Applies To: John Comaroff

  • Cattle, Currencies, and the Politics of Commensuration on a Colonial Frontier

    Cattle, Currencies, and the Politics of Commensuration on a Colonial Frontier

    PREFATORY NOTE

    Encounters between different regimes of value – regimes divided by cultural space and time — presume mediation, translation, and communication. And, therefore, currencies, at once verbal and material, that objectify them. This, in turn, depends on one thing above all else: on mechanisms of commensuration, mechanisms that render negotiable otherwise inimical, apparently intransitive, orders of signs and practices. Without such mechanisms, which have often been the object of conflict and contestation, large scale projects of world-making, like colonialism, would have made no sense, neither as a world-historical undertaking on the part of colonizers nor as a lived reality to those upon whose worlds it was wrought. Jane Guyer (2004: 13), in an acute reading of the West African archive, warns against the assumption that commensuration, especially that attributed to the alchemy of money, necessarily dissolves all distinctions between disparate scales and measures of worth. In Africa, she insists, nonequivalent exchange has been pervasive. If anything, it has been facilitated by the spread of quantifiable currencies: as people became adept at deploying monetary scales, they frequently used them for negotiating intervals, “exchanging goods and services that were explicitly not the match of each other” (Guyer 2004: 47). In similar spirit, the following essay interrogates the role of the commensuration in the colonial encounter: How might the management of value conversion – efforts, that is, both to facilitate and to impede it — play into larger processes of political contestation and incorporation at the edges of empire?

    INTRODUCTION

    Money is sacred, as everyone knows… Barry Unsworth (1992: 325)

    This essay explores a very specific obsession with very general historical implications: the effort of Nonconformist evangelists to introduce coinage, to replace beads and cattle with banknotes, among Tswana peoples in South Africa. At its broadest, it posits a postmarxist argument, rooted in the concerns of both marxist and liberal theory, about the salience of commensuration in the modernist construction of society and history. And above all, in the forging of empires. For, we shall claim, at the heart of all “modern” colonialisms, a condition of their possibility perhaps, were mundane mechanisms that made ini- mical kinds of value, with different cultural roots, at once objectifiable, comparable, and negotiable–me- chanisms, that is, which permitted the up- and downloading of unlike forms of wealth, both human and inanimate. Commensuration and objectification, standardization and abstraction, equilibration and con- vertibility, of course, all feature prominently in classic theories of commodification; also in theories of the workings of money. But their significance in the construction of modernity as an ideology of global scale, and in the encounter between Europe and its others, has not been adequately plumbed. Nor, we believe, have their various media, their poetics and magicality, been adequately theorized..

    In order to make our general point, and to explore its further theoretical consequences, we interro- gate processes of commensuration in one African colonial theater, focusing on the material transactions they enabled across semantic frontiers; on their diverse, and differently endowed media, alike in- digenous and imported; on their implications of the long-run for cultural constructions of wealth; on their existential effects upon all involved. We ask why it was that the campaign to convert Tswana to Christianity, and to the ways of the West, concentrated so centrally on recasting their currencies: on tea- ching them to use cash, to make good by buying and selling goods, to commodify their labors by transfor- ming the wages of sin into virtuous incomes. We trace how these ventures were challenged by African conceptions of value; how they called into being hybrid tokens of exchange; how they set in train strug- gles to domesticate new alchemies of enrichment while striving to protect local means of storing wealth. We shall show that, for nineteenth-century colonial evangelists in South Africa, saving savages meant teaching savages to save. If Jesus was to redeem them, his sable followers had to learn to invest. Also to produce providentially, using God’s gifts to bring forth the greatest possible abundance. Or at least marketable surpluses. Only then would Africa become part of the Christian commonwealth and its sacred economy. Drawing “native” communities into that body of corporate nations meant, first and foremost, persuading them to accept money, the ultimate currency of conversion, commerce, civility, salvation. In their efforts to do this, the Protestant missions took the waxing spirits of capitalism, its specie and its signifying conventions, on a world-historical journey.

    In recuperating that journey, we seek to make visible the hidden hand, sometimes the sleight of hand, behind the political economy of nineteenth-century European colonialism. Which returns us to the broad outlines of our argument: (i) inasmuch as the building of empires depended on processes of commensuration, on rendering epistemically equivalent and transitive once incomparable objects and ideas, signs and meanings, it demanded media–beads, coin, contracts, and the like–with the capacity, simultaneously, to construct, negate, and transfigure difference; and (ii) inasmuch as those media, those currencies of conversion, opened up new lines of distinction, new languages of value, new forms of inequity, new objects of desire, new possibilities of appropriation and exploitation, they took on magical properties; this because (iii) they appeared, in and of themselves, to objectify history-in-the- making, even to make history of their own accord. Which, we shall demonstrate, is why banknotes, beads, and bovines became the objects of a protracted struggle in the South African interior; why, more generally, they became metonymic of the antinomies of value on which the colonial encounter, tout court was played out.

    As this suggests, we seek here to make two species of theoretical claim. Both are instantiated by our South African story, both extend far beyond it. One is about “modern” European colonialism, whose historical logic, we propose, is incomprehensible without an understanding the processes of commensura- tion and conversion that allowed various worlds to be brought into the same orbit of being, both imagina- tively and concretely–and made phenomenological sense of the politics, economics, semantics of the en- counters to which it gave rise. The other is about commensuration itself and about the media upon which it depends: media are fetishized not merely because they congeal labor power and/or obscure relations embodied in processes of production, nor because they displace unspeakable passions from people to obj- ects or vice versa, but because , being uniquely endowed things, they take on a social life of their own. Their genius, we shall show, does not lie in their being empty, or emptied, signifiers, just as their meaning does not derive from their relations to other, equally empty signs. It is owed in part to their intrinsic properties, in part to the moral, material, and magical work they are made to do in the exigent course of history.

    SPECIES OF VALUES, VALUE AND SPECIE

    Christian Political Economy: secular theology, sacred commerce

    If early modern European political economy was a secular theology (Hart 1986: 647), contempo- rary Nonconformist theology sanctified commerce. During the “second reformation” of the late 1700s, British Protestantism had refashioned itself with cultural fabric milled by the industrial revolution.
    Indeed, the interplay of church and business, realms never fully separate, produced a rich discourse, at once religious and temporal, about value and its production (Hempton 1984: 11; Waterman 1991: 3f). Eighteenth-century evangelicals, Rack (1989: 385f) claims, had been more influenced by the language of practical reason than their espousal of scripture and spirituality might suggest; similarly Warner (1930: 138), who long ago linked the “empirical temper” of Methodist lore to the central place it accorded econo- mics.

    But the discourse of political economy, which fused a belief in the beneficence of existing econo- mic institutions with a whiggish desire for reform, was especially audible among abolitionists and “impro- vers” in the first years of the nineteenth century (Waterman 1991: 6). As a call to practice, moreover, it was particularly congenial to the spirit of the great evangelical societies. While liberal theory per se was seldom a subject of open discussion among missionaries to South Africa, most of them were guided, more or less, by its material and moral principles. Some actually did cite it as a charter for their labors: the LMS Superintendent, John Philip (1828,1: 369), for example, quoted Adam Smith on the need to stimulate the indigent to industry; and David Livingstone (1961: 194) made mention of Malthus on the subject of re- production. As this implies, Nonconformist theologians and their followers were advocates of moral deregulation. According to the “New System” Calvinism of the Congregationalist clergy, everyone, not just the elect, were candidates for salvation. They also sought to remove the spiritual “ceiling” that the Anglican hierarchy put in the way of aspiring dissenters (Helmstadter 1992: 15,23). These men set all available means, including economic ones, to work for their cause. Likewise the Methodists; in line with early champions of free trade, Wesley saw nothing intrinsically unworthy or antisocial in riches (Semmel 1974: 71f). Quite the reverse. The “lusty zest” with which he advocated the quest for gain went further than most previous Puritans, who tended not to celebrate wealth but to condone it as a necessary compromise with evil (Warner 1930: 138f). For him, “business” did not “interrupt communion with God.” It was merely one of its channels.

    “Business,” in fact, seems to have served as a synecdoche for human action in the world,1 just as “usefulness” conveyed a sense of virtuous efficacy (Helmstadter 1992: 9). Not that commerce did not pose its own dangers. Wesley’s economic teachings were, in many ways, a lifelong effort to counter those implications of The Wealth of Nations that he saw to be corrupting (Outler 1985: 264). But therein lay the challenge: “Make yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness,” he preached (1985: 266), citing Luke’s injunction (16: 1-2) to redeem the potential of wealth. In his sermon on “The Use of Money,” he (1985: 267-8) chides fellow Christians for acquiescing in an “empty rant” against the “grand corrupter of the world.” The duty of the faithful was to deploy, to the greatest possible advantage, all that providence had provided. Money was a precious “talent”; the word evoked both biblical coinage and a sense of spe- cial, God-given capacity:

    [It] is of unspeakable service to all civilized nations in all the common affairs of life. It is a most compendious instrument of transacting all manner of business, and (if we use it according to Christian wisdom) of doing all manner of good.

    Money, he went on (p.268), was “food for the hungry” and “raiment for the naked.” Even “father to the fatherless”–surely one of the most genial images of cash in contemporary European moral discourse. As a compendious instrument, it was an ur-commodity, condensing in itself the essential quality of all good/s. Reciprocally, it could stand for all things, even the closest of human connections.

    Wesley seems to have seen coin as the servant of existing laws of value and a neutral vehicle of trade; he subscribed to the “commodity theory” of currency shared alike by classic liberal theorists and by Marx (Hart 1986: 643). Marx, of course, also stressed that money, as capital, was uniquely equipped to extract value from human producers. Wesley would himself inveigh against dishonest industry and fetter- ed exchange, but not against the powers of cash itself. In his simpler moral economy, its poison was drawn if it was used in ways pleasing to God. And it made all virtuous effort measurable and com- mensurable, permitting the conversion of worldly enterprise into spiritual credit. In this sense, the most “precious talent” of money was its capacity to enable mortals to “trade up.” Salvation itself became obtainable on free market terms. These fiscal orientations also suffused Wesleyan practice. “As a voluntary organization,” says Obelkevich (1976: 206), “Methodism…fostered in its members a new outlook, individual and collective, towards money.” Finances were a constant matter of concern and collections were taken up for many causes, not least foreign missions. In Britain, as among African converts, a ceaseless stream of demands and appeals highlighted the meliorative qualities of cash.

    The great evangelical societies, in fact, were run like businesses, with men of commerce actively investing their resources and managing their affairs (Helmstadter 1992: 10). In the field, the Nonconform- ists put their trust in the power of money to bring progress, and to place all things, even God’s grace, with- in human reach. This faith in the creative powers of cash recalls Simmel’s Philosophy of Money, perhaps the most refined statement of the nineteenth-century European belief in the transformative power of coin. For Simmel (1978: 291), man was by nature an “exchanging animal” and, by this token, an “objective animal” too: exchange, in its “wonderful simplicity,” made both the receiver and the giver, replacing selfish desire with mutual acknowledgement and objective appraisal. Transaction, he went on, begets rationaliza- tion. And the more that values are rationalized, “the more room there is in them, as in the house of God, for every soul.” Because of its unlimited convertibility (p. 292), money was uniquely capable of setting free the intrinsic worth of the world to be traded in neutral, standardized terms. And so it enabled the con- struction of an integrated society of morally dependent, but psychically self-sufficient persons (Simmel 1978: 297f).

    While they might never have put it in just these terms, the Nonconformists missionaries in South Africa devoted much of their effort to making Africans into “exchanging animals,” an enterprise in which cash played a pivotal role. They, too, nurtured the dream of an expansive civil society built not upon sav- age barter but upon transactions among self-possessed, moneyed persons. According to this dream, the liberation of “natives” from a primitive dependence on their kin and their chiefs lay in the creation of a higher order, a world of moral and material interdependence mediated by stable, impersonal media: let- ters, numbers, notes, and coin.

    There was, as everyone knows, another side to money: its long-standing Christian taint as an in- strument of corruption and betrayal. In part, this flowed from the power of cash, indeed all instruments of commensuration, to equate disparate forms of value. It could dissolve what was unique, precious, and per- sonal, reducing everything to the indiscriminate object of private avarice: the Savior, note, had been sold for thirty pieces of silver, monastic relics melted into gold. What was more, the ability of coin to trans- pose different forms of worth enabled profitable conversions to be made among them; in particular, it allowed the rich to prosper by using their assets to control the productivity of others. Parry and Bloch (1989: 2f; cf. Le Goff 1980) remind us that this sort of profit was anathema to the medieval European church, which saw productive work as the only legitimate source of wealth and condemned, as unnatural, the effortless earnings of merchants and money-lenders. Capitalism was to exploit the metabolic qualities of money in unprecedented ways, of course–especially its capacity to make things commensurable by turning distinct aspects of human existence, like land and labor, into alienable commodities. And Protestantism would endorse this process by sanctifying desire as virtuous ambition; also by treating the market as a realm of provident opportunity. Yet its medieval qualms remained. As Weber (1958: 53) stressed, those Christians who most aptly embodied the spirit of capitalism were ascetics. They took little pleasure in wealth per se. For them, making money was an end in itself, a transcendental value. It gave evidence of ceaseless “busy-ness” and divine approval.

    In so far as money remained demonically corrosive, there was only one way to avoid its corrup- ting qualities: to let it go. If it was to generate virtue, it had visibly to circulate. Hoarded wealth was “the snare of the devil” (Wesley 1986: 233). It made men forsake the inner life for superficial pride, luxury, and leisure. The Divine Proprietor required that his stewards put his talent to work either by cycling it back into honest business or by giving it away in charity; the proper movement of wealth was both creative and positive. By those lights, exchange was production (Parry and Bloch 1989: 86). Non- conformists still held to a labor theory of value, but now the notion of industry was cast in terms of manu- facture and the market, of wage labor, the circulation of wealth, and the productive character of capital.

    For Nonconformists like Wesley, in short, assiduous effort and ethical dealing–the market, lite- rally, as a “moral” economy–were enough to curb the malignancy of money. Charity, itself a high yield investment in virtue, was the main means of redistributing wealth, a way to “lay up…treasures in the bank of heaven” (Wesley 1984: 629). Humble toil also paid spiritual dividends, but at a lower rate. In the here-and-now, Methodism tended to endorse existing labor relations; during the late 1700s, even child workers were said to profit from industrious discipline (Warner 1930: 151). And the just wage was just, for exertion in one’s allotted calling was its own reward. Hence it behooved the faithful to strive cease- lessly to produce all they could, an injunction that gelled well with the expansive ethos of humane imperialism.

    Read in this light, it is clear that the economic emphasis of missionary practice in South Africa expressed more than a mere effort to survive or even to profit. It expressed the spirit of liberal modernity, being part of the attempt to foster a self-regulating commonwealth, for which the market was both the model and the means; also, to induce what Unsworth (1992) has aptly termed a “sacred hunger,” an insatiable desire for material enrichment and moral progress. As we shall see, the task proved onerous, for the “mammon of unrighteousness” was never easily befriended. By the mid 1820s, some of the more radical evangelicals in England were denouncing the reduction of human qualities to price. And, in the mission field, the Nonconformists were caught, time and again, in the double-sided implications of money. Meanwhile, the kind of value carried by coin would come face to face with African notions of worth, setting off new contrasts, contests, and combinations.

    The Southern Tswana world of the early nineteenth century bore some similarity to the one from which the missionaries set out. Stress was laid here, too, on human production as the source of value. Here, too, communities were understood as social creations, built up through the ceaseless actions and transactions of people eager to enhance their fund of worth. Here, too, exchange was facilitated by versatile media that measured and stored wealth, and permitted its negotiation from afar.

    These parallels, we have argued (1992: 127f), are sufficient to cast doubt on the exclusive asso- ciation of commodities and competitive individualism with industrial capitalism. Or modernity. But, by the same token, similar practices do not necessarily have the same genesis, constitution or meaning. Al- though Southern Tswana subscribed to a fundamentally humanist sense of the production of wealth, their understanding of value–and the way it vested in persons, relationships, and objects–was different from that of their interlocutors from abroad. Thus, while early missionaries thought they detected in the Af- ricans a stress on self-contrivance, a dark replica of Western economic man, they found, on longer acquaintance, that this person was a far cry from the discrete, enclosed subject they hoped to usher into the church. Indigenous “utilitarianism,” Tswana literati like Molema (1920: 116) insisted, was unlike European “egoism”; the evangelists referred to the “native” variant as “selfishness.” Indeed, closer en- gagement of previously distinct economies on the frontier would reveal deep distinctions behind superficial resemblances. And it would give birth to a dynamic field of hybrid subjects and signs.

    The Setswana verb go dira meant “to make,” “to work,” or “to do.” Tiro, its noun form, covered a wide range of activities–from cultivation to political negotiation, cooking to ritual performance–which yielded value in persons, relations, and things. It also produced “wealth” (khumô), an extractable surplus (of beer, artifacts, tobacco, stock, and so on) which could be further deployed to multiply worth. Sorcery (boloi) was its inverse, implying the negation of value through attempts to harm others and/or unravel their endeavors. Tiro itself could never be alienated from its human context and transacted as mere labor power; that experience still awaited most Southern Tswana. Rather, it was an intrinsic dimension of the everyday act of making selves and social ties.

    This vision of the production of value, based on close human interdependence, bore little resem-blance to that of liberal economics, which saw the commonweal as the fruit of impersonal transactions among autonomous beings. For Tswana, wealth inhered in relations. Which is why its pursuit involved (i) the construction of enduring connections among kin and affines, patrons and clients, sovereigns and sup- porters, men and their ancestors; and (ii) the extension of influence by means of exchanges, usually via the medium of cattle, which secured rights in, and claims over, others. But, while these rights and claims were constantly contested, the productive and reproductive properties of a relationship, be it wedlock or serfdom, could not be separated from the bonds that bore them (Molema 1920: 125; Schapera (1940: 77). The object of social exchange was precisely not to accumulate riches with no strings attached: the traffic in beasts served to knit human beings together in an intricate weave, in which the density of linkages and the magnitude of value were one and the same thing.

    Because they were the means, par excellence, of building social biographies and accumulating capital, cattle were the supreme form of property here; they could congeal, store, and increase value, hol- ding it stable in a world of flux (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 139). Not surprisingly, their widespread use as currency in human societies was noted by early theorists of political economy (Smith 1976: 38; Marx 1967,1: 183). While Adam Smith (1976) judged them “rude” and “inconvenient” instruments of commerce, he appreciated that they embodied many of the elementary features of coin, being useful, alienable, relatively durable objects. Although standardized as species, moreover, stock come in different sizes and colors, genders and ages, and so might be utilized as tokens of varying quality and denomination. (Many African peoples, of course, have long elaborated on the exquisite distinctions among kine). True, cattle are not as divisible as inanimate substances like metal and tend, therefore, to be more gross, slow-moving units of trade. But, as we shall see, Southern Tswana took this to be one of their advantages over cash, whose velocity they regarded as dangerous. Herds were movable, of course, es- pecially for purposes of exchange, a fact stressed by Marx (1967,1: 115); for him, the apparent self-propulsion of currency was crucial to its role in animating commodity transactions. Affluent Tswana men exploited this ambulatory quality, dispersing bridewealth to affines and loaning stock to clients as they strove to turn their resources into control over people. They also rotated animals among dependents, and between cattle-posts, both as a hedge against disaster and as a way of hiding assets from the jealous gaze of rivals (Schapera 1938: 24).

    It is as exchange value on the hoof, then, that cattle occupied a pivotal place in Southern Tswana political economy. Their capacity to objectify, transfer, and enhance wealth endowed them with almost magical talents. Much like money in the west. The beast, goes the vernacular song, is “god with a wet nose” (modimo o nkô e metsi; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 127). This is a patent instance of fetishism in bovine shape–of the attribution to objects, that is, of value produced by humans–which suggests that the commodity is not specific to capitalism. At the same time, the case of Tswana stock also shows that commodification need not be an all-or-none process; and that it is always culturally situated in a meaningful world of work and worth. Here, for example, while animals enabled rich men to lay claim to the labors of others, they did not depersonalize relations among people. Quite the contrary. They drew atten- tion to the social embeddedness of those very relations–while making them seem part of the natural order of things.

    The complex qualities of cattle currency would intervene in mission efforts to transform the Sou- thern Tswana sense of value. For beasts were enough like money to be identified with it, yet enough unlike it to make and mark salient differences. On one hand, they could abstract value. On the other, they did the opposite: they signified and enriched personal identities and social ties. The capacity of animals in Africa to serve both as instruments and as signs of human relationship has long been noted; the so-called “bovine idiom” is an instance of the more general tendency of humans to use alienable objects to extend their own existence by uniting themselves with others (Mauss 1954; Munn 1977). Both in their individual beauty and their collective association with wealth, kine were ideal–and idealized–personifications of men. A highly nuanced vocabulary existed in Setswana to describe variations in color, marking, disposition, horns, and reproductive status (Lichtenstein 1973: 81; Sandilands 1953: 342). Named and praised, they were creatures of distinction. Not only did they bear their owners’ stamp as they traversed social space (Somerville 1979: 230). They also served as living records of the passage of value along the pathways of inheritance, affinity, alliance, and authority.

    The intricate patterns of stock deployment among Tswana made it difficult for early European vi- sitors to assess their holdings. Longer-term records suggest a history of fluctuations in animal popula- tions, with cycles of depletion being followed by periods of recovery, at least until the end of the nine- teenth century (Grove 1989: 164). But there is clear evidence of the existence, at the beginning of that century, of large and unequally distributed herds. Observers were struck by blatant discrepancies in cattle ownership, and by the unambiguous association–Burchell (1824,2: 272) used the word “metonymy”–of wealth in kine with power (cf. Lichtenstein 1973: 76f; Molema 1920: 115). Thus the chief was the sup- reme herdsman (modisa) of his people, a metaphor that captured well vernacular visions of value and political economy. Situated atop the morafe (“nation”), he presided over a domain marked not by fixed boundaries, but by an outer ring of water holes and pasture–in other words, a range (Comaroff and Co- maroff 1992: 141). Royal stock also built relations beyond the polity, being used to placate and to trade with other sovereigns.

    It was not only chiefs who mobilized cattle as a currency of power: other men of position also ac- cumulated stock and set up networks of alliance and patronage. Ordinary male citizens, however, relied on inheritance, bridewealth, and natural increase to build their modest herds. Some–serfs, and others laid low–had no animals at all. They made up what Burchell (1824,2: 348) termed an “ill-fated class,” eternal- ly dependent on their betters. In the bovine economy of the Southern Tswana, in sum, an indigenous “stock exchange” underwrote inequalities of class, gender, generation, and rank. As the pliable media used to forge all productive relations, human and superhuman alike, cattle were the quintessential form of social and symbolic capital. They moved men to intrigue, sorcery, and warfare, to deep contemplation about the nature of life and worth, and, as Somerville (1979: 134) witnessed in 1801, to passionate public poetry.

    Cattle were also a prime medium in the exchanges that, by the late eighteenth century, linked Southern Tswana to other peoples on the subcontinent, yielding beads from the Kora and Griqua to the south, and iron implements, copper jewelry, and tobacco from communities to the north and northeast (Lichtenstein 1930,2: 409; Stow 1905: 449,489). Bovine capital also gave access to the ivory and pelts desired by white travelers, who arrived in growing numbers from ca.1800 (Shillington 1985: 11). And pack-oxen enabled the long-distance haulage of sebilô, a sought-after hair cosmetic, from its source in Tlhaping territory (Campbell 1813: 170). But the earliest European explorers already noted that Tswana were reluctant to trade away their beasts. Somerville’s (1979: 140) expedition to the interior failed in its mercantile objectives because of the “[natives’] unwillingness to part with their cattle.” The Englishman found this “difficult to account for, since they convert them to no useful purpose whatever.”

    Nonetheless, regional exchange networks were active enough to persuade the Europeans that they had stumbled upon the “essential principles of international traffic,” or “mercantile agency in its infancy” in the African veld (Burchell 1824,2: 555; original emphasis). Andrew Smith (1939,1: 251), in fact, ob- served that chiefs managed production explicitly to foster alliances; they tried, as well, to monopolize dealings with foreigners and to control commerce across their realms (Campbell 1822,2: 194). Indeed, whites found these men aware of discrepancies in going rates for such items as ivory, and keen to profit from them. Notwithstanding the reluctance to sell beasts, occasions to traffic with Europeans–in the early years for beads, later for guns and money–were eagerly seized. When Lichtenstein (1930,2: 388) visited the Tlhaping in 1805, before a permanent mission was established, he noted that a “general spirit of trade” was easily roused. The Africans kept up an energetic exchange until his party had naught left to sell. A few years on, Burchell (1824,2: 555) was struck by the existence of enduring trade partnerships (maats; Dutch) between individual Tlhaping and Klaarwater Khoi.

    We shall come back, shortly, to the entry of the civilizing mission into Southern Tswana commer- ce. Already, however, two things are clear. The first is that the Africans had long channelled their surpluses into trade, bringing them a range of goods from knives and tobacco to widely circulating forms of cur- rency. Of the latter, second, beads had become the most notable. By the turn of the nineteenth century,2 they were serving as media of transaction that articulated local and global economies, linking the worlds of cattle and money (cf. Graeber 1996). Along with buttons, which were put to a similar purpose, they were portable tokens that, for a time, epitomized foreign exchange value beyond the colonial frontier. Beads were “the only circulating medium or money in the interior,” Campbell noted (1822,1: 246), adding that every “nation” through which they passed made a profit on them. Different kinds composed distinct regional currencies; Philip (1828,2: 131) tells us that no importance was attached to particular examples, however beautiful, if they were “not received among the tribes around them.” At the same time, African communities showed strong preferences, in the early 1800s, for specific colors, sizes, and degrees of transparency (Beck 1989: 220f).3

    Even as they became a semi-standardized currency for purposes of external trade, beads served internally as personal adornments; in this they were like many similar sorts of wealth objects. Their at- traction seems to have stemmed from the fact that particular valuables could be withdrawn from circula- tion for display, itself a form of conspicuous consumption.4 But men of means also accumulated hidden stocks: “their chief wealth, like that of more civilized nations, [was] hoarded up in their coffers” (Camp- bell (1822,1: 246; cf. Graeber 1996). Here it stayed, in precisely the manner abhorred by the Protestants, until favorable opportunities for trade presented themselves. Market exchange was, at this point, a spora- dic activity directed at specific exotic objects. It was set apart from everyday processes of production and consumption.

    Some observers stressed the monetary properties of beads: “They answer the same purpose as cowrie shells in India and North Africa,” Campbell (1822,1: 246) wrote, “or as guineas and shillings in Britain.” But others were struck by the differences. For a start, aesthetic qualities seemed integral to their worth. “Among these people,” offered Philip (1828,2: 131), “utility is, perhaps, more connected with beauty that it is with us.” Simmel (1978: 73) would have said that the separation of the beautiful from the useful comes only with the objectification of value: the aesthetic artifact takes on a unique existence, sui generis; it cannot be replaced by another that might perform the same function. Such an artifact, therefore, is the absolute inverse of the coin, whose defining feature is its substitutability.

    Among Southern Tswana, the increasing velocity of trade did render some media of exchange–first beads, then money–ever more interchangeable. But the process was never complete. And it did not eliminate other forms of wealth in which beauty and use explicitly enhanced each other. Indeed, the longevity of cattle currencies in African societies bears testimony to the fact that processes of rationa- lization, standardization, and universalization are always refracted by social and cultural circumstance. In the cow, aesthetics and utility, uniqueness and substitutability complemented each other, coloring Tswana notions of value in general–and of money in particular. Black wage laborers in early twentieth century South Africa, Breckenridge (1995: 274) notes, set special store by the physical qualities of metallic coins; in explaining their attitude, public intellectuals John Dube and Sol Plaatje contrasted “flimsy” paper money with “the good red gold we know and love.” Comeliness and usefulness play off each other in the west as well, of course; modernists, after all, insist that form should follow function. The Tswana appreciation of prized beads and beasts, similarly, expressed a sense of “attractiveness” that fused the per- fect with the practical. Persons or objects possessed of it were thought to draw towards themselves desirable qualities dispersed in the world at large. Ornamental baubles or celebrated stock were the very epitome of attractiveness: held apart from the everyday cycle of exchange, they congealed precious po- tential.

    Objects that come to be invested with value as media of exchange vary greatly over time and space, a point well demonstrated by the emergence of new currencies as formerly distinct economic ord- ers begin to intersect. Marx (1967,1: 83) once said that, when the latter happens, the “universal equivalent form” often lodges arbitrarily and transiently in a particular commodity. So it was with beads, which had been mass-produced for different ends in the West, but turned out to serve well, for a while, as a vehicle of commerce beyond the colonial border. Marx also added that, as traffic persists, such tokens of equivalence tend to “crystallize…out into the money form.” So, once again, it was with beads. While Tswana would accept various articles as gifts, these were of little use in trade. “They want money in such a case,” Campbell (1822,1: 246) found, “that is, beads.” As transactions increased in volume, standards of value in the worlds linked by this new currency began to affect each other: merchants noted that rates charged by Africans in the interior rose and became more uniform.5 By the 1820s, the demand for beads at the Cape had driven up prices dramatically, to the extent that missionaries tried to secure supplies from England at one-third of the cost (Beck 1989: 218f).

    The bottom soon fell out of the frontier bead market, however (although not so further north; see Chapman 1971,1: 127). That market seems to have been sustained by the dearth of fractions of the rix- dollar, the currency at the Cape in the early 1800s (Arndt 1928: 44-6). After 1825, Britain introduced its own silver and copper coinage to its imperial possessions, and paper dollars were replaced by sterling. Once the new supply had stabilized, and had filtered into the interior, its effect on bead money was devas- tating. In 1835, Andrew Smith (1939,1: 250) wrote that a white merchant

    inform[ed] me that when first he began to trade in this country about 1828, nothing was desired by the natives but beads, etc., but now they are scarcely asked for; indeed nothing is to be purchased by them [beads] but milk or firewood…They understand reckoning money quite well, and if told the price of an article… they reckon out the money with the greatest precision.

    Ironically, while Tswana came to reckon in money, many traders preferred to deal in kind. But, even more important than changes in the cash supply, a shift was occurring in the structure of wants and in lo- cal notions of value. It was encouraged, above all, by the presence of the evangelists and by the entry onto the scene, at their urging, of a cadre of itinerant merchants and shopkeepers.

    Here, then, were two distinct regimes of value, one European and the other African, whose engagement would have a profound impact on the colonial encounter. To the Nonconformists, economic re- form was no mere adjunct to spirituality: virtue and salvation had to be made by man, using the scarce material resources bequeathed by providence for improving the world. Commercial enterprise allowed the  industrious to turn labor into wealth and wealth into grace. Money was the crucial medium of convertibi- lity in this. It typified the potential for good and evil given as a birth-right to every self-willed individual. Southern Tswana, upon whom the evangelists hoped to impress these divine possibilities, also inhabited a universe of active human agency, in which riches were made through worldly transactions. Exchange, in their case, was effected primarily through cattle. In contrast to cash, stock socialized assets, measuring their ultimate worth not in treasures in heaven, but in people on earth. We move, now, to examine how these regimes of value, already in contact in the early 1800s, were brought into ever closer articulation.

    EXTENDING THE INVISIBLE HAND

    Civilizing Commerce, Sanctified Shopping: The Early Years

    “You white men are a strange folk. You have the word of God…but [your traders] are giving beads to the girls [and] corrupting the women of my people. [T]hey are teaching my people abominations of which even they were once ignorant, heathen as they are. Here are traders enough.”

    Chief Sechele, 1865 6

    British observers in the early 1800s might have acknowledged that Southern Tswana showed a lively interest in exchange. But they also stressed the difference between “native commerce” and orderly European business. Thus Burchell (1824,2: 536-9) noted that “mercantile jealousy” had produced compet- ing efforts to monopolize traffic with the colony to the south. He proposed a “regulated trade for ivory… with the Bichuana nations,” to be vested in an authorized body of white merchants who would institute “fair dealing” to the advantage of all. Like liberal economies before and since, his “free” market required careful management.

    The founding evangelists shared this trust in the beneficent effect of trade. Some said that the ve- ry “sight of a shop” on mission ground roused savages to industry (Philip (1828,1: 204-5). The equation of civilization with commerce might have become one of the great clichés of the epoch. But, for the Nonconformists, it was far from a platitude. The point was not to create an exploitable dependency; al- though that did happen. Nor was it simply to play on base desire to make people give ear to the Gospel; although that happened too. It ran much deeper. Trade had a capacity to breach “the sullen isolations of heathenism,” to stay the “fountain of African misery” (Livingstone 1940: 255). All of which made materi- al reform an urgent moral duty. The optimism of the missionaries in this respect was to falter in the face of the stark realities of the colonial frontier. The Christians had eventually to rethink their dream of a commonwealth of free-trading black communities, actively enhancing their virtue and wealth. But they continued to hold that the market would rout superstition, slavery, sloth; this even when, later in the century, market forces undercut their own idyll of independent African economies, compelling “their” peoples to become wage vassals in their own land.

    There was, in other words, more to championing commerce among heathens than merely making virtue of necessity, as some have suggested; although it is true that many pioneer evangelists had to ex- change to survive (Beck 1989: 211). In fact, the most ardent advocates of free enterprise were often those most opposed to clergy themselves doing business. Livingstone (1857: 39) held that, while missionary and trader were mutually dependent, “experience shows that the two employments can not very well be combined in the same person.” Ironically, he was to be accused of gun-running by the Boers. But then, on the frontier, the lines between prestation, purchase, and profit were very fine indeed. And frequently in dispute. While traffic with peoples living beyond colonial borders was forbidden by law, missionaries were de facto exempt, except for the ban on selling liquor, weapons, and ammunition. Dealings with Afri- cans often went well beyond the procuring of necessities, involving considerable capital outlay. In the upshot, competition and accusations of dishonorable practice among the brethren soon became common (Beck 1989: 214). As early as 1817, the LMS at the Cape had had to confront the issue as a matter of poli- cy. Its members agreed that, while trade was forced on them by the inadequacy of the Society’s support, they should make their stations self-sustaining through agriculture and handicrafts. The quest for profit, however, was specifically discouraged.

    From the first, Tswana associated evangelists, like all whites, with barter. Moffat (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 18) reports that when he and the Rev. Kay of the WMMS traveled among Tlhaping in 1821, “the Bootchuanas flocked around us with articles for exchange.”7 The clergymen tended to be less than open in their formal correspondence about their dealings; this notwithstanding the fact that, in the 1820s, the mission societies considered entering the lucrative ivory business to raise funds for projects in the Co- lony (Beck 1989: 217; Moffat and Moffat 1951: 62). Cooperation between the Nonconformists and mer- chants was close: traders journeying beyond the Orange River tended to lodge at mission stations and of- ten accompanied evangelists on their travels (Livingstone 1960: 141).

    The Nonconformists also gave out goods for purposes other than trade. Early on they dispensed tobacco, beads, and buttons to encourage goodwill, only to find that prestations came to be expected in re- turn for attending church and school.8 Few Tswana seem initially to have shared the precise European dis- tinction between gifts and commodities, donations and payments. Yet one thing was widely recognized: that whites controlled desirable objects. As a result, they soon became the uncomfortable victims of deter- mined efforts to acquire those objects. Their correspondence declared that all Africans, even dignified chiefs, were inveterate “beggars”; that they persistently demanded items like snuff, which the missions were assumed to have in large supply; and that their behavior violated Protestant notions of honest gain (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 63). It took a while for the Christians to realize that “begging” was also a form of homage to the powerful (Price 1956: 166; Mackenzie 1871: 44f). Burchell (1824,2: 407), a naturalist and not a cleric, discerned that these requests were limited largely to a specific category of goods:

    ...they never asked for sikháka (beads); these being considered more especially as money, to be employed only as the medium of trade with distant tribes, and for the purchase of the more expensive articles; while muchúko and lishuéna (tobacco and snuff) being consumable merchandise, are…regarded as a less important species of property. (Original emphasis).

    A similar contrast between treasures and trifles seems to have obtained in the brazen “theft,” in the first years, of the evangelists’ belongings, especially their produce and tools (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 57). Previous visitors, interestingly, had remarked on the virtual absence of pilfering.9 Lichtenstein (1973: 75) was struck by the fact that only items not considered as property were ever taken. But Broadbent’s account of the severe response of a Rolong chief to one such incident10 makes it clear that the sudden pre- sence of quantities of desirable goods had raised unprecedented problems of defining and maintaining ownership. The missionaries tended to see this as a lack of respect for private effects: Hodgson (1977: 336) mused, in 1826, on the “precarious tenure upon which the natives [held] their possessions.” Obviously, conventions of acquisition, proprietorship, and remuneration were being tested on both sides of the encounter.

    As Beck (1989: 224) confirms, the evangelists introduced more European goods than did any other whites at the time. Their dealings eroded the local desire for beads and buttons in favor of a comp- lex array of wants, primarily for domestic commodities like clothes, blankets, and utensils. But this transformation, as we have suggested, entailed far more than the mere provision of objects. Changing patterns of consumption grew out of a shift in ideas about the nature, worth, and significance of particular things in themselves. Which, in turn, was set in play by the encounter of very different regimes of value. Thus, even where their uses seemed obvious, such goods as clothes and furniture were given meanings irreducible to utility alone, meanings which often made the Europeans uneasy (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: Chap.5).

    Yet more basic than this was the fact that, as the century wore on, it was less missionaries than the merchants they brought in their wake who were responsible for the supply of goods. Discomforted by the image of men of God haggling over the price of trinkets (Beck 1989: 213), most evangelists encouraged independent traders to settle on their stations. By 1830, John Philip (1828,1: 204f) had al- ready publicized the success of his “experiment” to have one open a store at Bethelsdorp:

    The sight of the goods in their windows…produced the effect anticipated: the desire of possessing the articles for use and comfort by which they were constantly tempted, acquired additional strength on every fresh renewal of stimulus.

    Money, he added, had gone up in the people’s estimation. They had begun, enthusiastically, to bring pro- duce to the trader to exchange for goods. Bechuanaland soon followed Bethelsdorp. The introduction of stores in this manner–all the better to instruct non-Western peoples in “the economic facts of life”–was a high priority among British Protestants in many parts of the world; Miller (1973: 101) describes similar ventures in the Argentine in the 1930s.

    Time would mute the idyll of cooperation between missions and merchants. Already in 1841, Mary Moffat (1967: 18), while reiterating the need to foster a desire for commodities, bemoaned the high prices charged by local dealers for “worthless materials.” A decade later, Livingstone (1959,2: 152) wrote in acerbic terms about traders of all stripes. While they reaped huge profits, he complained, these men re- sented the evangelists, accusing them of driving up the price of African goods. While the whites squabbled over their dealings with Africans, Tswana sovereigns–witness the words of Chief Sechele–had their own reasons for being wary of merchants. The latter paid scant respect to long-standing mores or monopolies, being ready to buy from anyone who had anything desirable to sell; the purchase of ivory and feathers from Rolong “vassals” in the Kalahari, for instance, cost the life of one businessman and his son (Mackenzie 1871: 130). Such friction was frequent beyond the mission stations (Livingstone 1959,2: 86). But even when storekeepers operated under the eyes of the evangelists, their behavior often gave offense. Brawling, theft and sexual assault were common; Sechele banished two of them for an “indecent” attack on a Kwena woman in broad daylight near Livingstone’s home (Livingstone 1974: 120). No wonder that local rulers developed a “well-known” reluctance to allow itinerant traders to traverse their territories (Mackenzie 1871: 130). Or that, later in the century, strong chiefs would try to subject European commerce to strict control (Parsons 1977: 122).

