since, at least in its governmental dimensions, many of the suits involve attacks on the rights of citizens – especially poor citizens, people of color, and immigrants – while, at the same time, defending corporations for their violations of the environment, of the health and safety their workers and customers, and so on; violations, as I said a moment ago, that may involve life or death. It is not hard to find examples: the legal exoneration of businesses that poison water supplies and soils, with fatal consequences; or the denial, by limiting medical insurance, of access to life-preserving care; or the immunity given to private security and state police when they kill young, unarmed black men. Nor is this confined to the USA. My own homeland, South Africa, for example, while not as extreme as the USA in the violence it deals out to its own citizens, is equally prone to judicialization. So, too, is Brazil: witness the fight in recent years for political control conducted by its right wing through the criminalization of leaders of the Workers’ Party – culminating if the parliamentary coup against President Dilma Rousseff and the indictment of ex-President Ignacio Lula – all of it effected through lawfare, the commissioning of the violence inherent in the law for political ends.
Kretschmann: What effects has the legalization of everyday life for the individuals?
Comaroff: The saturation of public discourse with talk of rights of all sorts has, I believe, insinuated a sense of legal consciousness into citizens everywhere, both as individuals and as the bearers of collective identities. Nor only citizens, even more so those who lack the rights of citizenship by virtue of being undocumented migrants, refugees, criminalized subjects, displaced persons. Not everyone, of course: cognizance and consciousness of legality obviously varies. And it has its exclusions. But, as Guiseppe Dalla Torre, a leading Catholic intellectual, suggested just before the millennium in a Vatican journal, a “culture of legality” has come to dominate our age, an age in which humanity knows itself increasingly as homo juralis. In many parts of the world, there is an almost autonomic tendency to respond to any sense of violation or injury – however slight, however varied – by turning to the language of the law in contemplating remedy. This tendency is stoked by mass media in all its registers: fantasy, fiction, drama, documentary, comedy, commentary, all of which give disproportionate time and attention to matters il/legal. There is no doubt, either, that the capillary spread of legal consciousness and the popular sense of a “right to rights” has been exacerbated by the proliferation of legal NGOs that seek to give access to “justice” to people who would otherwise not have it; also, in many nation-states, by the growing criminalization of race and poverty, the “get tough on crime” impulse to incarcerate for ever more petty offences, the spread of legal institutions and, to repeat myself, recourse to lawfare for a wide variety of political ends.
At the same time, as noted earlier, access to the law, in practice, is anything but equal. For all the efforts of NGOs, social activist lawyers, and the like, structural lines of social inequality replicate themselves in the degree to which ordinary legalities – and, more dramatically, lawfare – favor the rich over the poor, capital over labor, the powerful over the disempowered; as Carlos Fuentes once said, it is power that begets rights not rights that beget power. But not always. In our Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Jean Comaroff and I document examples of insurgent lawfare, cases in which minorities of one kind or another have deployed available jurisdictions and jurisprudence – or have had them deployed in their name – to secure rights, recompense, restitution, and recognition for their claims. The processes involved are rarely straightforward, however: sometimes “little people” win legal decisions, only lose out as those judgments are not implemented. In short, while lawfare yields the possibility of political transgression and transformation, realpolitik and the facts of social structure typically intervene between law and justice.
Kretschmann: Do the effects you describe interact with changes of the individuals’ perception of law? How do their knowledge and meaning of the law changes in parallel to the process you describe, and how their use of the law?
Clearly, the social effects of the neoliberal turn in reconstituting the citizen-subject as a fusion of homo economicus and homo juralis – a radically individuated persona in a historical formation founded less on a moral order or a social compact than on rhizomatic networks of contractual relations – is dialectically entailed in the forms of legal consciousness and action that pervade our world in the early twenty-first century.
Kretschmann: Taking into account rising legal consciousness in so many parts of the world these days, what judicial protections or legal rights can citizens, individually or collectively, deploy to address social, economic, moral, and cultural privation, violation, or exclusion – and with what effects?
Comaroff: This is an important question, since it is a more technical one than it seems. The reflex answer nowadays is to invoke human rights (HR) in one or another form; this itself being a manifestation, a fusion in the neoliberal moment of the rising fetishism of the law and the global turn to HR – whose genesis lies, mythically, in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration (UDHR) of 1948, the terms of which, translated into more than 500 languages, are flouted much more frequently by ruling regimes across the globe than they are respected. Without disputing the political and ethical importance of a focus on human rights in an increasingly anti-liberal age, they tend, in practice, to make for weak legal remedies. Indeed, in many nation-states, there is no effective HR jurisprudence, per se, under which to make claims against anything or anyone. It is always critical, in the individual or collective pursuit of justice, to appeal to the strongest form of jurisprudence and the most capacious, most sympathetic jurisdiction available. The specifics depend on context, obviously. We all know about forum shopping and the effort to fight suits – be they civil or criminal – in politically, culturally, and ideologically favorable jural environments. Which is why recent US presidents and parties have expended so much effort to stack the federal judiciary with partisan-compliant judges, judges who might be expected to deliver the “right” decisions. The issue of jurisprudence is more complicated: across the planet, in both intra-national and international actions, canny litigators pay a great deal of attention to framing their suits with reference to the kinds of “hard” law most likely to be effective for their purposes. Does one indict a warlord or a former regime for murder, for genocide, for mass rape, for a crime against humanity, for property violations? Does one sue the defendant/s in question also in a civil suit for reparations, the restoration of land, the repatriation of the remains of the dead? I could go on ad infinitum: the routes through the means of the law – through its geography and jurisprudence, its institutions and horizons, its normative practices and its ends – are always highly variable. But the way in which those routes are navigated can, and do, make a huge difference.
This is especially salient for social movements, not least movements that essay the cause of those who (or which) ostensibly have rights but do not act or speak for themselves: fetuses, animals, religious deities, the environment, inanimate objects. Both the strategic reading and the tactical deployment of legal geographies – of the institutions or jurisdictions or jurisprudence likely to prove conducive to juridical action/s – are often critical in accomplishing socio-political ends. At the same time, of course, the prescribed norms of juridical processes everywhere – prevailing procedural practices, rules of evidence, questions of standing – limit the ways in which the law may be engaged for those ends. Jean Comaroff and I published an essay in one of our books a few years back entitled “History on Trial”. It argues that, more and more these days, to make historical claims for recognition and/or for rights of various sorts, ethnic and religious groups, as well and others who see themselves as afflicted by collective injury, find it necessary to take to the courts to validate those claims; without legal ratification, recognition and rights alike remain immanent, unrealized, an abstraction awaiting concretization. But recourse to the law has its costs and constraints. It requires framing a narrative that the judiciary can cognize and address, one that must perforce pare down their history – which they typically tell themselves in the “thick” terminology of trials and trauma and tribulations, of resistance and redemption – to the “thin,” redundant-free language of facts and rules. Frequently, litigants seeking to reclaim their past from the violations they have suffered object loudly to having to reduce and translate their story, one that they desperately desire to have heard, to the bare bones necessary to win their struggles in court. It is a tough experiential and existential bargain. After all, the law is not necessarily their battleground of choice. Resort to it, even when successful in material and political terms may have deep affective, ethical, and aesthetic downsides.
Kretschmann: When you are talking about an increase of recourse to the law and of political struggles in law, caused by a spread of legal consciousness and a popular sense of a “right to rights”: would you characterize this as an increase of emancipatory struggle against the background of increased opportunity of addressing the state? Or rather as a shift from the political sphere towards the sphere of the law?