    The evangelists would have to wrestle constantly with the contradictions of commerce. In embra- cing its virtues, they had to deal with the fact that the two-faced coin threatened to profane their sacred mission. Yet the merchants were essential in the effort to reform local economies by hitching them to the colonial market–and the body of corporate nations beyond.

    Object Lessons

    And so the merchants remained on the mission stations. Where they prospered. Storekeepers stocked all the quotidian objects deemed essential to a civil “household economy” (Moffat 1842: 507, 502f): clothes, fabrics, furniture, blankets, sewing implements, soap, and candle molds; the stuff, that is, of feminized domestic life, with its scrubbed, illuminated interiors. Shops also carried the implements of intensive agriculture, and the guns and ammunition required to garner the “products of the chase,” inc- reasingly the most valuable of trade goods. Colonial whites abhorred the idea of weapons in African hands. But, by the 1830s, “old soldier’s muskets” were being sold for “6,7 and 8 oxen,” and three or four pounds of gunpowder for a single animal (Smith 1939,1: 232)11–although, after the midcentury, the expanding arms business was mostly in the hands of well-capitalized Cape entrepreneurs, a fact that would have far-reaching consequences for game stocks and for the economic independence of Southern Bechuanaland (Shillington 1985: 13f,21f).

    Mission accounts from the late 1800s show that European commodities had begun to tell their own story in the Tswana world. As Wookey (1884: 303) wrote:

    Through the settlement of missionaries, and the visits of traders and travellers, the country became known and opened up. Cattle first, and then ivory, feathers, and karosses, were the principal things brought by the natives for barter. They were exchanged for guns and ammunition, cows, wagons, horses, clothes, and…other things. To-day a trader’s stock is not complete unless he has school material, stationery, and even books…

    Ornaments, cooking utensils, and consumables were widely purchased, as were coffee, tea, and sugar. The foreign goods that seemed everywhere in use spoke of far-reaching domestic reconstruction.

    At least in some quarters: the acquisition of these commodities required surplus production and disposable income, which was restricted to the emerging upper and middle peasantry. At the same time, despite their taste for European things, many wealthy men remained reluctant, save in extremis, to sell stock (Schapera 1933: 648). On the other hand, the market was particularly attractive to those excluded from indigenous processes of accumulation. Client peoples, for example, were easily tempted to turn tribute into trade–which is why some chiefs lost their monopolies over exchange (but cf. Parsons 1977: 120). Especially along the frontier, ever more Tswana, citizens and “vassals” alike, entered into commer- cial transactions; as a result, they acquired manufactured goods well before the South African mineral re- volution of the 1870s and the onset of large-scale labor migration. Small objects may speak of big chan- ges, of course. Rising sales of coffee, tea, and sugar marked important shifts in patterns of nutrition and sociality. They also tied local populations to the production and consumption of commodities in other parts of the empire (cf. Mintz 1985). As George Orwell (1982: 82) once said, in this respect, “changes in diet are more important than changes of dynasty or even of religion.”

    But Wookey’s account also suggests that things had veered out of mission control (1884: 304): Changes, however, have taken place in the trade of the country. A few years ago many thousands of pounds’ worth of produce annually changed hands and passed through to the colony. Now ivo- ry has become scarce…[and] the [ostrich feather] trade has dwindled down…But another door was opening for the people…I mean the Diamond Fields.

    Proletarianization was an almost inevitable consequence of the economic revolution encouraged by the Nonconformist mission. Wookey (1884: 304) admitted that the material developments promoted by the evangelists had not been an “unmixed good”; in this, he anticipated the concerns of African critics, voiced later, about the impact of sugar, alcohol, and imported provisions on the health of black populations. Not only had new diseases appeared, but drink had become “one of the greatest curses of the country.” The most profitable and addictive of commodities, its effects were a sordid caricature of the desire to make “natives” dependent on the market. Despite Christian efforts to limit its distribution (Mackenzie 1871: 92), brandy was being supplied in ever growing quantities to Bechuanaland by the second half of the nineteenth century.

    The issue was not trivial. Several Tswana rulers had already tried to banish brandy from their realms, and Khama III expelled traders who failed to comply (Holub 1881,1: 278). Plaatje (1996), using the black press, was to champion the Liquor Proclamation of 1904, a law prohibiting the purchase of “white man’s fire water” by “natives” in South Africa. But the flow of alcohol had been eroding the cul- tural and physical defenses of many frontier communities for decades. Holub’s (1881,1: 236) graphic account of his tour of Tlhaping territory belies Wookey’s paean to the positive, “opening” effect of Eu- ropean commodities. It sketches a dark picture of the corrupting force of the colonial market:

    …men, in tattered European clothes, except now and then one in a mangy skin, followed by as manywomen. ..and by a swarm of childre n as naked as when they were born, came shout- ing ea- gerly towards us. They were nearly all provi- ded with bottles, or pots, or cans, and cried out for bran- dy…Th ey had brought all manner of things for barter for spirits. One man held up a jac- kal’s hide, another a goat-ski n;…It was a disgus- ting scene… One of the men made what he evi- dently imagi- ned would be an irresistible appeal, by offering me a couple of greasy shillings.

    In the nineteenth-century colonial imagination, as we have shown (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: Chap.5), “grease” evoked the clinging filth of savagery, the grime of uncontained bodies and unsavory as- sociations. Money was meant to promote the kind of industry and lifestyle that would dissolve its dirt. But in this instance it had failed, merely adding to the muck of heathenism, its own non-stick surfaces becom- ing coated with residues of depravity.

    Accounts of this sort soon became more frequent. As new industrial centers sprang to life around the diamond fields, the satanic underside of commerce came all but to the Nonconformists’ door. And, as it did, it exposed their naivety in hoping to befriend the “mammon of unrighteousness” by introducing Tswana to the market in a controlled, benevolent manner. By then, in any case, the traders they had brou- ght into their midst had already helped to set a minor revolution in motion through the “magic” of their commodities. That magic had ambiguous effects. It led, at one extreme, to the contrivance of a polite bourgeois life-world; also, among ordinary people, to forms of consumption in which objects were de- ployed in new designs for living, newly contrived identities, all of them stylistic fusions of the familiar and the fresh. At the other extreme, it conjured up the “disgusting scenes” of poverty described by Holub and others. To be sure, the merchants had also given Southern Tswana practical lessons in the exploitative side of enlightened capitalism. From the very first, these entrepreneurs engaged in the infamous practice of buying local produce for a pittance and then, when food was short, selling it back at exorbitant profit.

    The missionaries themselves had also played a crucial role in determining the ways in which wes- tern objects and market practices had entered into Tswana life, however; as we have stressed, there is more to commodification than the mere provision of goods. The Christians set out to instil a “sacred hunger,” a sense of desire that linked refined consumption to a particular mode of producing goods and selves–and that encouraged continuing investment in civilizing enterprise. Above all else, this required a respect for the many talents of money.

    THE OBJECTIFICATION OF VALUE AND THE MEANING OF MONEY

    …money’s educational. It’s far more educational than the things it buys. ([1910] 1992: 133) E.M. Forster

    In so far as colonialism entailed a confrontation of different regimes of value, the encounter bet- ween Tswana and the missionaries was most clearly played out–and experienced–through the media most crucial to the measure of wealth on either side: cattle, money, and the trade beads that, for a while, strung them together. Encounters of this sort, especially when they involved European capitalism in its expansive form, often ended in the erasure of one currency by another. But they sometimes gave rise to processes a good deal more complex than allowed by most theories of commodification. For value is born by human beings who seek actively to shape it to their own ends. Along the frontier, cash and cows became fiercely contested signs, alibis of distinct, mutually threatening modes of existence. The Noncon- formists found themselves deeply mired in this struggle, not least in the early years.

    To Tswana, it will be recalled, beasts were the prime means of storing and conveying wealth in people and things; also of embodying value in social relations. In fact, control over these relations was one of the objects of owning animals. Thus, while cattle were sometimes dealt on the foreign market, the bulk of both internal and long-distance trade seems to have been directed toward acquiring more stock.12 In ordinary circumstances, barter never drew on capital; this is why Somerville’s (1979: 140) party failed, in 1801, to persuade Tlhaping to part with bovines or to procure a single milk cow. Beads, here, stood for worth in alien and alienated form, circulating against goods on the external market, or those which had been freed from local entanglements. By being transacted with neighboring people for animals, they could also be used to convert value from more to less reified forms.

    But this currency had its own logic. With the increasing standardization of the bead market across the interior in the early nineteenth century, the value of certain resources in Tswana life was rendered measurable. And more easily negotiable. Articles formerly withheld from sale, or given only for cattle (such as karosses, made as personal property; Lichtenstein 1930,2: 389), became purchasable (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 262,267). The Nonconformists encouraged this process of commodification, although their real objective was the introduction of money. Hence they used the token currency themselves to put a price on inalienable things, such as land and labor. Not only did they pay wages in it, but, in 1823, used it to acquire (what they thought was) the freehold on which their mission station was built (Moffat and Moffat 1951: 189,113). Beads were also bartered for agricultural surpluses by both missionaries and mer- chants. There is even evidence–vide Sechele’s outrage–that some traders offered Tswana women these baubles for sexual favors.

    The effort of the missionaries to commodify African land, labor, and produce, and to foster a de- sire for domestic goods, eventually helped to reorient the bulk of trade from the hinterland toward the Cape. This had the effect of limiting the viability of bead currency itself. The latter had served well as long as token transactions remained relatively confined in space and time; as long as they involved a narrow range of luxuries from a few external sources of supply; as long as exchange was sporadic and did not extend to the procurement of ordinary utilities. But once the ways and means of everyday life began to be commodified, and increasingly to emanate from the colonial economy, a more standardized, readily available, and widely circulating currency was needed to buy and sell them. And so, as Tswana engaged with a broadening range of manufactures and middlemen in the 1830s, money quickly became the measure of worth. This, in turn, posed a threat to vernacular regimes of value, which before had been kept distinct from foreign traffic. Even where coin did not actually change hands, it came to stand for the moral economy, the material values and the modes of contractual relationship propagated by the civilizing mission–and its world.

    In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the first attempts of the missions to teach the value of cash were not a success. Tswana evinced distrust in European tender, most notably in paper money. Not only was it suspected of being an easy medium of fraud, but its lack of durability was also a worry. For good reason. Between 1806 and 1824, rixdollar notes were infamously fragile, and were thought unrelia- ble by many whites as well (Arndt 1928: 44,62). Later in the century, traders would pass illiterate Africans false bills–issued, in one case, by the “Bank of Leather,” entitling the bearer to “the best Value” in “London or Paris Boots & Shoes” in exchange for diamonds (Matthews 1887: 196).

    Given the uncertainties of colonial currency, the evangelists did not always entrust the actual in- troduction of money, or the dissemination of its qualities, to the workings of the market. Occasionally they took matters into their own hands. Thus the Rev. Campbell had, on a tour beyond the colonial frontier in 1812-3, decided that the Griqua community merited consolidation both as a “nation” and as a base for expanding LMS mission operations into the interior (Parsons 1927: 198). Crucial to the venture was a proper coinage (Campbell 1813: 256):

    It was likewise resolved, that as they had no circulating medium amongst them, by which they could purchase any small articles…supposing a shop to be established amongst them… they should apply to the Mission Society to get silver pieces of different value coined for them in England, which the missionaries would take for their allowance from the Society, having Griqua town mar- ked on them. It is probable that, if this were adopted, in a short time they would circulate among all the nations round about, and be a great convenience.

    God’s bankers indeed! This mission money would be dubbed “one of the most interesting emissions in the numismatic history of the British Empire” (Parsons 1927: 202; Arndt 1928: 128). Campbell set about or- dering supplies of special coinage from a well-known English diesinker. We have record of four denomnations, two each in silver and copper. “Griquatown” and the amount were inscribed on one face, the symbol of the LMS on the other. The latter, a dove with an olive twig in its beak, aptly embodied the ideal of pacifying diffusion. Aesthetic considerations were significant on both sides: the Griqua expressly asked Campbell to obtain only silver pieces for them. Consistent with their views of beauty, Africans at the time preferred bright, shiny currency over duller coppers, a fact that seems to have had a tangible effect on the dissemination of this money (Parsons 1927: 199). Shipped to South Africa in two con- signments in 1815 and 1816, it established itself in limited circulation (pace Arndt 1928: 127), a few examples turning up in places like Kimberley in later years.

    The evangelists also deployed other means to foster respect for money. At issue, as we have said, was a moral economy in which its talents measured enterprise and enabled the conversion of wealth into virtue. If there was no cash in the African interior it had to be invented–or its existence feigned. The evi- dence shows that, even when little coinage was in circulation, missionaries used it as an invisible standard, a virtual currency, against which to tally the worth of goods, donations, and services. In 1828, a few months after establishing an offshoot from the main Wesleyan station at Platberg, Hodgson wrote of his new school (WMMS 1829-31: 120):

    We pay for it four shillings and sixpence per month rent; which sum, however, is raised by the children themselves, most of whom subscribe one halfpenny per week each, which they obtain by bringing us milk, eggs, firewood, &c., for sale… The first week produced three shillings and nine- pence; (the children having been requested to bring one penny each;) the second, two shillings and twopence…

    Amidst a barter economy, the missions reckoned accounts with numerical exactitude. In the 1820s, the Methodists on the eastern Cape frontier encouraged offerings of beads and buttons that would be rendered in shillings and pence according to current “nominal” values (Beck 1989: 223). Also at issue in this small grinding of God’s mills was the effort to encourage calculation. Counting–adding up, that is, the margins of profit and loss–enabled accounting, the form of stock-taking that epitomized puritan endeavor. The evangelists associated numeracy with self-control, exactitude, reason; school arithmetic, for example, was taught mostly in fiscal idiom, computation being inseparable from the process of commodification itself. Numbers provided a tool with which to equate hitherto incomparable sorts of value, to price

    them, and to allow unconditional convertibility from one to another. Quantification was iconic of the pro- cesses of standardization and incorporation, the erasure of differences in kind, at the core of cultural colonization. Hence the frequent association, in “modernizing” contexts, of religious conversion with various forms of enumeration; an association well captured by Spyer’s (1996) term “conversion to se- riality.” But it was also salient to the exacting logic of evangelical Nonconformism, with its need to mea- sure conquests and count treasures. This emphasis on numbers cannot be taken to imply a trading of quality for quantity, however, as Simmel (1978: 444) might have implied in arguing that the reduction of the former to the latter was an intrinsic feature of monetization. The Protestants were also preoccupied with the morality of money, with the exchange of riches for virtue above price. They sought ceaselessly to reconcile these two dimensions of value. For, just as time always entails space, quantity always entails quality.

    Still, by promoting the commodification of the Tswana world–where, in fact, cattle had long been counted13–colonial evangelism spawned a shift from the qualitative to the quantitative as the domi- nant idiom of evaluation. This shift had important consequences for control over the flow of wealth, as men of substance were quick to grasp. In effecting it, the Nonconformists were helped, and soon outstripped, by the European traders. Ironically, while these men preferred to do business by barter (above, p.15), they used monetary values to compute all transactions (Philip 1828,1: 205f)–including the wholesale purchase of local produce, for which they gave goods set at well-hiked retail rates, and the extension of loans, from which they extracted high interest (Shillington 1985: 221; Livingstone 1940: 92). In attempts, later on, to exert influence over prices and profits, some Tlhaping farmers would persuade merchants to pay them in cash for their crops (Shillington 1985: 222). But coin remained scarce for a long time and struggles to elicit it from white entrepreneurs would go on well into this century in some rural areas (Schapera 1933: 649). Not only did storekeepers benefit from conducting business by barter, mediated through virtual money; by using goods as token pounds-and-pence, they also limited the impact of rising prices in the Colony on those they paid in the interior. This form of cash-in-kind was a species of signal currency that had its (inverted) equivalent in Tswana “cattle without legs,” or cash-as-kine. Such were the hybrid media of exchange born of the articulation of previously distinct, incommensurable regimes of value. They expressed the efforts of the different dramatis personae to regulate the conversion of wealth in both directions. We return to them below.

    While familiarity with the value of money did not always translate into the circulation of cash, it did bear testimony to the growing volume of Tswana production for the market. Most lucrative were the fruits of the hunt. As they gained access to guns, African suppliers became ever more crucial to the capital intensive colonial trade in feathers and ivory–until natural resources gave out (Shillington 1985: 24). But agriculture was also important, especially among the middle and upper peasantry. Surpluses were sold in increasing quantities, permitting the purchase of cattle, farming implements, wagons, and other commodi- ties. With the discovery of diamonds, but before the territory was annexed by Britain in 1871, Tlhaping, Kora, and Griqua took part in the new commerce, finding stones and selling them to speculators for cash, wagons, and beasts (Shillington 1985: 38; Holub 1881,1: 242). Matthews (1887: 94f) writes that, once this trade had been outlawed, traffic was conducted in an argot in which gems were referred to as “calv- es.”

    Although Southern Tswana soon lost all claim to the diamondiferous lands, many remained im- plicated in the local economy around Kimberley–wherever possible, converting their profits into live- stock. Indeed, a report in the Diamond News in 1873 voiced the worry that, by turning their cash into animals, blacks were avoiding wage work (Shillington 1985: 68). Sir Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister at the Cape, echoed this concern to white audiences on a tour of the colony in 1878. “[L]arge troops of cattle and other stock…[mean] idleness,” he declared, to cries of “Hear, Hear!”14 Such anxieties were not base- less. But they focused only on Africans of means, underestimating the growing impoverishment of the in- terior. While most resources, even water, now had a price in Southern Bechuanaland (Holub 1881,1:231,246), the majority of Tswana were in no position to benefit from new market opportunities. Those with stock and irrigated lands might have been able to provision the diamond fields; however, as John Mackenzie observed, the “poorer classes …[were] often sadly disappointed.”15 Many had already begun to sell their labor either to rural employers or in the Colony.16

    Of the ironic history of Southern Tswana proletarianization we have written elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; 1997: Chap.4). Here it will suffice to make two points. First, the workings of the co- lonial economy, of the very mechanisms supposed to “civilize” and enrich Africans, did more than just eat away at their material lives. It also perverted the effort of the Protestant mission to instill in them a com- mitment to the idea of self-possessed labor and enlightened commerce; to seed among them the persua- sive hegemony of the market as sacralized place, practice, and process; to replace their “primitive communism” with a lifestyle centered on refined domesticity, the nuclear family, and money. Second, despite their indigence, most ordinary Southern Tswana remained reluctant proletarians, with strong views about the terms on which they were willing to sell their labor. Even when hunger was rife, and jobs at the diamond fields were scarce, they were loath to toil on the Transvaal goldmines, where there was a great demand for employees, but where workers were known to be ill-treated (van Onselin 1972: 486; Cape of Good Hope 1907[G36]: 20). In fact, observers noted repeatedly that labor migration was not driven by brute necessity. Among other things, it was tied, as an Inspector of Native Locations observed in 1908 (Cape of Good Hope 1909[G19]: 32), to the state of cattle-holding; also, as we have said, to the desire of Tswana to invest, through various forms of stock exchange, in local social relations and political enterprises. It was just this, of course, that decades of colonial evangelism had been designed to trans- form.

    STOCK RESPONSES

    Cattle, Currency, and Contests of Value

    Cattle are our “Barclay’s Bank”…17 Mhengwa Lecholo, 1970

    By the close of the nineteenth century, Southern Tswana communities had become part of a hybrid world in which markets and migration were more-or-less prominent; in which money had become a ubiquitous standard of worth; in which coin undercut all other currencies, including cattle. For many, this last development was neither inevitable nor desirable. Turning cattle into cash was not a neutral act. It en- tailed the loss of a distinctive form wealth and endangered their autonomy. Especially older men, whose power and position derived from their herds, sought to reverse the melting of everything to money. Even more, as we have noted, they tried constantly to convert all gains from the sale of labor or produce into beasts. Their orientation contrasted with that of the rising Christian literati, for whom universalizing me- dia–cash, education, consumer goods–promised entry to a modernist, middle class commonwealth. Not that these families ceased to invest in beasts; correspondence among Southern Tswana elites at the time makes frequent mention of transactions in kine. But, as Chief Bathoen of the Ngwaketse wrote in 1909 to Silas Molema in Mafikeng, he would be happy to take payment for an old debt “in cattle or money.”18

    The missionaries knew that livestock enabled Southern Tswana to sustain their independent exis- tence–and to resist the invasive reach of Christian political economy. As Willoughby once put it:19

    the whole cattle-post system has been alien to our work… [T]he frequent absence of the people attheir posts has been a break in all their learning, as well as an influence of an alien order.”

    Efforts to persuade men to harness their beasts to arable production might have been reasonably success- ful. But, for the most part, the evangelists had failed to decenter the “alien order” inscribed in animals. They had not convinced Tswana to dispense with their herds or the social relations secured by them. Quite the contrary: in 1881, in Kuruman, “[t]he people [were still] almost all engaged in pastoral pur- suits–either being themselves the owners of cattle, or as servicing those who are.”20 What is more, their stock gave the Africans a potent resource–their own cultural expertise–in their dealings with whites.

    Here, to their obvious satisfaction, they were on home ground; here their own local knowledge gave them a clear edge; here, within the colonial economy, was one domain, one site of contest, from which they profited (Mackenzie 1887,1: 80). The corollary? By investing in wealth that served as a hedge against the market, they made themselves less dependent, conceptually and bodily, on the cycle of earning-and-spending on which the missions had banked to change their everyday life-ways. Through such ordinary deeds were grand colonizing designs eluded. For a time.

    Other whites, in particular those eager to employ black labor, shared the uneasiness of the missio- naries over the enduring African preoccupation with cattle. They, too, were aware that stockwealth allow- ed “natives” some control over the terms on which they entered the market economy; hence Sprigg’s fighting talk of animals, idleness, and wage work. From the very start, the colonization of Southern Tswana society involved the gradual, deliberate depletion of their herds and the dispossession of their ran- ge. It was a process that gained momentum through the century. Early on, Boer frontiersmen tried to press Rolong communities into service by plundering their beasts, seizing their fountains, and invading their pastures. Later, in the annexed territories of Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, settlers impounded “stray” African stock in such numbers that government officials were moved to express concern (Shillington 1985: 99f). Exorbitant fees were charged for retrieving these beasts, cash that had to be borrowed from traders at the cost of yet further indebtedness. The Tswana sense that “money eats cattle” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 151) owed much to such experiences.

    Apocalypse, then: Rinderpest

    Several of the evangelists working on the unsettled frontier protested the blatant expropriation of African stock.21 At the same time, they did not mask their relief when the rinderpest pandemic of 1896 seemed, along with overstocking and deteriorating pasture, to deal a fatal blow to Tswana herds. The Rev. Williams’s response was fairly typical:22

    If the loss of their stock teaches the people the value of labour it will prove a veritable blessing in disguise. The wealth of the people has always been a hindrance to progress. So long as a man had a cattle post he cared little about anything else. The cattle have gone and larger numbers of the people are away at the Diamond and Gold Fields.

    Similarly sanguine clergy elsewhere in Southern Africa reported that stricken populations were seeking refuge at missions (van Onselen 1972: 480f). Many of them cheered the apparent demise of pastoralism. A few, though, pondered its implications for the lingering ideal of viable Christian communities in the countryside. While the scourge would probably help their cause, mused Willoughby at Palapye, it had reduced “the capital of the country” by some 50% to 60%. And it had deprived Tswana of their protection from drought, their income from transport riding, and their main means of locomotion.23 From his vantage in the more heavily agricultural district around Taung, John Brown saw a revisitation of the days of Moses, when “all the cattle of Egypt died.” Wagons and ploughs lay idle, and “women and girls, and in some cases men, [were] busy picking [at the ground] in the old way.”24

    The Tswana experience of rinderpest was unquestionably apocalyptic in the short run. Stockown- ers large and small lost millions of beasts (Molema 1966: 196). The southernmost peoples, who were al- ready land-poor and widely dependent on the wage labor, never fully recovered. Some communities in semi-arid regions turned to agriculture for the first time, only to be struck by locusts and drought. “Not since the days of Moses,” repeated the Rev. Williams, had there been such a cataclysm. “Re hedile,” in- toned a chorus of local voices, “we are finished!”25 Over the longer run, in fact, herds did recover in most places. But the impact of the devastation was inseparable from that of wider political and economic processes unfolding at the time; most immediately, from the protracted, at times violent, struggle of the Africans to withstand those who would deprive them of their autonomy.26 Beasts were often implicated in acts of rebellion along the frontier; they became highly charged objects of contestation on both sides. For example, Burness, a farmer killed in an uprising in 1898 (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 290), was the keeper of an official cattle pound beside the Orange River. When government agents sought to halt the implacable advance of the pandemic by shooting entire herds of Tswana stock,27 they were met with acute disaffection. Rumors spread that the authorities had introduced the rinderpest to reduce blacks to ser- vitude (van Onselen 1972: 487). In the end, some rulers complied with the administration and received compensation. Cattle-to-cash once more.

    Africans in the Cape called the rinderpest masilangane, “let us all be equal” (van Onselen 1972: 483), a sardonic reference to its levelling effects and to the power of beasts to make or break people. While the pandemic had ruinous effects, it did not diminish the value of stock among Tswana. If anything, it enhanced the “bovine mystique” (Ferguson 1985). Exploiting the transport crisis caused by the shortage of oxen, the upper peasantry were first to rebuild their herds–and, with them, the distinctions that comprised their world. Their understanding of the economic forces at work was epitomized in the relation of cattle to coin. Not only could coin eat cattle, but the replacement of the second was made pos- sible by the first. And yet animals remained the preferred form in which to store money; a form which, barring catastrophe, allowed it to grow into, and accumulate, social worth. The association of beasts with banks became a commonplace, making livestock synonymous with wealth at its most generative (cf. Alverson 1978: 124). In the event, cash came to be seen as the most fitting recompense for kine (Schapera 1933: 649), kine the optimum medium for the storage of cash. As we said earlier, they were alike special commodities. Both had an “innate” capacity to equate and translate different sorts of value. And to pro- duce riches. It is this capacity to commensurate that give such media their magic. Because of it, they seem to bring about transformations, and so to make history, in their own right.

    But cash and cattle were also different in one respect that no European political economist could have anticipated: their distinctive colors, their racination. Money was associated with transactions controlled by whites. It was the elusive medium of the trader, the hard-won wage paid to worker, the coercive currency of taxes levied by the state. It was also a highly ambiguous instrument. On one hand, it opened a host of new possibilities, typifying the culture of the mission and its object-world; and it made thinkable new materialities, new practices, new passions, new identities. Yet, in its refusal to respect per- sonal identities, it also undermined “traditional” monopolies, eroded patriarchal powers, displaced received forms of relationship–which is why, in part, many Southern Tswana rulers found their authority weakened, the centralization of their chiefdoms giving way, the hegemony of long-standing political and economic arrangements in question. “Money,” the vernacular saying goes, “has no owner”; madi ga a na mong. In democratizing access to value, it put a great deal of the past at risk, sometimes in the cause of transitory desire. Formerly inalienable, intransitive values might now be drawn into its melting pot. And, in the name of debt, tax collectors could attach Tswana cattle and force men to sell their labor to raise cash.

    Government Stock, Live Stocks

    Meanwhile, many observers–besides the evangelists–were announcing the death of African pas- toralism. Prematurely, it turns out. The Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-4 (South Africa 1905: 54), concluded that “money [has become] the great medium of business where form- erly cattle were used.” In a post-pastoral age, it went on, Africans should be encouraged to use government savings banks. But the matter was not so straightforward. In 1909, a resigned Rev. Williams wrote to his superiors that, to Tswana, cattle were already like government bonds:28

    …the Native is very slow to part with his cattle…Too often he will see himself, wife and family growing thin, whilst his cattle are increasing and getting fat, but to buy food with any portion of them is like draining his life’s blood…His cattle are like Government Stock which no holder will sell for the purpose of living on the Capital unless forced to do so.

    The reference to “life’s blood” is telling. Williams understood that beasts, here, enabled a particular kind of existence. It was this, for Tswana, that made them capital in the first place. Indeed, any asset that did the same thing might be treated as if it were stock. Even coin. But all too often coin did the opposite, con- suming cows and threatening relations made through them. Ironically, it was referred to in Setswana as madi, an anglicism and a homonym for “blood.” But this was blood, or perhaps blood-money, in a less sanguine sense. It connoted the alienable essence of the laborer, that part of her or him from which others profited (J. Comaroff 1985: 174). As Williams implies, selling cattle under coercive conditions was tantamount to selling lifeblood.

    The Rev. Williams went on to say that Christian teaching had made inroads into the Tswana re- luctance to sell beasts, that many were now willing to part with cattle when corn was scarce. But prices had fluctuated wildly on local markets: during the rinderpest, a “salted” (disease resistant) ox had fetched £30; by 1908, the finest animal brought £6 at most. No wonder, Williams concluded, contradicting what he had just said, that Tswana were slow to retail their stock. Returns on agricultural produce were also erratic. As a result, money was often scarce. Under these conditions, the capacity of kine to serve as the “safe custody” of wealth was underlined. They were a bulwark against the ebb and flow of other, less sta- ble stores of value. Hence their enhanced mystique. Hence, too, the fact that they were exchanged only for coin or other forms of capital; in particular, wagons, ploughs, and guns, which had become the primary means of producing wealth in a receding rural economy.

    But as importantly, cattle were also shares–live stocks as it were–in a social community and a moral economy whose reproduction they enabled. While overrule further eroded courtly politics in Sou- thern Tswana chiefdoms, patronage continued to be secured through the loan of cows; young, educated royals seem, in the early 1900s, to have used their cultural capital to shore up family herds, and vice ver- sa.29 Court fines were levied in kine, and marriage involved the transfer of animals, late into the twentieth century. Significantly, where bridewealth came to be given in cash payments, the latter was often spoken of as token beasts, “cattle without legs” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 148).

    ENDINGS, CONTINUITIES

    Livestock, in sum, were still the medium for making the social connections that, by contrast to more ephemeral contracts, formed and reformed a recognizable social world. These “signal transactions” (Sansom 1976: 145)–in nominal animal currency at a rate well below prevailing prices–distinguished pri- vileged exchanges from ordinary commercial dealings. Legless cattle were a salient anachronism, an en- clave within the generalizing terms of the market. Counted in cows but paid in coin, this notional cash-in-kine was the inverse of the cash-as-kind deployed by merchants to compel Africans to barter at non-competitive rates. Both virtual currencies served as modes of surge control that tried to harness the flow of value, if in opposite directions, by putting a brake on the rapid conversion from one form to another.

    It was precisely because they experienced colonization as a loss of control over the production and flow of value that so many Tswana–-as Tshidi-Rolong elders at the court of the late Chief Setumo Montshiwa reminded us recently–pinned their hopes on cattle in the early twentieth century. In them, it seemed, lay the means for recouping a stock of wealth and, with it, a sense of self-determination. This did not imply an avoidance of money or wage work. The Africans had been made dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, on the colonial marketplace; their access to beasts and other goods–not to mention cash–lay increasingly in the sale of their produce and/or their labor. Neither did it imply opposition to Christianity. By the turn of the century, as we have seen, most chiefs had joined the church, and many of their people followed suit, even if they were not, in the main, pious converts. The significant contrast in this world did not lie between Christian and non-Christian. It was between those for whom the values and relations inscribed in cattle remained paramount and those more invested, ideologically and materially, in the capitalist economy of turn-of-the-century South Africa. Cows, and the ways in which they were used, were the markers of this contrast. Rather than the bearers of a congealed, unchanging tradition, they were the links between two orders of worth. Thus, even where they served as icons of setswana, they were hybrid signs of identity in the here-and-now; identity that was itself a matter of shifting relations and distinctions.

    Remember too, in this respect, that stockwealth was not repudiated by those of more modernist bent; they tended to treat it like other forms of capital in a world of mercantilism, commerce, and commo- dities. It was they–the educated children of old elites, the upper peasantry, and the petite bourgeoisie cultivated by the mission–who were heirs to the liberal vision of the early evangelists. Others, less able to ride the contradictions of colonial political economy and Protestant modernism, remained marginal to the conventions and the cultural practices of the marketplace. They sought to garner what they could of its wealth,30 and to invest it in the social and material assets they knew and appreciated. This was to be an enduring strategy, visible even as the forces of global capital reshaped the post-apartheid Southern Afri- can periphery in the late twentieth century. In August 1995, the Gaming Gazette of the Sun International Corporation carried the story of a man, apparently of modest means, from Ramotswa in Botswana. He had hit the jackpot on a slot machine at the Gaborone Sun Hotel. Ralinki, his given name, would use his winnings to buy beasts. For Tswana, he explained, “cattle are…wealth, and it is traditional to have as many as possible to pass on to your sons.”31

    Which brings us back to the matters with which we began.

    World historical movements of social incorporation–nation-building, colonialism, globalization, and the like–are all founded on a logic of commensuration and conversion. On the demand that inimical sorts of value–in respect of language and culture, wealth, beauty, even the idea of god–are made equata- ble and translatable; that irreconcilable forms of difference among people and things are rendered reduc- ible, imaginatively and concretely, to common denominators. As our case shows, such processes of com- mensuration and conversion, and above all their enabling currencies, have often been the focus of con- cern, indeed of struggle, among people caught up on all sides of colonial encounters. These people tend to be minutely sensitive to the capacity of diverse media–money, beads, stock, or whatever–to make or to resist convertability and, therefore, the modes of exchange, abstraction, exploitation, and incorporation they allow; modes that sustain or threaten the autonomy, distinctiveness, and control we often associate with the “local.” That is why currencies of conversion often come to be fetishized; why they seem to have a power all of their own; why they loom so large at times of great historical changes of scale in economy, society and culture. Hence the obsession on the part of European missionaries with inducting Africans into the use of money–and the equally impassioned investment, among Tswana, in retaining their wealth in kine. Conversion, after all, was not merely a matter of religious reform. It was the key mechanism of imperialism at large.

  • Weaponizing the legal system

    Weaponizing the legal system

    Cambridge – John Comaroff explains lawfare or how authoritarian regimes around the world weaponize the legal system to de-legitimize their opponents. The term lawfare was used in Brazil by the defense of former President Lula to describe the violations of legal procedures by the Brazilian courts, as he was a victim of a collective act to discredit him and remove him from public life. Preventing Lula’s election is the struggle of some judges, public prosecutors and most part of the press in Brazil.

  • Thoughts on Theorizing from the South

    The following interview with John Comaroff (JC), conducted by Social Transformations editor Lisandro Claudio (LC), took place in Copenhagen in November 2014. Its content arises largely out of the recent publication of Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is evolving toward Africa , by Jean and John Comaro” (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012).

  • The Crisis and the Global South

    Chicago – John Comaroff joined scholars Achille Mbembe, Ho-fung Hung, and Claudio Lumnitz in 2015 for a forum sponsored by the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory. Comaroff focused on the 2008 economic crisis and its impact on the global south. Unlike the United States, which saw the stock market crash and housing foreclosures escalate, capital inflows to Africa increased by 16 percent, money invested in the Nigerian stock market earned a return of 16 percent, and west African banks witnessed an explosion of investments.

  • A Silent Tribute to Tata Madiba

    A Silent Tribute to Tata Madiba

    Thanks for asking us to write something on Nelson Mandela, which we appreciate. Alas, though, we both feel somewhat exhausted on the subject, having done any number of things for the media. The Harvard Gazette has already published a long interview with us, in which we try to contextualize Mandela’s legacy and move subtly away from the big-man history that underpins all the empty hagiography now so pervasive in the US and British press.1 That legacy is not the story of an individual hero, as iconic—or, rather, metonymic—as he may have become. It is the story of a sovereign struggle, one that involved the deaths of many unnamed heroes, innumerable heroic acts without signature, processes both with and without subjects. The reason that we all feel morally orphaned by the death of Madiba, of Rolihlahla (the troublesome one), of Tata, our last living grandparent, is that he was our final link to a modernist sense of political possibility, a utopianism without innocence, with critique rather than self-obsessed cynicism. But sadly, he became a living anachronism in the land of his birth, as the latter was overtaken by neoliberal adjustment, despite all that he had done and been. Somehow, while he lived, that older sense of freedom still seemed recoverable. The death of the man is also the death of an epoch, of our epoch, one in which people like you and we actually dared to put faith in the ideals of democratic equity, of justice, of a humane humanity, of the sovereignty of citizens. All that seems fanciful, indeed irrecuperable, after Mandela. In short, the reason that we feel unable to write any more about this moment is that we have said, in deliberately few words, everything we think about it. At this point, the greatest eloquence is the eloquence of a deeply reflective silence. Much of the rest is noise, ritual noise most of it, noise often being made by people who have lacked the courage to stand openly for the things to which Madiba—and the movement at large of which he was part, since he was not “apartheid’s conqueror,” in the phrase of the US media,2 just its most famous struggle hero—gave their lives, their freedom, their spirit. Perhaps the lesson of those lives for us in the US is what we, as a country, did NOT do to fight apartheid while Rolihlahla Mandela languished in prison, what we have done repeatedly to fight AGAINST democracy under the sign of security and self-interest, why we continue to condone the blatant racism and brute inequity in our desperately unequal, cruel society. Rather than mourn Mandela, which South Africans will do, have done, in their millions, perhaps Americans should mourn the death, in our own country, of the ideals and principles for which he stood.

  • Thoughts on Theorizing from the South

    Thoughts on Theorizing from the South

    Thoughts on Theorizing from the South: An Interview with John Comaroff, conducted by Lisandro Claudio. Published in Social Transformations: Journal of the Global South, 3(1):3-18, 2015. Also published in The Johannesburg Salon, 10:30-38; http://jwtc.org.za/volume_10/lisandro _claudio.htm.

    The following interview with John Comaroff (JC), conducted by Social Transformations editor Lisandro Claudio (LC), took place in Copenhagen in November 2014. Its content arises largely out of the recent publication of Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is evolving toward Africa, by Jean and John Comaroff (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012).

    LC: How do you define the Global South?

    JC: This is not an easy question to answer. The Global South has multiple referents, multiple meanings. In ordinary conversation, of course, its primary denotation is geographical: it signifies, hemispherically, the lower half of the planet, its underside. But this is a grotesque simplification, a realist—and often racist—conceit. The term has a far more complex fan of significata. Superficially, it describes those reaches of the planet that were formerly colonized, although not always at the same time; those parts of the world that European imperial metropoles “discovered,” conquered by means of one or another form of violence, exploited for economic and political purposes, and took to be part of their so-called overseas “possessions.” A more subtle conceptualization treats the Global South less as a geopolitical or even an historical entity—in spatio-temporal terms, that is—than as a relational term that takes on its substance by virtue of its contrast, be it binary or complementary or orthogonal or, even at times, rhizomic, to the Global North. Because it is a relational sign, a “shifter” if you prefer the technical linguistic designation, its content is constantly shifting. In some contexts, its connotation is largely imaginative: it stands as a loose, and quite plastic, rhetorical trope of otherness to Euro-America. In others, it takes on a hard- edged materiality, as in the formation of BRICS (a geo-economic axis that brings together Brazil, India, South Africa, China, and Russia); or, in the world of finance, as a zone in which credit ratings are low, labile, and carefully regulated, and toward which G8 policies require regularly to be negotiated. For the critical scholar, however—and here is the point—our theory-work requires that we do not take “the Global South” as an analytic category in or for itself. Our task is to interrogate, and explain, the various ways in which the term is understood, deployed, commissioned, and contested. In Theory from the South, Jean Comaroff and I make the argument that, whatever else it might be taken to denote, geopolitically or imaginatively or economically, “the Global South” alludes to any ex-centric location—a location external to self-appointed, historical centers, that is, in a world of metamorphosing relations among, even deconstructions of, centers-and-peripheries—from which to look at the contemporary planetary order in its totality. Note that “ex-centric” here, itself a felicitous conceptual pun, is owed to Homi Bhabha. What is more, we argue, it is those ex-centric locations that, in the here-and-now, have become frontiers in the history of the present, the unfolding history of global capitalism; hence the notion that they are harbingers of the economic, political, and social future/s of Euro-America.

    LC: How would you distinguish it from concepts such as the developing world or the Third World?

    JC: This is an interesting question. The Global South has gone by several such terms in times past, among them, the premodern world, the colonial world, the underdeveloped world, the developing world, and, most recently, the Third World. However, few people talk about the Third World anymore. It is difficult to track the political etymology of “the Global South”; clearly, it dates to the demise of the Cold War era, an era in which “First,” “Second,” and “Third” Worlds signified the bloc alignments, and the ideological antinomies, of the long twentieth century. With the end of that era, and with the globalization of neoliberal capitalism in its late modernist form, the so-called center-periphery relations on which Cold War geopolitics was founded began to give way. In that sense, “the Global South” is a term that conjures with the ghosts of an historical epoch now visible primarily in its turbulent wake, its material and social after-effects. Because the empire has struck back, so to speak; because Africa and Latin America and South Asia are no longer merely the margins of an industrial capitalist World System of the sort so acutely captured for the twentieth century by the likes of Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Walter Rodney, and dependency theorists of various stripes; because both capital and labor now flow in all directions—with Euro- American workers seeking employment in their former colonies, northern capital investing south of the equator, and ex-colonial wealth buying up the corporations of their former colonizers—the world, as it is commonplace to observe these days, is caught up in irretrievable entanglements. Thus it is that one of the biggest beer manufacturers in the United States, Miller, is owned by South African Breweries. And that much of the British motor industry, including its signature names, is owned by Indian :frms; well, sort-of Indian :frms. Like many corporations of global reach today, they are highly complex structures consisting of holding companies, investment arms, subsidiaries, and the like, often registered in offshore tax-havens with production sites that offer :fnancial incentives, lax labor laws, and few environmental constraints—sites often in former colonies, where the legacy of the past, those ghosts that I mentioned a moment ago, makes the present highly congenial to the exigencies of capital. And because these places, by and large, cluster in the antipodes, old archetypes, anachronistic imaginaries, continue to animate the translation of the Third World into the Global South.

    At the same time, despite (or because of ) the fact that Euro- American capital invests so heavily in Africa, Asia, and Latin America these days—foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, for example, has risen dramatically in the past decade or so—and despite the emergence of new markets and new home-grown corporations in those places, the dystopic undersides of the global economy are felt most acutely in them: poverty and unemployment, crime, illness, and Gini-coe:ffcients are all on the rise; this in spite of the tendency of free-market fundamentalists to stress the growing gross wealth of the continent, a faith-based tendency that ignores the bitter harvest sown by the neoliberal policies of the Washington consensus in the cause of “structural adjustment.”

    Of course, given that Africa, Asia, and Latin America have become harbingers of the future history of the Global North, note how much more “like Africa”—or, at least, like Africa-as- archetypically-imagined—the “new normal” of America and Europe are becoming. Euro-America is suffering rapid urban decay, social unrest, environment degradation, and real unemployment. By realhere, I do not intend simply the number of people who do not have jobs—in the United States, the prison population and those who have given up seeking work are not counted as unemployed; if they were, the country would have a rate that looks distinctly African. My intention, rather, is to point to the unremarked distinction between jobs and incomes: because a very large number of people in the United States and Europe who have formal jobs do not, in the wake of the deliberate depression of wages and the removal of benefits, earn sufficient to support themselves and their families, employment figures have become effectively meaningless. A much more realistic figure if we really wished to measure the social health of economies is an “economic viability ratio,” if I may be forgiven a neologism, a ratio that measures level of net income against cost-of-living; only if the former were equal or greater than the latter might an individual be said to be economically viable. National economic health, then, ought to be rated according to the proportion of economically viable citizens (or families, if one wanted to render the equation slightly more complex) to the total population. That, at least, would yield a more sensible economic anthropology of the wealth of nations than does our current fetishism of un/employment figures. Comparing Global Southern cities with those of the Global Nrth is not always flattering to Euro-America: even the poorest citizens of Johannesburg or Lagos would find urban Detroit or the southside of Chicago an edifying place to live.

    What is more, the World-Formerly-Known-as-First, in which the cutting of state budgets has become a competitive imperative for most political parties, is often slower than the Global South these days to develop or reproduce infrastructure: vide its rotting inner cities, their housing estates and banlieus; its over-burdened, reduced transportation systems; its withering support of public culture and tertiary education. Nor is it quick to experiment with post-neoliberal forms of redistribution or new kinds of public-private investments in social welfare—like the Bolsa Familia in Brazil or the social grants and housing programs of South Africa that have abetted the regeneration, or slowed the degeneration, of local economies. Interestingly, in a recent New Yorker, James Surowiecki notes that some US cities are, for the first time, building homes for the unemployed, largely because it is cheaper to deal with homelessness before than after the fact. This is basically a welfare program by another name—“welfare” being a word currently unutterable in the US public sphere—that resembles post-apartheid South Africa’s huge effort, now almost twenty years old, to house its immiserated population; a striking instance, this, of the Global North following behind the history of the Global South. The irony is obvious. There is often a strong cost-benefit rationale to the state for this sort of intervention, but the culture of neoliberalism, despite its obsession with cost-benefit calculation, makes any social policy that is not market-driven, any policy that involves a proactive state, unthinkable—even if it has clear economic returns. Global South-like social conditions, however, are compelling Global Northern nations to mimic many of the socioeconomic strategies developed in the antipodes, albeit under different, less charged labels. The pity of it is that, while such things—the historical effects of neoliberalism, I mean, and the politics required to address them—are openly argued about in places like South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, and India, they are rendered non-negotiable in most of the ideologically-riven, toxic, de- democratizing polities of Euro-America.

    LC: Where does your interest in thinking about the Global South come from?

    JC: I am a South African by birth and affinity, a long displaced white South African. I grew up in Cape Town in the bad old days. My wife and I left because we could not stay, in all conscience, after 1967, when we graduated from the University of Cape Town. But we retained our roots there. When we could not work or live in South Africa—we were resident for ten years in the UK before moving to the United States— we spent extended periods in Botswana. Since 1990, although we have continued to live in the United States, we have spent between three and six months every year back home; in 2000–2001, we returned for fifteen months, most of it spent in the North West Province, where we have done the bulk of our fieldwork. In 2015, once again, we shall be doing new research for much of the year in South Africa

    As this makes clear, we spend much of our lives moving between America and Africa, with regular if shorter sojourns in Europe. In doing so, we try constantly to see each of these places through the eyes of the other/s, thus to facilitate the critical process of estrangement— which is the essential gesture of all theoretically-principled, methodologically-sensitive anthropology. In short, our optic on the world, the angles of vision from which we interrogate it, has a great deal to do with biography. But it also owed to something else, to an epistemic consideration. Lenin once said that social formations—he had industrial capitalism in mind—are often best understood from what we think of, autonomically, as peripheries; that life at those peripheries makes visible forces and faces and facts often unseen, or disregarded, at metropoles. This is another way of making an argument for treating ex-centric locations as critical vantages for theory-work in the social sciences. We have repeatedly been struck by this in South Africa: much of its public intellectual life is situated in its large cities, as a result of which many of the contradictions at the heart of its postcolonial political economy, most acutely evident in its rural reaches, go unremarked, unseen, unanalyzed.

    LC: You have mentioned your most recent book, 7heory from the South. Can you summarize its argument?

    JC: As I have already intimated, its argument is complex, and is applied to a wide range of phenomena, from contemporary personhood, citizenship, and democracy, through history and the judicialization of memory, the crisis of liberalism, nationhood and borders, and the law, to the politics of life itself. Unfortunately the commentary literature that it has accrued—almost all of it based on a rather superficial reading of its introduction—has simplified it a great deal, and confused it with what has come to be labeled “southern theory”; theory, that is, written in the South by scholars from the South. There is huge value in southern theory, of course. Apart from all else, it opens the academe to voices long ignored, often for reasons that are flatly racist, reasons that have to do with the fundamental incompleteness of processes of decolonization. We, however, do not claim to be “southern theorists,” nor do we speak for “them,” which, patently, would be a blatant act of colonial paternalism. Our work, rather, derives precisely from the triangulated, estranged perspectives, the multifocality, of which I spoke a moment ago; it is a North-South co-production, neither one thing nor the other, but grounded simultaneously in the in-between, in a both-and. (This is true, of course, of many Southern scholars as well, but that is another story. If antipodean authenticity requires the mono-spatialization of positioning, voice, and conceptual repertoire, few could claim it. And why would one want to anyway?)

    The central argument of the book is founded on a doubling, on a counterpoint of two theses. The first is anything but new, although many continue to dispute it; we do not claim its authorship, only a particular version of its enunciation. It is that African modernity ought not to be seen as a derivative, a doppelganger, or a degenerate variant of the European original; that all modernities, plural, are vernacular ideological formations, formations that, in valorizing contemporaneity, posit their own notions of personhood, history, and world-making in the here-and-now; that, despite its claims to universal Enlightenment, to a monopoly on the production of truth, philosophy, forensic knowledge, science, theory, Euro-American modernity is a parochial cultural formation like any other, and subject to the same cultural relativism; that Afro-modernity has deep roots in the past and, like its northern counterparts, has long been the object of endogenous contention and contestation. Which is why modernity, sui generis, has multiple forms, multiple narratives, multiple sources, multiple origin mythologies; to wit, as Jack Goody recently pointed out in The Theft of History, many things that the West believes itself to have invented— among them, democracy, capitalism, individualism, and love—had precursors which were “borrowed” from elsewhere, particularly Asia.

    The second argument of the book, to which I alluded earlier, is much more controversial, much more open to contestation. It is that, in this, the latest chapter in the history of global capitalism, the effects of its so-called “neoliberal” turn have been felt first and most acutely in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, thence to manifest themselves in Euro-America; “neoliberal” is rendered here in scare quotes since, as an adjective, it describes a mutating formation with many variants, most of them unstable, labile, still under construction, often under-theorized. North and South, I stress, are caught up in the same meta-process of contemporary world-making. But it is a meta-process of multiple temporalities: not all parts of the planet are coeval in the here-and-now. The fact that the history of the Global South is running ahead of that of the Global North, a harbinger of the Euro-American future, has its origins in the long duree of the past two centuries. Partly it has to do with the residual effects of the politicaleconomy of colonialism, and, in particular, with the non-sedimentation of liberal democracy in former colonies, itself a legacy of the divisive technologies of European overrule. But it is also because, more recently, experimentation in deregulated capitalism—in its labor relations, in its collaboration with (or, in extremis, its seizure of ) the state, in its financial gerrymandering, in eco-destruction, and the like—has been allowed to occur in the Global South without the same ethico-legal constraints it has faced in the Global North. The South has always been a laboratory for capitalist development. But it is now more than that: it is also a site of the production of some of its new, more inventive ways and means; this because it has seized and recommissioned the knowledge and expertise yielded by that experimentation, frequently with unintended consequences. As a result, the frontiers of the global economy have left the North and begun to move southward, often, as I have said, prefiguring historical processes that would gain force later in Euro-America—often unanticipated, with costly consequences.

    Take, for example, the economic recession of 2008. It is clear, in retrospect, that earlier crises in Asia, Latin America, and Asia, as George Stiglitz has observed, were caused by basically the same conditions, the same “structural” adjustments, the same fetishism of the “free” market. But Western economists—driven by an ideology they misperceive, misconstrue, and misrepresent as science—saw no lesson for themselves in this precursor; in the fact, that is, that their prescribed policies were responsible for that catastrophe and would be responsible for one later in Euro-America. It is telling that those economies of the Global South that did not buy into the Washington Consensus, and were most heavily state regulated, suffered 2008 least and recovered fastest. This, of course, flies in the face of American neoliberal ideology and economic orthodoxy, which is deeply anti- etatist. What is more, even now, when the United States speaks as though its economy has recovered from the implosion of six years ago, it is deluding itself. Wealth may have returned to its traditional homes and havens, so to speak. It always does.Twenty-first-century capitalism, famously, is risk-free for its upper reaches. But inequality continues to deepen, more Americans are alienated from both civil society and the economy, redistribution is unthinkable, infrastructure is rusting and withering, and the commonweal has been looted to the point of bare existence. And the idea that unemployment rates are dropping, as my comments above make clear, is pure myth, a mendacious figment of statistical mystification.

    The “new normal” of the United States and Europe, in short, recalls the recent pasts of Africa, Latin America, and, if briefly, Asia.

    Hence Adriana Hu:ffngton’s pungent Third World America. The United States, oddly—or perhaps predictably, given that its curious fusion of provincialism and imperialism prevents it learning from the history of others—has responded either by reproducing the economic theology that got it into trouble in the first place, or by attempting to reindustrialize; this, ironically by reimporting the modes of production that it exported to the exploitable edges of the global economy—which makes no practical sense under contemporary conditions. For their part, many states in the South are seeking new solutions, ones that avoid the excesses of market fundamentalism and anti-etatism.

    Take another example of history running from Africa towards the Global North. It pertains to the law, and, again, has several dimensions. One of them involves constitutions, of which more than thirty-five new ones have been promulgated since 1989; this on a continent stereotypically, and wrongly, said to have little respect for constitutionalism tout court. Most notable among those constitutions, perhaps, is that of South Africa, which melds European liberal theory with an Afrocentic sensibility to create a creolized legal culture whose recognition of rights—especially economic, social, and cultural rights—is among the most capacious, most advanced in the world today. Not only has become a model for other nation-states; it has also drawn the avid attention of Euro-American constitutional scholars, for many of whom it has become a paradigm case for the jurisprudence of the future. What is more, the South African Constitutional Court sees itself—as does its Indian counterpart, another paradigmatic instance from the Global South—as an institution whose function is actively to produce a more just and equal society, a society less bedeviled by racism or sexism. It is, in other words, makes the case for judicial activism, one in which civil society has a strong democratic voice. By contrast, the US Supreme Court pretends to avoid judicial activism. But the opposite is true. In its de facto practices, it is rapidly catching up to South Africa in this respect, but with a quite different ideological agenda: it is willfully producing an ever more unequal, ever more unjust, ever more racially differentiated society, one effectively governed by the corporate sector.

    Another register in which the same historical trajectory is visible is the deconstruction, or demise, of the idea of absolute property. In precolonial and colonial—and, by genealogical turn, postcolonial— Africa, there was no such idea. All property was conditional, held in trust under long-term, heritable usufruct arrangements of one kind or another. What is more, most assets were socially embedded in relations of (often) kin-based mutuality; wealth, in sum, lay in people and the links of generalized reciprocity among them. Thus, for instance, in many African contexts, the bridewealth received for a woman at her marriage was used to enable her brother to take a wife, thus weaving a complex tapestry of material-inscribed ties; similarly, the inheritance that devolved to a man on his father’s death came with the responsibility to use it in care of his siblings, his mother, and other relatives. Even so-called tribal territory was held by chiefs in trust for his (occasionally her) subjects, under the final authority of ancestors. Of course, thanks to colonialism, Euro-modernist concepts of ownership have insinuated themselves deeply into Africa. Interestingly, however, under contemporary conditions of economic stringency, the appeal to received forms of social exchange as insurance against immiseration appears to be as significant as it was in the past, perhaps even more so. Although Euro-America has not yet evolved sufficiently to socialize property in such a way as to make its institutionalized exchange the basis of universal insurance—I am being ironic, obviously—there is a burgeoning body of legal theory, some of it quite technical, to the effect that the concept of “absolute dominion” in the Global North is coming to an end; that property is being held ever more conditionally, ever more partially and partibly, less “privately,” in the literal sense of that term; that it is increasingly abstract, less concrete, less permanent, more subject to extinction or incursion under the terms of such things as eminent domain. In this respect, at least, Euro-America seems to be headed toward the conditionalities of the African past. And the past- in-the-present.

    Economy, law, property—I could go on giving example after example. As I said, the book offers many, but the point will be clear.

    LC: Are you wary though of how anti-Western or “anti-imperial” discourse can be coopted within the Global South towards ends that are very destructive like, for example, when Lee Kuan Yew, uses the critique of the West to say, “we have Asian values here” and then moves on to suppress basic freedoms?

    JC: Of course those are dangers. They exist in Africa as well, where autocratic, conservative chiefs subvert the rule or law, and basic rights, under the sign of “tradition.” The potential to appropriate, expropriate, re-appropriate difference in the name of power is infinite, from both the left and the right. The case of Lee Kuan Yew provides an interesting inflection on theory from the South. The “Singaporean model” of governance—one which fetishizes the rule of law, although it rules by law, and a very coercive law at that—is becoming a global aspiration, widely imitated in the Global North, whose states are effectively de-democratizing under the sign of technical efficiency and economic growth. What is more, Lee’s appeal to Asian values has been mimicked in the UK, which has taken to celebrating “Britishness” as a national trope, and has inserted it into national school curricula, thus to reassert a national imagining founded—perhaps laughably— on cultural homogeneity. It is no coincidence that, during the 1970s, Lee Kuan Yew was probably most respected non-British ruler in the Commonwealth and was held up, in Britain, as the icon of strong, development-oriented, no-nonsense authority. His ghost lives on as a sublime object of desire for those in power across the Global North, and as a nightmare for those who yearn for a more equitable, more social-democratic world.

    LC: Okay, so let me flip the question. If the North has learned or should learn from the South, what does the South still left to learn from the North?

    JC: People in the South learn from the North all the time—again, taking these to refer less to geopolitical hemispheres than to imaginative, relational loci—as they have been doing since early colonial times. Sometimes they do so under compulsion, sometimes on their own terms, sometimes in mimicry, sometimes creatively, often redeploying what they learn to their own ends by recourse to their own means. The contemporary world, I repeat, is one of almost infinite entanglements, collaborations, co-dependencies, co-determinations, displacements, multicentricities. And exclusions. In this respect, we are undergoing an epistemic revolution in our very idea of geography, whose modernist lineaments—after Kant and von Humboldt and sixth-grade school textbooks—have been overlaid by new coordinates, new geometries, new realities. Received connections between space, place/ment, temporality, and subjectivity (both individual and collective) are being radically ruptured and refigured. At the most banal, the most self- evident, this is this due to the space-time compression built into the planetary electronic commons. When I was growing up, to indulge in a cliché, my residential address determined my entitlements of citizenship, my social and affective identities, and much else besides. Only criminals and mad people, it was presumed, had no fixed abode. Now my most important address is my email, which travels with me wherever I go, and situates me not in a physical place but in cyberspace; when I use it, I could be in anywhere, and often am. Now, moreover, my legal persona—which effectively marks out my humanity, my rights, my being—is, in large part, genetically constituted, biometrically defined, digitally inscribed, infinitely mobile, and stored in an iCloud, whose existence is, for all practical purposes, pure abstraction; so, too, of course, is much of the money I spend and many of the transactions in which I engage, although all of them have material consequences. And, as we all know, any individual can create any number of personas, avatars, for conducting a social and an economic life situated nowhere in particular. In the South, the construction of purpose-driven, labile, place-defying identities—identities-on-the-move, in every sense of the term, that remake received geographies and their relationship to subjectivities—is a commonplace, even in the face of increasingly intrusive technologies of governance in countries like India, South Africa, and Brazil.

    But this, as I said, is only one, rather obvious, symptom of the epistemic shift in our geographic reason. The terms of modernist geography are also undergoing reconstruction at the behest of shifts in the material space-time of global capitalism, which play havoc with long-standing categories, concepts, and distinctions.

    Take, for example, the South Korean agricultural industry. It is, in large part, now located in Africa, where South Korea has purchased huge swathes of arable. If we were to write an economic geography of that country today, how would we do it in such a way as to represent the fact that it conducts a significant proportion of its primary production and feeds its population by extending its effective territorial domain onto another continent in the form of privately-owned real estate? What is more, the cost of its seed and the global price of agri-goods, which affect the Koreans as much as they do everyone else, are heavily determined by commodity futures markets, notably situated in Chicago, many of whose traders are expatriates, operating with foreign or offshore capital. Again, think about this as a conundrum in cartography. Wherein lies the thing that we commonly call “South Korea?” Or the “South Korean economy”?

    Similarly, what are we to make of situations, like that of Iceland, in which the entire fiscus of one state has been effectively purchased by another, in that instance, by Russia? Or, as I noted earlier, ones in which a nation’s signature industry has been bought up by corporations from elsewhere, as has happened with the purchase of British auto manufacture by Indian businesses? Or the invasive takeover by Singaporean sovereign funds—note the term—of major banks associated with the economies of other countries? Or, to take an African case, how ought we to describe, in geographical terms, the Senegalese cultural economy when so much of its famed “world music” is performed, produced, financed, and distributed from Paris: while it remains emphatically Senegalese in branding itself, and in asserting an affective connection to its nationality, it also centers itself on another continent—but unlike South Korea, in the Global North— and circulates, unbounded by international borders, on the Internet, whence it draws most of its income. In short, it lives in multiple spatio- temporal dimensions, which, taken together, resist ordinary mapping. And this is not to mention another sector of the Senegalese cultural economy that flies under the radar: its faith-based global trading networks, conducted by Mourides, who ply their wares on an huge scale as they move among cities abroad, and whose remittances, moved through supra-territorial Islamic banking practices, have a major, if largely unrecorded, impact at home.

    All this becomes infinitely more complicated when we add legal jurisdictions into the mix, since they transcend and transect national borders, continents, hemispheres, even the limits of the terrestrial. Since a growing proportion of all political conflict is pursued nowadays through the courts, both intra- and international politics often play themselves out along axes that override received geographies, received sovereignties. Thus, for example, some years ago, the legal struggle for gender equality in respect of the retirement age in England, unsuccessful in Britain itself, was fought against the Whitehall government, and won, in the European Court, thus rupturing both the de facto and the de jure sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and resituating its terrain of political contestation in another jurisdiction, another lawscape, outside the British Isles. In our earlier volume, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Jean Comaroff and I document any number of other instances from the Global South. What they point to is the fact that, if we are to understand the global order of the twenty-first century at all well, we require to write a new, post-Kantian geography, one which recognizes that economics, politics, and the law have come to take on quite different dimensions from those with which we lived—and in terms of which we made sense of the world—in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

    LC: Final question: In a world like this, which is in flux and where geographies are unclear, what becomes of those ideas that have been traditionally associated with “Western Enlightenment,” like, say, liberalism? Or socialism?

    JC: Both liberalism and socialism are deeply in crisis under the impact of global capitalism and the neoliberal turn; in particular, of their effects on political economy, identity and subjectivity, governance, civil society, the workings of the law, even religiosity. This is a large and complicated issue, of course, one that deserves to be dealt with at greater length, not as a coda or an afterthought. But a point or two here. With this turn, we are seeing a fundamental unraveling of the human being imagined as social subject; indeed, of the presumptive existence of society itself. S/he, more than ever before, is a fusion, at once cold and hot, of homo economicus and homo juralis, an economic and jural person, radically-individuated and rights-bearing. Genetically endowed, s/he is, above all else, sentient human (bio)capital to be mobilized, invested, commissioned, enriched, circulated, consumed, alienated, disposed of—by herself or himself, or by others, or by some mix of both—all in proportion to the lottery of life chances, a lottery heavily inflected by race, class, gender, generation, sexual orientation, physical endowment, and a host of other things.

    Under these conditions, the liberal social contract has given way to the legal contract, society to the digitized network, sociality to the market, the Hobbesian Leviathan to the corporate state. A new post- social theology increasingly governs our lives, albeit with elements of the modern still there; uneasily, unevenly, often under challenge. In the upshot, concepts like class become more-or-less unthinkable, just as race becomes unspeakable, as explanations for anything; this in spite of the fact that we live in a world riven by grotesque inequities of class and race. Which, in part, is why socialism, indeed why thinking from the left, is so deeply in crisis; it has provided little by way of an antithesis to the social and material effects of neoliberal orthodoxy. Vide the extent to which social democratic, labor, and socialist political parties in Europe, instead of offering a strong counter to that orthodoxy, have compromised themselves heavily in bowing to the forces of the deregulated market.

    But even more, the liberal idea of the commonweal, of the public sphere, is being eroded by the florescence of identity politics, especially by what we have called elsewhere Ethnicity, Inc. and Religion, Inc. The rise of identitarianism based on culture, its emergence as a pervasive form of political mobilization, derives in part from the geneticization of being; itself, as I have said, a corollary of the alleged demise of the social under neoliberal hegemony. Because genetics appears—note, appears—to hold the key to “life itself,” those putatively with the same bio-substance presume a “natural,” ineffably shared interest in claiming legal rights and entitlements for themselves and for their distinctive life-ways. And so the radically individuated “me” becomes aggregated as the biogenetic “we,” whose cultural practices, by extension, derive from what it is that makes them different, sui generis. Increasingly, these days—in which few other principles of common cause are recognized—cultural identity comes with a demand not merely for recognition, but for sovereign self-determination. Which violates the very essence of classic liberalism, whose tolerance extends only to difference exercised in the private domain, not to sovereignty over any public, or to its different ways and means, exercised within the political community by an authority other than the state. At least in theory. In practice, as we have long seen in the Global South, and are seeing with gathering pace in the Global North, that theory is fast losing its purchase on reality.

    Similarly with identities embedded in faith,which assert themselves against the commonweal in the name of one or more divinity whose word takes precedence over all other authorities, including that of the state, and under whose suzerainty a Schmittian world of good and evil is imagined—often in the face of other rationalities, including those of Western enlightenment. Both faith-based and ethnic groups tacitly treat liberal modernity—and often contest it—as though it were just another culture,another ideology,another episteme,pace enlightenment notions of universal, i.e., secular, knowledge and truth. No wonder, then, that we are witnessing a world of hardening difference, of more belligerent claims to transcendent sovereignty, sometimes to the point of death-dealing, or less dramatically, by resort to lawfare against those who would subsume differences of culture and faith within an all- embracing, worldly civility.

    The challenge for critical scholarship in this, the second decade of the new century, it seems to me, is to begin to theorize these shifts, to make sense of our post-liberal, post-socialist, even post-humanist world. I am aware that this is a controversial call in an age in which the social sciences—echoing the phenomenal incoherence, the sheer complexity, of the contemporary order of things, its tendency toward the anti-systemic, the contingent, rupture, and disorder—have tended to turn their back on theory. And to seek succor in ever more exquisite forms of neo-empiricism; in anthropology, my own discipline, this has been accompanied by a return to the search for pristine, de-historicized cultures, now rebranded as the “ontological turn,” which we wisely gave up on some decades ago. But to give up on “doing theory” in this way, to suffice ourselves by merely describing the world as we and/ or our “natives” see it, is to give up on the essential gesture of critical social knowledge: namely, to account for the connections between the visible and the invisible, to plumb the forces that lie unseen behind the tumult, the cacophony, the contingent in the phenomenology of our everyday lives, forces that make that world at once inequitable, violent, and catastrophe-prone, at once obscenely rich in its benevolence and punishingly poor in withholding its bounty, at once progressive and retrogressive, at once remarkably stable and wildly labile. It is to this endeavor that Theory from the South sought, modestly, to join itself.

  • Ethnicity, Inc.

    Ethnicity, Inc.

    In October 2000, Business Day, a leading South African newspaper, published an extraordinary story. Its title read: Traditional Leaders Form Private Firm for Investment.1 Contralesa, the Congress of Traditional Leaders, is the voice of ethnicity in this postcolony. It speaks for culture, customary law, and the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Also for the authority of chiefs who, as a power bloc, seek to change the national constitution. Their objective is a nation-state that accords them sovereign autonomy over their realms, a nation-state that puts the dictates of indigeneity before the universal rights of citizens.

    According to Business Day, Contralesa had decided to move ethnicity into the global market place: it was creating a corporation to investin mining, forestry, industry and tourism, that archetypical site for the commodification of culture. Said Patekile Holomisa, powerful Xhosa head of the organization: “We have concentrated for too long on the political fight for constitutional recognition.” The time had come to empower their peoples by venturing out from their traditional capitals into the realm of venture capital. Since then, Contralesa has become a truly cosmopolitan concern, a multi-million dollar business with interests carefully diversified across the planetary economy.

    Could it be, pace all social science orthodoxy, that the future of ethnicity – or, at least, a future – lies, metaphorically and materially, in ethno-futures? In taking identity into the market place? In hitching it to the world of franchising and finance capital? Leruo Molotlegi, King of the Bafokeng,2 a wealthy South African chiefdom, intimated as much in an address on “corporate ethnicity” at a leading American university. The Wealth of ETHNO-Nations is a topic about which he knows a lot. His people is famed throughout Africa for its lucrative platinum holdings. In 2000, soon after he succeeded to his throne, Leruo was picturedon the cover of Mining Weekly under the caption, “Meet the New CEO of Bafokeng Inc.”3

    Cut away to another time, another optic, another part of South Africa.

    In 1994, in the North West Province, there appeared an op-ed piece in The Mail, the local weekly,4 by one Tswagare Namane. “Our futures,” he predicted, are going to rely increasingly on tourism. To attract it, however, demands not just hotels or game parks. It requires “uncovering,” and marketing, “what is authentically Tswana.” Recourse to the cargo of cultural tourism, as we all know, has become a global panacea, an autonomic reflex almost, for those with no work and little to sell; this despite the fact that it seldom yields what it promises. But Namane had in mind something more than simply the tourist dollar. The commercialization of identity, he argued – pace Frankfurt School orthodoxy – does not necessarily reduce it to a brute commodity. Per contra: marketing what is “authentically Tswana” is also a mode of self-construction, of producing Tswana-ness. And an assertion, thereby, of universal being-in-the-world.

    I have searched for something genuinely mine; something I can cherish as the achievement of my forebears, something to affirm my humanity and my equality.

    This restless urge, he added, is most acutely felt by persons dispossessed of their past. Note the choice of term: “dispossession.” It connote of property, propriety, prosperity, paradise lost. “What I am reclaiming is my ethnicity, my heritage; not my ‘ethnicism’.” The distinction, a striking piece of vernacular anthropology, is critical. Ethnicity refers here to membership in a population with distinctive ways and means; ethnicism, to the tribal allegiances “propagat[ed by] apartheid.” Heritage, of course, is culture projected into the past, and, simultaneously, the past rendered into culture. It is identity in alienable form: identity whose objects and objectifications may be consumed by others and, therefore, delivered to the market. Its alienation, as Namane saw, has the curious capacity to confer upon ethnicity a currency at once social, political, moral, material and affective. Even more – and here is the irony – in solidifying the stuff of difference, of locality and indigeneity, the circulation of that currency also holds out the promise of universal recognition: of entry into what, from the perspective of the parochial, is a global cosmopolis. To have culture is to be human – in an age in which “humanity” is the key trope of species being. If they have nothing distinctive to alienate, many rural black South Africans have come to believe, they face collective extinction. As a Tswana elder once said to us: “if we have nothing [of ourselves] to sell… does it mean that we have no culture? No presence in the world?”

    To be sure, the sale of culture seems, in large part, to have replaced the sale of labor in the Brave Neo South Africa,5 whose industrial economy, founded on racial capitalism, is presently under reconstruction. A new breed of consultancy firm, like African Equations, has arisen to advise communities on how best to market themselves and their cultural products.6 There is a growing demand for their services. Ethno-businesses are opening up all over. Like Funjwa Holdings, established by the Mabaso Tribal Authority in KwaZulu-Natal and funded by a major bank, to “reap the sweets and cakes of free enterprise.”7 Seeking to draw “thousands of international visitors each year,” the “Mabaso people” have invested in a wildlife park offering such “authentic” African activities as bow-hunting – which, being Zulu, they never did.8 By these means they hopeto find “empowerment.” Mark this term. It has little to do with power or politics. What it connotes is access to markets and material benefits. Among ethnic groups, it is frankly associated with finding something essentially their own, something of their essence, to sell. In other words, a brand.

    This, patently, is not just true of South Africa, or Africa, or that part of the World formerly known as Third. It is as true in the US, where, as Marilyn Halter (2000) points out in The Marketing of Ethnicity, there is a large “industry [to remind] hyphenated Americans of how valuable heritage is no matter how remote or forgotten it may be” (our italics). According to brandchannel.com, this has “spawned an array” of culture-conjurers, a.k.a. “ethnic marketing experts,” whose commerce – referred to as the “ethnic industry,” in an unwitting parody of Adorno – yields $2b a year. Even in Britain, long known for its indifference to difference, that industry is growing quickly. The English and Celtic “heritage” business is expanding in direct proportion the decomposition of Great Britain as national imagining. Scotland the Brave has, literally, become Scotland the Brand.

    The juxtaposition of branding, marketing, culture, and identity – what Namane pointed to in seeking something “authentically Tswana” to sell – finds echoes in recent scholarly discourse. Thus Martin Chanock (2000:24-26) suggests that, in our age, in which “fantasies work where reality fails,” advertising technologies, those neoliberal weapons of mass instruction, replicate the production and alienation of culture.9 In particular, he says, the process of branding – of creating an attachment to a commodity, to both its object-form and to the idea of an association with it – is “full of clues to the ways in which allegiance to culture [is] made.” Note the term “allegiance to culture.” It translates, with little slippage, into ethnicidentity. But here is the heart of the matter. To survive, concludes Chanock, “[c]ultures, like brands, must essentialise. Successful, sustainable cultures are those that brand best.” This calls to mind a remarkable example of the willful “commodification of tradition” in South Africa (Oomen 2005:161). It concerns the koma, the initiation school of the Pedi of the Northern Province. Initiation rites, across Africa, are held to transmit “deep knowledge”; it is here that cultural secrets are passed on (cf. J. Comaroff 1985). For Pedi, the koma is also a lucrative business. This is not just because locals pay up to $250 to take part (p. 162, n.129). It is also because many non-local youths – for whom the fee is much higher – also enroll. Pedi brand koma has become a niche product in a regional culture market. In this immiserated economy, the alienation of vernacular knowledge is both a means of self-construction and a source of income. Cultural survival is giving way, in many places, to survival through culture. But with a twist: the more successful an ethnic group is in commodifying its difference, the quicker it may devalue itself. This is the irony, too, of the quest of those who consume exotic cultures-as-commodity: the more they pursue their alienated selves in the geist of others, the more that geist risks succumbing to the banality of the market (cf. Povinelli 2001).

    But not always. Ethno-commodities are queer things. Apart from all else, their aura does not, as critical theory would have had it, inevitably diminish with their mass production and circulation. As we have implied, ethnicity as a fact-of-being-and-becoming seems often to take palpable, credible, creative life in the very process of its commodification. Thus we read of Balinese dances, designed for tourist consumption, which so captured the imagination of “natives” that they ended up replacing the sacred, auratic originals previously performed only in the temple (Sanger 1988: 99-100). Observing similar things in China and elsewhere, Phillip Felfan Xie (2003) arrives at an unwitting, counter-intuitive syllogism: that, far from destroying cultural value, the commodification of “tradition,” insofar as it valorizes indigeneity, is as likely to be a “positive mechanism in the pursuit of authenticity,” a means of finding “true selves,” individual and collective, “through the appropriation of pastness.” The dialectic of banalization and enchantment is a complicated, unpredictable one. It is propelled, among other things, by the ever growing impetus of capital to create value by conjuring with difference. And, to invoke Źiźek (n.d.), by the enduring presence of unalienated otherness as the “necessary supplement” to a sense of dispassionate modernity.

    What conclusions may be drawn from all this? Could it be that we are seeing unfold before us a metamorphosis in the production of identity and subjectivity, in the politics and economics of culture, in the interpellation of indigeneity into worlds beyond itself, and, concomitantly, in the ontology of ethnic consciousness? If so, what lies behind this metamorphosis? Where is it leading? Does it have a telos of its own? Note that, in posing the problem thus, we treat ethnicity, culture, identity, and indigeneity not as analytic constructs but as signs variously deployed by human beings across the planet in their quotidian efforts to inhabit sustainable worlds.

    ETHNICITY, IN THE ONGOING PRESENT: one or two questions of theory

    Let us pause briefly here to offer two general observations about cultural identity. One is ontological, the other, orientational.

    First, ontology.

    The oldest, most foundational question of all about ethnicity, sui generis – ethnicity as consciousness, ethnicity as a sociological formation, ethnicity as a sentiment deep enough to die for – is whether it is primordial or an instrumentally-motivated social construction.10 Happily, this question – which once divided scholars, organic intellectuals, and militias – has receded in significance. Few social scientists would argue any longer for primordialism, pure and simple, although ethno-nationalists continue to kill for it. To many in academia, bromides about ethnicity really being both, part primordial and part social construction, offer a banal compromise, a way of distantiating an intractable problem. In fact, that compromise is itself incoherent, impossible: primordial attachment and the social construction of identity describe irreducibly different ontologies of being that cannot, logically or sociologically, dissolve into each other. Unless, of course, the primordial is treated not as an explanation for ethnic consciousness, but as a phenomenological description of how that consciousness is experienced from within by those who share it (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:49-67; J.L. Comaroff 1996). More important, for now, however, is the fact that the compromise itself – that ethnicity is part primordial, part social construction – actually mimics an ever more palpable social fact: the great existential irony that, in its lived manifestations, cultural identity is increasingly apprehended, simultaneously, as a function of voluntary self-production and the ineluctable effect of biology. In other words, as both construction and essence.11 This doubling, we would argue, is not a contradiction at all: it is an endemic condition of identity in neoliberal times. Of which more in due course.

    Second, orientation.

    It is a matter of observation that, across the positivist social sciences, treatments of cultural identity, where they extend beyond its modes of expression and representation, tend overwhelmingly to orient towards its political dimensions; perhaps this is itself the corollary of the triumph of constructionist perspectives, for which the fabrication of any collective consciousness is, by definition, a political act (cf. Hall 1996:442f). Which is why politics and identity are so often locked in conceptual embrace, as if each completes the other. So much is this the case that the economics, ethics, and aesthetics of ethnicity are, by extension, almost invariably reduced to a politics: to the pursuit of sharedsocial and material interests (cf. Jung 2001); to struggles for recognition in the face of homogenizing hegemonies; to redress for histories, real or imagined, of injury, suffering, victimhood (cf. Brown 1995); to the right to engage in “different” bodily and domestic practices, poetics, musics, moralities.

    Patently, the politics of ethnicity are critical. All the more so because “neoliberalism” is commonly said to disperse the political by submerging its ideological bases in the imperatives of economic efficiency and capital growth, in the fetishism of the free market, bioscience, and technology, in the dictates of security and social order, in the demands of “culture” (Comaroff 2001). At the same time, the continued privileging of the politics of ethnicity has a number of costs: it depends on an under-specified conception of the political; it reduces cultural identity to a utility function; and it confuses the deployment of ethnicity as a tactical claim to entitlement with the substance of ethnic consciousness. Indeed, it is arguable that ethnicity-as-political

    identity and ethnicity-as-cultural identity are quite different phenomena, despite being conditions of each other’s possibility. Ethnicity-as-political identity usually presents its cultural bases not in the “thick” terms of a living, inhabited order of signs and practices – i.e., of ethnicity-as-culture in its anthropological sense – but in the “thin,” second-order terms that, purged of density, refer to very general ethical values (cf. Jung 2001:22-4). Like Britishness, which stresses such things as fair-play and civilty. Or ubuntu, African “humanity,” usually glossed in South Africa as a socially-oriented sensibility by contrast to Western individualism.