Comaroff: Again, a complicated issue. To take the second part of the question first: the judicialization of politics, in its many forms, appears as a shift of collective action from the political to the legal domain. But what it suggests, I think, is the erasure of the line as we have long conceived of it in Euromodernist liberal thought; or, more accurately, it points to a morphing of that line into a new alignment in which political ends seek out legal means, not least because of the persistent impression – itself a corollary of its fetishization – that the law has the capacity, the numimous power, to bring about enforceable ends. Of course, the line between the political and the legal, wrapped up together in the political theology of sovereignty, has always been more a membrane than a moat: a porous, translucent filter, sometimes enforcing real or imagined spheres of distinction, sometimes a conduit between different species of collective action and their legitimation. In the contemporary moment, it has become more of the latter than the former; hence the conduct of so much that we have long of as normatively “political” by an almost autonomic turn to the institutions of the law. The first part of the question refers to the extent to which the judicialization of political struggle, and rising legal consciousness, has emancipatory potential, especially for those who assert a “right to rights” against the state. The deployment of legalities by the disempowered against the powerful – we refer to it, in Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, as “insurgent lawfare” – does have emancipatory potential. It has opened up possibilities and sites of social action to populations for whom mass politics have proven ineffective. Indigenous Brazilian Indians, for example, have won cases in the country’s highest courts against the state. So, a couple of years back, in the Constitutional Court of South Africa, did Abahlali base Mjondolo, a shack dwellers’ movement against a government long bitterly hostile to it. There are plenty of other examples. But many have failed as well. It is a well-worn truism that the law tends, proportionately, to favor the politically and financially well-resourced. At the same time, are many NGOs and activist lawyers skilled in insurgent lawfare that, increasingly and with gradually increasing success, are taking up the cause of those who claim recognition, rights, and recompense hitherto denied them. What, in sum, the latter- day judicialization of politics has done is to create another domain of emancipatory praxis. Like all such domains, however, it is not one in which things are easily accomplished. As this implies, it behooves social movements to come to understand the theory and practice of insurgent lawfare – a much more complex species of politics than may first appear – if they are to exploit and expand its emancipatory potential, and to address its dangers and downsides and difficulties, in the cause of righting the wrongs of an increasingly unequal, structurally violent, and unfree world.
Kretschmann: Thank you very much for the interview, John.
Prof. Dr. John Comaroff is Professor Hugh K. Foster Professor of African and African-American Studies and of Anthropology, and Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies, at Harvard University; jcomaroff@fas.harvard.eduDr. Andrea Kretschmann is scientific researcher and leader of the department “Crisis and Constitution of Societal Orders” at Centre Marc Bloch, affiliated institute of Humboldt University of Berlin; andrea.kretschmann@cmb.hu-berlin.de
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Does Anthropology Matter to Law?
Does Anthropology matter to Law? As phrased, this provocation, worthy of address though it certainly is, may ultimately be unanswerable. The reason? Because, like all questions of this sort, it harbours others within it. Precisely which “anthropology”? “Law” as what? As everyday practice, as theorized praxis, as pedagogy, as politics by other means? What, moreover, counts as mattering? And from where, in particular, is the provocation being posed? All of these questions, patently, make a difference.
But first things first.
With limited exception, anthropology, broadly conceived, has comparatively little impact on the core of any of the other social sciences, law demonstrably among them. Why? For all the fact that we tend to look for answers to ourselves – as, indeed, the provocation paper implies that we should — they are as likely to lie in the epistemic construction of those other disciplines. Or, more precisely, in a negative dialectic between the sorts of knowledge regimes on which they are founded and those that ground most sorts of anthropology. Ours is an “indiscipline” (Comaroff 2010) whose essential critical gesture, like Brechtian theatre, is estrangement: the decentring of received knowledge/s, which we are wont to trouble by relativizing them in one or another way. Since the normative essence of the social sciences, sui generis, is the positivist, empirically-driven pursuit of universal truths – truths, Kuhn (1962) long ago noted, that are typically sustained against challenge until they collapse under their own involutionary weight – anthropology will always represent an epistemic exterior: an ontological supplement that marks the outer limits of those truths without deracinating the modes of their production. We may be interesting intellectual cabaret to much scholarly orthodoxy, but it is only at the critical margins of the other disciplines that anthropology tends to make any inroads at all; useful sources of collateral quotation for those who plough their more-or-less edgy edges. Clifford Geertz (1983), reflecting on the salience of culture to the law, may, in his famed Storrs Lectures, have given grist to some mills at the then-frontiers of legal theory. But his sort of hermeneutics scarcely breached the discursive horizons of juridical thinking.
In short, Euro-modernist law is, in all its inflections, a repertoire of naturalized cultural practices, one rarely concerned, save in spaces of exception, with what “others” do or think or say. In that respect, it exists in harmonic resonance with the ideological tenor of its times. That is why, in the history of the present, some its most powerful influences come from so-called “law and economics”, an inter-discipline that elevates post-Keynesian market rationality – the sort of thing that, for Foucault (2010), typified neoliberalism – from organic theology to a peculiar, and hegemonic, form of theoreticism; vide the impact of the likes of Richard Posner (e.g. 1973), whose effort to reduce academic law to the calculus of cost/benefit merely foreshadowed a growing trend in US courtrooms, or Gary Becker’s conception of “human capital” (1964), an elision, now taken-for-granted, of potentially Frankensteinian proportions. To the degree that anthropology confronts such Euro-modernist orthopraxis with its outsides, it is no wonder that the things we have to say are so often treated as little more than interesting curiosities. Which is what our forms of relativism, cultural or ethical or social, are generally taken to be. Even worse: inasmuch as legal philosophy, theory, and pedagogy are motivated by an impulse to the normative, and to the perfectability of the law, it is perhaps imperative that they do not pay anthropology any heed. We are not just irrelevant, we are anti-relevant. Even critical legal studies – and legal realism more broadly – which had good reason to seek substantiation in legal anthropology, rarely did so. Which is why, to reflect on the provocation paper, finding ways to matter more to law by doing better legal analysis or by better conceptual work is beside the point. Quality is not the issue. Epistemology is.
This, I reiterate, is not to say that anthropology has absolutely no impact on the practice or pedagogy of law. Banalities abound: many large law firms across the world now have culture departments. A number employ anthropologists. Or think they do anthropologically sensitive work. And, intermittently, ethnographic expertise enters courtrooms, the media, and everyday legal consciousness. Some law schools, moreover, offer electives, or cross-list courses, in legal anthropology. But such marginalia are not really material to the question at hand. Should anthropology matter more? Of course it should, for all the reasons offered in the provocation paper. However, given that we appear to be at the dawn of an age – a counter-Enlightenment? – in which the critical disciplines are under attack, in which reason is devalued, in which antitheory rides the rising tide of Big Data, there is not much room for optimism.
There is a caveat here, though. It relates to another of the questions-within-the-Question raised at the outset.
Usually, when we ask whether anthropology matters to law, we confine the
conversation to Euro-America. Nor is this surprising. Anthropological self-reflection tends overwhelmingly to centre itself in the academies of the global north. But what if we re-situate our archimedian point of reference in the other hemisphere, the one in which most the work of the discipline has historically been done?
Let me take South Africa as a proxy, although many of the things to be said about it occur elsewhere.
South Africa, like many ex-colonies, is a country in which Euro-modern, liberal conceptions of the law, while still institutionally dominant, are no longer hegemonic – no longer taken to be universal in their rationalities, their knowledge practices, or the values for which they stand. Per contra: they are increasingly contested, increasingly seen as one cultural provenance – a minority one at that – in a poli-cultural nation; a nation, that is, in which assertions of alterity are framed not as polite appeals for recognition, but as strong demands for the sovereignty of indigenous politico-legal orders, each with its own constitutionally authorized institutions, its own notions of belonging, its own jurisprudence (Comaroff and Comaroff 2010). This is one of the many contradictory bequests of colonialism: the kinds of difference once conjured up to govern the formerly colonized are now insisted on by them as a right to difference. Thus does indirect rule now boomerang back as a claim to “authentic” African governance. And decoloniality as recoloniality. Not by or for everyone, clearly:opposition against the Euro-modern legal regime – sometimes bundled into a struggle against “white monopoly capital” – is complicated, far from universal, and often internally unresolved. But it manifests itself broadly across the socio-political spectrum.
In this context – often subsumed, reductively, under the sign of legal pluralism – there has been an escalation of legal processes involving conflict over cultural differences, sovereignty, and constitutional rights, processes in which conventional anthropological concerns have tended to insinuate themselves. And so the discipline enters: sometimes explicitly, sometimes organically, sometimes unmarked, but there all the same. Not everyday, obviously, yet enough to be noticed by the ethnographic eye. Perhaps the most visible of its manifestations is in the realm of expert witnessing and citation. Recently, for example, the evidence of Ørnulf Gulbrandsen (University of Bergen) was decisive in a successful suit – brought by the Bafokeng Land Buyers Association against the Royal Bafokeng Nation in the High Court, North West Division (CIV APP 3/17, 2018) – that contested the limits of chiefly authority, with consequential implications for the future disposition of mineral rights; some years earlier, our work was cited at the Constitutional Court in Shilubana v. Nwamitwa (CCT 03/07 [2008] ZACC 9), a case that awarded a chiefship to a female heir against the apartheid imposed, patriarchal presumption that primogeniture prescribes male succession – the action having hinged on the right of an indigenous community to amend its prevailing rules, under vernacular law, by popular consensus.