    But, most of all, the stress on the political misses precisely what we began this lecture with. Recall Contralesa, the trustees of culture in South Africa, who have taken identity into the realm of venture capital; recall, too, the King of the Bafokeng, with his emphasis on corporate ethnicity. None of their visions lacked a politics. But what they recognized is that the institutional topography of the world has shifted: that the current age is one in which the political is no longer apprehensible as an autonomous domain, with sovereignty over material life; that politics and economics, inseparable as never before, are anchored together at once in the market and in the law. Nor is this revelation confined to South Africa. In China, says Arif Dirlik (2000:129), “ethnic groups, once defined politically, now perceive themselves as `natural’ economic groups.” Pay attention to the stress on natural economic groups. It will have echoes as we proceed.

    These observations lead, in turn, to a Big Issue. To the extent that theyare true, should it not follow that the context in which culture, identity, and politics are embedded is itself under radical reconstruction? That context is typically taken to be the nation-state and, ever more nowadays, the neoliberal order of which it is part. Or, more accurately, in which it is dialectically entailed.

    It has become commonplace to bespeak the metamorphosis of the modernist polity under the impact of globalization, neoliberalism, empire, whatever. The more difficult question is how precisely to make sense of this unfolding history. And how to do so in such a way as to illuminate the variant species of political subjectivity taking shape within it.

    THE NATION-STATE AND ITS SUBJECTIVITIES

    Modernist European polities, according to Benedictine history – Benedectine, as in Benedict Anderson (1983)12 – were founded on a fiction of cultural homogeneity, on an imagined, often violently effected, sense of horizontal fraternity. Much has been said about this imagining: that Euro-nationhood was always more diverse than its historiography allows, always a work-in-progress, always subject to a tenuous hyphenation with the states that ruled them. But that is another story, a narrative of the longue duree which begins with Westphalia and ends in the Failure of the West. (Now, tellingly, renamed the “global North.”) Since the late twentieth century, those polities have had increasingly to come to terms with difference. Historical circumstance has pushed them toward a more heterodox nationhood (J.L. Comaroff 1996:177). Hence the growingliteratures, scholarly and lay alike, on citizenship, sovereignty, multiculturalism, minority rights, and the limits of liberalism. Hence the xenophobia that haunts heterodoxy almost everywhere. Hence, too, our disciplinary concern with the curious counterpoint between cosmopolitanism and indigeneity, both variously understood. Hetero-nationhood seeks – usually for pragmatic, not ethical reasons – to accommodate cultural diversity within a civic order composed of universal citizens, all ostensibly equal before the law. And to embrace identity politics within a liberal, constitutionally-founded conception of national community. Especially since 1989, global neoliberalization has not merely transformed the sovereignty of nation-states. It has actively compounded the degree to which they are both polymorphous and porous: we scarcely need mention, here, the ever more mobile demographics of wage labor; or the incapacity of many Western cosmo-polities to reproduce their social infrastructures without the discomforting presence of “aliens”; or the impact of the electronic commons on the planetary circulation of virtually everything – and everything virtual. All of which, plainly, are corollaries of the hegemony of the market, of its power both to breach and to buttress borders, to curtail and to extend the regulatory reach of states, to valorize the local and to cast it into economic force-fields well beyond itself.

    In this world, in which the political and the ethical are also swept up under the sign of the market, freedom presents itself ineluctably as choice: most of all, as choice of identities and modes of fashioning them. Which is why it is that culture, the quintessential space of self-fashioning, has become an ever more animated site of politics; why those politics center less on the general good than on the pursuit of goods; why ideology is giving way to ID-ology, the -ology of identity, as a basis for mobilization (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003) – especially with the “globalspread of democracy,” which makes a fetish out of freedom-as-choice. But why should shared essence be such a compelling premise on which to define being and belonging? And to claim recognition? Because it appears to run to the very core of “life itself.” Note: “life itself,” a trope at once bioscientific and philosophical that has become the foundational obsession of our age, alike populist and specialist. From this vantage, in polities having to come to terms with diversity as never before – and in which class is so dispersed as not to provide a meaningful call to social action – there can be no more persuasive a ground on which to pursue collective interest than the assertion of an essential right to be different. Which is why, finally, in our Brave Neo World, cultural identity has become, simultaneously, a function of elective self-production and ascriptive biology.

    To the degree that it has, to the degree that ethnicity represents itself as both primordial connectedness and a commonality of interest, it follows that culture would congeal into a naturally copyrighted, legally protected collective possession; in other words, into genetically-endowed intellectual property (cf. Coombe 1998). A true fetish, it becomes a form of monopoly capital, yielding value to its owners as its products are soldfor profit.

    Note, here, the stress on legal instruments: on copyright, intellectual property, and the like. The modernist polity has always rested on jural foundations, of course. But, of late, there has been a palpable intensification in the resortto legal ways and means. The signsare everywhere: in the development of a global jurisprudence far more elaborate than its internationalist predecessor; in the epidemic of new national constitutions since 1989; in the proliferation of legal NGOs across the world; in the remarkable spread of human rights advocacy; in the subjection of ever more intimate domains of human life to litigation. In South Africa there is even a Law Train that traverses the land. It prompts citizens to seek redress for their troubles by recourse to the languages of legality. People across the planet are being encouraged to behave as homo juralis. And collectivities of all kinds are given ever more reason to mimic bodies corporate (Comaroff and Comaroff 2007).

    There is a critical corollary to all this. It concerns the relocation of politics into the legal domain. As Martin Chanock (2007:34) notes:

    In place of a politics in which rights were delivered through the political process, now jurisprudence is the site of important decisions. No longer part of the bargaining and struggle of the political arena, decisions about entitlement are de-politicised and rendered by means of the law.

    This is part of something to which we alluded earlier: the displacement of the political. More and more are differences of all kinds being fought out in the courts – whether they involve private freedoms, property rights, or national resources, access to medical treatment or titleto real estate, sovereignty or cultural knowledge. Politics may or may not be about class any more. But it certainly is about class actions. In ways unthinkable until recently, governments and their agencies, especially those that deal in death and taxes, are regularly sued by their citizens; and citizens are ever more litigious in respect of each other. What once happened in parliaments, street protests, and political councils now finds a new space of contestation. Even history is being re-politicized, redeemed, recouped in the courts. Britain, for one, is being sued by several formerly colonized peoples in East Africa, each demanding restitution for an old wrong: the Nandi, for the killing of their leader in 1905; the Nyoro for a land seizure in 1900; the Samburu for injuries inflicted by relict munitions. In all these class actions, the plaintiff is an ethnic group, reclaiming its past by jural means. And asserting a corporate identity in the process.13

    Project the legal subject onto the terrain of cultural identity, add the reduction of culture to property, mix it with the displacement of politics into the domain of jurisprudence, and what is the result? It is, to return to where we began, Ethnicity, Inc.”

    CASINO CAPITAL, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND INCORPORATION

    Neither the incorporation of ethnic groups nor the commodification of culture is new. In North America, it has had legal recognition since at least 1934, with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. In1971, moreover, the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act explicitly re-organized indigenous peoples into corporations composed of shareholders whose rights were based on genealogy, whose traditional lands became private, alienable property, and whose cultural products, a growing proportion of them trademarked under the Silver Hand, were directed toward the market (Hollowell-Zimmer 2001).14 But the popular prototype of Ethnicity, Inc. in the US lies in the Native American casino-owning “tribe,” its apotheosis in the Mohegan Sun and the Pequot Foxwood Resort, two enormous monuments to ethno-marketing and the architecture of vernacular kitsch; at Foxwood are found such establishments as Ethnic Concepts International Gift Shop.15 As it turns out, the Native American cases of ethno-incorporation are bewilderingly complex; their identity economies stretch far beyond the gaming house. But most of them share five things that will turn out to be significant as we proceed.

    The first is obvious: the more like profit-seeking corporations indigenous groups become, the more the terms of membership privilege birth, blood, and biology over social or cultural attachments. And the more they tend to be contested.16 The second, by contrast, is counter-intuitive: not infrequently, it is commercial enterprise that begets an ethnic group, not the other way around. Vide the Pomo Indians – Pomo in both name and spirit – that, in the 1950s, consisted of two families, without tribe or territory. These families lived on land set aside for homeless Native Americans until they secured reservation land and a casino licence. Whereupon they became “the” Pomo. Or better yet, the case of the Augustine Cahuilla Indians, who consist of one woman, Maryann Martin, but who have been allowed to open a gaming house on an abandoned reservation in California. By these means does Ms. Martin constitute a certified ethnic group. Nor is she the only one-person ethno-corporation in North America.17

    The third notable thing about the US cases is that, in many of them, the creation of a corporate ethno-economy has been set in motion by venturecapital from outside. Its source is usually non-Indian financiers, for whom real or virtual “tribes” are franchises licenced to make a killing. As this suggests, ethno-enterprise is mandated by culture, but may not originate in it. In fact, several officially recognized bands have little connection to vernacular life-ways. Maryann Martin, the last living Augustine Cahuila, was raised African American. But, once on the road to incorporation, they typically begin to assert– if necessary, to discover or invent – their “traditions,” which may then be merchandized; hence the Ethnic Concepts store on the Pequot reservation – and, close by, a state-of-the-art Museum and Research Center of Culture. The content of identity, as we all know, is often produced in response to the market. So, sometimes, is indigeneity.

    The fourth matter of note is that, once recognized by the state, Native American groups tendto proclaim their sovereign autonomy against it.18 Thus, for example, Indian tribes, now major contributors to political campaigns in California, refuse to report their donations; as “nations,” they claim exemption from US law. Predictably, such assertions provoke reactions; the State of California has litigated against several Indian tribes.19 Similarly, when the governor of New York insisted that cigarette sales on the Mohawk reservation be licenced by his state, indigenous leaders invokedsovereign exclusion; the Mohawk make their own tobacco products and, acting under the sign of ethno-preneurship, were determined to protect their market.20

    Finally, the Indian cases indicate that ethno-incorporation strives for geo-spatial materiality.21 To be sure, it often involves a land claim. Which is not surprising: real estate held in patrimonial tenure – territory, that is – is typically taken to be a founding principle of sovereignty. Note these five points. They will, we repeat, turn out to be critical.

    The prototypical Native American instances of Ethnicity, Inc., those associated with casino ownership, presumed a cultural identity at their core. But the substance of that identity was incidental to their incorporation. There are exceptions to this. Or rather, inversions: “tribes” whose corporate history began not with casino capitalism22 but with the copyrighting of their cultures. Take the Zia Pueblo (Brown 1998:197), who successfully sued New Mexico a few years back for the unauthorized use of their sun symbol on state flags. The design, with its spiritual powers, they said, was their holy-owned property. Or, also in New Mexico, the Indians of Sandoval county who, over centuries, developed a ritually-valued variety of blue corn that, in the 1980s, became a fashionable health food. As a result, Five Sandoval Indian Pueblos, Inc. was established to superintend the sale of trademarked agri-goods, like “Hopi Blue” (Pinel and Evans 1994:45). Here, in sum, an ethno-corporation arose from distilling local knowledgeinto a brand that, in turn, sedimented sociologically into an ethnic federation; just the thing Chanock pointed to in saying that “sustainable cultures are those which brand best”(above, p.5).

    The branding of culture has been facilitated by an implosion, in recent times, in the domain of intellectual property: in the laws governing its possession, the rights accruing to it, and the spheres of existence over which it extends. This has persuaded the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization to recognize an “inherent” right of indigenous peoples to the fruits of their vernacularknowledge (see e.g. Posey 1994:227-233; Greene 2004:213) – one effect of which has been to accelerate yet further their incorporation in many places. Some of them quite unexpected.

    Which brings us to a Tale of Two Ethnicities, two instances of Ethnicity, Inc. that draw together the various strands of our narrative by addressing an unresolved dialectic at its core: the dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture. It should be clear by now that they are not the same thing. Hence the contrast between (i) those Native American groups, exemplified by casino capitalists, that became bodies corporate by virtue of being shareholders in enterprises enabled by their sovereign legal status and (ii) those made into corporations by virtue of a shared copyright in vernacular signs, knowledge, or practices. The relationship between these two tendencies, it turns out, completes the dialectic. But we are running ahead of ourselves. Our Tale of Two Ethnicities returns us to where we began: Southern Africa.

    ETHNO-FUTURES, AGAIN

    The first takes us to the edge of the Kahalari Desert, to the Land of the San – known, pejoratively, as Bushmen. It involves the hoodia cactus, xhoba, which they have imbibed since time immemorial. In the past, when hunting in the desert, it stayed their appetites and thirst; it is used these days to stave off the effects of poverty. San suffered severely from the predations of colonialism: stigmatized, victims of various forms of violence, removed from their ancestral lands, prey to illness and alcohol, their numbers diminished greatly. Over the past century, in fact, most of their communities dispersed into the immiserated reaches of the South African “coloured” population.

    The hoodia saga was to unleash a global media frenzy: In the USA, 60 Minutes attested to the efficacy of the plant and spoke in awe of its promise for the fat-fighting industry;23 the BBC sent a reporter “deep into the Kalahari desert,” to “one of the world’s most primitive tribes,” to sample the “extremely ugly cactus” that “kills appetite and attacks obesity with no side effects.”24 It all began in in South Africa in 1963, when the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) became interested in the medicinal properties of the cactus (Evans 2003); this was stimulated by reports of its use by San trackers deployed by the army in its wars against the enemies of apartheid. The CSIR corroborated its appetite suppressant capacities, identified their bioactive component and, in 1997, patented it under the label P57.

    The CSIR licenced P57 to Phytopharm, a British company – which, after extensive trials, licenced it on to Pfizer for $21m; ironic perhaps, since xhoba has some of the same properties as Viagra, Pfizer’s most famed product. It is at this point that the story becomes especially interesting.

    The San first heard about the patent when Phytofarm announced P57 to the media. Or, more precisely, it was Roger Chennells,25 a human rights lawyer, who read a quote from the head of Phytofarm, Richard Dixey, to the effect that the people from whom the knowledge of hoodia derived, were extinct. At the time, Chennells was representing the San in a land claim (see Robins 2003:12-14; Isaacson 2002), in the course of which there emerged an NGO, the South African San Institute (SASI), one of many such organizations that surfaced with the end of apartheid, with liberalization, and with the postcolonial politics of identity.26 Chennells told SASI that the San were victims of biopiracy, that the return on the patent could be huge – its value in the US is about $3b a year (Evans 2003:16) – and that this was an opportunity to assert a collective identity under the San Council, a new body created by SASI to give political shape to, and claim sovereignty for, their ethnic aspirations (Evans ibid:14).

    Richard Dixey may have been disingenuous in asserting the extinction of the San; the advantages to Phytofarm were plain enough. When the San Council protested to the CSIR, it acknowledged the error of its ways, Dixey confessed his “embarrassment,” and a profit sharing agreement was signed. Since then, Pfizer has given way as licencee to Unilever. Since then, too, the San Trust, set up to manage the incoming funds, has received its first royalties, has begun to tackle the problems of distribution among the San of South Africa, Nambia, and Botswana, and has filed suit against twenty-six illicit producers. Since then “the San,” as an ethno-corporation has taken ever more articulate shape.

    In point of fact, Dixey had not been altogether wrong. The San may not have been extinct, but their ethnocide had gone a long way. Having been cast out of their social ecology, “they” did not evince much by way of a collective identity; their dispersal into the gray racial space of South Africa made it impossible to do so. But the assertion of intellectual property – coupled, significantly, with the land claim that preceded it – reanimated San “identity.” And gave it ever “thicker,” more dense substance; a symptom of this, interestingly, being a sudden increase in people accusing each other, on biological grounds, of “not being real San .” 27

    Thus it is that there has been a language revival, that genealogies are being collected to create a population register; that SASI has initiated a “cultural resources management project”; that programshave been designed for “San-controlled income generation” using indigenous knowledge in a sustainable manner; that a legal platformhas been set up to protect the global interests and dignity of the San. All of which had the effect of re-indigenizing this “people” through the very act of interpellating them into a distinctly cosmopolitan sense of being-in-the-world. When we asked Roger Chennells whether a new ethnic identity had been produced in the process, he answered in the affirmative. He is correct. The presumption that “the” San actually had a sharedidentity– or a coherent ethno-sociology – prior to the colonial dispersal of a complex population of hunter-gatherers collectively called “Bushmen” is itself contentious: who or what “they” were has long been a subject of bitter debate.28 But that does not matter any more, at least not outside of the academy. Today they are a multi-national, ever more assertively cosmopolitan ethno-corporation: as we said, “the” San, and the San Council that makes manifest their sovereignty, now straddle three of the countries of southern Africa.

    The other story involves the Bafokeng, the people made wealthy by platinum, the people whose kings are spoken of as CEOs, the people actually referred to in South Africa as Bafokeng, Inc.29 The history of their incorporation begins, long ago, with land: one of their nineteenth century chiefs realized that, to protect their territory from white settlers, his people ought to purchase it outright (Cook n.d. [a]:5-6). So he sent young men to the diamond fields and commissioned their wages to buy as much terrain as possible. The subsequent history of South Africa did not make it easy to hold on to this land. But, by establishing the Bafokeng as a private, corporate owner, the purchase enabled their chiefs to defend it from seizure (Cook ibid.:6 et passim), especially after the discovery of platinum in 1924 and its leasing to Impala Platinum, a large company, in the 1960s.30 The greatest challenge, in this respect, came when the puppet homeland government of Bophuthatswana, set up by the apartheid state, exiled the chief of the Bafokeng, expropriated their mineral rights, and negotiated contracts directly with Impala; this sparked a lengthy series of legal actions which eventually yielded a victory for the “tribe” in 1999 – and, with it, a lucrative profit-sharing arrangement.31 All of which made the Bafokeng so adept at litigation that, as one journalist put it, “their traditional weapon became the law, not the club.” 32

    The corporate growth of Bafokeng, Inc. in the wake of these legal processes has been breathtaking. This nation of 300,000 shareholders – membership is defined by patrilineality – has largestakes in a complex network of companies; their interest in Impala alone yielded $80m in 2002.33 In addition, they have opened up two new mining operations each valued at $65m;34 established a profitable partnership with Exxon;35 bought a huge construction company;36 purchased 20% of South Africa’s second largest packaging plant;37 and own 33% of SA Chrome, now renamed Merafe Resources.38 Merafe is Setswana for “nations.” Nor does the story end there. Their sovereing government is vested in the Royal Bafokeng Administration; their global investments are overseen by Royal Bafokeng Finances; a Royal Bafokeng Economic Board managesdevelopment within the chiefdom; and their mineral interests are husbandedby Royal Bafokeng Resources (see e.g. Gray 2003:16) – which may soon become a public company.39 By these means, “the Bafokeng” chiefdom would become the ultimate ethno-enterprise: one in whose present holdings and futures you or we might purchase stock.

    What is missing in all this? The cultural element of Bafokeng cultural identity. King Leruo and his money managers have long presented themselves as highly cosmopolitan business people primarily concerned with a sustainable future: Vision 2020 is their ambitious plan to develop Bafokeng into a “self-sufficient,” fully employed, globally-oriented nation by, well, 2020 (Gray 2003:13-14). Of late, however, there has been much more culture talk, much more talk of indigeneity. Since being installed in a ritual saturated with the trappings of a tradition partly historical, partly made up, powerfully vernacular, the young king has taken to essaying “African values,” to celebrating “traditional governance,” and to arguing that, in moving toward “Afro-modernity,” his people must “affirm” their essence (see Gray ibid:14). In short, Bafokeng, Inc, the manifest commodification of Bafokeng identity, appears to be reaching toward a cultural sensibility in order to complete itself.

    Running the San and Bafokeng together, then, the dialectic at the heart of Ethnicity, Inc. reveals itself. Each of these cases evinces the five things foreshadowed in Native America, if in different proportions: membership in both has come to be defined genealogically, with some contestation either evident or imminent; in both, commercial enterprise has been instrumental either in crystallizing or in reproducing the sociological entity in which cultural identity is presumed to inhere; in both, venture capital and legal expertise from outside has been crucial; both have asserted their new-found sovereignty against the state; and both have based their incorporation on land claims, past or present. In both, moreover, the displacement of the political into the legal has been demonstrable: both have fought their battles by means of lawfare. In the process, they have both naturalized the trope of identity around which their “rights” adhere – and interpellated into it a significant measure of affect. This is particularly striking in the case of the San. It is arguable that knowledge of the hoodia was produced not by “the San” at all – who may or may not existed at the time – but by hunters of the Kalahari, a class defined by their relationship to a mode of production. The projection of a vernacular right to intellectual property onto “the San,” a putatively “primordial” collectivity, has the effect of extinguishing a class of producers as it distinguishes and materializes a cultural identity – and, as it does so, giving ontological primacy to the idea of identity itself. Thus, to reiterate, does ideology become ID-ology and hide itself in a sense of the natural, the inevitable, the given.

    Most of all, though, the stories of the San and the Bafokeng, precisely because they are such extreme instances, demonstrate how and why it is that Ethnicity, Inc. rests on a dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture; and, at another level, between indigeneity and the human cosmopolis. Whether it starts with the incorporation of identity, as in the Bafokeng case, or with the commodification of cultural property, as in Kalahari, the process evinces a drive to complete itself in the other. Thus it is that a dispersed group of former hunters and gatherers have become “the San,” replete with a sovereign sense of their own ethno-sociology, their own governance, their own affective economy, their own range of institutions to make it all real. Thus it is that Bafokeng, Inc is turning to vernacular ways and means in the name of an Afro-modernity which it may inhabit as it reaches toward 2020. Neither is fortuitous. After all, Ethnicity, Inc., to the degree that it naturalizes collective right, material entitlement, and sovereignty, does require both the incorporation of identity and cultural substance to realize, recognize, fulfill itself. Which is why it tends to begin in land, thence to make claims to sovereignty, to secure its cultural property, and to invest in the long-run. The future of ethnicity does seem to lie, at least in one important respect, in ethno-futures.

    CONCLUSION

    We have come not to praise to Ethnicity, Inc. Nor do we extol empowerment that depends on the commodification of culture or the Empire of the Market, let alone the creeping judicialization of politics or the naturalization of the ethno-trope of identity into a brute term of social being. Quite the opposite. Ethnicity, Inc. carries with it a host of costs and contradictions. What we seek to do here, in short, is to interrogate a world-wide phenomenon in the making; one that is much more complicated than it first appears.

    In so doing, we have stressed that Ethnicity, Inc. has deep roots and many precedents. After all, nation-states have long sought to distinguish themselves by marking as unique their national cultures, their heritage, their essence as embodied in both utilitarian and aesthetic objects. French champagne, Italian grappa, German opera, British tea and…china, have long been branded national products. In ever more cases they carry trademarks. Implicitly, in other words, the modernist nation has always been a brand, with some strange consequences; note, in this regard, Jonathan Franzen’s brilliant caricature of Lithuania, Inc. in The Corrections, the upshot of which is that its national economy is sold by a quite plausible mistake to a bank in Atlanta. Note, too, the fact that Silvio Berlusconi, CEO extraordinaire, often refers to his country as Azienda Italia, “Italy, the Company” (Muehlebach n.d.). Nor only nations. Religions too. Note how the judiciary of Pakistan, in deliberating the dispute between Ulema, religious authorities, and the Ahmediya, whom they style as blasphemers, has recently chosen to treat Islam as intellectual property (Ahmed 2006). And the process is proliferating in time as well as space: vide the recent efforts of the Israeli national archive to establish in a court of law that, because he was a Jew, Kafka’s works were rightfully the intellectual ‘assets” of the Israeli state as the guardian, in perpetuity, of Jewish heritage (Butler 2011). What is going on here, it seems, is the hyperextension of an old phenomenon. And its migration into places it has not gone before: into the domain of cultural being, where, as Clifford Geertz (1963) once reminded us, modernity was supposed to run up against its limits. But the ethnically-defined peoples of “traditional” Africa, Latin America, the USA, and Asia have become thoroughly modern, if each in their own ways. Even more, they have sometimes passed by the modern and, like that Indian tribe of which we spoke, leapt directly into the Pomo. Which, above all, distorts, exaggerates and sometimes renders absurd, the lineaments of modernity. We may or may not like what Ethnicity, Inc. promises. But we are going to have to live with it, and, even more, to fashion an engaged anthropology to deal with its unfolding logic, its ambiguous promises, its material and moral vision for times to come, the deep affective attachments that it engenders. All of which suggests that it is spreading with exponential speed, albeit on very different scales of elaboration. Why? Perhaps because Ethnicity, Inc. is the congealed product – a fusion both hot and cold, if you will – of three elemental features of the neoliberal tendency: the apotheosis of intellectual property and the reduction of culture to it; the migration of politics into the realm of the law; and the growing naturalization of the trope of identity as the taken-for-granted domain of collective action. Herein lies a critical station on the Road, if not to Damascus, then to a Brave Neo World.

  • Video Lecture on Theory from the South

    Video Lecture on Theory from the South

    https://vimeo.com/61631828

    In this video Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff discussed their book Theory from the South, touching on some of their life long themes. The post 2008 economic crash caused Northern states to experience racial tension, political corruption and the kinds of ailments associated with the “global South”. The couple draw on their long experience of living in Africa to address a range of familiar themes – democracy, national borders, labour and capital and multiculturalism.

  • Policing and Contemporary Governance

    Policing and Contemporary Governance

    Common though it may be, it is always dangerous to announce a new book – or any scholarly project, for that matter – by speaking of a lacuna in the literature that it is about to fill. For one thing, to presume a “gap” in existing knowledge is to presume that the contours of that knowledge exist a priori, unmediated by the processes of its ongoing production; a presumption that, philosophically-speaking, might live well with crude empiricism and with encyclopaedophilia, but not with a critical anthropology. For another thing, altogether more basic, there ought always be more to commend intellectual production than to liken it to therapeutic dentistry, the sort that repairs cavities. This is certainly the case with Police in Practice, which makes a distinctive contribution – alike ethnographic, conceptual, and analytical – to a pressing topic of our times.

    That said, remarkably little of substance has been written to date on the anthropology of police and policing per se; this in stark contrast to the other social sciences, especially sociology, which, in some places, seems to be dissolving into criminology. There have been a few notable exceptions, of course; one of the most remarkable, perhaps, is Malcolm Young’s An Inside Job: Policing and Police Culture in Britain (1991), a doctoral ethnography written in Britain by a former cop-turned-anthropologist. The lacuna is particularly noteworthy because social control in general, and crime in particular, have been recursive concerns throughout the history of modern anthropology, from Malinowksi’s Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926) to James Siegel’s A New Criminal Type in Jakarta (1998), Teresa Caldeira’s City of Walls (2000), and Parnell and Kane’s Crime’s Power (2003), not to mention a great deal of other writings along the way.1 This is all the more so since anthropology has left the reservation, ceased to see its primary subject matter as “traditional societies,” taken both colonialism and the modern world order into its analytic purview, and, latterly, paid increasing attention to the nation-state and its transformations.

    It also is noteworthy for another reason, one of which William Garriott reminds us graphically in his Introduction below: the fact that the contemporary age is marked by “police fetishism” – Robert Reiner’s term – which takes as axiomatic that police are a “prerequisite of social order,” or even, as Derrida (2002:276) had it (Jauregui, infra), that the they actually “are the state…if not the lawmaker of modern times.” We have come a long way since Michael Banton (1964:1) could argue, quite plausibly, that “the police are relatively unimportant in the enforcement of law.” Or that Jane Jacobs (1961) could state with confidence that “social order is not brought about by policemen” (see Scott 1998:135-6). These days, with the political centrality of discourses of law and order, and, almost everywhere, with a growing mood of “popular punitiveness” (cf. Bottoms 1995; Haggerty 2001:197), it is difficult, prima facie, to disagree with Reiner; although, as the essays below make plain, there are many parts of the world in which cops are regarded, ambivalently, as both a positive presence, a “prerequisite of social order” and a popular nightmare, a dark, often excessively violent force that undermines that very order, blurring the line between those who administer the law and those who evade, erode, and exploit it. Perhaps it is this very doubling, this simultaneous embodiment of order and its unraveling, of promise and nightmare, that underlies the fetishization of police. More immediately, he fact that policing, as a socio-legal phenomenon, has become as focal as it has in the discourses of our times merely reiterates the point that it is surprising how little specifically anthropological attention has been given to it.

    The current volume, and the work by the contributors to it, make plain that this is changing, at once emphatically and productively: that the anthropology of policing is establishing itself as critical field of inquiry both für sich and as a significant site of general theory-work in a world in which the metaphysical, meaningful, ethical, and pragmatic bases of order and the law, of power and violence, of citizenship and the state, even of society, are deeply in question. This is a world, as Jonathan Simon (2007) has said of North America, increasingly “govern[ed] through crime” and “a culture of fear.” In it, entire classes and categories of person – those marked by race, poverty, and, in some instances, faith – find themselves criminalized, their socio-scapes often reduced to carceral sites (see e.g. Waquant 2001). In it, also, many species of social action once taken to be the democratic expression of free citizens are treated as felonies against property or public order. It is a world, self-evidently, in which the practice of policing has become a saturating dimension of the ecology of everyday life (Martin, infra) – sometimes in new ways, sometimes in hyperbolic extension of older ones – and hence of any anthropology that would seek to make sense of it.

    To the degree that anthropological perspectives on policing have taken shape to date, they appear to have been variously influenced – wittingly or otherwise, more or less critically – by four broad theoretical touchstones. Or, if you prefer, dispositions, discourses, genealogies. The first derives from the Weberian orthodoxy, still manifest in much scholarly work, that attributes to the state a monopoly over the means of legitimate coercion, a monopoly vested in police for purposes of law and in the military for purposes of war. This is in spite of the fact that, historically-speaking, there have been many exceptions and exclusions: imperial charter companies and other large-scale colonial business enterprises, for example, often ran their own private police forces (see e.g. Worger 1987) – just as do corporations engaged in enclaved extractive industries in postcolonial Africa (Ferguson 2006:37) – with little no state oversight. It is also in spite of the fact that both policing and military operations are now widely, and increasingly, outsourced to the private sector: in the USA, for instance, “three times as many persons are employed in private forces as in official law enforcement agencies” (Singer 2003:69); in South Africa, the ratio is four to one (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.). Yet more fundamental is the fact that legitimacy, however it may be defined, is a notoriously elusive signifier; vide Janet Roitman’s (2006) subtle exploration of the complex lines of distinction between the il/illicit, the il/legal, and the il/legitimate in the Chad basin, in its policing and its vernacular forms of criminality; what precisely constitutes legitimate coercion in any real-life situation rarely goes uncontested. True, in many parts of the world, the organic anthropologies and vernacular ideologies with which law enforcement agencies themselves work are profoundly Weberian. Apart from all else, police spend a great deal of effort in husbanding their monopoly over the perpetration of violence, sometimes by spectacular shows of force, sometimes by the careful management of images; this is why so many of them devote substantial resources on public “information” and “education,” and why they often invest heavily in mass-mediated self-representation2 – even to the extent of fabricating dramaturgies of disorder in order to establish their claim to counter them by extraordinary means (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004). Little wonder, then, that the question of legitimate violence, and its paradoxes, is interrogated in the present volume. With great profit, to be sure.

    Talk of legitimate violence provides an obvious segue into the second theoretical touchstone: Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, in which a relatively brief, rather general passage – no more than a long paragraph, really – has spawned a great deal of scholarly reflection on policing. It also stands as a cogent counter to the Weberian idealism, indeed the romance, of much functionalist sociology and criminology. Recall Walter Benjamin (1999:286- 7) here. Police violence, he observed, may “[exist] for legal ends” in so far as it inheres in the exercise of a foundational right; hence Weber’s attribution to it of legitimacy, a.k.a. authority. But, in practice, it marks the point at which the capacities of the state run out, thus to intervene “where no clear legal situation exists.” Even more, it does so in such a way as to erase the line between preserving the law and making it. This last point – the erasure of the line – has been stressed by those who have followed Benjamin, often without paying attention to his own caveat that “the ‘law’ of the police…marks the point at which the state…can no longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain”; even more, and more starkly, by those who would elide entirely, as Derrida has done (see above), the state, the police, and the pragmatics of lawmaking. It is arguable that, to a degree at least, Benjamin himself allows this elision. For one thing, he portrays policing in “civilized states” as a perennial, pervasive “[accompaniment to] the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life regulated by ordinances, or simply [supervision]”; shades here, as we shall see, of the early Foucault. For another, Benjamin speaks of modern police violence, as “formless,” a promiscuous, “spectral mixture” (p.286), concocted, as Joe Masco notes in his Afterword, typically under the sign of security – especially in democracies, which “[bear] witness to the greatest conceivable degeneration of violence” (p.287). No wonder, again, that strong traces of Benjamin’s characterization of policing, now almost a century old, are to be found throughout this volume, admirably re-membered, re-mastered, and remixed into the history of the present. Of which more in a moment.

    The question, largely left mute by Benjamin himself, is security for whom? Police violence, legally authorized or not, in the protection of what? G.K. Chesterton, in The Man Who Was Thursday: A Nightmare ([1908]1986), believed the answer to lie in the fight against anarchy, personified, in particular, by that “most dangerous criminal,..the entirely lawless modern philosopher” (p.45). Our third theoretical touchstone, by contrast, seeks an explanation at the point of intersection between the material and the social. Marxist in its genealogy,3 its situates the rise of modern policing in relations of class and property, broadly conceived; the very same property that Proudhon, the noted anarchist philosopher, was wont to regard as theft. The first modern constabulary, it is often said – if not altogether accurately, as Garriott reminds us in his Introduction below – to have been established in the late 1820’s, during the industrial revolution in Great Britain. Substantively-speaking, for Marxist historiography, the origins of modern policing date back to Hobsbawm’s Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (1962), to the triumph of a “conquering bourgeoisie” (p.19), with its stress on the primacy of private property, of what Macpherson (1962) was to dub “possessive individualism,” above all else: private property as the most inviolable of the rights of citizens; private property as the material grounding of the common good; private property as the basis of public order, ethical self- possession, and civil society; private property as the infrastructure of the modernist nation and its moral economy (Thompson 1993:185-351); private property, one might add, as the practical philosophy of a new liberalism, the mindscape of a rising Leviathan. As property rights became increasingly privatized in Euro-America and its colonies, goes this story, policing became an ever more taken-for-granted, and fully-paid, function of government, of the public sphere. And, as Mandel (1948) points out, it dedicated itself less to the oppressive control of unruly populations, save under exceptional conditions, than to the protection of the assets, effects, and interests of individuals, human and legal (i.e. corporations, qua “legal persons”); of the property of those, it was said – after the early Marx – who controlled both the corridors of power and the means of production. Thus it was that a monopoly over the deployment of legitimate force, the policing function, became a prerogative of the modernist capitalist state –not as an intrinsic feature of the latter, but in the process of its emergence as a social formation, one founded on a historically-particular regime of property, itself dialectically entailed in an order of relations among classes of citizens. Whatever its shortcomings, this version of the Marxist narrative has some cogent evidence to support it. Which is why the policing of private property – and, concomitantly, the policing of the poor – commands the attention of some of the contributors to this book.

    But a vision of policing that sees it primarily as violence in the protection of property and the rights of persons, compelling as it clearly is in many contexts, may be censured for a certain narrowness of focus. Hence the fourth theoretical touchstone, which takes its inspiration, not surprisingly, from Foucault, especially from his early work. Discipline and Punish (1995), it hardly need be said here, locates the archaeology of the modern subject, and of modernist subjection in the move away from premodern punitive technologies that emphasized spectacles of publically-inflicted pain toward the administrative micro-physics of everyday surveillance, discipline, and capillary self-regulation. Policing, from this perspective, exceeds the work of the police per se. It is diffused everywhere into the social and institutional order (cf. Martin, infra). The latter, for their part, are increasingly banalized: they are rebranded as a benign public agency, under logos like “Serve and Protect.” Their criminal anthropology stresses “the community,” which becomes both the object and the subject of oversight and enforcement, as well as the domesticated terrain of the friendly beat cop – or, in less friendly precincts, of a form of policing based on the familiarity of close-distance; it portrays those on whom police officers continue to inflict more or less spectacular violence as anti-citizens, those beyond the secured zones of civility, be they unwanted migrants, refugees, or homegrown lumpen; its rhetoric of decisive force and of zero tolerance is softened by the argot of human rights and an ethics of care. Which is why “governing through crime” and a culture of “popular punitiveness” can coexist easily with a regime of rigorous surveillance and enforcement represented as public service.

    As important, Foucaultians would note, is how the routine police-work is implicated in the construction and regulation of populations tout court, all the more so, to borrow a turn of phrase from Tom Vanderbilt (1997:141), as those populations turn from “bodies politique” into that new behemoth, the “body demographic”: how police geography redraws the topography of nation-states – even now, the globe (Stalcup, infra) – mapping out the axes of sovereign jurisdiction, surveillance, security, danger, disposability, exclusion, even the necropolitics of “disappearance” (cf. Caldeira, infra); how police anthropologies identify, reify, and typify social categories in ways that either enter into, or sustain, patterns of popular consciousness;4 how police sociologies serve to sediment the shifting lines of the normal, the criminal, and the pathological, and extend administrative and bureaucratic rationalities to them; how police semiotics give meaning to our vernacular conceptions of crime and dis/order in an age that has come to obsess over the rule of law, an age increasingly ruled by law. Of course, the later Foucault moves in a somewhat different direction, toward a greater emphasis on biopolitics; but that is beyond our current concerns. For now, the point is that the Foucaultian vantage directs us to look for policing everywhere (Martin, infra). At the same time, by extension, it also warns us to distinguish between the anthropology of policing and the anthropology of police, between the general and the specific, the unmarked and the marked; after all, as Marx has been quoted as saying, “If everyone is a policeman, then no one is a policeman.” Which is much the same as saying that, if power/violence is everywhere, it is nowhere in particular; if its limits are not specified, its various forms left undifferentiated, it ceases being a useful concept or an object of theory. Both anthropologies have their value, patently – all the more so when the relationship between them is carefully specified – and both appear in the chapters to follow, again to productive effect. So, too, does the attendant issue: what happens at the points at which both police and policing are visible primarily by their absence.

    These theoretical dispositions are not the only ones whose traces, alone or in various combinations, run though Police in Practice; so, too, do those of other theoretical genealogies. But this volume of essays, precisely because it is ethnographically based – indeed, ethnographically rich and nuanced – forces us to complicate, rethink, and enlarge received views of law enforcement in several ways. Not only does it demonstrate that abstract, generalized-yet-narrow conceptions of policing – including some of those in the tradition of Weber, Benjamin, Marx, and Foucault – often caricature and simplify, decontextualize and dehistoricize the phenomenon. It makes a cogent case for the view that, if we are to take the full measure of “the pragmatics of police power” (Garriott, infra), we would be best served by a dialectical methodology: by a counterpoint of ethnographic discovery and critical theory, of the inductive and the deductive, that reads the empirical microscopy of everyday policing against the larger forces that give shape to it – forces inherent in the age of the market, of deregulation and privatization, of the fetishism of rights and the rule of law.

    But this volume does more than point the way to an anthropology of police, more broadly conceived. It also raises a large number of questions, and a number of large questions, some of them addressed here, some that require further thought. For the sake of symmetry, let me mention just four – well, four clusters of questions – in descending order of elaboration.

    The first is this: If we allow Benjamin’s thesis that police everywhere have the power to erase the line between the preservation and the enactment of the law – or, in the words of Rolling Stone and amateur ethnographer, Keith Richards (2008:14), who had a great deal of first hand experience in the matter, to bend and distend it every which way – how do we account for the palpable limits of their sovereignty: for the fact that, in many parts, of the world, cops are regularly sued and indicted for excessive use of force and felonies of one kind or another? Note, in this respect, that Jackie Selebi, until recently a planetary supercop – not only was he South Africa’s police chief, but he was also head of Interpol – is now sitting out a fifteen year prison sentence for corruption, largely the result of having consorted with criminals. In other words, how, in a world so thoroughly subject to police power – to police-as- governance and governance-as-police, to invoke Garriott’s apt typification of its ever broadening purview – do we explain the hedges against its hegemony? Or the fact that, while there is a great deal of truth in Benjamin’s founding observation, not to mention in the Foucaultian insistence on the omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence of the police, that truth sometimes simply does not hold? Not only does police sovereignty run out at critical moments, but, as we shall see, it also encounters popular, effective refusal under the sign of informal justice (cf. Goldstein, infra), may be expropriated by other species of sovereign authority (that of organized crime, private enforcement, and corporate security, for example), and may itself decide that, save in exceptional circumstances, entire zones of unruly national space do not warrant its attention (e.g. Penglase, Caldeira, infra). And this is not to mention that it is often difficult even to know where to draw lines between regular police, private security, and the underworld. In short, wherein lie the outer bounds of police power, especially when the term is taken capaciously, as it rightly is throughout this book, to extend beyond the narrow confines of law enforcement and the management of crime on the part of the state? How, moreover, does the attribution of such extensive power to police – be it in the tradition of Weber, Benjamin, Foucault, or Marx – square with a critical axiom of Egon Bittner’s classic criminology, refreshed recently, in an ethnographic key, by Jonny Steinberg (2008): that populations are only policeable to the degree, and in the domains, that they themselves want to be policed? Could there be a connection between this incongruity and the tendency of police, when faced with the limits of their own sovereignty, to engage in spectacle and/or to ramp up their own public pedagogy, thereby to manage the metaphysics of dis/order?

    Second, a paradox, one alluded to earlier. How is it that, in many places, populations – of different classes, races, genders, generations, ethnicities – express an urgent desire for “more policing,” more uniformed officers on their streets, while, at the same time, they are quick to accuse cops of being violent, venal, corrupt, and incompetent, indeed, habitually criminal? Where they have the means, it seems, citizens almost everywhere are turning in greater numbers to the private sector, including to organized crime, for the protection of their property and persons – and where they lack the means, to “informal justice,” a.k.a. vigilantism – while all the time insisting that the primary function of the state is to safeguard their security. Patently, this is a refraction of a more general phenomenon in the contemporary world: the contradictory tendency among populations to want less government on one hand, and yet, on the other, to demand ever more from the state, including more effective law enforcement, tighter regulation of borders, and harsher treatment of offenders. Homo politicus, it seems, desires both greater freedom from constraint, obligation, responsibility, surveillance and greater security, certainty, protection, order. (So, patently, does the corporate world; capital, after all, has always profited at once from chaos and disorder and from protection by the state.) How, precisely, are the bipolar yearnings of homo politicus to be explained? How, schismogenetically, can these different polarities, of more and less, excess and absence, coexist in popular discourse, especially under conditions in which crime-and-policing is the register in which much political debate is engaged?

    Third, and closely related, given that ever more policing and military operations have migrated to the private sector – and infused each other, often in promiscuous, legally opaque ways – how do we refashion our conceptualization of the state accordingly? How does the outsourcing to the market of the monopoly over the use of legitimate force it affect the sovereign authority of governments and their law enforcement agencies? And how does it inflect our understanding, after Foucault, of the difference between policing, in the broad sense of the term, and the work of the police, in its more narrow sense? How, indeed, do we theorize the relationship between the former and the latter? Or is it merely a matter of historical contingency, differently construed in different times and different places?

    Fourth, and finally, the Big Question, the one in which the other three are all subsumed: to what extent, and in what manner, have regimes of policing themselves become imbricated in, and refashioned by, the material life and cultural practices of the contemporary moment in world history? Patently, the great theoretical traditions of Weber, Marx, Benjamin, and Foucault gave voice to the emerging realities – to the contradictions, aspirations, anxieties – of a particular world-historical epoch, the epoch of rising industrial capitalism and the modernist nation-state. How is our epoch, an epoch still struggling to define itself – it is now often referred to, of course, as the age of global neoliberalism, but with a heavy measure of agnosticism, irony, caveat, uncertainty – to make sense of the way that it is being policed? How, as the nation-state form is mutating, are emerging forms of police power congealing within it? And how are they to be best typified and accounted for?

    The answer to this last question, indeed to all the questions, lies at the heart of an anthropology of police and policing still in its infancy, still unfolding. Police in Practice is a timely, very thoughtful invitation to take part in that unfolding. To which, on its own account, it makes a significant contribution precisely by demonstrating how much theoretical and analytic value is to be added by an ethnographically-rich approach to the topic. “A crime is like a crack in reality,” observes Natsuo Kirino, a Japanese feminist crime crime writer, playfully and provocatively. “[I]t is an author’s role to explore those cracks” (French 2003:B1). The same is true of policing. Perhaps even more so. It, too, opens up cracks in the lineaments of reality, all the better for ethnographers to puzzle at what produced that reality to begin with, what sustains it, how it conduces to the regulation of social life. This volume peers through many such cracks. In so doing, it challenges us to contemplate anew the connections, at a particular historical moment, between the human condition and the manner of its policing.

  • Theory from the South

    Theory from the South

    There appears to be a growing echo, slowly reverberating around the world, that, for good, ill, or both, Africa is the future, a harbinger of Europe’s history-to-come. Experts may debate the reasons for this: among them, a significant population bulge heavily skewed toward youth; an urban “revolution” unique in the current era; burgeoning consumer markets, rising middle classes, and accelerating techno-development; also, a propensity to repurpose material practices both foreign and homegrown, thus to remake modernity for late modern times. Says Keith Hart (2017:2), basing his prediction on the long historical relationship between demography and economy, “Sooner or later, Africa and Europe will change rank order.” The former – Africa, the continent that once signified the West’s prehistoric past and remains a perennial “basket case” in the jaundiced eyes of Euro-America – is now frequently taken to prefigure what lies ahead for humanity at large.

    A decade or so ago, our Theory from the South explored this proposition and its implications for the social sciences, one of them being that Africa, as an “ex-centric” location (Bhabha 1994) and ground-zero of the Global South, has become a privileged axis from which to theorize the emerging world order of the twenty-first century. In so doing, it provoked a great deal of argument and, among northern intellectuals unused to the idea that their hemisphere may not be the font of all knowledge and theory-work, frank skepticism.

    Reduced to its essence, the thesis of the book is this. While Euro-America and its antipodes are caught up in the same world-historical processes – each being entailed with the other in a counterpoint of reciprocal remaking, of “creolization” – the South has tended to feel their effects before the North. And much more intensely. There are good reasons for this. Most significant, perhaps, is the familiar fact that the imperial expansion of modern capitalism into colonies across the planet laid the basis for the violent exploitation of human labor and local ecologies, of raw materials and real estate, without the legal, moral, or political constraints that governed life at the metropole. The colony, site of rampant “primitive accumulation,” was, in short, the dark secret of Empire, its working laboratory for the refinement of the means and ends of racial capitalism (Robinson 1983). For all the talk of a civilizing mission, of progress and development, the social, economic, and governmental infrastructures of the liberal nation-state were never put securely in place here; as a result, a southern, illiberal variant of capitalist modernity, with none of the liberal conceits of individual freedom, rights-bearing citizenship, or equality before the law, took firm root. Which left postcolonial populations open to brute exploitation with the dawn of a new age of empire; the age, that is, of structural adjustment, of largely unregulated, highly mobile corporate capital, of the hollowing out of state, civil society, and democracy, of the displacement of welfare with the fetishism of rights – all under the magical sign of the market.

    In the upshot, the “advanced” edges of post-Cold War political economy – its profitable re-engineering of legal and regulatory instruments, of taxation and labor arrangements, of modes of extraction and enclaved sovereignty – rooted themselves deeply in Africa; so much so that, in 2010, Newsweek declared the continent to be “at the very forefront of emerging markets…Like China and India, [it is]…illustrative of [the] new world order” (Guo 2010:44). “Africa Rising” duly became the meme of the moment: The Economist editorialized about it,[1]a YouTube documentary dramatized it,[2] a fashion magazine was named for it,[3] scholars debated it,[4] an IMF conference was held to discuss it,[5] a sustainable development program took it on as a charter,[6] and an eminent professor of marketing invoked it as call for shrewd global business investment (Mahajan 2009). The basis for all this? A major influx of Foreign Direct Investment earning high returns; healthy GDP numbers and growth rates in many countries; the rise of homegrown African mega-corporations; the increasing presence of transnational firms; and thriving local informal economies marked by flexible, strikingly inventive enterprise, some of it, alike licit and illicit, having grown out of performing outsourced services for northern firms. And so new regimes of work and time, new perceptions of futurity, new modes of sociality and livelihood, have taken root – regimes with analogues that are becoming ever more visible in Euro-America.

    At the same time, and for the same reasons that have made the continent so exploitable for capital, so open to the siphoning off of value to worlds outside, the dystopic aspects of our times have also been most readily evident in the South. Material inequality, human disposability, mass un- and under-employment, epidemic illness and homelessness, eco-despoliation, crippling private and public debt, violent crime, and social exclusion remain endemic. Indeed, it was this counterpoint of promise and dystopia, of creative life-making and destructive death-dealing, that we sought to detail in Theory from the South. It is a counterpoint whose trajectory is under-determined. And it is full of surprises; an unruly dialectic, if you will, that does not recapitulate the telos of modernity or its reverse, defying both received Marxisms and liberal modernization theories of one sort or another. Sometimes it also defies expectation in almost uncanny ways: just as many African economies weathered the global recession of 2008-9 more successfully than did those of the north, growing at unanticipated rates as others struggled, so Africa has weathered the Covid-19 pandemic better than most, perhaps because it has had a long history of dealing with public health and economic crises.

    But this is just half of our story. The other half has to do with contemporary Euro-America, site of rising carceral populations, of spiraling inequality, poverty, precarity, and debt, of a crisis of social reproduction, a silently ticking generation war, and increasing real joblessness, most of it unmeasured; all of these things, usually taken to be symptomatic of so-called “developing nations,” are now endemic to much of the World  formerly known as “First.” The “new normal” of the North, it seems, is replaying the recent past of the South, not least because many of the rights and protections of citizenship once associated with liberal democratic societies have been eroded, leaving their a rising proportion of their populations, especially the poor and racialized, in something like the predicament long endured by colonial, and subsequently postcolonial, subjects – although, to be sure, there is good cause for seeing Africa less as postcolonial than as Afropolitan (Selasi 2005; Mbembe XXXX), if in its own singular, endogenous ways. This is why, in so many respects, Africa, Asia, and Latin America appear to be running ahead of Euro-America, prefiguring its history-in-the-making. And why Euro-America, tracking behind the antipodes, appears to be “going south.”

    Take, for just one example, the rotting urbanism spreading through parts of the Global North. When it is said, for example, that Lagos augurs the future of the modernist city (Koolhaas and Cleijne 2001) it is not because northern conurbations also have rising homeless populations, ever more stricken neighborhoods, and pathological patterns of inequality. (Nor is it because real estate on Victoria Island is more expensive than its equivalent in Manhattan, or that “smart city” experiments are mushrooming across the continent, abetted by Chinese capital.) It is because urban scapes, as planetary phenomena, have strongly convergent tendencies: among other things, their rhizomatic patterns of sociality; their fractured political rationalities and the claims made to sovereignty within them; the gating off of their elites and the privatization of their civic amenities; the segmentary sprawl of impermanently housed, radically under-resourced populations which, at very best, enjoy only partial citizenship; their economies, including the burgeoning informal (sharing, caring, criminal, affective, i.e. “gig” ) economies arising under the impact of radical changes in labor markets everywhere. These are all corollaries of the ways in which capital, and its cultural mediations, are playing themselves out under parallel, globally-emergent sociological and infrastructural conditions, conditions that began to manifest themselves in the South earlier than they did in Euro-America. And are most graphically visible in Africa.

    In Theory from the South we explore a wide range of phenomena of which the same things can be said: that they presented first in the South, and tend to be more hyperbolically visible there than they are in the North. These extend to such things as the changing nature of personhood and political subjectivity; the erosion of democracy and the crisis of liberalism; the shift from a politics of ideology to the politics of ID-ology, a politics of right/s in which identity takes precedence over all other forms of claim and mobilization; the radical transformation of labor as capitalism – itself taken ever more to be a millennial, indeed enchanted, solution to all social problems – is treated the primary force determining world history-in-the-making. The book also asks a number of foundational questions: What, exactly, is meant by theory in this day and age? And what is “the South,” given that it is a shifting signifier which cannot easily be pinned down? Given, also, the fact that “it” is not, as some would have it, simply the antithesis of “the North,” a mythic geography within which exist unreconstructed, untouched indigenous worlds whose vernacular life ways may offer rescue or redemption from the contradictions, deformities, and disfigurements of global modernity. But these are topics for another time, another blog. Theory from the South is intended as an ongoing conversation about the contemporary global order and how we are to make sense of it.

  • Theory from the South

    Theory from the South

    Jean and John L. Comaroff

    There appears to be a growing echo, slowly reverberating around the world, that, for good, ill, or both, Africa is the future, a harbinger of Europe’s history-to-come. Experts may debate the reasons for this: among them, a significant population bulge heavily skewed toward youth; an urban “revolution” unique in the current era; burgeoning consumer markets,…

    The idea is very simple really, although its implications are potentially quite radical. We have essayed it many times over the past two decades. So have many others.1 Especially “other” others. 

    It is this. Western enlightenment thought has, from the first, posited itself as the wellspring of universal learning, of Science and Philosophy, upper case; concomitantly, it has regarded the non-West – variously known as the ancient world, the orient, the primitive world, the third world, the underdeveloped world, the developing world, and now the global south – primarily as a place of parochial wisdom, of antiquarian traditions, of exotic ways and means. Above all, of unprocessed data. These other worlds, in short, are treated less as sources of refined knowledge than as reservoirs of raw fact: of the minutiae from which Euromodernity might fashion its testable theories and transcendent truths. Just as it has long capitalized on non-Western “raw materials” by refining and adding value to them. In some measure, this continues to be the case. But what if, and here is the idea in interrogative form, we invert that Order of Things? What if we posit that, in the present moment, it is the so-called “global south” that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large? That it is from here that our empirical grasp of its lineaments, and our theory-work in accounting for them, ought to be coming, at least in major part? That, in laying bare the contradictions inherent in the antinomy between north and south, we may move beyond it, to the larger dialectical processes of which it is a product. What follows is a reflection on the contemporary Order of Things approached from a primarily African vantage, one which invites us to see familiar things in unfamiliar ways. 

    Euro-American social theory, as writers from the South have observed, has tended to treat modernity as though it were inseparable from the rise of Enlightenment reason. Not only is each taken to be a condition of the other’s possibility. Together, they are assumed to have animated a distinctively European mission to emancipate humankind from a prehistory of bare necessity, enchantment, and entropy. Whether the Enlightenment is seen as an epoch or an “attitude,” as vested in Kantian critique or positivist science, in self-possessed subjectivity or civic democracy, in Arendt’s (1958:4) “laboring society” or Marx’s capitalist mode of production, in the free market or liberal humanism – or in various ensembles of these things – the modern has its fons et origo in the West; this notwithstanding the fact that, in the West itself, the term has always been an object of contestation and ambivalence. Pace Cheikh Anta Diop (1955), the Senegalese polymath for whom civilization arose in Egypt thence to make its way northward,2 other “modernities” are taken to be either transplants or simulacra, their very mention marked by ironic scare quotes. The accomplishment of anything like the real thing, the Euro-original, is presumed, at best, to be deferred into a distant, almost unimaginable future – to which, as Fanon put it (1967:121), if the colonized ever do arrive, it is “[t]oo late. Everything is [already] anticipated, thought out, demonstrated, made the most of.” To the degree that, from a Western perspective, the global south is embraced by modernity at all, then, it is as an outside that requires translation, conversion, catch up.

    Take two diverse instances, both involving north-south representation. One is literary. It is J.M. Coetzee’s (2003:51) story, “The Novel in Africa,” set on a cruise ship called, not coincidentally, Northern Lights. The narrative hinges on a conversation between a Nigerian writer and Elizabeth Costello, the Australian novelist who serves as Coetzee’s alter ego. “[H]ow can you explore a world in all its depth,” Costello asks the man, “if at the same time you are having to explain it to outsiders?” To Europeans, that is. From the standpoint of enlightenment, African prose is taken to be a performance of otherness, not an act of “self-writing” (Mbembe 2002). As Žižek (n.d.) observes, the universality presumed by Western liberalism “does not reside in the fact that its values (human rights, etc.) are [treated as ]universal in the sense of holding for ALL cultures, but in a much more radical sense: it lies in the fact that individuals relate to themselves as `universal;’ it is as if they participate in the universal dimension directly, by-passing any particular social position.” But the African author is foreclosed from writing in the cosmopolitan voice taken for granted by literati in Euro-America. If s/he speaks Out of Africa, it requires “explanation”; conversion, that is, into the lexicon of liberal universalism and the humanist episteme on which it is based. The other example comes from the social sciences. For Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000:89), European historicism allows only one trajectory to non-Western societies if they are to be recognized as part of the grand human story: they must undergo a visible metamorphosis – fast or slow, effective or otherwise – to western capitalist modernity. Their diverse, variously animated life-worlds have to be translated into the “universal and disenchanted language of sociology” whose telos decrees: “First in Europe, then elsewhere” (p.7).

    Coetzee and Chakrabarty echo a long, slowly rising tide of critique. To be sure, the object of much postcolonial theory has been to disrupt the Western telos of modernity, to trouble the histories it presumes, to “provincialize Europe” (Chakrabarty 2000), to “renarrate” empire (Makdisi 1992) – all the better, Homi Bhabha (1994a:6) insists, to move the project of theory-making to an “ex-centric site,” thus to capture the restless, re-visionary energy that comes from the vast reaches of the planetary population whose genealogies do not reach back directly into the European Enlightenment. Bhabha’s call is echoed by those who have pointed to the qualifications brought by non-Western experience to mainstream discourses about the nature of modernity itself. It is also echoed, as George Orwell (1933) and W.E.B. du Bois (1933) long ago reminded us, in the life-stories of those within the metropole – southerners in the north, so to speak – who are largely excluded from its human fellowship.

    More immediately, though, despite decades of postcolonial critique, the modernist social sciences – not excluding those of more radical bent – tend still to “bypass… the third world,” its narratives of modernity and the work of its ‘local’ intellectuals, in writing the planetary history of the present. Even critical theorists take the “driving engine” of late capitalism to lie wholly in Euro-America (Chakrabarty 2000:7). In the upshot, the south continues to be the suppressed underside of the north. Which is why, in an important, early intervention on the topic, Gayatri Spivak (1988) censured post-structuralism for failing to give account of geopolitics in its analyses of ‘Power’ and the ‘Sovereign Subject.’ By ignoring the impact of the international division of labor on discourse everywhere, she argued, and by rendering ideology invisible, post-structuralism participated in an economy of representation that has kept the non-European other “in the “shadow” of the Western “Self” (p.280) – thereby allowing the Universal Subject to remain securely on Euro-American terrain. 

    Spivak’s point is well taken. But, in dissecting the technologies of Eurocentrism, she courts the very psychic self-obsession that she faults in post-structuralism. By focusing on the colonial narcissism of Europe, a narcissism that obliterates “the trace of [the colonized] Other in its precarious Subject-ivity” (1988:281), she sets aside the social and material conditions to which she herself drew attention. As a result, the subaltern is so fully eclipsed by an omnipotent Western selfhood as to be rendered inaudible, unspeaking, unspeakable. But they – the colonized were, and are, a social category, after all – are not quite that easily effaced, despite their multiple displacements. Even at their least articulate, the unsettling presence of those others has always troubled imperial aspirations, demanding constant oversight. Like Rochester’s West Indian wife in the attic who, as Edward Said (1983:273) noted of Bronte’s Jane Eyre, repeatedly threatened to disrupt polite society at the metropole.

    What is more, because colonial societies were complex formations, they entered into complex, unpredictable relations with Europe. Metropole and colony, after all, were co-constitutive elements in a rising world capitalist order – entailed, that is, in what Deleuze and Guattari call a double capture, “an encounter that transforms the disparate entities that enter into a joint becoming” (Toscana 2005:40). Hence the now well-known claim that colonies were critical sources of value and innovation for the modern nation-states of the north. At the same time, the colonized were excluded from full citizenship in those “imagined communities.” Worse yet, colonial polities were sustained by acts of violence that flew in the face of the tenets of liberal European law and civility: imperial frontiers were places of partial visibility, where working misunderstandings bred reciprocal fetishisms, unwritten agreements, unruly populations, and protean social arrangements, held to require forceful techniques of control (Pietz 1985-88; Stoler 2006:9). 

    Above all, these frontiers fostered conjunctures of Western and non-Western desires, conventions, and practices, fusions that fueled the destructive, innovative urges of Euromodernity — but with little of the ethical restraint that reigned them in “back home.” Nor is this all in the distant past. In 2000, US Republican senator Tom Delay, prevented legislation barring sweatshop conditions in the Northern Mariana Islands, an American territory in the Western Pacific; said Delay to the Washington Post, “the low-wage, anti-union conditions of the Marianas constitute a “perfect petri dish of capitalism.”5 

    As this suggests, modernity was, almost from the start, a north-south collaboration – indeed, a world-historical production – albeit a sharply asymmetrical one. However hard it may seek to “purify” itself (Latour 1993), it has always consisted of diverse significations, materializations, and temporalities – perpetually contested, hard to pin down, historically labile. As an ideology, it has never been dissociable from capitalism, from its determinations and social logic (cf. Amin 1989); although, to be sure, fascism and socialism have sought to fashion their own versions. Hyphenated, capitalist-modernity has realized itself, if very unevenly, in the great aspirations of liberalism. But it has also excluded many populations from just these things, especially those in colonial theaters who have been subjugated to its modes of extraction. Or, worse yet, have been rendered disposable by virtue of having no value to extract.

    Precisely because it has plied its abrasive course in so many disparate contexts, in other words, modernity has always been both one thing and many, always both a universal project and a host of specific, parochial emplacements, a force both for equality and simultaneously, for difference. This is self-evidently true in Europe, where national imaginings have never been all alike, neither within nation-states, nor between them. But it has been even more so in Europe’s distant “peripheries,” where, in the shadow of various metropoles, modernity was made at a discount. Colonies were pale proxies, subsidiary holding companies, as it were, for sovereign Western powers. Here the violence and the magic, the syncretism and archaism suppressed in Europe were often promiscuously visible. So, too, were the local inventions, accommodations, and hybrids produced in different colonial contexts: the work relations, the forms of domestic life, the new urbanisms and displaced cosmopolitanisms, all forged in the spaces between promise and privation, there to assert their own contemporaneity, their own…modernity.

    Here, then, is the point. To the degree that the making of modernity has been a world-historical process, it can as well be narrated from its undersides as it can from its self-proclaimed centers – like those maps that, as a cosmic joke, invert planet earth to place the south on top, the north below. But we seek to do more than just turn the story upside down, thus to leave intact the Manichean dualism that holds Euro-America and its others in the same, fixed embrace. We also seek to do more than merely note that many of the emergent features and concealed contradictions of capitalist modernity were as readily perceptible in the colony as in the metropole – or that the former was often a site of production for the ways-and-means of the latter. What we suggest, in addition, is that contemporary world historical processes are visibly altering received geographies of core-and-periphery, relocating southward not only some of the most innovative and energetic modes of producing value, but the driving impulse of contemporary capitalism as both a material and cultural formation. It is in this light that we propose that the history of the present may be more acutely grasped, alike empirically and theoretically, from the vantage of the south. This claim is founded on two closely interwoven arguments. We develop them, as we intimated earlier, by taking Africa as our point of departure. 

    AfroModernity, in practice and theory

    The first argument is that modernity in Africa is not adequately understood as a derivative or a doppelganger, a counterfeit, of the Euro-American “original.” To the contrary: it demands to be apprehended and addressed in its own right. For one thing, it has a deep, highly self-conscious history, as South African scholar, Ntongola Masilela shows (n.d., 2003), a history of mutating ensembles of signs and practices in terms of which people across the continent have long made their lives; this partly in dialectical relationship with the global north and its expansive imperium, partly with others of the same hemisphere, partly in localized enclaves. As in the north, moreover, modernity in Africa has manifested itself in a number of registers at once, from the literary to the lay, the philosophical to the pragmatic. And, as in the north, it has been mired in contestation and “entangled meanings” (Deutsch, Probst, and Schmidt 2002; Nuttall 2009; Táíwò 2010:13). Should Africans see themselves as part of a universal enlightenment, of Christianity and civilization, of Shakespearean English and scientific reason, as some black South African intellectuals argued in the early twentieth century (Masilela n.d.:6)? Or should they strive to “combine the native and the alien, the traditional and the foreign, into something new and beautiful” as H.I.E. Dlhomo wrote in 1939 (1977)? In point of fact, there has been a steady move toward the second option; a move, that is, toward the mimetic, understood – after Achille Mbembe (2008:38f) – as a process that “establish[es] similarities with something else while at the same time inventing something original” (cf. Halliwell 2002). Like its European counterpart, modernity in Africa has entailed a regenesis, an awareness of new possibilities, and a rupture with the past – a past that, in colonial times, was flattened out, detemporalized, and congealed into “tradition,” itself a thoroughly modern construct.

    African modernities, in sum, have long had their own trajectories, giving moral and material shape to everyday life. They have yielded diverse-yet-distinctive means with which to make sense of the world, to fashion beings and identities, to act effectively on contemporary conditions. What is more, Africa has produced some of the most dynamic, most iconic of modern cultural forms, among them, popular Christianities, plastic and fine arts, mass-mediated musical genres, and cinematic genres like the mighty Nollywood video industry. This creativity has been at once generative and destructive in flouting, repudiating, and remaking European templates. Sometimes, in its intellectual aspect, the process has been strikingly reflective, as among Xhosa writers of the 1880’s (Masilela 2003:506f) and, later, black South Africans of the New Africa Movement, who famously insisted that the continent not be compared with Europe since it had its own genius; a genius inseminated, we might add, by other southern influences, from Mohandas Ghandi to the African diasporas of the New World.

    Much the same rhetoric was to suffuse anticolonial movements and post-independent nationalisms. It was also to be heard in the assertive alterities of Pan-Africanism, Negritude, and Afrocentrism; in experiments with communitarianism and democracy; and in high-minded visions, like Ubuntu, the call for a generically “African humanity” to undergird a new “African Renaissance.” Nor is it best labeled an “alternative modernity,” singular or plural.8 It is a vernacular – just as Euromodernity is a vernacular – wrought in an ongoing, situated engagement with the unfolding history of the present. 

    It is important, in this respect, to distinguish modernity from modernization (cf. Appadurai 1996), a point that takes us away from Africa and onto more general terrain for a moment. 

    Modernity refers to an orientation to being-in-the-world, to a variably construed and variably inhabited Weltanschauung, to a concept of the person as self-conscious subject, to an ideal of humanity as species being, to a vision of history as a progressive, man-made construction, to an ideology of improvement through the accumulation of knowledge and technological skill, to the pursuit of justice by means of rational governance; to a relentless impulse toward innovation whose very iconoclasm breeds a hunger for things eternal (cf. Harvey 1989:10). Modernization, by contrast, posits a strong, normative teleology, a unilinear trajectory toward a particular vision of the future – capitalist, socialist, fascist, whatever – to which all humanity should aspire; to which all history ought to lead and all peoples should evolve, if at different rates. This telos has expressed itself in progressive movements, both secular and religious, in expansive models of improvement, and in “objective” scientific paradigms, among them, “modernization theory” in sociology. It has also been censured for the contradictions between its promises and its effects: between, for example, the promise of a more equal humanity and the burgeoning biopolitics of difference across the world. We are less concerned here with these contradictions than with the confusion between modernization and modernity. It underpins a recent debate about the latter, about modernity as category of critical analysis, and raises a clutch of theoretical issues salient to our argument.

    Frederick Cooper (2005:113), whose own scholarly oeuvre is also deeply rooted in Africa, has recently complained that modernity is ever more imprecisely used as a technical term in the academy. We agree, having remarked ourselves on its vagueness, its tendency to melt into air under scrutiny (1993:xii). We concur, too, with his observation that its analytic and everyday connotations are often confused and conflated (ibid:xiif); although this is as true of other constructs in the vocabulary of the human sciences, like colonialism, identity, politics, liberalism (cf. Duara 2007:295). Even theory. In point of fact, it is precisely the protean quality of modernity that has made it so productive as a trope of worldly claim-making, as a political assertion, and as an object of analysis. “Modernity,” plainly, is what linguists term a ‘shifter’ (Silverstein 1976). Its meaning is dependent on context, serving to put people in particular times and places on the near-or-far side of the great divide between self and other, the present and prehistory, here and there, the general and particular; oppositions that are mobilized in a range of registers from theologies to party platforms, from policy documents to black letter law, from maps of social space to the classification of populations.

    The positivist social sciences have also deployed this grammar of oppositions, of course; hence the embrace of such foundational contrasts as mechanical versus organic solidarity, status versus contract, precapitalist versus capitalist, and so on. Modernization theory, ascendant in sociology from the 1950’s, was no exception. Despite having been subject to repeated critique, Cooper argues (2005:9ff), both the conceptual foundations and the Eurocentric telos of the modernization paradigm linger on in colonial/postcolonial scholarship. As a result, he says, the latter “reinforce[s] the metanarratives [it] pretend[s] to take apart” (p.9), thereby muddying rather than illuminating the question of modernity in Africa and elsewhere, of what it actually is and how we might typify it. For theorists like Cooper, the problem is to be solved by a strong dose of rigorous historical research, as though a protean phenomenon of this sort might finally be pinned down by recourse to frank empiricism.9 Ironically, by the canons of just such empiricism, colonial/postcolonial studies are not so easily dismissed. Work in that tradition has taken pains to transcend the assumptions and methods of modernization theory. Constructs like “alternative modernities” have their problems. But they were developed precisely to move beyond the binary opposition between the premodern and the modern, and to avoid conflating modernization with Westernization.10

    But there is something else here, something more general. The effort to counter indiscriminate uses of the term “modernity” underscores why it is so important not to mistake it for modernization, or to use modernity as analytical construct without also considering the conditions of its material existence. Cooper laments that, with the repudiation of modernization theory, “everything” tends to be treated as “simultaneously modern” (p.132). But that, in part, was the very object of the critique: to show that, while modernization-as-Western-ideology might represent non-Western societies as just so many not-yet-modern outsides, the capitalist imperium to which it is joined has no real exteriors, although it has many peripheries. Its exclusions and its margins, as critical theorists of various stripes have stressed, are a requisite condition for the growth of its centers. What is more, to reveal the negative impact of “modernizing” processes perpetrated in the name of universal advancement is not necessarily to be “against modernity,” as is sometimes suggested. Or for it for that matter. It is to subject its history to critical interrogation. 

    The point, surely, is to pay heed to the ineluctable fact that many disadvantaged people across the world desire what they understand by the modern — and, to the degree that they can, fashion their own versions of it, even as they live with its constraints and contradictions. Which is where the empirical fact of “multiple modernities” came from to begin with. Acknowledging the widespread yearning for the elusive promise of “progress,” patently, does not preclude recognizing its destructive effects, or challenging the Eurocentric myth that there is only one authentic, patented instance of it. Nor, by accepting that there may be more than one modernity, do we ipso facto neglect the real inequalities that exist between centers and margins, a legitimate fear expressed by James Ferguson (2006:33, 176f). It is not that people in the global south “lack modernity.” It is that many of them are deprived of the promise of modernization by the inherent propensity of capital to create edges and undersides in order to feed off them.

    Modernity, in short, is a concrete abstraction. It has realized, manifest forms, being a product of human activity, but also exists as a reified order of transactable value. In this sense, it is a Big Idea, refering both to something general and to things particular, both to the singular and to the plural. And to the relations between them. It embraces the tangible dimensions of life in specific times and places – and, simultaneously, connotes the epochal and the universal. Multivalent constructs of this kind are as integral to theory-work in the social sciences as they are to the everyday discourses of mass culture; the need to make sense of their practical semiosis would appear self-evident. Can one really argue, as Cooper does (2005:116), that to treat it as more than a vernacular category, or to elevate it to an abstraction at all, is to give it “artificial coherence”? What exactly is artificial about it, beyond the fact that every concept mobilized by the human sciences is, ultimately, an artifice? Why should it be that to recognize modernity to be one thing and many is to fall into “confusion” (ibid)?12 To bring this back to our own argument, it follows from what we have been saying that modernity in Africa is both a discursive construct and an empirical fact, both a singularity and a plurality, both a distinctive aspiration and a complicated set of realities, ones that speak to a tortuous endogenous history, still actively being made. A history, as it turns out, not running behind Euro-America, but ahead of it.

    The Global South: 

    This brings us to our second argument. Contrary to the received Euromodernist narrative of the past two centuries – which has the global south tracking behind the curve of Universal History, always in deficit, always playing catch up – there is good reason to think the opposite: that, in the here-and-now, it is the antipodes that tend first to feel the concrete effects of world-historical processes as they play themselves out, thus to prefigure the future of Euro-America. It is this that we seek to capture in our pointedly provocative, counter-evolutionary undertitle, How Euro-America is Evolving toward Africa.

    Put another way: while Euro-America and its antipodes are caught up in the same all-embracing world-historical processes, old margins are becoming new frontiers, places where mobile, globally-competitive capital finds minimally regulated zones in which to vest its operations; where industrial manufacture opens up ever more cost-efficient sites for itself; where highly flexible, informal economies – of the kind now expanding everywhere – have long thrived; where those performing outsourced services for the north develop cutting edge info-tech empires of their own, both legitimate and illicit; where new idioms of work, time, and value take root, thus to alter planetary practices. Which is why, in many respects, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America seem to be running ahead of the Euromodern world, harbingers of its history-in-the-making. And why the global north appears to be “evolving” southward.

    There are many dimensions to this, many cultural mediations: like the fact that European nation-states, having had to come to terms with demographic diversity and the realsociology of difference on an unprecedented scale, are beginning to resemble policultural postcolonies. Or the fact that European and North American legal systems, are becoming demonstrably more like African “customary” ones, which typically treat most breaches of the law, even homicides, as torts, not as crimes against the state. Or take what in South Africa is called “living politics” (Chance n.d.), a force to be reckoned with as unemployment and homelessness burgeon, as state services are privatized and class politics eclipsed, as ever larger populations are consigned to the limbo of transit camps. Here social action centers on what Arendt (1958:100), after Locke, termed “the condition of human life itself,” life vested in the quest for full membership in the polis. Like similarly assertive movements elsewhere, from Cochabamba to Mumbai, Chiapas to Cairo, the South African versions seek to secure what are glossed as the “services” required for a minimally dignified existence: clean water, housing, sanitation, medical care, basic income. Drawing on a diverse global archive — from Marx, Gandhi, and Fanon, through the Book of Revelations and the Zapatistas, to born-again faiths and human rights crusades – this species of social action is enabled by new social media, often intended explicitly to develop a critical consciousness. It also fosters novel modes of mass mobilization and, in some places, popular debate about the nature of theory and who ought rightly to be producing it (Desai 2002). These movements decry the limited horizons of procedural democracy and politics-as-usual. In large part, theirs is a post-colonial, post-totalitarian enterprise, informed by a legacy of struggle, often in sharp contrast to the north, where social critics frequently bemoan the loss of the political, or rue the cynicism that surrounds the idea of a public good. But the wave of protests against austerity measures recently introduced by national governments in Europe has brought something akin to a living politics to the streets of Athens and London. Under the sign of economic emergency, new progressive projects have been championed, among them, the push for society-wide basic income grants. Again, the south provides a paradigmatic model: Brazil’s Bolsa Famlia, a massive cash transfer program, initiated in 2003. Retooling social redistribution in the idiom of neoliberal “human capital,” it uses debit cards to make small monthly payments to poor families, usually to women, which are then augmented if they invest in such things as education and health services for their children (Morton n.d.).

    We could go on and on. Here, however, we are concerned with more general processes, processes that run to the very heart of contemporary capitalism and its moral economy: to the means of primary production associated with it, to its preferred forms of labor extraction, to its modes of accumulating wealth and signifying value, to its political and legal geographies, to its interpellation in the institutions of governance. In recent decades, capital, with its growing stress on flexibility, liquidity, and deregulation, has yet again found untapped bounty in former colonies, where postcolonial states, anxious to garner disposable income and often in desperate need of “hard” currency, have opened themselves up to business; specifically, to corporations – now often based in China, India, the Gulf – that have little compunction in pressuring ruling regimes to offer them tax incentives, to waive environmental controls, wage restrictions, and worker protections, to limit liability and discourage union activities, even to allow them to enclave themselves – in short, to bow to laissez faire at its most sovereign. As a result, it is largely in the south, Tom DeLay’s preferred “petri dish,” that the practical workings of neoliberalism have been tried and tested; in them that the outer bounds of its financial operations have been explored – thence to be re-imported to various Euro-American locales. 

    The north, of course, is now experiencing those practical workings ever more palpably as labor markets contract and employment is casualized, as manufacture moves away without warning, as big business seeks to coerce states to unmake eco-laws, to drop minimum wages, to subsidize its infrastructure from public funds, and to protect it from loss, liability, and taxation, as center-right governments cut public spending, public institutions, and public sector jobs;13 this, often, over unavailing protests from civil society. Which is why so many citizens of the West – of both laboring and middle classes – are having to face the insecurities and instabilities, even the forced mobility and disposability, long characteristic of life in the non-West. It is also why public intellectuals are now publishing mass-circulation books with titles like Third World America (Huffington 2010). The so-called “New Normal” of the north is replaying the recent past of the south, ever more in a major key.

    At the same time, some nation-states in the south, by virtue of having become economic powerhouses – India, Brazil, South Africa – evince features of the future of Euro-America in other ways, having opened up frontiers of their own and having begun to colonize the metropole: vide the seizure of global initiative in the biofuel economy by Brazil, or the reach of the Indian auto industry into Britain, or the impact of the Hong Kong banking sector on the development of new species of financial market. Or, in another register, the emergence of South Africa, a major force in the international mineral economy, as the America of Africa, eager to experiment with constitutional law, populist politics, and, if hesitantly, post-neoliberal forms of redistribution. Or, in yet another, the rise of new forms of urbanism, as in Nigeria, where, according to Joshua Comaroff and Gulliver Shepard (1999), “many of the trends of canonical, modern, Western cities can be seen in hyperbolic guise…Lagos is not catching up with us,” they show. “Rather, we may be catching up with Lagos.” That city, adds Rem Koolhaas, is “a paradigm for [the] future” of all cities. A “megalopolis” whose prime real estate is as expensive as property in Manhattan (Guo 2010:44), it is at “the forefront of globalizing modernity” (Koolhaas and Cleijne 2001:652-3). Note: not of an alternative modernity. Of modernity sui generis. The irony of this will be obvious to those familiar with Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other (1983). The question now is not whether the West ignores the “coevalness” – i.e. the contemporaneity – of the non-West with the West, which is what Fabian accused anthropology of doing. It is whether the West recognizes that it is playing catch-up with the temporality of its others.