Anthropology also finds it way into the language of legality, and into public discourse, in respect of cases in which a “cultural defence” is advanced, especially those that call upon ethno-racial alterity as a challenge to Euro-legal reason. The most notorious instance, probably, is ex-President Jacob Zuma’s successful effort to counter a rape charge by citing “traditional” female sexual expectation, thus to exonerate himself by recourse to his constitutional right to Zuluness; the commentariat at the time repeatedly mouthed anthropology-lite statements, in sub-ethnographic form, about vernacular social practices. There are many other, less graphic examples, all the more so since there has lately been a move in the country to essay an Afro-modern jurisprudence. For its most vocal proponents, that jurisprudence is already immanent in the indigenous principle of ubuntu (lit., “humanity”, connoting the value of social interdependence). Some landmark legal-scholarly writings on the topic, which argue that South African law ought to replace its Kantian foundations with this precept, are heavily indebted to legal anthropology (e.g. Cornell 2014). What is more, among the earliest Constitutional Court justices to assert the juridical centrality of ubuntu to post- apartheid South Africa, Yvonne Mokgoro (1997), is wont to tell that she learned what she knows of “customary” (i.e. African vernacular) law from an anthropological monograph, Rules and Processes (Comaroff and Roberts 1981). In this light, it is ironic that some of those calling for a new, decolonized “Africanist” constitution, and doing so in terms that owe much to anthropology, are legal activists who have nothing good to say about the discipline and its colonial roots.
But it is not only into litigation and constitutional debate that anthropolog y has made its way. It has a rising presence, as well, in legal pedagogy. In a country in which indigenous courts remain the first resort for much of the population, in which the demand for the Africanization of almost everything is rising, law schools have felt pressure to embrace what is now referred to, awkwardly, as “living customary law”. That law still lives at the margins of legal education, to be sure, but at margins growing in proportion to ever louder calls for the constitutional recognition of difference, for decoloniality, and for acknowledgment of the limits of liberalism. Again, the legal anthropology brought to bear in local law schools is not always the most enlightened. But its presence is increasingly underwritten by the violent historical sociology that continues to haunt this poly-ethnic, poli-cultural nation-state.
At the same time, an altogether more contemporary anthropology is also making itself heard here. It flows from the global fetishism of the law and the judicialization of everyday life, especially political-economic life. Take two examples. The first arises from the legal recognition, as intellectual property, of “indigenous knowledge”, a gloss for culture as it is increasingly commoditized and enters the market. This is a domain in which anthropologists are widely cited not only in Africa, but across the world, alike in courtrooms, the academy and the media. The second is more rarified: it refers to what has become known as “lawfare”, a term with multiple meanings (Jones 2015). One relates to US national security, specifically, to the role of legalities as a weapon in the conduct of war. Another is owed to anthropology: “the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:30); “insurgent lawfare”, its complement, denotes the deployment by the disenfranchised of those same instruments against the state, capital, and other powerful institutions. This anthropological variant has become common usage in South Africa, where it is regularly invoked by law professors, judges, and journalists. Also in Brazil, where lawyers who defended ex-President Lula have accused the state of resorting to it against their client; in consultation with anthropologists, myself included, they have gone so as far as to create a Lawfare Institute. By these means has anthropology found a conduit into legal practice, pedagogy, and public life. This in a country where the discipline has many other resonances in the law as well – not least in fighting for the rights, indeed material survival, of indigenous populations. Here, unquestionably, anthropology does matter.
As all this suggests, the prospect of anthropology mattering to law are markedly greater in the global south than in Euro-America. This, arguably, is because of the historical conditions that have produced its political sociology, a sociology in which the pressing demands of difference may presage the future of the nations of the north, whose founding fiction of horizontal fraternity is under rising threat of heterodoxy. If these polities do become more like those of the south in this respect, the nature of their legal regimes – the dialectical embedding of law in economy and society, that is – may well change too. In which case, anthropology could well come to matter more, and in similar ways. It is noteworthy that, to date, ex-colonies have had at least three anthropologist presidents (Kofi Busia, Jomo Kenyatta, and Ashraf Ghani); the first glimmer, in our own hemisphere, was Barack Obama, son of an anthropologist mother and a Kenyan father, and, incidentally, sometime professor of constitutional law. Meanwhile, anthropology ought to persist in the effort to estrange Euro-modernist law and its epistemic grounding, to demystify its ideological and ritual forms, and to learn the lessons to be gleaned from the global south. It may or may not really matter whether anthropology matters to law. What does, however, is the way that the former addresses the latter as an ethnographic object, a polymorphous ensemble of signifying practices that require to be laid bare, to be analysed and theorized, all the better to understand its place in the contemporary Order of Things.
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Occult Economies, Revisited
In an essay written 20 years ago—of which this version is an update1—we sought to explain an unforeseen effect of the rise of neoliberalism and, with it, the spread of democracy to places it had not been before. These two processes, then widely thought to infuse each other, were attributed an almost magical potential to transform the human condition for the general good; magical in that the means-ends relations involved, and the causal circuits that linked them, were taken on faith rather than subjected to critical scrutiny. This millennial mood of expectation, of an eternal path to prosperity primed by the end of the Cold War, was driven by radical realign- ments in the received order of things—things at once political, economic, social, techno-scientific, ethical, even ontological—that shook existing inter/national institutions and eroded long-standing visions of society and world-making. New levels of global integration were experienced almost everywhere: an increasingly planetary division of labor notable for its mobility and flexibility, for instance, and an electronic commons that cir- culated capital, knowledge, images, consumer goods, and cultural practices with unprecedented speed, thus to compress space-and-time and to pro- mote “free” trade. This was felt especially in places like South Africa, Latin America, and Central Europe, so-called transitional societies, where the collapse of authoritarian regimes had been accompanied by an uneven infu- sion of liberal freedoms, freedoms long deferred.
The sense of possibility that characterized that moment also brought with it new forms of uncertainty and precarity. In a world that saw the rapid ascendance of finance capital, a world in which unfettered market forces and entrepreneurialism were held to be the alchemic key to abun- dance, liberty, and opportunity for all, huge amounts of wealth accrued in some quarters, leaving an ever larger sediment of poverty in its wake; this as “jobless growth” became a measure of national well-being, as man- ufacture moved to ever cheaper, less regulated elsewheres, as the unbot- tled genie of “new” capitalism fed rising Gini-coefficients, separating affluent from disposable populations, the insured from uninsured, the propertied from propertyless. And leaving many caught more or less in/ securely between. It was in this context, itself heavily inflected by race, gender, and generation, we argued, that there had been a turn, in many places, toward “occult economies”: to what appear to have been arcane modes of attempting to generate value, often by experimental means, thus to access the hidden mechanisms held to operate behind conven- tional forms of accumulation. Hence the upsurge, we suggested, of “fee- for-service” theologies and prosperity gospels, “get-rich-quick” scams, and pyramid schemes of various sorts that eroded the clear line between the mundane and the miraculous (West and Sanders 2003; Wojcik 1997; Stoll 2013). Hence, too, the rise of locally inflected satanic scares and witch hunts. And a palpable preoccupation with magical practices: with mimetic performance of all kinds, from conjuring with body parts to the practices of voodoo economics—among them the turn to derivative financial instruments to charm assets from abstractions. All of which spoke, at once, to efforts to make sense of the mysterious possibilities of the “new way of the world” (Dardot and Laval 2014) and, to one degree or another, to act upon them.
Our conceptualization of occult economies, elaborated below, has received its fair share of critical attention, although it has also been pro- ductively deployed across several disciplines. Leaving aside disagree- ments over details, a few serious objections have been raised. One is that the concept “indiscriminately aggregate[s] … disparate phenomena” (Murray and Sanders 2005: 295). As Ranger (2007: 279) notes, this critique arises from the view that the various practices that we take to be interrelated—witch killings, medicine murders, ponzi schemes, what- ever—ought each to be analyzed in its own (“local”) right; this because they have different motivations and determinations. The argument here, he adds (p. 276), is a foundational one between “splitters,” who insist on treating those practices as if each were discrete unto itself, and “lumpers,” who prefer to look for, and find explanations in, the connections among them, hypothesizing that they are cognate elements in an embrac- ing economy—itself conditioned by larger historical forces. In point of fact, in our original essay, pace those who accuse us of not taking indigenous beliefs seriously in and of themselves, we stressed that occult economies are always mediated by the substance of local signifying prac- tices. However, our intention was not to write yet another micro-anthropology of witchcraft. It was to seek out higher order articulations, pragmatic and expressive, between patently different, but interrelated efforts to engage with changing material and social conditions: condi- tions that, to many, either appeared unpropitious or seemed to hold the key to great wealth—if only one could unlock the secret of their work- ings. The object of interrogating an occult economy is precisely not to look at its component elements in isolation. It is to account for the way they are subsumed in a logic of concrete practices and rationales. Whatever the specific ends those practices seek to accomplish, whatever the specific means they use to do so.