    In large part, however, it is the lumpen end of the story that is worked out first in the south, where much of the working class of the world is dispersed. This, perhaps, accounts for the fact that some of the earliest critiques of the neoliberal turn – and the most skeptical responses to free market fundamentalism – have come from those very undersides (see e.g. Lomnitz 2006; Desai 2002; Amin 2010), this being yet another respect in which the global north has tracked behind its antipodean counterparts.15

    But why? Why has Africa in particular, and the south in general, come, in significant respects, to anticipate the unfolding history of Euro-America? Why, for good or ill, are the material, political, social, and moral effects of the rise of neoliberalism so graphically evident there? We have already begun to address the question: the answer begins with the past, with the fact that most colonies were zones of occupation geared toward imperial extraction. To the degree that neocolonial politics and economics have conspired to keep them that way, postcolonies have remained dependent and debt-strapped, tending still to export their resources as raw materials and unskilled labor rather than as value-added commodities or competencies; this even as some of them – like Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and, again, South Africa – have experienced real growth in their manufacturing industries, in their service sectors, and in urban consumer spending.16 Furthermore, (i) because large sectors of their populations have long worked under conditions designed to depress wages and disempower potentially dangerous classes, (ii) because market forces in Africa have never been fully cushioned by the existence of a liberal democratic state and its forms of regulation, and (iii) because governance there has frequently been based on kleptocratic patronage – all these things also being, in part, legacies of colonialism and its aftermath – African polities have been especially hospitable to rapacious enterprise: to asset stripping, to the alienation of the commons to privateers, to the plunder of personal property, to foreign bribe-giving. In sum, to optimal profit at minimal cost, with little infrastructural investment. 

    The rapid increase of foreign direct investment south of the Sahara over the past decade17 – capital inflows to Africa rose by 16 percent in 2008, while falling 20 percent worldwide (Guo 2010:44) – has led James Ferguson (2006:41), among others, to speculate that African countries might be less sites of “immature forms of globalization” than “‘advanced,’ sophisticated mutations of it.” A recent report on African economies by the McKinsey Global Institute supports this view (Roxburgh et al 2010; see n.10). So does Brenda Chalfin’s (2010) case-study of Ghana, which has become a “neoliberal pacesetter” (p.29) by putting into play new regulatory techniques at a time when customs mandates are expanding everywhere in response to burgeoning transnational trade. “Ghana…functions in many respects as a laboratory for the testing out and…shaping of global modalities of governance,” she notes (p.29-30). Again, for better or for worse, Africa is ahead of the curve. It is precisely the melange of its inherited colonial institutions and its availability to neoliberal development that make Ghana, and other nations of the south, a vanguard in the epoch of the market. As Newsweek put it in early 2010, Africa is “at the very forefront of emerging markets…Like China and India, [it is ] perhaps more than any other region,..illustrative of a new world order.”

    The US and Europe have colluded in this by imposing their future-vision – infamously, under the sign of structural adjustment – on Africa, Asia, and Latin America, inadvertently giving early warning of what would lie in store for themselves. George Stiglitz (2002) has argued that the doctrinaire insistence on the liberalization of trade and capital markets, along with the privatization of public assets, precipitated the Asian crisis of 1997, a history of failed development in Africa, and the meltdown of 2001 in Argentina. The fallout provided a chilling preview of the effects of the global economic implosion of 2008. In terms that now sound prophetic, Stiglitz described how the nations of the East were thrown into chaos; how, in order to protect international markets, the IMF rushed in with massive bailouts directed mainly at corporate creditors, leaving ordinary citizens to carry the costs; how financial stabilization rather than job creation became the prime objective (Stiglitz 2002:73). How was it that the over-analyzed Asian and Latin American financial crises, or the ill-effects of structural adjustment in Africa, sounded no warning bells for the future of the global north? Could it be because these things occurred outside of Euro-America? Because, blinkered by our own narratives of Universal History, we have simply been unable to see the coming counter-evolution, the fact, so to speak, that the north is going south?

    To be sure, the north had foretaste of the downsides of market fundamentalism well before the crisis of 2008. The contradictions that brought it to a head, after all, were long in the making: the relentless reduction of manufacturing heartlands into rustbelt wastelands has long traced the de-industrialization of Euro-America; recently, it has given rise to calls for re-industrialization, ironically, by repatriating Fordist manufacture exported to, and re-engineered in, the south – which, under present conditions, is a structural impossibility. Those contradictions also flash into the public eye dramatically from time to time. In the US, the implosion of Enron in 2004 made plain the fragility of an economy built on corporate voracity and voodoo accounting. (The Economist, a while back, rerred to all this as deja voodoo.) A year later, Hurricane Katrina revealed to middle Americans the hidden effects on national infrastructure of the unregulated privatization of many of the critical functions of state, not to mention the deep fissures of race and class among them. Brutal conflict in the banlieus of Paris, attacks on immigrants in the UK and Sweden, and the demonization of Muslims in much of Europe have played out similar themes, making clear how, despite their preoccupation with democracy and human rights, the nations of the north are witnessing rising tides of ethnic conflict and xenophobia; of violent criminality, rampant corruption in government and business, and shrinking, insecure labor markets; of afflicted middle classes, lumpen youth, and much more besides (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006a, 2006b). Africa, it seems, is becoming a global condition (cf. Watney 1990). Or, at least, Africa as imagined in Euro-America. Its own reality is rather more complex. And, like that of late capitalist modernity at large, not all dark. 

    Just as it has been in the past, the continent is also a source of inventive responses to the contingencies of our times, responses driven by a volatile mix of necessity, possibility, deregulation, and space-time compression. Hence, among other things, the extraordinary, if uneven expansion of its formal sectors and endogenous capital, the massive growth of “informal” commerce, the rise of profitable economies built on counterfeit and mimicry, the emergence of new modes of service provision, and the swelling traffic in care, security, intimacy, affect. The south has also led the way in the efflorescence of “ethnoprise,” what elsewhere we term Ethnicity, Inc. (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). The boom in the identity economy is having thoroughgoing implications for the ways in which ordinary people experience collective being, social capital, and political attachment. And it is diffusing northward, toward those metropoles that once saw themselves as above and beyond ethnic parochialism. As this suggests, the global south is producing and exporting some ingenious modes of survival – and more. It is often those adversely affected by modernity who recommission its means most effectively and most radically, thus also to bring to light long suppressed elements of its intrinsic nature. Indeed, it is precisely this dialectic that has pushed Africa, Asia, and Latin America to the vanguard of the epoch, making them the contemporary frontiers of capitalism – which, in its latest, most energetic phase, to reiterate, thrives in environments in which the protections of liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the labor contract are, at best, uneven.

    It is here that our two theses converge: here where the first, the claim that modernity in Africa exists sui generis, not as a derivative of the Euro-original, meets the second, the counter-evolutionary assertion that, in the history of the present, the global south is running ahead of the global north, a hyperbolic prefiguration of its future-in-the-making. Note, in this regard, that, just a month ago, the South African Minister of Education unveiled a “Charter for Social Theory.” The time has come, he said, for the south to take a lead in the production of social science theory, all the better to understand the perplexing times in which we now live. This at the very moment when, across the global north, governments are closing down sites of intellectual production and becoming increasingly anti-theory. Perhaps Euro-America is not evolving toward Africa quickly enough.

    Coda

    What might be the impact of all of this for the very idea of the “Global South? What do we actually mean by the term?

    Despite the fact that it has replaced “the third world” as a more-or-less popular usage, the label itself is inherently slippery, inchoate, unfixed. At its simplest, the shift expresses the collapse of the tripartite divisions of the Cold War era, in which there were two major ideological paradigms for configuring the political economy of modernity – each with its “less developed” others. In the age of neoliberal capitalism, the measure of modernization is more crass: it lies everywhere in success or failure in the global marketplace. In the upshot, “the South,” technically speaking, has more complex connotations than did the World formerly Known as “Third.” It describes a polythetic category, its members sharing one or more – but not all, or even most – of a diverse set of features. The closest thing to a common denominator among them is that many were once colonies or protectorates, albeit not necessarily during the same epochs (cf. Coronil 2004). “Postcolonial,” therefore, is something of a synonym, but only an inexact one. What is more, like all indexical categories, “the global south” assumes meaning by virtue not of its content, but of its context, of the way in which it points to something else in a field of signs – in this instance, to its antinomy to “the global north,” an opposition that carries a great deal of imaginative baggage congealed around the contrast between centrality and marginality, free-market modernity and its absence. Patently, this opposition takes on a hard-edged political and economic reality in some institutional contexts, like the G-8 and world bond and credit markets. But it obscures as much as it describes. 

    Two things in particular. 

    We have already alluded to both. The first is that a number of nation-states of the south, far from being marginal to the global economy, are central to it. Although this is not reducing mass immiseration or lowering Gini coefficents in those places, it does ensure that they will become ever more integral to the operations of capital, not to mention cultural imaginations, across the planet. However it may be imagined, as Balibar puts it (2004:14; cf. Krotz 2005:149), “the line of demarcation between ‘North’ and ‘South,’ between zones of prosperity and power and zones of ‘development of underdevelopment,’ is not actually drawn in a stable way.” Per contra, that line is, at best, porous, broken, often illegible. Even if it could be definitively drawn, moreover, many nation-states defy easy categorization: On which side, for example, do the countries of the former USSR fall? Or, if economic development is the primary criterion, where are we to place those powerhouses to which we keep returning, the likes of India, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria, which seem to straddle the cleavage between hemispheres? And this is not to mention the most portentous player of all, China. On the one hand, these are among the more dynamic economies on the planet. Yet, still being highly polarized, they are geo-scapes – microcosms of the north-south divide, if you will — in which enclaves of wealth and order feed off, and sustain, large stretches of scarcity, violence, and exclusion. Which is also true, increasingly, of Euro-America. In short, there is much south in the north, much north in the south, and more of both to come in the future.

      The second thing, which follows as both cause-and-effect of the inchoateness of the line between the hemispheres, is the deep structural articulation – indeed, the mutual entailment – of their economies. This, after all, is what makes global capitalism global, not merely international. Not only are the working classes of Euro-America, those who produce its means of consumption, situated ever more at southern margins, but, as we have noted, southern capital buttresses, even owns, many signature Euro-American businesses, all of which is yet further complicated by the world of finance, whose labyrinthine capillaries defy any attempt to unravel them along geopolitical axes. In the complex hyphenation that links economy to governance and both to the enterprises of everyday life, then, the contemporary world order rests on a highly flexible, inordinately intricate web of synapses, a web that both reinforces and eradicates, both sharpens and ambiguates, the lines between hemispheres. As a result, what precisely is north, and what south, becomes ever harder to pin down. All the more so as Euro-America evolves toward the world of its former colonies. 

    Which is why “the global south” cannot be defined, a priori, in substantive terms. The label bespeaks a relation, not a thing in or for itself. It is a labile signifier whose content is determined by everyday material and political processes. Conceptually, though, to return to the point made by Homi Bhabha (1994b:6), whatever it may connote at any given moment – whether or not it retains any value as an analytic category, which, for us, it does not — it always points to an “ex-centric” location, an outside to Euro-America. For our purposes here, its importance lies in that ex-centricity: in the angle of vision it provides us from which to estrange our world in its totality in order better to make sense of its present and future.

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  • The End of Neoliberalism

    The End of Neoliberalism

    This essay was initially written by John Comaroff as an opening comment for a roundtable discussion at the Johannesburg Workshop in Theory and Criticism on “The End of Neoliberalism? What is Left of the Left?” in 2009. The published version is to be found in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 637(1):141-147, 2011, special edition on Race, Religion, and Democracy, (eds.) John L. Jackson and David Kyuman Kim.


    Two Marks, neither of them Marxist or even Marxoid, set the coordinates of my remarks today. The one, Mark Twain, notwithstanding his towering literary legacy, has become an American cliche for his famous one-liner about untimely obituaries and deaths-prematurely-pronounced – in particular, the deaths of people who evince distinctly more vigor than mortis. The other is Groucho. You may well recall one of his more famous moments: playing Doctor Hackenbush in A Day at the Races (1927), Groucho finds a patient lying supine on the floor, takes the unconscious man’s wrist in his hand, puts his timepiece to his ear, listens briefly, and says, “Either he is dead or my watch has stopped.”

    The double analogy is rich. Is neoliberalism dead? Or have our watches stopped? More to the point, are we watching for the right symptoms as homo economicus capitalis lies prostrate? Or are our fingers pressed to the wrong pulse, drawing our attention to an entirely false unconsciousness, thus to mistake it for mortality? Are the obituaries being written in some quarters more than a little premature? Pardon the play here. Itis intended to underscore the deadly seriousness of the question.

    That question has been posed in a number of ways. Here we are asked to reflect on whether neoliberalism has reached its “ultimate limits” – and with what implications for the future of politics, culture, the Left. Are we really witnessing the “demise of capita- lism” as we currently know it? Interestingly, this last phrase, “the demise of capitalism,” appeared thrice in the op ed pages of the The Guardian in England on one day in late June 2009 – in each instance as a provocation, a call to make sense, more broadly, of the current moment in the unfolding history of capital.

    Let me begin with a caveat. For all the fact that Jean Comaroff and I have written a great deal about neoliberalism, I am uncomfortable talking, in this conversation, about the term in its noun form. Why? Because, thus reified, it takes on the denotation of a concrete abstraction, an accomplished object, a totalizing ideological formation; even, in its temporal dimension, an epoch, one that may be deemed present or past. For me, the adjective, “neoliberal,” is much easier to grasp discursively and politically, since it may be taken to describe a tendency, a more-or-less realized, more-or-less articulated, unevenly distributed ensemble of attributes discernible in the world; in the active voice, as adverb, it connotes an aspiration, a species of practice, a process of becoming – however unbecoming that process may be to our eyes. It is on the basis of this under- standing of “the neoliberal,” at once adjectival and adverbial, that I seek to parse the history of the present: In what measure have recent tendencies in that history run their course? Are they still with us? If so, in what proportions and in what guises? Or are we seeing unfold before us a tectonic shift of the long run?

    My own reading, uncharacteristically, is cautious. It runs sharply against the grain of what is being whispered in some nooks and crannies of the Left in the US academy – of which, sadly, there is not much left. It also runs against my deepest well of political desire: I want to see millennial hope in this moment; I want to see radical change emerge from some of the more egregious contradictions of neoliberal capitalism come visibly home to roost; I want to see the so-called “masters of the universe” punished for their grotesque excesses, their self-serving, often venal practices, their structural crimes against humanity; I want, also, to see neocon scholar-ideologues, among them those of my Chicago colleagues who put the con in modern economics, finally having to admit to the error of their ways. There is also some grim satisfaction, having written about millennial capitalism a decade ago,1 in seeing the processes that we identified then coming to full fruition – although when life begins to imitate anthropology, know that the world really is in deep distress, that the faeces really have hit the air-conditioner. But desires and satisfactions are one thing, diagnostics quite another.

    While the world economic crisis of 2008-9 might well kill off neoliberalism as a global ideological project – here, patently, in the noun form – it could well leave the capillaries of the beast, less Leviathan than Great White Shark, largely intact. Indeed, the “meltdown” and its aftermath may see the planet less, not more, open to alternati- ves to the neoliberal tendency – albeit with significant “corrections,” as some econom- ists are already calling it. I am reminded here, simultaneously, of Reinhart Koselleck and the Manchester School of Anthropology in Central Africa: Koselleck, because he drew attention to the dialectics of crisis, critique, and correction; the Manchester School, because it demonstrated the capacity of cycles of rupture and their repair to reproduce social systems and the order of values on which they are predicated.2 Crisis, self-evi- dently, is not always reproductive. But it frequently is. As Mike Davis has noted, “apo- calypse” tends often to be absorbed relatively quickly into the history of the everyday, a process he describes as the “dialectic of ordinary disaster.”3

    Already, as talk grows of “green shoots” sprouting in the wake of the economic devastation of the past year or so, there are signs of both: of both crisis-driven-critique in pursuit of “correction,” and of a return to the “ordinary.” In the respect of the first, dis- courses of correction have come both from liberal and conservative sources. Thus, for example, the now-celebrated edition of Harper’s Magazine of November 2008, which bore a feature on “How to Save Capitalism: Fundamental Fixes for a Collapsing Sys- tem.” In it, the likes of James Galbraith, Joseph Stiglitz, and others, most of them with impeccable liberal credentials, suggested a range of strategies by means of which to ensure that capitalism might re-emerge relatively unscathed. They prescribed such cures as reforming the tax system,4 banning stock options as incentives,5 bringing into line the self-interest of the banking sector with those of the economy and society at large,6 finding regulatory means to harness both the risk-laden excesses of the finance industry and the tendency to favor short-run profiteering over longer-term wealth production.7 Only one contributor to the debate, Eric Janszen – ironically, a venture capitalist – took a more radical line: he argued for a return to industrial capitalism, pointing out that all recent bubbles-and-busts are owed to government creating conditions for mammoth, “metastaz[ing]” markets in financial speculation.8

    Janszen apart, these efforts to “save capitalism” are symptomatic of a rush of similar liberal writings on the topic. Few of them – the notable exception being Gillian Tett’s extraordinary Fool’s Gold9 – delve very deeply into the archaeology of the crisis itself or, more generally, into the inner workings of a global political economy whose complexity has increased exponentially over the past couple of decades. As a result, most seek solutions along its outer surfaces. They posit adjustments that might limit the material excesses of the neoliberal tendency, and, in particular, the market instabilities and conflicts of interest to which those excesses give rise. This, itself, is a function of the pervasive practice of explaining all economic processes these days by recourse to one or another kind of utilitarian theory; which is why the four Causes of the Apocalyp- se, as John Lanchester10 has pointed out, are almost invariably taken to be “greed, stupidity, government, and the banks.” Not anything in the structure of contemporary capitalism itself. The pursuit of explanations and panaceas in such terms, as we might expect, has its parallel on the right, most notably perhaps in Richard Posner’s A Failure of Capitalism, a salvo from the Halls of Friedmania.11 Note, not The Failure, definite article, but merely A Failure. Posner, predictably – and, in light of Tett’s account, spuri- ously – argues that individuals in the finance industry acted perfectly rationally in the years before the crisis. That crisis, in his view a fully-fledged “depression,” is blamed, as predictably, on bad government – and, much less predictably, on ill-considered, perfectible forms of deregulation. His “corrections,” though, belong to the same genus as those proffered by liberal economists: establish new forms of regulation that reduce the conflict between the rational self-interest of economic actors and the commonweal – the invisible old hand here, of course, being the economist of invisible hands, Adam Smith. In the final analysis, from this vantage, the point is to perfect free market economies by establishing the regulatory environment most conducive to a successfully deregulated world.

    In the meantime – and this where the second thing, the “dialectic of the ordinary” becomes salient – for all the talk of the urgent need for “correction,” signs are that we are seeing a tangible return to business-as-usual, even bad-faith business. This is in spite of the fact that, without new forms of regulation, yet worse crises appear inevita- ble, in spite of worsening employment statistics, of rapidly rising poverty, and much more besides. The current buzz word in the City of London, in late June 2009, was “BAB”: “bonuses are back.” And, with them, the forms of finance capital from which they emanate. Listen to Jonathan Freedland, writing also of Britain:12 “Nine months ago, the financial crisis seemed certain to bring a revolution in our economy…Change had to be on the way.” The ghost of Keynes was rising. But now “look what’s happened…[Just] when the world seemed ready to bury the neoliberal regime…we have returned to [its ways and means].” With a vengeance.

    In sum, despite the stream of assertions over the past year that the crisis would have deep transformative effects, putting an end to the “neoliberal regime,” most indica- tors suggest otherwise. For one thing, the massive infusions of money into the banking industry and mega-business on the part of national governments have occurred without any of the regulatory initiatives that were promised to follow. Yet again, public funds are being diverted into the private sector, underscoring the fact that capital continues to take its profits but not shoulder its concomitant losses; a curious denouement, this, to the rise of Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society.13 To be sure, state intervention into the economy is not currently pointed in the direction of a “New New Deal,” but away from it. It has been intended to “save” the corporate world, not secure civil society or ordinary citizens from the predations of the market; the pledge of measures that might protect those citi- zens immiserated by the crash, never substantial to begin with, have gone largely un- realized. We are plainly not witnessing a return to social democracy, let alone the gene- sis of a new age of nationalization; note, in this respect, that many of the nation-states of the global north – the USA aside, due in major part to the singularity of the Obama “moment” – are moving (further) to the right. Which may be why there have been so few legislative enactments anywhere promulgated to curb the practices that sparked the meltdown in the first place: per contra, while market forces have made it harder to ne- gotiate toxic assets and to take some of the more extravagant gambles in the business of finance, the investment industry is widely reported not merely to have returned to its old ways, but to be inventing new “products” without any palpable constraint. The deri- vatives trade, it seems, is rising again. So, too, are the ramparts around “economic libe- ralism.” A recent leader in The Economist argues that, notwithstanding “the biggest eco- nomic calamity in 80 years…the free-market paradigm…deserves a robust defence.”14

    Nor are these the only signs that the capillaries of the neoliberal tendency, and the “free-market paradigm,” continue to embrace us. There are many others. Some are obvious, like the continuing dominance of the corporate sector: its relative immunity from most legal challenge, even when its enterprises violate the being, bodies, belong- ings, or bio-environment of ordinary citizens; its enjoyment of favorable taxation regi- mes and, increasingly, the use of laws of eminent domain to expand its horizons; the protection of its physical, financial, and intellectual property, sometimes by recourse to police violence, as an ostensible function of the collective good; its capacity to influence the disposition of the public treasury and public policy and, reciprocally, to have insur- gent action directed against it prosecuted as common crime – like, for example, in mass protests against the privatization of such “natural” assets as water and land. Other signs are less obvious, like the growing hegemony of legal orders, founded on constitutions of distinctly neoliberal design,15 that favor individual rights over collective well-being; that limit the responsibility of government to protect or provision its citizens; that tend to cri- minalize race, poverty, and counter-politics, in part by outlawing the salience of social cause or consequence; that subject what were once everyday democratic processes to the finality of judicial action, thereby juridifying politics to the exclusion of other forms of social action; that displace the “hot” sovereignty of the people into the “cold” sovereignty of the law; that treat all citizens as rational, self-interested, rights-bearing actors – and the world as a community of contract.

    I could go on in this vein. To do so, however, would be to risk stating the obvi- ous. But allow me one observation. Perhaps the most significant capillaries of the neo- liberal that remain with us have to do with the state and governance. Foucauldians would prefer “governmentality” here; they have a point. Broadly speaking, neoliberal etatism seems to be surviving well, even strengthening, in most places. As Foucault himself explained in The Birth of Biopolitics,16 the rise of neoliberalism – his use of the noun – marked a radical transformation: whereas before the state, amongst its various bureaucratic operations, “monitored” the workings of the economy, its “organizing prin- ciple” is now the market. Government actually has become business. And nation-states have become holding companies in and for themselves. In the upshot, the categorical distinction between politics and economics, that classical liberal fiction, is largely erased. Effective governance, in turn, is measured with reference to asset management, to the attraction of enterprise, to the facilitation of the entrepreunial activities of the citizen as homo economicus, and to the capacity to foster the accumulation (but not the redis- tribution) of wealth. Under these conditions, heads of state begin to resemble, and often actually are, CEOs who treat the population as a body of shareholders; vide Silvio Ber- lusconi, who explicitly speaks of Italy as a company, or Dmitri Medvedev, head of Gaz- prom, Russia’s mightiest business and a major instrument of its foreign policy. There is a more profound point here. Once upon a time, anti-neoliberal theory posited an oppo- sition between state and the free market, arguing that the antidote to the latter lay in the active intervention of the former. But the opposition is false, just another piece of the detritus of the modern history of capital. As states become mega-corporations – Krem- lin, Inc., Britain, PLC, South Africa, Pty Ltd., Dubai, Inc., all of them, incidentally, brand- ed and legally incorporated – they become inextricably part of the workings of the mar- ket and, hence, no longer an “outside,” an antidote or an antithesis, from which to re- think or reconstruct “the neoliberal paradigm.” Which, in part, is why government is in- creasingly reduced to as an exercise in the technical management of capital, why ideo- logically-founded politics appear dead, replaced by the politics of interest and entitle- ment and identity, three counterpoints of a single triangle. And why the capillaries of neoliberal governance seem so firmly entrenched in the cartography of our everyday lives, there to remain for the foreseeable future. To the degree that any future is fore- seeable.

    None of this is to suggest that neoliberal economics will persist unchanged. It is quite possible that we will see some minor re-regulation of the finance industry, especi- ally in favor of long-term wealth-generation against short-term profiteering; marginally greater citizen protection against the cons of corporate world, particular in the domain of credit; adjustments to regimes of taxation; and further state intervention into the market under the guise of public-private initiatives. Anything more? Hard to say. But it is not highly likely. Not unless a counter-politics, a praxis of deep insurgency, impels us tow- ard a history of the future distinctly different from the one we are living in the continuous present. Only time will tell whether, and whence, that might arise.

    In this respect, a final thought.

    History has taught us repeatedly to be humble before it, a lesson as apposite today as it has ever been. If we are to seek out possible alternatives to the neoliberal tendency, if we are to fashion other futures, it is critical to grasp fully the nature of the beast, of its capillaries and their effects not just on our lives but on our thought process- es. After all, those forces covered by the adjective “neoliberal,” not to mention its ad- verbs of practice, are no less colonizing than the forms of empire to which the global south has been subjected before now. As Frantz Fanon might have insisted, decoloniz- ing our habits of thinking – sometimes by a violent reconsideration of its most foundatio- nal assumptions – is the first step to decolonizing the world into which history has inter- pellated us.

  • The End of Anthropology, Again

    The End of Anthropology, Again

    The “End of Anthropology” has been predicted many times, and for many different reasons – among them, its disappearing object study, its political imbrication in colonialism, the loss of its distinctive concepts, and the effects of globalization in diffusing its received subject matter. And yet, both institutionally and discursively, the discipline is very much alive, producing new species of knowledge, new theoretical discourses, new empirical interests, new arguments. How, in light of this, do we read the history of its present? By what means is its “end” to be avoided, its future/s assured? Where should it go from here, empirically, methodologically, theoretically? One answer lies in a new indiscipline, a discourse that, in dialectic tension with the contemporary world in which it is embedded, redefines the scale, the conceptual foundations, the techniques of knowledge production of anthropology.


    Published in American Anthropologist, 112(4):524-538, 2010. [Reprinted in The End of Anthropology? (eds.) Holger Jebens and Karl-Heinz Kohl. Wantage, UK: Sean Kongston Publishing, 2011; also, excerpted, in Anthropology in Theory: Issues in Epistemology, 2nd edition, (eds.) Henrietta L. Moore and Todd Sanders. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2013.]


    John Comaroff
    University of Chicago
    American Bar Foundation


    In May 1971, I underwent an initiation rite, one that stripped me all but naked before the world. This was the day on which I had finally to deal with the trauma of becoming adult. I refer to my very first job interview, at the University of Wales. To be honest, I had some forewarning. It came in the guise of an ethnographic film. Actually, the movie was styled as a farce, but I know high realism when I see it. Entitled Only Two Can Play,1 its high point was a job interview for the position of sub-librarian. In a Welsh town. Both the committee and its questions were notable for their absurdity: a few involved plumbing, one, how best to treat a woman who asked to borrow Lady Chatterley’s Lover. This should have primed me. When my turn came to meet my inquisitors, I faced a dean, a priest, an archaeologist, and an elderly matron, who, I think, represented the local community. Her name was Mrs. Evans. Their queries ranged widely. Had I, as a youth in South Africa, played rugby? This, clearly, was a job requirement. Did I take drugs? Whether that was also a requirement was less clear. What was my political past? In Wales, rugby is politics, so those two questions were really the same. The clincher came from Mrs. Evans. “I read somewhere,” she said, “that anthropology is becoming extinct.” I waited for the interrogative. There was none. Instead, excruciating silence. The question was left hanging. I was caught totally unawares. Could this everywoman from the Celtic fringe have read Margaret Mead, Levi-Strauss, and others who believed that our discipline might die with the demise of the last primitive? Had she come to the same conclusion by a parallel process of induction? Of course, she could simply have been confusing anthropology for something else with the prefix anth-. Like anthropophagy, cannibalism. That, however, did not occur to me at the time. My reply was wholly vacuous. As it happens, I got the job, probably because I was the only candidate who actually had played rugby. But I left the room deep in thought: What are the conditions that kill off a discipline? Or ensure its continued life? So, although Mrs. Evans is long dead and I am almost forty years late, here at last is my answer to what I take to have been her question: Is anthropology about to die? Wherein lies the future of its extinction?

    Few believe any longer that our continued existence depends on the perpetuity of the primitive or the survival of le savage. As long as there are human beings living on the planet we will, in principle at least, have an object of study. And after that, who cares? More seriously, the real question is not external to anthropology. It is internal. (Well, largely internal. As we all know, some of its “natives” have long censured the subject for being a brute instrument of Empire; or worse, the regime of knowledge on which colonial capitalism was founded. Which, in turn, has ensured our exile from a good part of the postcolonial world – although now that the politics of identity have made a return, so has anthropology, the human science that dignifies difference.) As Clifford Geertz (1988:71) once suggested, we do seem to suffer from a proclivity for the auto-pathological; he referred to it as “epistemological hypochondria.” And yet, while we appear to stagger from one self-inflicted crisis to the next, anthropology lives on to tell the tale: it evinces palpably more than mortis. Indeed, it is almost as though we actually require to look disciplinary death in the face in order to survive. Perhaps, with apologies to vampires and anti-functionalists everywhere, imminent demise is our necessary life-blood. After all, as Becket (2008:50) observes in his analysis of the long history of the concept – recalling Koselleck (1988) and Williams (1983:84-6) – crisis and critique are closely connected, both alike a potential source of animation and emancipation. To the degree that ours is a critical practice, then – and it is not always that, by any means – it will always be imbricated in crises. Perhaps intermittent iterations of the End of Anthropology do not portend oblivion so much as prevent it. 

    I shall not dwell on the archaeology of anthropological crisis here, since it is the future with which I am primarily concerned. But just a few words. As Matti Bunzl (2008:54-55) reminds us, the 1960’s and 70’s put paid to the hegemony of British structural functionalism and American culture and personality, the two enduring orthodoxies of 20th-century anthropology. Both decomposed under the cumulative insurgency of colonial and postcolonial literary theory, of early feminist anthropology, of anthropological hermeneutics, of various species of Marxism, Derridean deconstruction, and Foucauldian post-structuralism. For my own generation, though, it was the colonial critique that was most devastating. It held that the entire theoretical scaffolding of anthropological knowledge was rotten to the core:2 its commitment to closed systems, to holism and homeostatic models, to the representation of the social by analogy to the biological, to reproductive process rather than dialectics, to an inherent idealism, and, in America, to an ahistorical, apolitical concept of culture were all said to be corollaries of the racialization of difference, not to mention the radical “othering” (cf. Fabian 1983), at the dark heart of the discipline. Hence Peter Rigby’s critique, which bore the title African Images: Racism and the End of Anthropology. This critique was simultaneously political, ethical, epistemic. It called for a new kind of praxis, another meta-narrative to replace the liberal idealism that had entrapped anthropology: for less crypto-empiricism, more critical theory; less localism, more contextualization in both space and time; less hermeneutics, more materiality; less description, more explanation. 

    By contrast, for the next anthropological generation, especially in the USA, crisis-talk gave voice to a very different sensibility, a sensibility, in retrospect, not unrelated to the rise of neoliberalism. It began, famously, with the publication of Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986; cf. also Marcus and Fisher 1999; Marcus 2008), which congealed into a single discourse many of the diverse impulses that had led to the implosion of prevailing paradigms (cf. Bunzl 2008:54-55). Whatever may be said on either side of the debate, it had a palpable impact on the discipline – this largely by railing against metanarratives sui generis; against the authority of the authorial; against the finality of any representation; against generalization and, for the most part, explanation. Against culture, except in the most anti-coherent, contingent, contested sense (Abu-Lughod 1991:147). Against exoticism, closure, dialectics, determination. Against theory. For partial truths (Clifford 1986) and provisional readings (Crapanzano 1986). For ethnography as textuality. Toward a new empiricism of ever greater descriptive complexity. 

    There have been counter-arguments, of course. They stress the depoliticizing, dematerializing, unwittingly conservative tendencies of this kind of anthropology. And its reduction of ethnography to a solipsistic literary practice, one so obsessively reflexive as to be of no interest to anybody outside of itself (cf. Sangren 1988). There has also been a great deal written since 1986 that has looked elsewhere for its theoretical and critical inspiration; notable, in this regard, being the important work, in the 1990’s, of feminist (e.g. Behar and Gordon 1995) and black scholars (e.g. Harrison 1991). I shall have more to say about anthropology after 1986. My point here, simply, is that much of the talk of the future of the discipline in the present – and the substantive responses it has elicited – is haunted by some of the issues that surfaced during the Writing Culture moment (cf. Marcus 2008). To be sure, there is a direct line to be drawn between that moment and the symptoms taken by disciplinary pessimists, of which I am emphatically not one, to be prognostic of the End of Anthropology. 

    TRIAGE: THREE SYMPTOMATOLOGIES OF CRISIS

    Let me deal briefly with just the three most commonly cited of those symptoms. 

    The first is that the discipline has lost its brand – I use the commodity metaphor pointedly – in the form of its signature method, ethnography; its root concepts, especially culture; its research terrain, namely, comparative societies, in particular, non-Western societies; and its paradigmatic theoretical landscape. In respect of method, goes the angst, many sociologists, political scientists, social psychologists, humanists, even some economists, claim these days to “do…ethnography,” the practice constitutive of our discipline (Geertz 1973:5). What is more, ethnographic technique itself – which, like all qualitative methodologies, has long been under siege from the “hard” social sciences – has become more inchoately imagined than it was in generations past, which may be why so many “how to” manuals are being produced (e.g. Hobbs and Wright 2006; Atkinson et al 2001), why so many anthropology departments have added courses on the topic over the past decade,3 why anthropologists sometimes lament how “thin” has become its modal practice,4 why so much institutional effort is being given to its defense. In the US, the National Science Foundation has created what it calls, appositely in our market-driven academy, a Cultural Anthro Methods Mall: an on-line facility intended “to provide skills to current and future colleagues who are conducting scientific research in cultural anthropology.”5 

    As with method, so with concepts.“ While emblematic of…the discipline,” argues George Marcus (2008:3), echoing many others, culture “is longer viable analytically”;6 to wit, its use is typically hedged around with caveats about what it is not being taken to signify. Furthermore, as it has become commonplace to point out, the concept has disseminated itself quite promiscuously. Corporate law firms have courses on it. Sports teams invoke it. Nations brand it. But, most of all, “natives” insist on claiming it for themselves, often trademarking it, sometimes even charging scholars who study it (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). Worse yet, other disciplines have muscled in on it. And, if that were not enough, our research terrain, “society” and its cognates (social order, system, organization), have been eroded from a number of sides. Existentially, for one. “There is no such thing as society,” Margaret Thatcher, organic voice of the 80’s, said famously to Woman’s Own magazine,7 anticipating Bruno Latour by several years. It was a view that had deep echoes across both the lay and the scholarly world, heralding not merely the age of the market, but also an age in which non-societal metaphors would come to describe the domain vacated by a Durkheimean sense of the social: terms like network, community, civility, citizenship, biosociality;8 terms, again, that cannot be claimed for itself by anthropology. But even if we leave the existence of society aside, it is impossible, in this epoch of anti-system, of anti-totalization and indeterminacy, to envisage any anthropologist believing that she or he would be taken seriously were they to rest an analysis on the concept. As with everything else, we can use it in its adjectival form to describe a contingent practice or a process, but not as an abstract noun – we may speak of the social, not of society, of the cultural, not of culture (cf. Appadurai 1996:13) – which, I shall argue, actually does have a positive point to it. And something to say about a distinctive future for anthropology. 

    The adjectivalization of our concepts, the suspension of the noun-form, and, with it, the flight from abstraction, points toward the idea that anthropology is threatened as well by the erasure of its exclusive theoretical landscape. Englund and Leach (2000) have argued, in effect, that any theory-work which does much more than serve as a vehicle for vernacular voice, consciousness, or cognized experience is the illegitimate spawn of “[Euro-metropolitan] modernity,” of its “metanarrative.” As such, it undermines the authority, and the claims to an authentic identity, of our “native” subjects (p.225) – and, hence, calls into question our raison d’être. As Jean Comaroff and I (2003) have countered, this is a position at once incoherent and self-negating. But it has some real support among those scarred by accusations of “othering.” And among those unwilling to be tarred as “modernists,” let alone as functionalists, structuralists, or Marxists. Perhaps it is this unwillingness that has made so much of the discipline theory-averse and, beyond descriptive-analysis of the most limited, self-referential sort, explanation-phobic. Perhaps it is this, too, that has led George Marcus (2008:2) to declare that anthropology is “in suspension”: that it has “no new ideas, and none on the horizon, [that there is] no indication that its traditional stock of knowledge shows any signs of revitalization,” and that its best work has been energized less from its interiors than from its borders with feminist studies, media studies, postcolonial studies, science studies, and the like. To the extent that this is true – a matter to which I shall return – it is unlikely that our concepts and constructs, our propositions and dispositions, will ever again be subsumed within an exclusive disciplinary paradigm. They may be political or philosophical or ethical or social, generically-speaking, but not specifically anthropological. 

    The second symptom said to prognose the End of Anthropology follows closely. It is that, by contrast to other disciplines, which retain distinctive empirical terrains, we have no real subject matter of our own any longer. Why can an account of, say, the Indian advertising industry (Mazzarella 2003) not be as authoritatively done in cultural studies? Or one of fraudulent elections in Nigeria (Apter 1999) by a political scientist? Or one of fatwa councils in Egypt (Agrama 2005) by an Islamic law and society specialist? Or one of clothing and adornment in Africa (Hendricksen 1996) by an art historian. Or one of casino capitalism in Native America (Cattelino 2008) by an economist. The answer is that they could be. Some have been. Which simply compounds the angst. Hence the third symptom of crisis: that, having relinquished its object of study – namely, local “societies” or “cultures” – the subject matter of anthropology has diffused itself into anything and everything, anywhere and everywhere, and hence is about nobody or nothing or nowhere in particular. Marshall Sahlins, commented recently that anthropology appears to have become little more than the production of “thin” ethnographic accounts of the myriad, dispersed effects of global capitalism.9 These days, he added, there are forensic journalists who cover the same topics as do we, often better. It is true that, in South Africa, the most memorable recent ethnography of prison gangs is the work of one such journalist (Steinberg 2004), who treats their symbolic economy, their iconography, their legal anthropology, and their socio-material existence with extraordinary “thickness.” 

    The point? That, while Sahlins may have exaggerated somewhat to make a rhetorical point, his remark – which arises out of a genuine fear for the extinction of anthropology – packs a powerful punch. Prima facie, a discipline that takes to doing work which could as well be done, and be done as well, by journalists, technicians of ephemera, is indeed one without a distinctive subject, distinctive theoretical concepts, distinctive methods, or a distinctive place in the disciplinary division of labor. A discipline that hardly exists at all, in fact, other than as an institutional trace waiting to be erased.

    How, then, is anthropology responding to the threat of its banalization, its dissipation, its annihilation, real or imagined? What may we make of those responses? Are they likely to avert the End of Anthropology by charting new Ends for Anthropologists? Or are they merely deferring the inevitable?

    Before I answer, two parentheses. 

    One is this. While we attend here to the End of Anthropology, other disciplines may equally be said to be in crisis. Take economics. It may have become the most influential knowledge regime on the planet. But, to the degree that its theoretical models seek to account for and predict outcomes in the real world, it remains, well, a pretty dismal science. Hence the growing recognition, exacerbated by the global meltdown of 2008, that most economists get things badly wrong most of the time. This, says James Galbraith, is because they remain wedded to a “theoretical model that has been shown to be fundamentally useless.”10 Even Richard Posner (2009:231), leading scholar-ideologue of the law and economics movement, speaks of the “crisis of ‘08″ as a “wake-up call to the economics profession,” a view recently echoed by the Economist.11 Not that its spectacular capacity for error has had much practical effect: it continues to perpetrate its theories on living societies, whatever the consequences – among them, the political, social, ecological, and moral havoc wrought as a result of rising corporate power and the massive concentration of wealth in relatively few hands in recent decades. Thus, for example, a 2008 survey by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization12 reported that a billion people would go seriously hungry in 2009, despite “bumper harvests,” primarily because they cannot afford the cost of food; because currency depreciations in the global south have prevented those who most need it benefitting from falling basic commodity prices; because, despite soaring agrochemical and biotech profits, fertilizer and seed are priced beyond the means of most non-Western farmers; because, with shrinking job markets across the global north, migrants are losing their jobs and, with it, their ability to send remittances home; because, in other words, the confident axioms of free-market economics have been proven catastrophically untrue. This, in part, is why the so-called Post-Autistic movement of French economists seeks to “liberate” the discipline from its “obsession with formal models [with] no obvious empirical reference.” Post-Autism challenges the “neoclassical mainstream” to embrace the analysis of non-market phenomena, of human intersubjectivity, and of “cultural and social fields” (Fullbrook 2003:17, 22f), a view, apparently, shared by a growing number of economists elsewhere too. Could it be that the next step for them, their way out of their own crisis, is to sidewind silently onto our terrain?13

    Or take sociology, a house deeply divided. As Lopreato and Crippin (1999:xi-xii) note, it stands accused of having “produced ‘no…theory’ of worth,” of importing much of its methodology from other disciplines, of “failing to define [its] concepts” adequately, of producing knowledge that has “little or nothing in common…[with] the real world”;14 so much so that it faces imminent “decomposition,” even “deletion from the academy.” As in anthropology, talk of crisis in sociology is neither new nor a matter of consensus: Raymond Boudon (1980[1971]) and Alvin Gouldner (1970) famously wrote about it almost forty years ago. In doing so, each, in his own way, raised important philosophical, political, and theoretical questions. Contemporary crisis-talk tends to be more mundane. The discipline is “tired,” says Satish Deshpande (1994), and lacking in distinction: its qualitative end has become a mere shadow of anthropology, relying increasingly on ethnography; the work of its sub-fields – politics, economics, law, culture – is more substantially done in other disciplines; and its quantitative end typically celebrates method above all else, evolving ever more exquisite techniques for measuring phenomena that are often poorly conceptualized or reduced to their most superficial manifestations. Hence Lopreato and Crippin’s anxieties about both the epistemic and the empirical scaffolding of contemporary sociology. This is not to deny that it – or economics – yields much of value. It is to observe that, as regimes of knowledge, other disciplines too have critical challenges to meet.15 

    The second parenthesis. Many prognoses of the End of Anthropology have presumed a rather monolithic view of the discipline, one circumscribed by its “traditional” concepts, objects, and methods. And yet it was never so bounded, so self-limiting. After all, contemporary network theory had one of its sites of origin in the Manchester School in urban Central Africa (see e.g. Mitchell 1969), whence it found its way into American organizational sociology – and beyond; Godfrey Wilson’s (1941-2) economics of detribalization, also in Africa, was a remarkable harbinger of world systems theory; Barth’s (1959) early deployment of “The Theory of Games” to Yusufzai Pathan political processes foreshadowed later applications of rational choice models and transactional analysis. And so on and on. Ours has long been an undisciplined discipline, whose heterodoxy has always made its future hard to predict. And ultimately, to its great advantage, irrepressible.

    I shall return to both of these parentheses.

    DEFYING DEATH, or VIGOR MORTIS 

    Back to my question, then: How have anthropologists reacted to talk of the imminent demise of their discipline? Most do not bother with it at all. Like the vast majority of sociologists (Lopreato and Crippin 1999), they treat it as so much background noise. Among those who have chosen to react, however, three primary tendencies are discernable.16 

    The first is a retreat back into the local, often still, although we rarely admit it, the exotic local. This is owed to the fact that, for many anthropologists, the uniqueness of the discipline remains its “ability to get inside and understand small-scale communities, to comprehend [their] systems of knowledge” (Graeber 2002:1222). Herein lies our sense of security, our source of solace in the face of epistemic or ethical uncertainty. This is in spite of the fact that much contemporary anthropological practice deviates far from the foundational fiction of fieldwork: the conceit that, given sufficient time “on the ground,” it is possible to comprehend “the totality of relations” of a “society” or the essential workings of “a culture” (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997). The foundational faith in fieldwork survives, nonetheless, because it rides on the methodological myth that ethnography may “function well without a theory to guide it” (Marcus 1994:44).17 It is also buttressed by a long-standing chimera: that anthropological wisdom consists in generalizations about the particular that are also particularizations of the general – empirical aggregates, in short, not propositions or explanations. Hence the oxymoron “descriptive-analysis” so strongly favored by my teachers’ generation. 

    One corollary of the fetishism of the local has been a denial of the relevance to anthropological concerns of macrocosmic forces and determinations in the world, forces and determinations referred to, dismissively, under the sign of globalization; this by asserting the efficacy of indigenous agency against those global forces – and by demonstrating the banal truism that different peoples do things differently.18 What follows is a species of relativism, and an intractable realism, that repudiates any “general” theory-and-method grounded in political economy, history, philosophy, whatever; indeed, any form of knowledge that threatens our distinctiveness. Thus, for example, in the early 1990’s, when rural South Africa was awash in mystical violence – in the murder of alleged witches and other technicians of evil – a few social scientists, Jean Comaroff and myself included (1999a, 1999b), argued that these outbreaks were local effects, figurations really, of changes in the production of social, moral, and material life. Those changes had been occasioned in part by the impact on the countryside of so-called structural adjustment. They manifested themselves in growing joblessness, in a crisis of social reproduction, and in the emergence of a virulent occult economy, all of which bespoke the modernity of witchcraft (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; cf. Geschiere 1997). The details are not important here. What is, though, was the skepticism of anthropologists both within the country and outside (e.g. Moore 1999; Niehaus 2001). They countered that the phenomenon had a profoundly parochial character, which is self-evidently true – and that, therefore, to pursue explanations beyond the local is to court the dual dangers of abstraction and theoreticism. Which does not follow logically at all. In point of fact, our argument was that contemporary African witchcraft is reducible neither to “the local” nor “the global,” that it has to be understood with reference to the complex, multi-layered mediations in between.

    For Arjun Appadurai (1997:115), the refusal of explanation beyond the compass of the immediate is owed to anthropological angst over the loss of the “space of intimacy in social life,” classically the stock-in-trade of the ethnographer. Whether or not this is so, it certainly is true that the ethnography of the local is being depicted as an endangered art. Englund and Leach (2000:238; see above), for instance, argue that “it” is engaged in mortal struggle with “generalizing perspectives.” In other words, with Theory, upper case: theory represented by an ensemble of “familiar sociological” – note, sociological – “abstractions,” among them, commodification, modernity, disenhantment, neoliberalism; theory that seeks not merely to describe the world but to account for what goes on within it; theory that opens our scholarly patrimony to the encroachment of an ever more generic social science. This sort of self-ghettoization, it seems to me, is less likely to stave off the End of Anthropology than to assure its death by descent into an exquisite form of irrelevance.

    The second reaction to perceptions of disciplinary crisis complements the first. It is a retreat into fractal empiricism: the description of acts, events, experiences, images, narratives, and objects in the phenomenal world – in all their concrete, fragmentary, unruly manifestations – without reducing them to any more coherence than is required to render them into words, without imposing any authorial order upon them, without seeking meaning “beneath” their surfaces, thus to allow them to speak for themselves. Matti Bunzl (2008:56) offers as the prime exemplar of this species of anthropological practice Anna Tsing’s In the Realm of the Diamond Queen. In it, Tsing, a prose poet of rare gift, lays before us a wealth of descriptive detail, enunciated from a variety of vantages and voices. On principle, however, no gesture is made toward integration or explanation. Which raises the problem of the anthropological value-added. Why call this anthropology at all? Why not literary nonfiction? Literary nonfiction of the highest quality, no question. But – unless we ask what it is that gives shape to a social world, how it is imaginatively made social in the first instance, how its internal incoherencies and fractiousness are to be understood, who in it can speak or cannot, what is or is not thinkable and actionable within it, how its realities are constructed, negotiated, empowered, embodied, how its materialities materialize – what makes this particular text, any text, specifically anthropological? And how might it serve to sustain the singularity, or the raison d’être, of the discipline?19 

    The same might be asked of contemporary anthropological writing that shares a commitment to the empiricist, but eschews the fractal by resorting to ordering metaphors. Metaphors, I stress, not explanations. Network analysis is a case in point. Here the use of the fecund imagery of reticulation, of the assemblage or the ensemble, stands in for theory, the descriptive tool being an alibi for the presentation of the particular as if it might portray something beyond itself. From this vantage, the concrete itself is the highest permissible form of abstraction. But, again, there is nothing anthropological about this. Network analysis might have had one of its points of origin in the Manchester School (see above) – where, incidentally, it was never mistaken for theory20 – but it has dispersed itself widely across the social sciences. For all the fact of it being a response to epistemic crisis, in other words, a resort to empiricism does not, even when coupled with a focus on the intimacy of the local, add up to disciplinary distinction.

    This brings me to the third response, especially manifest in America. It is to return to basics, so to speak: to the concept of culture, albeit hedged about by caveats, albeit transposed into a lexicon of more contemporary vintage, most usually that of semiotics, of image, representation, voice. Or of phenomenology, of experience, belief, being-in-the-world. A vivid instance has been the recent effort to essay something called the Anthropology of Christianity (see e.g. Cannell 2005, 2006; Robbins 2003, 2007). This endeavor, Chris Hann (2007) has argued, is reductionist, incoherent in defining its subject matter, self contradictory in the claims it makes about that subject matter, and unreflective in its idealism. What is more, he adds, it yields little we do not already know from the comparative anthropology of religion. So be it. My own concerns lie elsewhere. Joel Robbins (2007:5f), in making the case for it, asserts that anthropologists, Jean Comaroff and I being the worst offenders, have taken pains to make Christianity “disappear” from anthropological discourse, to “airbrush [it] out” of historical ethnographies, largely by writing it into a narrative that embraces such things as its connections to capitalism and, in Africa, its imbrication in colonialism; largely, also, by giving too much weight to the ways in which its message has been indigenized by “native” populations – and too little to its own intrinsic substance and determinations. Robbins concedes implicitly that Protestantism may indeed have been interpellated in these broader historical forces, that its southerly march may have been integral to the rise of colonial capitalism, that some African peoples may have vernacularized it content.21 But “empirical adequacy,” he asserts, is insufficient (2007:8). 

    Why? Because anthropologists persist in “assum[ing] that Christianity [is not] culturally important” in its own right (p.7). Here is the crux of the matter: what is particular about the Anthropology of Christianity is that it treats the faith primarily as culture (p.8). Robbins himself appears to “airbrush out” of it anything other than its putative cultural content, which, at a glance, would seem greatly to diminish its complexity as a world religion. He also presumes that it actually has a cultural content, as opposed to a theology, independent of the social worlds in which, historically, it has sown itself. Ironic this, since the Protestants who exported it in the nineteenth century bore with them a faith heavily inflected by the secular cultural contexts (plural) whence they came. It was a faith that contained, within its own Euro-ontology, a credo actually called “Christian political economy” (Waterman 1991), one explicitly embedded in the capitalism of its time. This is why the likes of John Wesley wrote at such length about money and other materialities. And why evangelists thought that teaching Africans to shop and to cultivate cash crops opened a pathway to their souls, whatever their would-be converts made of their theological message. They understood clearly that the political economy, theology and semiosis of Protestantism were one – and that all alike were embedded deeply in the “civilization” of a rising Euromodernity. Neither did it take them long to conclude, in Southern Africa at least, that even the most enthusiastic of African Christians, deeply separated from them by culture, seldom shared their ideas of time, personhood, divinity, even conversion itself.

      My object is not to squabble over Christianity or its anthropology.22 It is to argue that a return to cultural accountancy as the signature of a quintessentially anthropological contribution to the understanding of this or any other phenomenon – and hence as a justification for the continued existence of the discipline – is deeply problematic. Not that culture is unimportant. In dialectical engagement with the socio-material, and framed in appropriate theoretical terms (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:19-31; 1992: 27-31), it is critical in making sense of the world. But the reduction of a global religion to it, conceived immaterially and ahistorically, is precisely what gives anthropology a bad name. After all, evangelical Christianity has changed the political and economic face of the planet. All manner of conflict is being conducted under its sign. Christian political economy has returned to haunt us. To distill it to culture is to ensure for the discipline not prolonged life but death by trivialization.

    If, then, the three major panaceas for disciplinary perpetuity – retreat into the local, resort to the empirical, and return to the cultural – are part of the problem not the solution, is there a way to speak of the future of anthropology in different terms?

    ANTHROPOLOGICAL FUTURES: FIRST THOUGHTS, SECOND GUESSES

    There is no easy answer to this question, of course. But let me offer a few thoughts. They lead away from received ideas of the discipline toward a sense of indiscipline, a knowledge regime that seeks to rethink the conceptual foundations, the empirical horizons, and the methodological coordinates of anthropology. 

    To begin with, the claim that we have lost our distinctive subject-matter, methods, concepts, theoretical scaffolding – and, with it, our unique place in the disciplinary division of labor – rests on a fallacy, the fallacy of misplaced typification. This has it that anthropology is a species of knowledge defined by its topical reach and received techniques. In sum, we are what we study and how we study it. It goes without saying that many social scientists subscribe to this view; so do lay people, like the late Mrs. Evans of South Wales. For them, our work lies in the ethnographic documentation of small-scale, non-Western cultures. Historically-speaking, we have also tended to typify ourselves in these terms. To continue to do so, however, is at once anachronistic and counter-productive; worse yet, it leads to silly wrangles over what is or is not properly anthropology. In this day and age, it seems to me – if not to those who seek panaceas in neo-empiricism, crypto-culturalism or brute localism – the discipline ought to be understood as a praxis: a mode of producing knowledge based on a few closely interrelated epistemic operations; operations that lay the foundation for its diverse forms of theory-work, mandate its research techniques, and chart its empirical coordinates. They belong, I stress, to the domain of Methodology, upper case: the principled practice by which theory and the concrete world are both constituted and brought into discursive relationship with one another. And they are epistemic in that they entail an orientation to the nature of knowledge itself, its philosophical underpinnings and its notions of truth, fact, value. None of them is new, none of them absent from anthropologies past. Together, they underscore the point that our topical horizons ought to be configured by our praxis, not the other way around. 

    Let me clear. I am not suggesting that the discipline shares a single episteme. That is patently not so. The contrasts in this respect between, say, anthropological phenomenology and Marxist anthropology, or structuralism and actor network theory, are all too plain. However, as we shall see, these epistemic operations, because they belong to the domain of Methodology, transect substantive paradigmatic divides: they may as well chart the anthropology of a practice theorist as a structuralist or a Foucauldian. What is more, they permit anthropologists to converse critically across lines of theoretical difference, topical interest, even ethical cleavage. Note, too, that my argument is at once an account and an aspiration, at once description and prescription: it describes what many anthropologists do and makes a case for the kind of anthropology I believe should survive into the future.

    First among these operations is the critical estrangement of the lived world, itself founded on a double gesture – on the deconstruction of its surfaces and the relativizing of its horizons – thus to pose the perennial question: what is it that actually gives substance to the dominant discourses and conventional practices of that world, to its subject positions and its semiosis, its received categories and their unruly undersides, to the manner in which it is perceived and experienced, fabricated and contested? This goes way back. Recall Malinowski’s (1927) effort to rewrite Freud on the Oepidus complex by demonstrating its very different manifestation among the matrilineal Trobriand Islanders. Here boys were said to evince their first love for their sisters (not their mothers) and hostility toward their maternal uncles (not their fathers), a dramatic transposition of affective patterns found in Europe. The corollary? That the phenomenon has less to do with innate human sex drives than with culturally-specific relations of authority and their concomitant ambivalences. Whether or not he was right (cf. Spiro 1983), Malinowski’s general point was that Western perceptions of family, kinship, sexuality, and desire required critical decentering if they were to be analytically useful, something that only a comparative anthropology might accomplish.

    Ever since, anthropologists have insisted, with great profit, in making sense of the phenomenal world by estranging its observable forms. Vide, for instance, Monica Wilson’s (1951) extraordinary insight into the McCarthy era hearings in the USA through the defamiliarizing optic of the African occult as ethical etiology. The red agent of “the Senator’s fevered dreams” and the accused witch, she observed, were linked not just metaphorically by the trope of the witch-hunt, but by a positional equivalence (p.313): both were “standardized nightmares” of a moral order fraught with contradictions that defied ordinary discourse, contradictions sharpened by transformations of scale in the social universe. Her genius, in short, was to discern, and to historicize, the connection between the visible and the invisible, the audible and inaudible, beneath the contours of everyday existence. This is the genius of anthropology sui generis as a critical practice, one that continues to infuse its most creative work. It is what, for example, led Andrew Apter (1999; above) to see behind the elaborately ritualized exteriors of a Nigerian  election the same kind of counterfeit – the same play on the disconnect between signifier and signified, the same effort to render imaginative fictions into material facts – on which are based the 419 scams that bombard the internet daily; this itself being an artifact of the speculative culture of deception which pervades the “casino capitalism” that has come to infuse the global economy (Strange 1986). Here, in short, is a political anthropology that estranges normative discourses of failed states, corrupt regimes, and procedural democracy so as to give account of a politics in which the essential political act, the very essence of power, is to conjure with the definition what is or is not politics in the first place. A far cry, this, from the usual horizons of a conventional social science. 

    The second operation involves being-and-becoming: it is the mapping of those processes by which social realities are realized, objects are objectified, materialities materialized, essences essentialized, by which abstractions – biography, community, culture, economy, ethnicity, gender, generation, identity, nationality, race, society – congeal synoptically from the innumerable acts, events, and significations that constitute them.23 This operation, in other words, is concerned to discover how verbs of doing become nouns of being – common nouns, collective nouns, abstract nouns, proper nouns – thus to illuminate the pathways by which lived worlds are pragmatically produced, so cially construed, and naturalized. Take, for example, Arjun Appadurai (1995) on the “production of locality”: it is not the received nature of the local, goes his thesis, but its fabrication that is critical in comprehending the salience of place in social life. Appadurai’s (1986) “the social life of things” evokes the same sensibility, namely, an impulse to situate the “thingness” of objects, their simultaneous materiality and meaning, in the diachrony of their becoming. 

    There is, again, an archaeology to this: the classic work of Evans-Pritchard (1940) on the Nuer, one of the most nuanced pieces of conceptual anthropology ever written, albeit one that has not a word of theory in it. Evans-Pritchard’s achievement, famously, was to show how, in a stateless polity, an immanent grammar of social formation – inscribed, in the Anthropologese of the time, in patriliny – hardened into actually existing lineages under conditions of conflict. His ethnography pointed to the fact that African descent groups, far from being observable aggregations ab initio, existed as a potentiality, contained in the semiotics of blood; that they took on their manifest character through material practices occasioned by ruptures in everyday life. Contemporary anthropologists did not all understand The Nuer in these terms, seeing in it an empiricist account of African life; but this reading is powerfully present in the text. Similarly, if in counterpoint: alliance theory, developed in Levi-Strauss’s (1969[1949]) masterwork on kinship, arrives at an ontology of human society by treating its elementary forms as the sedimented effect of exchanges of conjugal partners and prestations according to a range of grammatical rules. Social order, the noun form, is a predicate here of modes of becoming realized through marriage practices. Each, therefore, has to be theorized as the condition of the other’s possibility.24 Or take, in a different theoretical vein but similar revisionist spirit, Frederick Barth (1969) on ethnicity.25 Reversing received truths, Barth argued that there is no one-to-one relationship between ethnicity-as-experienced and the sociology of difference (p.14). It is the act of drawing boundaries between populations, not their inherent “cultural stuff,” that constructs ethno-identities. The implication? That ethnicity is less a thing than a virtual relationship whose objectification is rooted in a dialectic of identification and contrast (p.15); that the cultural content of ethnic consciousness may be a product, rather than the constitutive basis, of “ethnic group organization” (p.11); that, by extension, the concept of identity itself is an historically sedimented abstraction with no ontological substance of its own. And the general point? That mapping processes of being-and-becoming is a vital element not merely in our theory-work, but also in the anti-essentializing sensibility of a critical anthropology.

    The third operation is the deployment of the contradiction, the counter-intuitive, the paradox, the rupture, as a source of methodological revelation.26 Again, this has a long genealogy. It begins with the use of the social drama by the Manchester School; in particular, with Victor Turner’s (1957) account of Sandombu, homo politicus incarnate in rural Africa, whose rise and fall was deconstructed through its drawn-out dramaturgy to lay bare foundational contradictions between structure and process in Ndembu society, to disinter the paradoxes and impossibilities inherent in political ambition in that context, and to reveal the aporias in domestic life intrinsic to matriliny; in sum, to make sense of the interiors of Ndembu life. The story may have been under-historicized, the depiction of “the Ndembu” too mechanistic for present-day sensibilities. But the methodological gesture itself underscored the capacity of the unexpected and the counter-intuitive to disclose deep truths about everyday existence. Echoes here of Edgar Allan Poe (1975:191 [1842]), who spoke long ago of the forensic value of that which falls “out of the range of ordinary expectation.”

    Which is why anthropologists have continued to return to them, in diverse ways, to lay bare worlds both familiar and strange. Noteworthy in this respect is Michael Taussig’s (1983) celebrated analysis of a Faustian devil compact to elucidate the contradictions of capitalism, and its misperceived magic, for Colombian cane-workers. So too, a generation later, is Mateo Rubbo-Taussig’s (2005) astonishing image of a one-way mirror in a Californian immigration camp, counter-intuitively inverted so that the inmates can see the guards but the guards cannot see the inmates; this image is put to the task of interrogating the sorts of sovereignty exercised over “illegal” entrants to the USA in recent times – and, thereby, to illuminate the increasingly contrarian nature of its borders, which are ever more both open and closed. Similarly Fernando Coronil’s (1997) narration of two deaths, the demise of a factory and the murder of a lawyer, alike theatrical moments of rupture, in order to dissect the “system of circulation” at the core of Venezuelan petro-economy in the 1970’s. Patently, recourse to contradiction, rupture, and the counter-intuitive as a methodological stratagem is closely related both to critical estrangement and to mapping processes of being-and-becoming. It is often by that means that the other two operations are enabled, that the interiors of the phenomenal world, in space and time, begin to reveal themselves.

    Space and time. The phrase itself points to the fourth epistemic operation: the embedding of ethnography in the counterpoint of the here-and-there and the then-and-now – in a word, its spatio-temporalization.27 In recent times, the notion of situating almost anything in its broader context has, as often as not, been banalized by reduction to the language of the local-and-the-global; just as the historicization of almost everything tends to be translated into the argot of the epochal, into framing terms like colonialism, empire, modernity, postcoloniality, neoliberalism. Blunt instruments, all of them. It goes without saying, or should, that neither spatial nor temporal contextualization is given empirically. Nor is it an a priori. Context is always a profoundly theoretical matter.

    Spatio-temporalization, as I said earlier, is eschewed by many anthropologists, especially those who repudiate explanation with reference to anything much beyond the enclosed edges of the ethnographic gaze. By contrast, I would argue that anthropology at its most productive is anthropology most comprehensively positioned in the here-and-there and the then-and-now – in proportion, of course, to its analytic object. Thus it is that Jessica Cattelino (2008; see above) embeds her ethnography of the Florida Seminoles, a study of the impact of casino capitalism on their world, in several pasts (US colonialism, local Indian history, recent turns in American political economy) and in several spatial frames (contemporary pop culture, the entertainment industry, rez [reservation] imaginaries, the politics and economics of identity, the realm of the law). As a result, she is able to show how this people has succeeded in deploying their new wealth, despite all the contradictions it has brought in its wake, to reconstruct their indigeneity and sovereignty – in such a way as to belie the notion, characteristic of on-reservation anthropology, that they are sacrificing their culture to the solvent of capital. Thus it is, too, that Harry West (2005), in explaining why sorcery is so important on the Mueda Plateau in Mozambique, situates the occult in multiple dimensions: in the here-and-there of the regional, national, and global economies and in the then-and-now of a past that begins with Portuguese overrule, moves through the Frelimo socialist period, and ends in with the neoliberal reforms imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. For those who live on the plateau, it is these intersecting dimensions out of which arises the mystical evil threatening their lives, evil that they require to control in order to make a habitable future for themselves. Thus it is, as well, that Kaushik Sunder Rajan (2006) accounts for the character of contemporary genomics by contextualizing it along two axes: vertically, in the rise of biocapital and bioscience, a corollary of which has been the rendering of “life [as] a business plan” (p.138f); and horizontally, by demonstrating how the market logic and the political sociology of research in the USA and India, respectively, affect what goes on in laboratories. In the absence of this spatio-temporalization, Sunder Rajan’s narrative would be just another addition to Science and Technology Studies.

    All of the anthropology I have cited in exemplification of the various epistemic operations underscores the final one: the founding of the discipline on grounded theory,28 on an imaginative counterpoint between the inductive and the deductive, the concrete and the concept, ethnographic observation and critical ideation; also, in a different register, between the epic and the everyday, the meaningful and the material. This, self-evidently, implies a respect for the real that does not conflate the empirical with empiricism. And a respect for the abstract that does not mistake theory-work for theoreticism. In the absence of one half of this counterpoint (the ethnographic, the inductive, the concrete) we risk becoming second-rate philosophers; or worse, ideologues who deploy “facts” purely in defense of a priori positions. Without the other (the deductive, the concept, critical ideation), we limit our horizons to forensic journalism, to bearing witness, to literary non-fiction or the poetics of pure description. Elsewhere, Jean Comaroff and I (2003) have made the case in extenso for grounded theory. I shall not rehearse the argument, which it has saturated everything I have said so far, save to suggest that the counterpoint between the empirical and the conceptual offers the most productive pathway for the discipline, maybe the only one, between the Scylla of brute descriptivism and the Charybdis of bloodless abstraction. 

    Also between triviality and obscurity. Hence the anthropological value added of, say, Andrea Muehlebach’s (2007) ethnography of ethical citizenship and the “new” voluntarism in Italy, which informs, and is informed by, a theoretically-provocative analysis of the changing nature of labor and nationhood in neoliberal Europe. Or of Rocio Magaña’s (2008) thick description of death in the Arizona desert, which, in telling of the dramaturgy of immiserated Mexican migrants, theorizes anew the relationship between the violence of the law, sovereignty, the politics of the body, and the paradox of national borders at once porous and policed. Or of William Mazzarella’s (2003; see above) account of an advertising in India, a narrative of condoms and commodity aesthetics that rewrites key elements of European critical theory by grounding them in the exigencies of situated cultural practices. Or any number of other recent works written with a similar eye to the fecund counterpoint of the concept and the concrete.

    *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *

    I reiterate that the epistemic operations of which I have been speaking lie at the core of much contemporary anthropological praxis. Self-evidently, moreover, the various ways in which those operations have been and are given analytic life have begotten different theoretical orientations and species of explanation – and, with them, the kinds of argumentation that animate disciplinary discourses; which, inflected by world-historical conditions, have, in turn, shaped the content of anthropology, its intellectual trajectories, its inner turbulence, its intermittent transitions, its futures-in-the-making. This is why I have illustrated them with instances drawn from both the past and present, from diverse ethnographic domains, and from a variety of paradigmatic approaches. Together they underscore the fact that our praxis is capable of yielding a wide spectrum of theory and method; hence my parenthetic point earlier about its long-standing heterodoxy, about anthropology as an immanently undisciplined discipline. Ours really is an indiscipline whose conceptual foundations and techniques of knowledge production have almost infinite potential to open up new horizons.

    INDISCIPLINARITY: TOWARD INCONCLUSIVE CONCLUSIONS

    Without a principled praxis, I submit, what pretends to be anthropology is not. Without it, the discipline would indeed be nothing in particular. And difficult to distinguish from others. This is true, too, when it conceives of itself in purely topical terms. That way lies anachronism or indistinction at best, extinction at worst. Conversely, if it remains epistemically grounded in the manner I have described, there is little by way of subject matter that anthropologists cannot take on and address in a distinctive manner, whether it be the Indian advertising industry, Nigerian electoral politics, Egyptian fatwa councils, African adornment, or casino capitalism – or, for that matter, Islamic banking (Maurer 2005), vigilantism and death squads (Abrahams 1998), the US nuclear uncanny (Masco 2006), the changing nature of money (e.g. Hart 1999; Guyer 2004), and many things besides. Which is why we are not forensic journalists, even when journalism and anthropology cover similar things, why we are not simply creative writers and poets, even though we may aspire to write creatively. And why we are not dissolving into the other social sciences. 

    In point of fact, from the perspective advanced here, the difference between us and them could not be more marked. Normatively-speaking, those disciplines continue to be topically driven – which abets their crises (see above).29 For the most part, they are not given to critical estrangement or the deconstruction of their ur-concepts. Political scientists, by and large, study political institutions and processes, conventionally understood, just as economists study economic institutions and processes. They rarely ask what politics or economics actually are.30 Anthropologists do, repeatedly. Unlike political scientists, we also spend a great deal of time trying to discern what taken-for-granted terms like democracy or the rule of law might mean for “natives,” both as signifiers and as species of practice – which often turns out to be anything but obvious. Likewise, most sociologists presume the concrete existence of such “social facts” as, for instance, ethnicity. While they may differ over definitional details, they see no epistemic problem in taking the measure of its manifest significance or its material impact on human lives, usually by means of survey instruments. We, on the other hand, are more likely to begin by calling into question the very notion of identity and then proceed to interrogate the production of ethnic consciousness, the objectification of ethnic populations, the phenomenology of “being ethnic,” and the like; which, parenthetically, is why we are such a pain to the policy industry.

    The contrast is stark. And this is not even to mention the vexed matter of quantification, which many social scientists take as the evidentiary basis of all truth, paying no heed whatever to foundational critiques of statistical knowledge or the means of its production. Anthropologists don’t count. But we like to think we know what does. And it is rarely measured numerically. For many of us, numbers are a fetish. Although they may reveal important things, they are just one mode of construing the world, one that often reduces complexity beyond recognition, one based on the occulting of probability. Even history, which, in its mainstream is predominantly qualitative, has a very different relationship to topicality, epistemology, and facticity from that of anthropology. For its orthodox practitioners, who are empirically-driven to a fault, the divine is in the detail, in fealty to the fact; the devil lurks in interpretation. This is why analysis-heavy historical anthropology is such a scandal to them, why it has provoked such bitter attacks in defense of their discipline against ours.31 Those historians who are theory-prone, who indulge in the imagination beyond the narrowest confines of the datum, risk being accused of committing…anthropology. So do political scientists and sociologists who concern themselves with “soft” political and social phenomena: the cultural, the meaningful, the phenomenological.

    Of course, there are others who engage in critical estrangement, in mapping processes of being-and-becoming, in the methodological deployment of rupture, contradiction, and the counter-intuitive, in spatio-temporalization, and in grounded theory. The more they do, however, the more they become like us. There are increasing, if unacknowledged, signs of this in diverse places; recall the rise of Post-Autism in economics and the ethnographic turn in sociology. But that – the anthropologization of other social sciences – is a topic for another time. Here we are concerned with our futures, not theirs. Except to say one thing. To the extent that anthropology is a critical in/discipline, this ought to chart its scholarly practice in university and other institutional settings, vexing the social sciences at large about the production of knowledge, about pedagogy, about the human predicament – and how best to make sense of it in the perplexing history of the present. To be sure, it is only by essaying our praxis in positive, even provocative terms that anthropology, the generic study of the human, may claim a unique place for itself in the world. How, precisely, are we to configure our indiscipline as a scholarly practice in educational and other contexts? That, it seems to me, is what we ought to be arguing about among ourselves right now.

    There is much more to say, patently. I have merely scratched at surfaces. And, no doubt, will provoke some angry reactions. This is all to the good. What is most likely to assure the Future of Anthropology is that those who inhabit its Very Small Planet continue to argue with one another. As long as we do, we will remain a scholarly community. For my own part – and here I return to my prescriptive voice – I should like to see the discipline perpetuate itself by recourse to the praxis that I have sketched above. While we ground our work in its various epistemic operations, there is every reason to believe that we shall not kill ourselves off by trivialization, irrelevance, or indistinction – which is more or less assured by a retreat into neo-empiricism, crypto-culturalism, or brute localism. Or by repudiating ethnography altogether, which has manifested itself in a few powerful places of late. For me, there is no such thing as a post-ethnographic anthropology, just as there is no such thing as a post-theoretical one.

    But there is a more positive basis on which to prognose the future of the discipline. It lies in a younger generation whose work distinguishes itself by its sheer energy, by the imagination that drives it, by its critical edge. I have offered many examples of their work along the way. Others that come immediately to mind – an invidiously small, random selection from a substantial body of work – include Cori Hayden (2003) on bioprospecting and the uneasy tapestry of relations to which it has given rise among local communities, scientists, and drug companies in Mexico; Janet Roitman (2004) on the economics and ethics of il/legality, militarized commercial networks and organized crime, and sedimentations of the state in the Chad Basin; Caitlin Zaloom (2006) on the operations of global finance, from the trading pits of Chicago to the digital dealing rooms of London; Daniella Gandolfo (2009) on urban renewal in Lima, Peru, read through the dramaturgy of struggles between female streetsweepers and a corrupt state over the privatization of public services; Kim Fortun (2001) on the Bhopal disaster and the litigation that followed it, a process in which the hidden workings of power interpellated themselves awkwardly into advocacy, the rights of victims, and environmental politics; Tom Boellstorff (2008) on the cyberworld of Second Life and its virtual culture, interrogated from the vantage of an avatar. All of them evince a capacity to estrange, to ground their theory in an ethnographic optic at once wide-angled and close-up, to demystify received orthodoxies. By these means does our own verb-to-be become a proper noun. By these means does the critical practice of ethnography become Anthropology, upper case.

    In a word, Mrs. Evans, no. Anthropology, into which I was initiated on that grim day in South Wales in 1971, is not about to die. Nor is it “in suspension.” It is very much alive, producing new kinds of knowledge, new theory-work, new empirical horizons, new arguments. The future of the discipline, in short, lies, as it always will, in its indiscipline.  

    ACKNOWLEDGMENT

    Many of the ideas in this essay have been developed in collaboration with Jean Comaroff. My title – which invokes a well-known essay by Peter Worsley (1970) – also plays, ironically, on  her “The End of History, Again: Pursuing the Past in the Postcolony” in Postcolonial Studies and Beyond, (eds.) S. Kaul, A. Loomba, M. Bunzl, A. Burton, and J. Esty (Duke University Press, 2005). Thanks, too, to Andre Gingrich, for his insightful reading of an earlier draft of this essay and to Molly Cunningham, my excellent research assistant. Finally, I should like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for the American Anthropologist and, above all, its Editor-in-Chief, Tom Boellstorff, for their gently critical, highly constructive comments of the version submitted to the journal.

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  • Interview with John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff

    Interview with John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff

    Between 1976 and 2010,  Alan Macfarlane, a professor in the Department of Sociology at Cambridge University,  conducted a series of interviews with anthropologists from around the world. Two of those anthropologists included John and Jean Comaroff. They discussed their early lives, their work in the field, life under the Apartheid regime and anthropology, among other things.

  • Reflections on the Rise of Legal Theology

    Reflections on the Rise of Legal Theology

    John L. Comaroff  

    The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled  it into man’s mind to as to be known by him naturally. 
    — Saint Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law 

    I. 

    Looking ahead toward the third millennium, Jubilaeum A.D. 2000, an or­gan of  the Va­ti­can, carried an essay by Giuseppe Dal­la Torre (1998), a leading Catholic  intellectual. Entitled “A Strong Moral Con­s­ci­en­­ce for a Cul­ture of Lega­li­ty,”1 it was  an ex­ten­d­ed reflection, from a theological perspective, on the law—specifically,  on its gro­w­ing he­ge­mony. Dalla Torre’s argu­ment need not detain us here: he makes a rather conventional case for jus­ti­ce over the jural, for collective duty  over in­di­vi­dual rights, for the recog­ni­tion of social responsibility. Noteworthy,  how­ever, was what he had to say ab­out the views of the pa­pacy on jurispru dence, tout cou­rt­­­­, at the dawn of the new cen­tu­ry. John Paul II, by his ac­count,  was deeply concer­n­ed to “underline the ur­gen­cy of a culture of legality,” high lighting how “neces­sa­ry [it is] abo­ve all to develop a sensi­ti­vi­ty and a prac ticality” toward the law. Why? Be­cause a new “chap­ter of ju­dicial ex­pe­ri­ence  has been open­ed”—the translation from Italian, alas, is clumsy—a chapter in  which hu­m­an beings “cla­mor” for “emancipation [through] rights,” notably  the “rights of desire.” Ours is an age, intima­t­ed Dalla Tor­re, in which hu­ma­nity  knows itself increasingly by virtue of those rights.  