This is also why another critique—that our approach to the occult is functionalist, that it revives old anthropological arguments about social breakdown (Kapferer 2001, 2002; Rutherford 1999: 102)—is frankly spurious. We should, says Kapferer (2002: 18), have “rather” seen con- temporary sorcery and witchcraft as “being generated in specific kinds of structural dynamics which … generate forces that are embodied in the forms that magical beliefs and practices take.” This is exactly what we did do in showing how occult practices concretized the structural contradictions of everyday life in fin de siécle South Africa. Far from treating “sor- cery and witchcraft as pathological indicators of social breakdown,” this being the original sin of British functionalism, we showed these practices to be directed toward explaining and acting on an historically labile world, thus to produce new forms of knowledge and creative action— and pointed out the parallels to, among other things, casino capitalism in New York City. Unless all historical change is taken to be “social break- down” and hence “pathological”—which may be Kapferer’s view, but is certainly not ours—our account of occult economies has nothing to do with functionalism. Unless, of course, any explanation, any analysis of cause or determination, is dubbed “functionalist,” a common, if often meaningless, term of abuse in anthropological discourse these days. As we put it in another essay (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 169), “witches and zombies are to be read as aetiological principles that translate struc- tural contradictions, experiential anomalies, and aporias … into the argot of human agency, of kinship, of morality and passion.” Their “symbolic excess and expressive exuberance … gesture towards an imaginative play infinitely more elaborate than is allowed by purely pragmatic, functional- ist explication.” It is a play, we took care to show, that involves subtle dis/ continuities between past and present (see Moore and Sanders 2001: 14).
A further objection to the concept of occult economy is tied to the question of rationality: Bastin (2002: 169), for example, has it that we “cast sorcery and witchcraft as … an irrational response to the world by the impotent.” Really? Even when we relate them to the workings of finance and venture capital? To be sure, we take care to extend the con- cept of occult economy to those among the wealthy and powerful everywhere who seek new, unconventional ways to become yet wealthier and more powerful. Mark also our stress on the fact that, at core, occult practices seek to produce knowledge by experimentation with means and ends. This is true of, and no more ir/rational than, most other techniques of knowledge production, which have their own enchantments—as do such “hard” scholarly disciplines as economics, itself sometimes viewed “as a religion” (Rapley 2017). This line of cri- tique appears also to project onto our account other preoccupations. One, addressed elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003), is that we have imposed a Eurocentric master-narrative of modernity on African beliefs and practices (Englund and Leach 2000)—as if Africans are not actively concerned to construct their own cutting-edge modernities, are unconscious of the colonizing effects of Euro-modernity on their life- worlds, and do not engage in critical debate about the relationship between the two.
Which, in turn, responds to one last critical point: Ruth Marshall (2009: 25, 28) asks “[w]hat allows [us] to assume that these [occult] prac- tices are principally modes of interpretation and understanding? Why might they not be, rather, principally forms of political practice, modes of action on the world?” Again, it is hard to take this seriously. As will be plainly evident below, we emphasize how occult practices are precisely that: modes of action on the world whose culturally grounded means and material ends have both political intention and consequences—unless one intends “political” in the most narrow, formalist, and literal of senses of the term. But why, ab initio, do we say that occult practices “are … modes of interpretation and understanding”? Because, unless one refuses interpretation entirely—which Marshall (p. 29) appears to do on a priori grounds—actions on the world, not least political ones, usually have some foundation in cognition; unless, that is, one treats those engaged in them as unthinking automatons, as zombies. Which we refuse to do. Our preference, by contrast, is to listen “principally” to indigenous voices. Says one South African scholar, Sibusiso Masondo (2011: 37), who has heard the same voices, those practices are just this: “a mode of producing new forms of consciousness, of expressing discontent with modernity and dealing with its [structural] deformities.”
But a number of more pressing matters here: Was the turn to occult economies in the late twentieth century merely a passing, ephemeral phe- nomenon? Or did it bespeak something more enduring sewn into the fabric of polity, economy, society, and personhood with the triumphal rise of neoliberalism? How transitional was the moment at which we first wrote this chapter? What has happened as the millennial mood has given way to a new normal, a time of “entrepreneurial governance” (Dardot and Laval 2014)? As global integration and deregulation have yielded yet greater accumulations of wealth in certain quarters, deepening inequality and some of the dystopic effects of contemporary capitalism in others? As nation-states, often unable or unwilling to ensure the viability of many of their subjects, condemn them either to a life of immobile disposability or to a desperate, migratory search for more secure footholds elsewhere? As means of communication, knowledge production, and conflict extend in both range and accessibility, linking local intimacies to political and economic processes of ever larger scale? As “truth” itself becomes harder and harder to plumb? How, in sum, does our argument about enchantment and the violence of abstraction hold up two decades on? With these ques- tions in mind, let us return to our reflections on millennial capitalism and occult economies in the late 1990s. We begin, as we did our earlier version, with a clutch of ethnographic fragments; different from our three original ones, they are drawn from a more recent South African archive.
II
The First: from a report in Times Live, South Africa, 26 February 2014 (Sapa 2014a):
There has been an increase in occult-related crimes reported in Gauteng [South Africa], police said on Wednesday. In the last three months, 78 … were reported, Lt-Col Hendriek de Jager, head detective of harmful and religious practices in Gauteng, said in Johannesburg ….Occult-related crimes “are on the increase, especially in the black areas where young boys and girls are promised fame and riches”…
“It’s all over Gauteng. It pops up, goes down and then appears again,” he said.
Occult-related killings were not limited to Gauteng, but were reported across the country.
The second: from The Daily Maverick, 13 October 2013 (Munusamy 2013):
In the Gospel according to Jacob (Zuma, that is, not the son of Isaac and grandson of Abraham in the Old Testament) a whole lot of us are going to Hell for sins against the government … “When you are carrying an ANC membership card, you are blessed. When you get up there, there are differ- ent cards used but when you have an ANC card, you will be let through to go to Heaven …”
In the build up to the 2014 elections, there will be lots more sermons and laying of hands, not only with Zuma as the anointed one but many other political leaders desperate for spiritual guidance, endorsement and support from the faithful. [Julius] Malema2 has already ventured beyond the borders for his spiritual enrichment when he led the EFF’s “central command team” on a visit to the Synagogue SCOAN Church of All Nation International of the great Prophet of God T B Joshua in Nigeria.
It might be indulging in the “opiate of the masses” or “drinking from the well of living water”, but making election promises is so much easier if it comes sanctioned by God.
Like the Lord, politicians work in mysterious ways.
The third: from IOL News, 24 January 2009 (Kgosana 2009):[In January 2009, a doyen of the ruling African National Congress, indus- trial tycoon Tokyo Sexwale, accused the founders of a breakaway political party, the Congress of the People (COPE), of using witchcraft to attract support, JC/JLC]
Businessman and ANC leader Tokyo Sexwale fiercely attacked Congress of the People for parading ‘old women’ on TV, using them as witchcraft to attract support. Sexwale was speaking at an ANC rally in Zwide township, outside Port Elizabeth, hardly 10km away from a COPE rally in the same city.
Speaking mainly in isiXhosa, Sexwale said: “Our mothers are taken, house to house, they are also paraded on TV, these people are performing witchcraft with our mothers ….They are liars. You can’t have respect for people who use older people in that fashion,” said Sexwale … The defectors include the 92-year old mother of President Thabo Mbeki, Epainette and a veteran ANC MP Lillian Ma-Njobe.
The fourth: from Inquisitr, 1 February 2016 (Sewell 2016):3
Customers of a sangoma (or traditional healer) in South Africa are angry after the woman has failed to raise their loved ones from the dead as she promised. She reportedly claimed to be able to put the life back into “zom- bies” and return them to the heart of their families.
Nolonwabo Mangele, 50, appeared in the Stellenbosch Magistrate’s Court after being arrested in the Eastern Cape of South Africa on January 18. She is now facing fraud charges for conning victims into believing she could raise the dead and bring back their loved ones.
Victims reportedly had paid R2800 ($231) plus a consultation fee of R60 ($4.95) to Mangele after she claimed she could “heal” dead people, or “zombies” as she called them, and bring them back to life within a year …
According to Mangele’s alleged fraud victims, she told them to buy clothing, blankets, toiletries and even airtime for cell phones and to deposit money into their dead relatives’ bank accounts. [H]er clients didn’t ques- tion why the clothing sizes kept changing as Mangele requested more to keep the “zombies” warm …
According to a story on Eye Witness News, sangomas in South Africa … now advertise their services on Facebook.
As these snippets suggest, forces at once spirited and ostensibly arcane remain vibrant actants in South Africa. While they may seem lurid exot- ica from the cool distance of Academia Americana,4 in their own context they seldom appear so, capturing a near-ubiquitous preoccupation—at times curious, at times playful, at times desperate, defensive, therapeu- tic—with those forces. And with the ways in which they may be wielded to gain advantage, private or collective, licit or illicit. This, moreover, has plenty of parallels elsewhere; although, to be sure, what counts as magic, and equally as rationality, varies across time, place, and cultures of knowledge production. Euro-America produces its own share of the late modern fantastic, the occult, and magical thinking (Kerr and Crow 1983; de Blécourt and Davies 2004; J. Comaroff 1994; Schwartz 1976). Commentaries on the turn to faith as “mysterious opiate” abound: vide, for instance, Jeff Sharlett’s (2016) account of Donald Trump as “American Preacher, [b]uilding a congregation for his prosperity gospel” that offers “belief in return for relief.” So does a vibrant discourse, espe- cially in the conservative Christian press, about resurgent Satanism in a USA “‘Submerged’ in the Occult”; also about witchcraft that, some claim, “is on the uprise” and has gone “mainstream” (Gryboski 2013).5 But not only in religious contexts. The turn to the paranormal, spirits, and magic, notes Annette Hill (2010: 1f.), is on the “uprise” across all contemporary Western societies. Even more, adds Eric Kurlander (2017: 299), the “renaissance in supernatural reasoning, shadowy conspiracy theories and extraterrestrial powers” has gone global in this age of uncer- tainty; significantly, Kurlander documents the centrality of the occult in other structurally similar times and places, among them Nazi Germany, where, among other things, the Schutzstaffel (SS) actually set up a “witch division.” In sum, occult economies are not new. Those of the present day have any number of precedents, each one taking on the form and substance of the social, cultural, political, and economic context in which it emerged.
The recent explosion of electronic communications has greatly acceler- ated the dissemination of narratives of the supernatural, digging deep into the archive of gothic, transcultural, and futuristic exotica: of zom- bies, vampires, revenants, wiccans, genies, jinns, and tokoloshes, all of them pulsing with the realistic half-life of digital animation. In tune with this, the boundaries of the post-enlightenment human are increasingly being called into question. Hence the fascination with transhumanism of one or another kind: with werewolves, changelings, or invading aliens clothed in ordinary physical form. And with paranormal processes like mind-uploading and digital immortality.6 Africa has long been replete with accounts of the ways in which powerful people deploy devilish pacts and freakish familiars, the better to attract capricious wealth, political power, personal invincibility, ever more so in libertarian times (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). Where postcolonial, post-totalitarian societies have been baptized anew in the gospels of democracy and laissez faire, a yawn- ing gap has opened up between promise and possibility, means and ends. It is a gap that has been widened by the dizzying, apparently uncharted flow of goods, money, and influence across local horizons.
These “new situations,” to evoke the ghost of Evans-Pritchard (1937: 513), have called forth “new magic.” And new organic theories to account for the hidden forces driving the moral and material economy of wealth creation, many of them decidedly unorthodox in repurposing old knowl- edge to fresh ends, thereby to divine the mysteries of the moment. In Africa, amidst the extremes of affluence and destitution that followed the impact of structural adjustment, stories abounded about visceral forms of extraction and exchange, about the sacrificial logic—the violence, fast and slow—said to underwrite unnatural accumulation: stories of traffic in organs (Scheper-Hughes 1996; White 1997; Durham 2004); of blood drawn by “electric vampires” for illicit medical ends (Weiss 1996: 203; Bastian 1993); of trade in AIDS-impregnated clothes (Vision Reporter 2015); of commerce in indentured workers, sex slaves, brides, and the bodies of albinos, thought to hold the secret of power, prosperity, and health (Masanja 2015; Schühle 2013).
Often referred to as rumors or panics, terms that speak to their unau- thorized, provisional, even perverse quality, these persistent suspicions tend to resonate at the interface of the corporeal and the commodity, captured by images at once apocalyptic and banal. Hence headlines like “Child Abductions at Spur Restaurants” (Sapa 2014b),7 a South African restaurant chain, which tell of new frontiers of consumerism both emi- nently benign—blacks frequenting establishments once the sole preserve of whites—and deadly. Similarly, the spreading rumors, around 2001, of organ trafficking in Chechnya: Russian forces, it was said, were murdering Chechen youths in order to sell their body parts, marking out new hor- rors of war-as-commerce (Regamey 2012). As elsewhere in the world, this traffic is suspected of charting new forms of imperialism, in which the vitality and procreative capacity of impoverished “others” is siphoned off in an increasingly corporate, transnational system of extraction for the benefit of those at the centers of power and affluence. The point is brilliantly captured in Stephen Frears’ film, Dirty Pretty Things (2002), about a London hotel staffed by over-worked immigrants, alike licit and not, that hosts a clandestine operation in which desperate illegals swop kidneys for forged passports.
Given that many of these panics, especially nightmares of organ steal- ing, have deep histories, having long marked out the fault lines of colo- nial extraction, is there anything distinctive about the arcane, enchanted visions of economy and society characteristic of the present? Or about the occulting of the relations of means to ends that they invoke? Or about the preoccupation with the literal use of the bodies of some for the empower- ment of others (cf. Meyer and Geschiere 1999)? Why now the acute anxieties about reproduction, physical, and social? What, if anything, has any of this to do with processes of globalization and the particular forms of capitalism associated with it? With postcoloniality? Or with the sociology of post-revolutionary polities?
We pose this problem as both a general matter of anthropological interest and, more specifically, one of concern in contemporary South Africa. Is it not surprising, for example, that the thoroughly modernist African National Congress saw it necessary, among its earliest gestures in government, to appoint a commission of enquiry into witchcraft and ritual murder in one of the new provinces (Ralushai et al. 1996)? That it found itself presiding over a so-called epidemic of mystical evil? That this “epidemic,” far from abating with the end of apartheid, increased with the democratic dispensation, despite the rationalist predictions of theorists of modernization? That, according to a former head of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services—itself a curious, oddly enchanted creature—the devil had been “[making] a revolutionary re-appearance” here (Gevisser 1995)?8 What are we to make of the strange longevity of this Unit, which survived legal challenge on the ground that its treatment of witchcraft and Satanism violated the constitutional rec- ognition of all religions and cultures? Officially disbanded in 2006, it was soon revived again, according to an internal police memo leaked in 2012. Now called the SAPS Harmful Religious Practices Unit, it strives, like its predecessor, to combat crimes driven by “belief in the supernatural, rit- ual, and spiritual coercion”—all held to be on the rise, as our opening fragment makes plain. Its 40 officers remain active across the nation (Kemp 2015).
In short, the story we told continues to unfold. If anything, even more palpably, more urgently.
III
The popular preoccupations that, in late 1990s, sedimented in the spread of an occult economy—with the pursuit of prosperity by all possible means; with the rising incidence of witchcraft, real, or imagined (Ashforth 1998: 505); with killing those suspected of magical evil; with zombies, Satanism, the piracy of body parts, Faustian bargains, and much besides— waxed behind the more mundane surfaces of the “new” South Africa. This, to paraphrase Julian Barnes (2016: 125, 91), was the “whisper of history” beneath the more audible, more strident “noise of time.” Primed by the expanding horizons of the post-Cold War world (cf. Piot 2010), with a sudden awareness of new geographies, new media, new means of mobility and accumulation, these preoccupations, as we have repeatedly said, drew on cultural elements with deep local pasts. But, in probing circumstances at once familiar and uncanny, they also invoked the narra- tive of liberal transition that beckoned them into the “brave neo world”: the narrative of democratization and development, of rights, resources, redress. And, above all, of the free market, the salvific spirit of millennial capitalism—which, in the global south, was experienced, ambiguously and ambivalently, as an uneasy fusion of the modern and the postmodern, utility and futility, promise and its perversion (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001).
As this suggests, the roots of the rising occult economy are not to be found simply in poverty or deprivation; local populations had suffered these things, and worse, for a very long time. They were grounded, rather, in a doubling. On one hand was the perception that, behind the ordinary, visible workings of the market lie mysterious mechanisms that hold the real key to its bounty: to the rapid, often immaterial, invisible flow of value across time and space, converging in the gray spaces where the local meets the transnational. This perception was authenticated by glimpses of vast wealth passing through many postcolonies into the hands of a few of their citizens. On the other hand was a dawning sense—not only among the poor, also among those caught in the mid- dle—of having been left out of the full promise of prosperity. In South Africa, after all, the end of apartheid held out the prospect that everyone would be free to speculate, accumulate, and indulge repressed desires. But, for many, the millennial moment went by without payback, either economic or political. While those who enriched themselves openly— political “big men,” cultural producers, property tycoons, prosperity preachers, sports stars, even “great” criminals—became objects of fame and admiration, others whose sudden affluence had no discernible source were subject to suspicion and scandal. And were thought, by vir- tue of their presumed control of the dark arts, to be potentially danger- ous to those around them. This, in turn, underlies an essential tension at the core of many occult economies; or, more precisely, the fact that they tend to manifest themselves on two inimical fronts at once. The first is the search for the key, the hidden means—often taken to lie in the power of profanation and the flouting of moral conventions—to tap into the arcane knowledge that yields this new kind of wealth-without-work. The second is the effort to identify and eradicate those held to have enriched themselves by those very means.
Partly because of the nature of the struggle to end apartheid, partly because of the legacy of racial capitalism here, partly because of the eco- nomic and political history of South Africa since 1994, most of those who experience the present as privation and thwarted aspiration, and who engage most visibly in enchanted commerce, are young. It is they, progeny of the digital age, who held out the greatest expectations for “the revolution.” They see themselves, with good reason, as the repressed for whom the promise of postcolonial return has been most obviously blocked by the hardening materialities of life. As a result, the dominant line of cleavage across the land has become generation. Post-1994 South Africa, to put it bluntly, has been attempting to construct a modernist nation-state under postmodern conditions, a historical endeavor fraught with contradictions and impossibilities. Black underclass youths embody those contradictions and impossibilities most tangibly. And volubly. It is the males among them, more than anyone else, who have to face up to the contemporary situation: to the difficulties of social reproduction in an age that once held out fervent hopes of rebirth. But, as we have already intimated, it is not only them. Entry into the occult economy transects color, culture, age, and sex.
In order to illuminate this, and to explore how locally grounded occult practices retool culturally familiar technologies for new ends, how they give voice to discontent with prevailing the social, economic, and politi- cal order, how they produce new forms of consciousness, and how they express themselves as one variant of a global phenomenon rising in response to similar structural conditions, we focus on a particular ethno- graphic setting: the northerly provinces of South Africa, just before the end of apartheid. And after, into the continuing present.
IV
In March 1995, in response to a mounting sense of emergency in the countryside (above, p. 00), a Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province9 was established by the new provincial administration. Not unlike official commissions in colonial times (Ashforth 1990), this one was an uneasy hybrid of gover- nance and ethnography: an effort at once to regain control over a runaway world and to grasp persistent lived realities, its terms of reference drew both from the tropes of scientific universalism and from the language of cultural difference. Chaired by Professor N.V. Ralushai, it comprised nine members, eight of them Africans. Their report is a rich, barely analyzed, amalgam of informant accounts, case records, first-hand observa- tion, and recommendations. These recommendations voice two impulses: (1) civic rationalism, expressed in a call for liberation through education and for a rigorous response to witch-related violence, including possible reinstatement of the death penalty and (2) frank, even assertive cultural relativism. Consistent with the latter, the report declares that most Africans regard magical attacks as “normal events of everyday life,” a real- ity incompatible with the legacy of European law, which criminalizes witch-finding (p. 61). The report also notes (p. 63) that most black police believe in witchcraft, making them reluctant to intervene when suspects are attacked. The conclusion? That there is “no clear-cut” solution to the legal problem—other than to advocate various strategies to stem the brutality with which accused witches are hunted down. The actuality of witchcraft itself, however, was never called into doubt.
On the contrary. The urgent tone of the commission, the sense of crisis to which it spoke, was underscored by a rising demography of violence: between 1985 and 1995 there occurred over 300 cases of witch-related killings in the Northern Province (p. 31); in the first half of 1996 there were 676, a 45-fold increase. Similarly in the Northwest Province where, although the overall incidence was lower, it also increased over the decade. Two decades later, in 2014, as we saw in our first fragment above, it was also said to be rising in Gauteng Province. Little wonder that many peo- ple, here as elsewhere in Africa, feared that witchcraft was “running wild.” Many still do. The mood of alarm was well captured in the opening remarks of the report (p. i): “[A]s the Province continued to burn,” as “witchcraft violence and ritual murder” were becoming endemic, “some- thing had to be done, and very fast.”
The countryside was burning alright. But there were lots of ironies in the fire. For one thing, this was a much heralded moment of exodus from colonial bondage. And yet rural populations were convinced that their communities harbored trenchant human evil; that familiar landscapes were alive with phantasmic forces of unprecedented power and peril; that the state, past and present, had failed to shield them from malignity, leav- ing them to protect themselves. For another thing, it was youths, not persons in authority, who felt most moved to cleanse their towns and villages by executing “instant justice.” They had greeted Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, viewed by the world as a sign that reason had pre- vailed at last, with a furious spate of witch burnings—often to the august chanting of freedom songs (pp. 62, 244). All this was accompanied by a growing fear, in the northerly provinces, that some people, mainly old people, were turning others into zombies: into an army of ghost workers whose lifeblood fueled a vibrant, immoral economy pulsing beneath the sluggish rhythms of rural life. The margin between the human and the inhuman had become permeable, ruptured by the living dead and their depraved owners. Along with a grisly national market in human body parts, these zombies bore testimony to a mounting confusion of people with things.
None of this, we repeat, is entirely new. In much of Africa, the colonial encounter gave rise to the sorts of frictions that ignite witch hunts (e.g. Richards 1935; Auslander 1993). To be sure, witchcraft has proven to be every bit as protean as modernity itself, thriving on its contradictions and its silences, usurping its media, puncturing its pretensions. Yet longevity does not imply continuity. Whatever their putative powers, witches can- not escape history. Neither is their flexibility infinite or random. Shifts in their cultural conception often speak, if often indirectly, to the impact of large-scale structural transformations on local worlds. Indeed, their very durability stems from a genius for making the parochial language of inti- mate, interpersonal affect register the impress of abstract social forces. It is this articulation, in both senses of the term, that has underlain the intensification of witch-finding in South Africa, and throughout the con- tinent, since the late twentieth century (Geschiere 1997; Meyer and Geschiere 1999). The parochialism of witches, it seems, is an increasingly global phenomenon.
Because witches distill complex, diffuse material and social processes into comprehensible human intentions and actions, they tend to figure in narratives that tie translocal forces to local events, map them onto proxi- mate landscapes, and translate them into vernacular vocabularies of cause-and-effect. In rural South Africa, the 1990s rise in witch-finding coincided with an efflorescence of other occult technologies that linked the arcane and the ordinary by thoroughly modern, even postmodern, means; means that evoked, parodied, and contorted the mechanisms of the market. Thus ritual murder was widely reported in the media to have become “big business” in northerly South Africa. In 1995, for example, stories spread about dismembered corpses found in the freezer of a casino in Mmabatho, capital of the Northwest Province, formerly the “independent” Tswana “homeland” of Bophuthatswana. The casino had been built for tourists during the apartheid years, when betting and interracial sex were illegal in South Africa—but not in the ethnic “homelands.” There, over the border, in the gray interstices of the transnational, white South Africans came to gamble and purchase sexual services. After 1994, as we have noted, black bodies were still for sale, but in different form; the gruesome trade now nested within the orbit of everyday commerce, circulating human organs to whomever could invest in them, thus to abet their undertakings by occult means.
Much the same thing was apparent, too, in all the talk about the “fact” that some local entrepreneurs were turning their fellows into working zombies, a practice that conjures with a foundational law of the market, namely, that rates of profit are inversely related to labor costs; as our fourth fragment makes plain, zombie-conjuring remains part of the social and media landscape in South Africa. But the most fabulous narratives, especially in the Northwest Province, concerned Satanism, held to be the most robust, most global of all occult enterprises. Less a matter of awe- some ritual than mundane human greed, dabbling in the diabolical was said to be particularly captivating to the young. In 1996, when the Setswana TV network broadcast two programs on the subject, the “reformed” ex-Satanists featured were juveniles. Taking calls from the public they told, in prosaic terms, of the translocal power of the black arts, among them an ability to travel great distances at miraculous speed to garner fabulous riches at will.
We shall return to ritual murder, zombies, and Satanism in due course. Here we note merely what our local interlocutors insisted on telling us: that the available array of enchanted, often visceral, modes of produc- ing value was expanding rapidly. Visceral, yet also oddly banal. In the past, divination and resort to occult means involved a clandestine encounter with a human expert. Now anxieties about witchcraft, money magic, ritual murder, and unnatural death are ventilated in a public sphere comprising “electronic” churches, radio, TV, and social media; newspapers, magazines, and online websites regularly advertise “dial-in- diviners” and “short time call” consultations with traditional healers on WhatsApp (see e.g. Gumtree n.d.). The multimediated quality of this communication is neatly captured in innovative ritual technologies. One is divining by “mirror” or “television” (Ralushai et al. 1996: 6, 148, 177): it requires clients to visit a “screen-room,” where they imbibe a fermented drink and watch a white, wall-mounted cloth, on which appear figures of miscreants, both human and animal. Their transmis- sion mimics the way in which satellite dishes, broadcast networks, and long-distance magic condense images, objects, and sounds from afar. Such technologies, moreover, keep evolving, like those facilitated by texting, whose enchanted potential has not been limited to Africa, as the haunting movie, Personal Shopper (2016, dir. Olivier Assayas), makes plain.
Once these theaters of mundane magicality render their verdicts, who are revealed as the witches? And who take responsibility for acting against them? According to Ralushai et al. (1996), the purported malevolents were, as they continue to be, the usual suspects of African witchcraft— men and women of unshared, conspicuous wealth (pp. 219, 253)— although those physically attacked were typically old, often socially isolated, and defenseless. As to taking action against them, “[i]n general the community is responsible … but the youth who are called ‘comrades’ are in the forefront” (p. 15). Not only were these young men the primary perpetrators of witch-related violence but they seem often to have forced neighbors and ritual experts to do their bidding.
Let us take a closer look at the most extended case recorded by the Witchcraft Commission, the Ha-Madura witch hunt (pp. 193f).10 The defendants, who ranged from 14 to 35, were charged with having mur- dered an elderly woman by “necklacing” and attacking two other elderly persons. Witnesses recounted that, on the afternoon of 21 March 1990, “the majority of the youths” of Madura, most of them male and unemployed, gathered under a tree near the primary school. Speakers urged them to exterminate the witches in their midst (p. 202), and they set off in search of suspects. The vacant homes of a couple of suspected miscreants were torched before the youths moved on to the yard of the deceased. When they found her, they doused her with petrol and set her alight. She tried to flee across a nearby field but the crowd caught up with her. “Why are you killing me, my grandchildren?” she wailed. Her assail- ants responded: “Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!” (pp. 206, 212).
There could scarcely be a more bald statement of deadly antagonism between generations. Or the reasons for it. Or its political consequences. For these youth, mass action might have vanquished the ancien regime. But it did not bring them the wealth or empowerment that was sup- posed to follow. South Africa threw off the shackles of apartheid just as global processes were compromising the sovereignty of liberal nation- states and their control over economic growth, as the manufacturing sector was shrinking, as multinational capital found more exploitable sites of production, as the service sector and the immaterial economy grew, and as other features of the neoliberal turn took root—all of which made un- and under-employment increasingly chronic, dispro- portionately so in the countryside. The fact that the living standards of a growing urban African middle class were rising at the same time (Mabandla 2013) only underscored the predicament of those rendered disposable in the post-apartheid moment. Complex historical forces, these: forces that brought deep structural change in their wake—but, to underscore our point, distilled into the vernacular idiom of occult evil. And into a proximate, human cause, one that was actionable. Thus the cry from the youths as they killed the alleged witch: “We can’t get work because of you!”
It is no wonder, then, that the most spirited witch-finding tends to occur where conditions are especially straitened, where raw inequality is especially blatant, and where contradictions inherent in the new order of things are most acutely felt.11 Limpopo, the former Northern Province (see note 9), is the second poorest in the country;12 the remote reaches of the Northwest come close behind. The failure of plans for reconstruction, development, redistribution, and accelerated growth has been most evi- dent in these regions. Agriculture is still practiced, largely by women, but much of it is pitiably limited. Along with social grants, petty business— beer-brewing, food vending, construction, service- and piece-work— supplements household budgets. At the same time, the migrant wages that had long subsidized faltering agrarian endeavors, and had granted young men a modicum of autonomy, have diminished markedly. Concomitantly, cash assets vested in the elderly, like pensions and grants, have risen in relative value; as disposable income, they are the object of fierce jealousy and mystical activity (e.g. Ritchken 1994: 361, 357). Also, conditions in the countryside have facilitated the emergence of modest new elites there too, if on nothing like the scale of the rising urban mid- dle class. And so, in places like Madura, material distinctions, albeit of widely variable magnitude, have become apparent among neighbors. Such differences are embodied in the kinds of commodities that index prosperity: houses, cars, televisions, even cell phones. The alleged witch of Madura owned some of these luxuries. She was, in fact, the occasional employer of several of her attackers and sometimes let them watch her TV (p. 212). The petrol that consumed her was seized from local men who now could afford cars by young men who saw little chance that they would ever do so.
Witch-hunting youth in the Northern Province acted as a cohort, much like an age-regiment (mophato) in Sotho-Tswana society of old. Ridding the countryside of baloi, witches, was all of a piece with the other forms of mass action that had fought a repressive social order; dur- ing the struggle, it should be noted, urban “comrades” denounced their parental generation as passive sellouts to colonial oppression. Indeed, the war against mystical evil fused political and ritual means of both recent and older vintage. In addition to singing songs of freedom as they carried out their exorcisms, “comrades” in Venda and Giyani also intoned a well- known circumcision chant (pp. 50, 179, 244).
Age, of course, is a relational principle. The young comrades forged their assertive identity against the foil of a gendered gerontocracy; signifi- cantly, those attacked were referred to as “old ladies,” even when they were men (p. 211). The antisocial greed of these predators was epitomized in the idea of unnatural production and reproduction, in images of toxic, ungenerative sexuality, of adultery, rape, and abortion (Ritchken 1994: 325, 363). The Commission, for example, made repeated reference to the inability of witches to bear children, to their “red” vaginas, and to their lethal, “rotten” sperm (pp. 141, 150, 158, 168). Killing these “per- verts” by fire, a vehicle of simultaneous destruction and rebirth, bespoke an effort to engender, literally, a more propitious, socially constructive mode of reproduction.
Threats to local viability, as we have noted, were also ascribed to the creation of a zombie work force. Thus, the following fragment from a case record (pp. 50, 158):
On a certain day … [when] the accused arrived … [people] shouted from the street that she is a witch with a shrinked [sic] vagina. They further said that she had killed people by means of lightning and that she has a drum full of zombies. They also said that her son “Zero” has no male seed and that he could not impregnate a woman.
It is hard to imagine a more pointed portrait of perversion: of witchcraft as a negation of life-giving, social exchange. In place of fertile procre- ation, and the forms of wealth that nurture community and enrich oth- ers, the witch makes ghost workers out of the able-bodied. She thrives by cannibalizing people, especially robbing the rising generation of a legiti- mate income and the wherewithal to marry and establish their own fami- lies, indeed, of becoming fully adult.
This sense of illegitimate production and reproduction pervades youth- ful discourses of witchcraft in much of South Africa. Many young black men, their adult masculinity ever more at risk, blame their incapacity to ensure a future for themselves on an all-consuming, aged elite. Their concern is underscored by the preoccupation with zombies (sing., setlotl- wane, Northern Sotho; sethotsela, Tswana). Long a feature of Caribbean vodoun, their appearance here owes much to a diasporic flow of occult images (Appadurai 1990), although they resonate with an indigenous affliction known as sefifi, a state of “living death” first described by nineteenth-century missionaries (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 143). Spliced into local mystical economies, these shadowy figures take on the color of their surroundings. As one of our opening fragments suggests, they are persons who are thought to have been killed and revived by witchcraft. The living dead exist only to serve their creators—generally, in the South African context, unrelated neighbors. Bereft of tongues to give voice to their alienation, they are believed to work after dark, mainly in agriculture (Ralushai et al. 1996: 5; Ritchken 1994: 329). Ghost workers can also be magically transported to urban centers, in fact, to any place where they might toil for their owners. In this era of casualization, there are even “part-time zombies” (pp. 224–225): people who awake exhausted in the morning, having toiled unwittingly at night to feed the greed of their masters
Reduced from humanity to raw labor power, the zombie, like the murderous criminal, is a nightmare citizen of contemporary South Africa. His absent presence makes tangible the sort of violent abstrac- tion that fuels otherwise inexplicable accumulation; to be sure, he dis/ embodies that mode of abstraction. Existing solely for the benefit of its owner, the toil of the living dead is pure surplus value (Marx 1976: 325): it has “all the charms of something created out of nothing.” Zombie production is thus an apt image of the inflating occult econo- mies of postcolonial Africa, of their ever more brutal forms of extrac- tion. As spectral capital, it will be evident why these forms of extraction are typically associated, as is witchcraft in general, with older people of apparent affluence: why they are thought to have multiplied as wage work has become scarce among the young and unskilled. Not only does the rise of a phantom proletariat consume the life force of others. By yielding profit without cost, it destroys the labor market, conven- tional patterns of social reproduction, and the legitimate prospects of “the community” at large. This, in essence, was the point made by striking workers on an Eastern Transvaal coffee plantation in 1995: they demanded the dismissal of three supervisors accused of killing employees to gain control of their jobs and keeping zombies for their own enrichment (Weekly Mail & Guardian 1995: 8). Spectral times also yield spectral crimes: the power of zombies to materialize wealth in the guise of ordinary things that mark the good life—clothes, toiletries, cell phone airtime—also shapes the fraudulent imagination; vide the case of the fake sangoma we encountered above in our final fragment.
But zombie production is merely one means among several. Recall that there has also been an increase in recent years of the incidence of ritual murder, of killing for the purpose of harvesting body parts. As Ralushai et al. (1996: 255) explained:
[B]ody parts are used … to secure certain advantages from the ancestors. A skull may … be built into the foundation of a new building to ensure a good business, or a brew containing human parts … buried where it will ensure a good harvest.
While they have long been part of the ritual repertoire of southern African societies, these practices appear to have been rare in the past. But a great deal of evidence confirms that, in this domain too, market forces have spurred production. In addition to stories of mutilated remains, the press purveys matter-of-fact details of such things as going rates for various body parts (Khoza and Mapoma 1994). Evidence from court cases in dif- ferent regions of the country confirms that would-be entrepreneurs, most of them young, engage in the sale of organs.13 These youths appear to act on the assumption that the occult economy feeds the malevolent ambi- tions of their elders, said to be the most ready consumers of the purloined parts. Already in 1988 it was noted that, in the (future) Northern Province, any disappearance of persons, especially children, was “imme- diately linked to businessmen and politicians” by young activists (p. 271). Across the border at Mochudi, Botswana, public discontent over the han- dling of a girl’s ritual murder in 1994—allegedly by local entrepreneurs, abetted by her father—brought youth onto the streets of the capital, prompting the Office of the President to call in Scotland Yard to help solve the crime (Durham 2004).
We reiterate that, just as the traffic in human organs is not new, neither is it restricted to South Africa: that there is a well-established, global economy in body parts (e.g. Frow 1997; White 1997: 334; Scheper- Hughes 1996), which flow from poor to rich countries, south to north, east to west, young to old; that some governments are said to raise reve- nue by farming corneas and kidneys for export; that, from the Andes through Africa to East Asia, mysterious malevolents are believed to extract blood, fat, members, and living offspring from the unsuspecting (Scutti 2014). At issue in these panics about corporeal free enterprise is a fear of the creeping commodification of life itself. Among Sotho and Tswana, people speak apprehensively of a relentless process that erodes the humanity (botho) of persons and renders them susceptible as never before to the long reach of the market.
Notice the emphasis on distance. The translocal dimension of the occult economy is crucial to the way in which its workings are understood in rural South Africa. Throughout the northerly provinces, people ponder the role of mobility and the means of abstraction—specifically, the capacity to siphon goods and people across space in no time at all—in producing new forms of wealth. Preternatual movement adds value. But how? How are its mechanics to be mastered? As South Africa has cast off its pariah status and has sought ever greater integration with transnational markets, the grow- ing velocity of long-range transaction, of the almost instantaneous flow of signs and styles and commodities across the earth, is discernible all around. This, to wit, underlay the fascination in the Northwest with Satanism (see above), itself a feature of the millennial moment in many parts of the world (e.g. Wright 1995; La Fontaine 1998; Meyer 1999).
Remember, in this respect, the television programs mentioned earlier, the ones in which “reformed” devil worshippers spoke to callers. When asked to explain the relationship of the diabolical to boloi (witchcraft), one laconic youth said, in a fluent mix of Setswana and English: “Satanism is high-octane witchcraft. It is more international.”14 So it is that old ideas are extended and new tropes domesticated to meet altered conditions. The devil’s disciples were rumored to travel far and wide, fuelling their accumulation of riches with human blood. As the petrochemical image suggests, the basis of their potency was, again, the capacity to “ride the tiger of time-space compression” (Harvey 1990: 351): to move seamlessly between the parochial and the translocal—here and there, then and now—thus to weave the connections of cause-and-effect that hold the key to the mysteries of the history of the present.
V
It will be clear now why, in post-1994 South Africa—and elsewhere in a world of whose epochal shifts South Africa is symptomatic—there has been a palpable intensification of appeals to enchantment. The rise of occult economies has tended to occur, at the turn of the twenty-first cen- tury at least, in contexts in which an optimistic faith in the free market has encountered the realities, indeed the “crises,” of neoliberal times: unpredictable shifts in sites of production and increasingly casualized, increasingly scarce, increasingly insecure labor, exacerbated, for many, by the contraction of real wages; the rising power of corporations and, with it, explosive levels of inequality; the dis/ordering of space, time, and the flow of value that has accompanied tightening global integration and the spread of a digital commons; the devolution of many of the func- tions of state to the private sector, rising authoritarian populism, de- democratization, and the dissolution of received political alignments— without any obvious coordinates, beyond identity and interest, along which new ones are taking shape. In South Africa, still struggling to cast off the legacies of apartheid, these things have been felt especially acutely, along with the dawning realization that the dream of liberation, its prom- ise of new freedom, prosperity, plenitude, has given way to a new normal. It is a “normal” characterized by state capture and epidemic corruption, by mass concern with violent crime against persons and property, and by the highest levels of debt in the world. Almost daily protests—for the delivery of basic services among the poor, for free and decolonized education among students, for safety, protection, and ethical government among the public at large—express spreading political disaffection. And urban environments continue to juxtapose the comfortable neighborhoods of the propertied against the violent, insecure streets of their less privileged, racially marked compatriots.
Such are some of the corollaries of the new age of capital. At the same time, of course, all sorts of legitimate ventures, some of them strik- ingly inventive, prosper and propagate themselves. From the quiet back- yards of rural homesteads through the teeming taxi ranks of large townships to sedate urban corporate quarters, African entrepreneurs “do business,” dissolving many, if not all, older cleavages of color. And a goodly number of whites continue to live in paradisiacal comfort. A poli- tics of optimism is actively purveyed by the ANC, not altogether in vain; the broadcast media envisage an Afropolitan future in which black is not bleak. Cultural production, often exhilaratingly experimental, spirited, intense, thrives across the country. Still, the dystopic undersides of the moment persist, although they evince ups and downs. At times they recede in the popular imagination, at other times—in the wake of the 2008 economic recession, for example, or with spikes in official crime rates and fresh revelations of corruption in the upper reaches of government— they grow increasingly baroque, medieval almost.
Perhaps all this will turn out to be transitory, a mere passing moment in the longue dureé. For now, however, enchantment in its diverse mani- festations, far from slipping away with the resolute march of modernity, seems virtually everywhere on the ascent, from back country Limpopo to an American presidency deeply mired in millennial thinking. In South Africa, as we saw in our opening fragments, it is palpable in police reports of spiraling occult crimes, especially killings, across the country; in “the Gospel according to (ex-)President Jacob Zuma,” according to which an ANC membership card is not merely a guarantee of direct access to heaven, but a ticket to electoral success and the privilege it conveys; in the claim by leading public figures that witchcraft has the magical capacity to attract electoral support; and in the fact that zombie conjurers advertise their services in the national media, even, allegedly, on Facebook. No wonder, then, that, in July 2017—amidst a rush of bewilderingly com- plex scandals surrounding state capture and political corruption—a pub- lic intellectual wrote, in the largest national newspaper, that, “against a backdrop of precipitous economic decline and a total collapse of governance,” the country at large has become “[an environment] fertile for purveyors of miracles” (Zibi 2017). The conditions that gave rise to the occult economy with which we were concerned almost 20 years ago, it seems, have not disappeared. If anything, that economy has become endemic, constantly reinventing itself in step with the contingencies of the historical present.