    Take note that Dalla Tor­re is not referring to ‘rites’, as we might expect from  the heart of global Catho­li­cism, but ‘rights’. In fact, this age appears to be one in  which the two, rites and right, conjoin in parallel significance as never before.  Faith and the law, ar­gu­ably, are the twin fi­x­a­­tions of this-world­ly being all  over the place­­­ nowa­days, some­times unex­pec­­­t­edly so. For In­di­ans in Trinidad,  according to Aisha Khan (2007: 142f.), the con­s­truc­tion of a South Asian “diasporic sensibility”—more ge­nerally, of a viable social iden­tity—has de­p­ended  on es­­tablishing “the propriety and authenticity of religious prac­­tice” by means  of a poli­tics of recognition “that translate[s] into rights.” In other words, here,  as in many other con­texts, “the discourse of rites is elemental to the dis­course  of rights” (ibid.: 144), and vice versa. Ours may not yet be an epoch of fully  realized theoc­ra­cy, al­though there are plen­ty who would pre­fer that it were,  plenty who seek to make it so, plenty of theocratic enclaves emerging across the  global map. But it is one of theo-legality.2 Pace Carl Schmitt, it is not just ab­out  po­lit­ical theo­lo­gy that we ought to be ve­x­ing ourselves­­. It is also about le­gal theo­lo­gy. No wonder, then, that the ‘historic’ process by means of which South  Afri­ca marked its pas­­­s­a­ge from the apartheid past to the post-­co­lonial present,  by which it en­ac­ted its re-Ge­nesis­­, was a Truth and Reconci­lia­tion Commission  that fused the ri­tual prac­ti­ces of reli­gion and law, the confession and the confessional (cf. Bozzoli 1998; Wilson 2000: 80)—or, more accu­ra­te­ly, their si­mu­­la­cra.  By those means, the pro­fa­ni­ties­ per­pe­­trated by the ancien ré­gi­me were re­com missioned to sacra­lize a new national ima­g­i­ning, a new de­mos, a new so­ver­eign future—a new moment of Constitution, in all senses of the term. Dalla Torre’s (1998) faith-based reflection on the “culture of legality” gestures  toward a very general phenomenon: the rising salience of the law—at once  as ideology, as spe­­cies of practice, as utopic cure-all, as landscape of political  struggle, as instru­m­ent of governmentality—with chan­­­ges in the global order of  things that are oft­en loosely glos­sed under the label ‘neo-liberalism’. Elsewhere,  Jean Comaroff and I (2006, 2009a), like oth­ers, have sought to make sense of its  symptoms, which include the following: (1) the tidal wave of na­tional constitu tions (re)writ­ten since 1989, with their stress on the rule of law and on poli­ti­cal,  eco­no­mic, social, even cultural rights; (2) the emergence of new, ex­pan­sive  forms of “trans­­na­tional le­gality” and of legally oriented NGOs (Schneider­man  2006: 387f.; cf. De­zalay and Garth 1996, 2006­­­­); (3) the rapid growth of a global  intellectual property regime that greatly extends re­ceived forms of copyright and re­­cognizes the en­titlement of indi­genous peo­ples to pro­­fit from their ver­nacular  know­led­ge (Coom­be 1998, 1999); (4) the ju­dicia­liza­tion of poli­tics (cf. Cha­n­ock  2000: 34), its rendering into ‘law­fare’; (5) the rising, wor­ldwide “hege­mony of  hu­m­an rights” (Klug 2005: 85) and every­day “legal cons­cious­ness” (Ewick and  Silbey 1998), not least among recent social movements (McCann 2006); and,  most of all, (6) the re­sort to liti­ga­tion to deal with an ever broader spec­t­rum of  everyday mat­­­ters, such as the vio­lation of bodies and inti­ma­cies, the dispo­sition  of commo­di­­ties and imple­mentation of public po­licy, and the determination of  life and dea­­th. In­deed, in many pla­c­es, including those where it is brok­en with  impu­ni­ty, its spi­rit bru­ta­li­zed­, its means and ends misap­p­ro­­pria­t­ed, the law app ears more and more as a fet­ish—an abstraction made real, ascri­b­­ed a life force of  its own, and attri­bu­t­ed the my­th­ic, nu­­minous capaci­ty to con­­fi­gure re­la­­tions and  tran­s­­actions in its own im­a­ge. In 2000, for ex­ample, soon after the Pu­tin ad­mi­ nis­t­ra­­tion rose to power in Rus­sia, it de­c­lar­ed it­self a ‘dicta­tor­ship of law’, os­ten si­b­ly to counter the chaos­­ of the Yelt­sin years. The na­­­ture of that dic­­ta­tor­ship is  the subject of contro­ver­sy, lar­gely be­cause, like other re­gimes from A to Z (Am­e rica to Zim­bab­we), it is erect­ed on a sys­tematic ord­er of ‘lega­li­z­ed illegali­ties’.3 But the use of the phrase itself be­s­peaks a po­li­ti­cal semiosis, not to men­­tion an extrac­tive eco­nomy, founded on the fe­tishism of the jural (cf. Rigi n.d.).  It goes without saying that modern secular law, born of the separation of  lex na­tu­­rae from lex dei, has always had the quality of a fetish and, as Saint  Thomas Aqui­n­as (n.d.) noted of all ‘natural law’,4 sacral underpinnings: vide Benja­min’s (1978) critique of the divine violence at its originary core, or Derri da’s (2002) ana­ly­sis of the mys­­tical foundation of its authority in his Acts of Reli gion, or Ag­amben’s (1998) con­cern to find the key to power in the trian­gulation  of sovereignty, the sacrifi­cial, and the juridi­cal—although all three of them  apprehend ‘the law’ in narrow terms, eli­ding it with go­ver­nance in general and  enforcement in particular. Its enchantment in the here and now also takes less  dramatic, more ca­­pillary forms. When, for instance, Bruce Ackerman (1997: 2,  5) speaks of “faith” in constitutions “sweeping the wor­ld” (cf. Klug 2000), his  choice of term is apt. Patent in many places is an al­most mil­len­nial be­lief, a  be­lief of theological proportions, in their capacity to con­jure up equitable poli ties, to make habitable societies, to secure the foundations of mor­al, material,  mortal being; a “belief in the im­pos­­si­ble,” as Danilyn Rutherford (n.d.) puts  it, speaking of secular en­chantments elsewhere. During the 1990s, in the rural  North West Province of South Africa, poc­ket ver­sions of the Bill of Rights— print­ed, Mao-like, as a lit­tle red book—were to be found in many homes, often  shel­v­ed along­side the Bible. Although lar­ge­ly ba­bel, its Setswana trans­la­tion  poor to the point of impenetrabili­ty, it had ta­ken on a sal­vi­fic quality, a Book  of Re­ve­lations for after-the-re­vo­­lu­­tion. Across the glo­­bal South, in fact, consti tutions and con­s­titution­a­lism sa­tu­rate many domains of daily life. Numerous  chur­­ches and NGOs have their own ver­­sions,5 as do tribes and chief­doms,  ethnic cor­po­rations, voluntary asso­cia­tions, even vi­gilante organi­za­­tions, taxi  drivers, and street gangs (J. L. Comaroff and J. Co­ma­roff 2006: 22–34).  Just as constitutionalism has taken on numinous proportions in many  places, so, reciprocally, do twenty-first-century national constitutions tend, if by implication, to recognize the growing salience of faith­. In contrast to the  past practice of erecting a Jef­fersonian ‘wall of separation’ between chur­ch  and state, barring any ma­ni­festation of religion in the real­ms of govern­ment,  many now offer equal protection to all creeds, allowing them full access to the  public do­main—provided that they are not coercive or openly exclusion­a­ry.6 

    All this un­der­scores yet more deeply the counterpoint of rites and rights and its  in­s­cription at the very core of national imaginaries. Even in America, the home  of constitutional fundamental­ism, there have been populist efforts to under mine the Jeffersonian wall. The administration of George W. Bush deliberately  did so, a point to which we shall re­turn. And when he ran as a De­m­o­cratic  vice-presidential can­di­date in 2000, Joseph Lieberman, a Jew, argued that the  US Bill of Rights can and shou­ld be read to gua­­ran­tee­ freedom of religion, not  free­d­om from reli­gion, and that therefore all bar­riers between faith and the  functions of go­ver­n­ance ought to be torn down forthwith.7 Lieberman’s argu ment re­­sonated widely with public opinion. That the judiciary is best staffed by  citi­zens of de­­mon­s­trated con­­­viction— spiritual conviction, that is, not criminal  convictions, ones born of penitence not borne in a penitentiary—has become  common cause ac­ross much of America.8 

    Re­call the notoriously­ troubling case of Ter­ri Schiavo, a car­di­ac-arrest pa­tient  who fell into a per­sis­t­ent vegetative state in 1990 and was kept alive by fee­d­ing  tube until March 2005 (see J. Comaroff, this issue). In 1998, eight years after  the onset of her condi­tion, Schiavo’s husband Michael peti­tio­ned successfully  to have her life sup­port ter­minat­ed, an ac­­tion bit­terly con­tes­ted by her Catholic  parents. The dispute, itself compli­ca­ted by financial interests on all sides, went  through repeated law suits and app­eals, all the way up to the US Supreme  Court. The Repub­lican-domi­na­ted State of Florida and the US Con­gress passed  legislation in ef­f­orts to pre­vent the re­m­o­val of the tube, but to no eff­ect. More  than 20 hearings found in favor of Mich­ael Schi­­a­vo, des­pi­te the shrill, mus­­­­cular demands of pro-life activists and politicians. Even the pope got in­­vol­v­ed.  When, in the end, Schiavo­­ died, evan­ge­li­cal Christians spoke darkly of im­ pea­ch­­­ing the jud­ges who had sanctioned­ her ‘kill­ing’. Tom De­Lay, the senior  Re­pub­li­can in the House of Represen­ta­tives, threatened them in terms dis­tinctly  theo-legal: “The time will come for the men re­spon­sible for this to an­s­wer for  their beha­vior.” It was broadly intimat­ed that the jud­ges would be replaced by  men of true faith. Not long be­fore, DeLay had told a group of con­servatives that  “God had giv­en Schi­­­avo to America to highlight the need to fight for a ‘cul­ture  of life.’”9 The ‘spirit of the law’, os­ten­sibly the ultimate ex­pres­sion of secu­lar  mo­dernist reason, has been subjec­t­ed to sus­­­tai­n­ed ef­f­orts to infuse it with a  spi­rit of an al­to­gether different, less secular, less ration­a­list sort. 

    II. 

    But I am getting ahead of myself. Among the many manifestations of the grow ing feti­shism of the law, one is par­ti­cu­larly sig­ni­ficant for present purposes:  the ten­dency of populations de­fi­n­ed by, among other things, faith, culture, gender, se­xu­al pre­­fe­r­en­ce, race, residen­ce, and hab­its of con­sump­tion to turn  to jural ways and means in order to construct and represent themselves as  ‘communities’. In doing so, they strive to protect their physical, intellec­tual,  and other property; to regu­late their in­ter­nal af­f­airs; to police their boun­­daries; to claim recognition and redress; and to mana­ge their re­­la­tions with the  wor­ld out­side. In sum, they seek to constitute their being-in-the-world—in the  hyphenated socio-legal sense of the term ‘constitution’—under the vernacular  sign of ‘identity’. This, Jean Comaroff and I have ar­gued (e.g., see J. Comaroff  and J. L. Comaroff 2003), is in large­ part a corollary­ of the­ un­folding history of  the na­tion-state, more precisely, of two of its con­tem­po­r­a­ry features, working  in tandem with each other.  

    The first is a palpable shift in populist conceptions of nationhood from one  founded on cultural homogeneity and “horizontal fraternity” (Anderson 1983),  itself always more an imaginative fiction than a palpable fact, to one that recog nizes its own heterogeneity, if often for pragmatic rather than ethical reasons.  If often, also, reluctantly. That hete­rogeneity has been exacerbated greatly by  the global circulation of labor, the con­t­ra-­flow of post-colonial populations to  the metropole, the transnationali­za­tion of cultural commodities and practices,  and other cognate processes. And it has inserted itself into the implosive poli tics of difference that has gained momentum stea­dily since the late twentieth  century—a po­litics that fre­quently leads to more or less ag­g­res­sive, more or  less comprehensive claims to sover­eign­ty in the name of identities of various  sorts; by ‘sovereignty’, I refer to the assertion of con­t­rol over the con­di­tions of  ex­is­­­­­tence, even the lives and deaths, of those who fall wi­th­in its pur­­view and  the ex­ten­sion over them of the juris­dic­tion of a nor­ma­tive order of one kind or  another (cf. Han­­sen and Steppu­tat 2005; J. L. Co­ma­roff and J. Comaroff 2006).  Ideology (the -ology of the idea) has given way as a basis of mobilization to  ‘ID-ology’ (the -ology of iden­tity) as the primary ba­s­is of poli­tical subjectiv ity—and, with it, to a species of ‘fractal’ citizenship in which na­tion­hood is not  so much repudiated as relativized (J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff 2003).  

    The second contemporary feature of the nation-state is closely related. It  derives from the out­sourcing of many of the ope­rations of go­vernance with  the rise of the neo-liberal state. Most of those ope­ra­tions have been fran­chised  to firms in the private sector­, but many have also been de­re­gulated and displaced into that amorphous socio-scape, ‘the community’, including those  very ‘communities’—the scare quo­­tes are meant to convey the fact that this  ab­­­stract noun covers a distinctly polymorphous so­ciolo­gy—that seek to pro vide their subjects with an alter­native citizenship, a parallel rule of law, and  a secure, orderly so­cial eco­lo­gy. With neo-­liber­al nation­hood having to admit  ever increas­ing hetero­do­­xy, ontological other­ness­ is widely in­voked these days  to make claims to sovereign self-regulation, all the more so where post-1989  constitutions give explicit recognition to di­versity. For their part, states tend  to re­gard such so­ver­eign­ties with ambivalence. Those that contend in the  economy of vio­l­en­­ce or spill over in­to polite, proper­tied society are likely to  be cri­mi­­na­liz­ed—or re­com­­mis­sio­n­ed—by go­vernment, if it has the capa­city  to do so. Others may be tolera­ted, particularly if they limit themsel­ves to the ‘private’ sphere, which, ac­cor­ding to libe­ral modernist po­li­tical theory­, is the  domain in which dif­feren­ce ought to express itself. For exam­p­le, according to  Fernanda Pi­rie (2006: 78–79, 93), Ti­be­­tan pasto­ra­lists are fiercely pro­­tec­tive of  the divinity of their ances­tors and the au­tonomy of their cul­­tu­ral patch when  it comes to mana­g­ing in­ter­nal affairs, but they defer volun­ta­rily to the Chi­nese  au­th­o­rities in matters of criminal violence. It is an arrange­ment with which  both sides appear to live comfort­a­b­ly. But the appeal to the autarky­­­­ of faith or  cul­ture against govern­ment does not always stop at this felicitous border, at the  border of disorder. 

    III. 

    In re­cent times, the kinds of ‘community’ that have become most assertive  of sovereignty are arguably those ba­s­­ed on religious and/or cul­tu­ral dif ference: the kinds that refuse altoge­ther the an­ti­nomy bet­ween the pri­­vate  and the public; that in­voke in­t­ran­sitive, often intransi­g­ent, ontologies of  being-in-the-world; that are based, existen­ti­al­ly, on transcendent truths and  sacredly sanctioned life-ways of their own; that demand some measure of  self-governance­­­—the kinds, therefore, that have tend­ed to show the greatest  alacrity in looking to legal theology and theo-legality on which to found them sel­ves and their futures. This, perhaps, is why Pope John Paul II was so keen  to embrace a ‘culture’ of rights jurisprudence—and why faith seems to be tak ing more and more to the law. Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann (2008:  86) refer to this pro­cess as the “juridification” of religion, by which faith aims  to remake the world in its own image. Not eve­ry­­where, nor always in the same  way, but palpably.10 Those creeds that bear the capitalized adjec­ti­ves ‘Great’  or ‘Wor­ld’ have deep juridical roots­­: the founding tes­ta­ments and texts, theo­­­ logies and iconographies, prophets and patriarchs of Ju­daism, Christianity,  and Is­lam are all heav­i­ly inscribed in legalities.­ 11 For organiz­ed reli­gion, in  fact, con­vic­tion has long been measur­ed by compliance with proscription and  pres­c­rip­­tion; sig­ni­fi­cantly, among the first acts of establishment on the part of  many ear­ly Afri­can Inde­pen­­­dent Chur­ches was to write a ‘Constitu­tion’, capi talized, since this is how mission Pro­­tes­t­an­t­ism presented itself to co­lonized  peoples (J. Co­ma­roff 1986).12 This had local resonances: ver­na­cular faiths in  Africa were also groun­d­ed in le­ga­li­ty, albeit in an­ces­trally sourced cus­to­mary  law; customary law, that is, in the techno-jural, not the colo­nially bastardized,  sense of the term. What app­ears dif­ferent nowa­days is the degree to which  all faiths are resorting to lawfare to pro­tect their sove­r­eignty, to ex­tend their  imperium, and, not infrequently, to challenge liber­al reason—albeit often by  libe­ral means (cf. J. Comaroff, this issue). Potentially, as we shall see, with  world-historical conse­quen­ces. 

    Take orthodox Islam. In the predominantly Muslim nation-states of the  world, re­cent political battles over their ideological character have been con ducted largely in terms of competing species of Islamic constitutionalism,  which has a long and excep­tio­n­al­ly complex history dating back to the second half of the nineteenth century. In the twenty-first century, Arjomand (2007:  136–137, passim) explains, a constitutionalism bas­ed on Sharia, in which  go­vern­ment exists primarily to implement divine law (typically asso­ci­a­ted with  nation-states such as Iran, Pa­kistan, and the Sudan), faces a “post-ideological” con­sti­tu­tionalism (typified by Egypt) in which Sharia is just one source  of a jurispru­den­ce that “ac­cepts demo­c­racy and … legal modernization­­” as  well as “other consti­tutio­n­al prin­­ciples” (cf. also Agrama 2005, n.d.).13 The  struggle for the fu­ture of the nations of the Islam­ic world, a struggle hardened  in recent times by “Islamic resurgence … and the per­sis­ten­ce of authoritarian  regimes,” Arjomand (ibid.) suggests, depen­ds on this legally mandat­ed dif­ference; in short, on different and opposed cultures of legality. Even in Egypt,  where Sharia is subordinated to a secular jurisprudence, “the law has become  a fundamental site of Islamic argumentation and practice,” to the ex­tent that  “contem­po­ra­ry attempts by Egyptians to reassess the role of Islam in their  lives, both personal and political, cannot avoid taking legal conditions into  account” (Ag­rama 2005: 51). According to a recent mass-me­diated account  (Feldman 2008b),14 a great number of Egyptians—66 percent, like 60 percent of  Pa­kis­tanis and 54 percent of Jor­danians—“say that Sha­ri­a ought to be the only  source of legis­la­­tion in their [country],” a country in which the Mus­lim Brotherhood, whose credo opens “Allah is our objective, the Qur’an is our constitu tion,” is the largest opposition bloc in Parliament. “For many Muslims today,”  Feld­man (ibid.) notes, “the call for Sharia is [a call] for an Islamic version of  what the West consi­d­ers its most prized principle of political jus­ti­ce: the rule of  law.” Even in Turkey, with its long history of Kemalist secularism, “new Islamic  move­ments”—themselves increasing­ly popular, increasingly pious—have been  said for a while to harbor “a secret agen­da to take over the state and enforce  Shariah” (Walton n.d.: chap. 1; cf. Esposito 1996; Ya­v­uz 2003).15 There are  signs pointing in this direction: in July 2008, the ruling Islamist AK Party, along  with the prime minister, the president, and 69 other leading figures, stood accu s­ed before the country’s Constitutional Court on charges of having subverted  the law of the land by fostering anti-secularist activities.16 This occurred after  the Court had enacted legislation to lift a ban against wearing headscarves on  university campuses. 

    It is no wonder, then, that efforts to ex­tend the dominion of both the faith  and the faithful in nations currently not governed primarily by Sharia law— like those of the Sa­lafiy­ya move­­­ment in rural Morocco—­would pro­pa­gate a  “return to the roots of leg­al Islam and de­mand the re­organization of social  life according to [its] core prin­cip­les” (Tur­ner 2006: 115–116; see also Turner  n.d.). This is tendered as an alternative not merely to the more secu­lar vision  of the Moroccan government, but also to the “pagan neoliberal develop­ment  agenda” on offer from the West.17 “Islamist concerns” here “are expressed in  legal discourse,” their “ultim­ate aim [being] the establishment of the rule of  Islamic law” (Turner n.d.: 3) in a chal­len­ge to the secular state. Even battles  over women’s rights are being conducted in these terms, pitting the female  branch of the Justice Spirituality Movement, an Islamist group, against secular  feminists (see, e.g., Williams 2008). It is no wonder, either, that the capture of regions within non-Mus­lim countries by or­thodox Islam—northern Nigeria and  Aceh being ce­le­brated cases—has ex­pressed itself in the enthusiastic applica tion of Sharia law to the re­gu­lation of all real­ms of existence.18 

    The centrality of Sharia in the lives of Muslim populations out­side of Is­la­m­­ic  na­tion-states was drama­ti­cal­ly affirmed in ear­ly 2008 when, of all peo­­ple, the  arch­­bi­shop of Canter­bu­ry, Dr. Row­an Williams, sug­ges­t­ed that some mea­sure  of of­fi­cial re­cognition be given to it by the Bri­tish state for pur­pos­es of everyday  go­vernan­ce in pre­dominantly Muslim communities. This may be the first time  that a reli­gi­ous leader of Williams’s stature has called for the ac­ceptance of ev­en  partial sovereignty for an­other fai­th. Pre­­dictably, the statement sparked a bit­ter  con­t­ro­ver­sy. Said his pre­­de­ces­sor, Lord Ca­rey, “There can be no exceptions to  the laws of our land.”19 Williams appears to have anticipated such a response.  “[A]s a mat­ter of fact,” he noted, “certain pro­­visions of Sharia are already recognised in our so­ci­e­ty and under our law”—as they are in India and Egypt—to the  extent that their adop­tion had become “un­avoidable.”20 He is probab­ly correct:  a Muslim culture of legality, itself a fusion of religion and juris­prudence with  deep roots, is asserting itself ever more vigo­r­ous­ly wherever Islamists live— often abetted by NGOs, such as Islamic Relief Worldwide, that ex­tend Islam’s  humanitarian reach.21 Perhaps this is why, as Susan Hirsch (2006: 165–166)  has ob­served, socio-le­gal scholarship on the topic has seen a noticeable rise in  re­ce­nt times, albeit one whose di­rec­tion was chan­g­ed by 9/11. A conse­quen­ce  of that mo­mentous moment, she adds, was to ensure that “the future of Islamic  law”—itself a “mo­­d­ern construction,” always “locally specific, in­tensely political, and richly varied” (Hus­­sin 2008)22—“would be more highly politicized than  previous­ly” (Hirsch 2006: 166), not least because of its deep interpellation in  Islamic faith and its pro­pagation. Rites and rights, again. 

    But it is not only the governance of everyday life that has caused Muslim  theo-legality to be evoked in assertions of sovereignty. The reli­gion itself is  being refram­ed in these terms. A dramatic instance is to be found in Pakistan.  It began in the mid-1970s, when the ulema, or­thodox religious authorities,  sought and won an injunction against the Ah­ma­dis, a move­ment they declared  to be heretical, to prevent this “sect” from using any of the Sha’ir (signs) of  Islam. These signs, they said, belonged solely to “pro­per” Muslims (Ah­med  2006: 19–24, 40–45). When the Ahma­dis appealed to the La­hore High Court in  1978,23 coun­sel for the ulema again ar­gued “that Mus­lim-ness [is] the exclu­si­ve  pro­per­ty of Mus­­lims alone, that cer­­t­ain Muslim ter­minology [is] analogous to  co­py­­right and trade­­­marks,” and that their im­pro­p­er use is, therefore, “an infr in­ge­ment of the rights” of the faith­ful (ibid.: 21). On this occasion, the jud­ge  found ag­ainst the religious authorities on the tech­­ni­ca­l ground that they could  not show that a ma­te­rial loss had been in­cur­red (ibid.: 41). But 15 years later,  in 1993, in a Pakistan Su­p­reme Court case24 that address­ed the con­sti­tu­­tio­nal  bases of Muslim identity, the same argument was accepted by a ma­jo­ri­ty of the  jus­tices.­ They argued that certain signs were not just distinc­tive cha­rac­teristics  and prac­ti­ces but “the exclusive proper­ty of Is­lam” (ibid.: 41–42). Thus was the  faith transformed “in­to property, something that could be own­ed, possess­ed  and bounded off from others” (ibid.), something whose true nature was vested in the law. In some contexts, as has been ob­served elsewhere (J. L. Comaroff  and J. Comaroff 2009a, 2009b), divinities may them­­sel­ves have a jural iden­tity.  In 1986, when the Indian govern­ment sued for the re­turn of a twelfth-century  bron­ze Shiva that had been looted from a village in Pathur, “it did so on behalf  of the offended god him­self,” who was the “named … plain­tiff in the case”  (Keefe 2007: 60–61; emphasis ad­d­ed). Thus does a deity, and the faith for  which it stands, be­come a legal per­son. The juridification of religion, to return  to the von Benda-Beckmanns’ felicitous phrase, has many faces. 

    Contemporary Christianity is also interpellating itself into the law—and,  in doing so, into governance—in an effort to extend the reach of faith-based  sovereignty. This, too, has precedents: Protestant and Catholic missions have,  through­out their history, sought to create more or less closed, more or less  sovereign commu­ni­ties, thereby to exercise over their citizens an authori­ty at  once institutional and capillary. And the chur­ch, in its va­ri­ous de­no­minational  guises, has always taken pains to exert in­f­lu­en­ce on political so­ci­e­ty and the  state. But we appear to be seeing an acce­le­ra­tion, and an ac­cretion, of this  tendency—a tendency against which Nietzsche ([1973] 1990: 87) warned: “[I]t  costs dear and terribly,” he said, “when religions hold sway … in their own  right and as sove­r­eign, when they thems­elves want to be final ends and not  means” (original em­phasis). That desire is making itself manifest both in small  Christian move­ments and in large ev­an­ge­lical awa­k­e­n­ings across the planet.25 Henning Mankell, the noted crime novelist and or­ga­nic anthro­po­­lo­gist of Sweden, writes of such movements in One Step Be­hind (2003), a fiction foun­d­ed  on an acute sociological reading of contempo­ra­ry Eu­rope. “No longer [are they]  simply cha­ris­matic,” he observes. “They are cor­po­r­ate fran­chises run by law yers and accoun­t­ants” (ibid.: 351), legal persons that strive to change the world  by means of le­gal ploys. The ex­tent to which this is true has been brought to  light in the US on an unpre­ce­den­ted scale since the turn of the new century.  Re­miniscent of the rise of Chris­tian Po­li­ti­cal Economy (CPE) (see J. Comaroff,  this issue) at the dawn of the modern age of capital (Wa­ter­­man 1991), con­ser va­tive Pro­tes­tantism would render social, mor­al, and material life ac­cording to  the dicta­tes of faith—al­though, in its second com­ing, CPE seems much more anxious to in­si­nuate itself directly into the workings of the state. Witness, in this respect, the spread of so-called dominionism, whose “global  ‘king­dom’ agenda” is founded on the belief that Jesus will not return “until the  Church has tak­en … con­­trol of the earth’s governmental and social institutions”  (Leslie 2008: 2, 3), includ­ing the market and the courts. Its “3-legged stool”  subsumes the state, busi­ness, and civil socie­ty (ibid.: 6). Even among Ameri can Christians who do not ex­plicitly see them­selves as part of the movement,  there is support for the effort to entrench “godly dominion over our neighbor hoods, our schools, our go­vern­ment, our literature and arts, our sports are­nas,  our … me­dia, our scientific endeavors—in short, over every aspect and institu tion of hum­an socie­ty.”26 For some, the longer-term ob­jectives are to make the  country over into a theocracy, thereby reversing the course of history, and to  put an end to the hegemony of secular reas­on. The ideology of the religious  right results in stands that are now very fa­mi­liar: its assaying of ‘family values’ and laissez-faire; its antipa­thy to ab­or­tion, homosex­uality, welfare, and stem cell research; its hard-nosed positions on po­ver­ty, the en­vi­ron­ment, theological  and cul­­­tural relativism, immigration, ‘just’ wars, and the like. In pursuing its  imperial ends, con­­ser­va­tive Christianity has been quick to resort to the means  of lawfare.27 Recall the disturbing and controversial do­cu­men­­tary Jesus Camp (2006; directed by Ra­ch­el Grady and Hei­­di Ew­ing) about the in­doc­trination of  very young peo­p­le, who spend their sum­mers learning to “seize back” the US  for Christ. The film may seem extreme in its choice of subject matter and in the  matter of its subjects’ choices, but it captures a rising tide in modern America.  Oth­er than footage of a Christian leader claiming to have open access to the  White House and its decision-making processes, the film’s most potent­ mo­­­t­if  is a life-size cardboard effigy of George W. Bush, the ultimate ‘Ameri­can Idol’:  pra­y­ers are said for him, urg­ing that he install “righteous judges”—the youths  chant the mantra “right­eous judges” over and over—who would conjure into  being a truly Chris­­tian common­weal­th­. The fight for domi­nion, in short, gives  yet further impetus to the fe­tishism of the law and, with it, the ju­dicialization  of politics. Legality is the se­cular in­stru­ment by which civil society is to be  re­made in the image of the sac­red.  

    Also uncivil society. Over the past decade or so, penitentiaries have become  a ma­jor target of Christian movements in many countries (Burnside et al. 2005)­­.  In the US, this ini­ti­a­tive is associated primarily with the conservative Prison Fel­ low­ship Minis­tries (PFM), which was foun­d­ed in 1976 by Char­les W. Col­son, an  ex-Watergate con­spirator and an alumnus of an Ala­­ba­ma correctional facility.  Neither Durkheim nor Fouc­ault would have been surprised, of course, given  their grasp of the constitutive relationship between the pri­s­on and the wor­ld,  the disgraced and the disc­i­p­­lined. The PFM’s “cultur­al com­mis­sion” is to assist  the church in evangelizing inmates, to pro­mote “bib­li­cal stand­ards of jus­tice in  the cri­mi­nal justice sys­­tem,” and, more broad­ly, “to cultivate righteous­ness in  soci­e­ty, streng­­the­n­ing the work of God’s king­dom.”28 In its Utopia, the Lord’s  Levia­than—about which Hob­­­­­bes (1986: pt. 3) himself wou­ld have felt distinctly  qu­ea­sy, given his belief that reli­gi­ous power ought al­ways to be sub­ordinate to  civil au­th­o­rity—would be ruled by a seam­less fusion of the laws of Levi­ti­cus  and the laws of the land. Again, the Protes­t­ant pre­­sence in prisons has a deep  his­tory. In his monumental novel Sac­red Hunger, Bar­ry Un­sworth (1992: 158)  reminds us that in the late eigh­teenth cen­tury, the bi­sh­op of Nor­wi­ch owned one  of Eng­land’s more no­to­rious hou­s­es of detention. In the US, the Pennsylvania  penitentia­ry model of similar vintage occupied prisoners “with labor and Bible  study” (Mauer 1999: 3). But there was less con­cern then for the promiscuous  embroilment of the chur­­ch into what were to become the functions of the state.  

    Ironi­cal­ly, when he was gover­nor of Tex­as, Geor­ge W. Bush was sued by a  con­vict for vio­la­ting the US Cons­ti­tu­tion by franchising out the pastoral care of  the pe­­ni­tentiary to PF­­­­M, thus giving an ad­van­t­age to ev­an­­ge­lical Christianity  over other faiths or no faith at all.29 PFM has had to answer to the law on its  own account as well. Its InnerChange Freedom Initia­tive (IFI), par­tly fun­ded by  the executive under Presi­dent Bush’s Faith-Based Community Ini­tia­ti­ves Pro­g 

    ram, was the ob­ject of an action filed in Iowa in 2003 by Americans United for the Separa­tion of Church and State. It “is uncons­cion­a­ble” said the plaintiffs,  “­­to give pre­ferential treat­ment to prisoners bas­ed solely on their willingness to  under­go re­li­gious conversion and indoc­tri­nation.” The real controversy here,  argued Minis­try­Watch, a Chris­­tian orga­ni­zation sym­pa­the­tic to PFM and IFI,  is about whether “our na­tion’s ba­sic app­roach to sol­­ving social prob­lems [is]  secular humanism powered by big go­vern­ment and void of trans­cendent values  [or] real and lasting social change … effected by ‘armies of com­pas­sion’ … work­ing for true jus­­tice based upon unchanging principles.”30 

    Critics of PFM, by contrast, ac­cuse it of religious coercion—indeed, of theo logico-lawfare. They point out that the evangelical Christian Ministry, which is  deeply committed to do­minion­ism, has persua­d­ed several states to make its prog rams, paid for by tax dollars, a requirement of parole and to give better carceral  treat­ment to those who sign on.31 As it turned out, the Iowa suit was successful.  Both the low­er courts and a federal ap­p­eals court, the second in late 2007, found  that IFI did violate the constitutional sepa­ra­­tion of church and state. Al­thou­gh  the plaintiffs took the ruling to be “a major setback for the White House’s ‘faith based initiative,’” IFI was banned only if it conti­nued to ope­r­ate with govern ment funds.32 In other words, as long as it is privately fi­nanced, it may have  access to prisons and be free to press its convictions on con­victs. At the time of  writing, PFM was consider­ing an approach to the ideologically stacked Supreme  Court—in res­pect of whose com­po­sition George Bush did answer the prayers of  the Jesus Cam­pers—to per­su­ade the highest levels of the judiciary that govern ment should pay for its work. And that the con­stitutional wall between church  and state, the sacred and the se­cular, ought to be realigned.  

    A luta con­tinua, the struggle continues. There are a number of organizations  in the US devoted specifically to protecting the separation of church and state.  Liberal opponents of creeping religiosity con­tinue to engage in insurgent law fare and to run up against evangeli­cal counter-in­sur­­gency.33 In February 2007,  for example, the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) ap­peared before  the US Su­­­preme Court to defend a claim in support of the right of tax­pay­ers to  challen­ge Presi­dent Bush’s crea­tion, by executive order, of the Office of Faith Based Initiatives—the same office that funded IFI and was thereby implicated  in the Iowa litigation—and other cognate offices.34 Both the FFRF and the White  House had their protagonists, many of whom filed amici briefs. The FFRF was  backed by the Am­e­­rican Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation  of Church and State, the Baptist Joint Com­mit­tee for Religious Freedom, People  for the American Way Foun­­dation, the Anti-Defamation League, the Center for  Free Inquiry, the American Jewish Congress, American Atheists, and a number  of legal histo­ri­ans and law scho­lars. The administration was supported by the  Foundation for Moral Law, the American Center for Law and Justice—note the  legal framing of these conservative Christian as­socia­tions—and eleven states of  the Uni­on. Earlier, before the Seventh Circuit Court of App­eals, the FFRF had  argued that be­cau­se those faith-based offices were created spe­cifically to help  Christian organi­za­­tions win go­vernment funding, they violated the es­tab­lish ment clause. Accepting the broad va­li­di­ty of this argument, the appellate ben­ch  had found in the FFRF’s favor, which in turn led the di­rector of the Office of Faith-Bas­ed Ini­tiatives, on behalf of the Bush admi­ni­s­tration, to take the case to  the Supreme Court. Its jurists, those ‘righteous judges’ ag­ain, decided ag­ainst  the FFRF case and overturned the decision of the Appellate Court on a nar­row  tech­nical ground—that be­cause the fun­­ding for the faith-based initiatives had  come from the executive branch and not from a budget passed by Congress,  which represents taxpayers, a challenge by the FFRF in the name of those  taxpayers had no legal stand­ing. The small matter of principle—the principled  separation of church and state at the core of American liberal democracy—was  submerged in judicial niceties.  

    It is not only the executive that has been implicated in the battle over re­li gion. So has the US military. This emerged with particular clarity in March  2008, when a sol­dier, Jere­my Hall, filed a federal lawsuit against the Depart ment of Defense and its se­c­re­ta­ry. Hall al­leged that his constitutional right to  free­­d­om of faith had been violated, that he had been overlooked for pro­mo­tion  on acc­ount of being an atheist, and that his life had been put at risk. Not sur pri­s­ing­ly, his claim met with stri­dent official de­nials. But as a CNN report by  Randi Kaye (2008) revealed, the mat­ter is not so straight­forward. The dispute  brought to light the fact that there does ap­pear to have been a perva­si­ve Chris tianization within the military. Michael Weinstein, a retired senior air force  offi­cer who establish­ed the Military Religious Freedom Founda­tion and joined  Hall’s legal ac­tion, speaks in that CNN report of a pro­mo­tional video featur­ing  uniformed generals that was made inside the Pentagon (Wein­stein insists on  calling it “the Pentacostalgon”) by Chris­tian Embassy, an evangelical organiza tion affiliated with Campus Crusade for Christ. Ano­ther religious as­sociation,  the Of­fi­cers’ Chris­tian Fellowship, al­so according to CNN, “has re­p­resenta­ti­ves  on near­ly all army ba­s­es worldwide. Its vi­sion … [is] ‘a spiritually trans­for med milita­ry, with am­bas­­sa­dors for Christ in uniform em­power­ed by the Holy  Spirit.’” Adds Weinstein, “their pur­po­se is to have Christian officers exer­cise  biblical lea­dership to raise up a Godly ar­my” (see Kaye 2008).  

    Mean­while, the US govern­ment has tried to have the suit dismissed, again  on procedu­r­al grounds. Jeremy Hall and the Military Re­ligious Freedom Founda tion, it says­, shou­ld have complained not through the civil courts but through  “the chain of com­mand.” Add­ed the brief filed for the state: “Ju­di­cial review  would significantly inter­fere with Army op­e­rations and intrude on discip­li­na­ry  and personnel decisions entrusted to military judg­­ment.” In asking the civi­lian  judicia­ry to pass the case back to the military, the army petitioned to be allowed  to act as jud­ge and jury in a suit in which it is the defendant before a tribunal  from which there is no external appeal.35 And it had every reason to be­lieve  that it would succeed, having bested Michael Weinstein in the courts before: in  2006, a jud­ge in New Mexico threw out as “baseless” a complaint against the  Air Force Academy—to the “app­lause” of conser­va­tive Pro­tes­tants and mili­ta­ry  person­nel—in which it was ac­cu­­sed by Wein­stein and other cadets of fostering  religious discri­mi­na­tion and favoring ev­an­gelical Chris­­tianity, even of abetting  dominionism. Said an attor­ney for the defen­se: “[S]ince the former ca­dets who  filed the suit were no longer at the aca­de­my, the legal action served no pur­pose”  (Winn 2006)—as if only a personal aff­ront, now out of date, was at issue.36

    The infusion of the sacred into governance is not confined to the United States,  of course. In Rus­sia, where there is a similar constitutional separation between  church and state, the two “reinforce each other intimately” (Benovska-Sabkova  et al. 2008: 51–52). Not on­ly does Rus­sian Orthodoxy receive “significant finan 

    cial support” from the nation­al trea­sury­­­, but it has also “become a central actor  in Russian politics and society” (ibid.). During To­ny Blair’s premiership in the  United Kingdom, the invocation of faith as justification for political decisions  became part of the ordinary discourse of public life. The same applies in other  parts of Europe, Asia, and the Americas, even when, as in Fran­ce, it hides itself  in laïcité, a sacralized secularism that is more often invoked to police difference  than it is to contain the Christian orthodoxy that silently suf­fuses the regulation of every­day being. In South Africa, where the consti­tu­­­tional pro­­­tection for  reli­gi­on is much great­er than it is in the US, and where the sub­stance of liberal  democracy is a deeply debated question, there is on­going argu­ment ab­­out the  place of reli­gi­on in civil so­ciety, pub­lic institutions, pedagogy, policing, and  go­ver­­nment­­. Here, too, efforts have been made by organiza­tions founded on  faith to de­ploy the courts­ to extend their sove­reignty.37 

    Nor, I stress, are such eff­orts restricted to Islam and Christianity. Similar  things might be written about other faiths in other places, be it the Mansions of  Rastafari in Ja­mai­ca or Hinduism in In­do­nesia (K. von Benda-Beckmann and F.  von Benda-Beckmann 2008) or fundamentalist Judaism, the popularity of which  has spread stri­k­ing­ly over the past few decades. In Is­rael, the role in go­v­ern­ment  of the religious parties—in par­ti­cular, their con­trol over fa­mi­ly law—has long  po­sed a problem for the full accom­plish­ment of a se­cu­­lar libe­r­al de­mo­c­ra­cy.  With the oc­­cupation of Palestine and the expan­sion of settle­ments domi­n­a­ted  by or­tho­­dox Jews, the West Bank has become an archi­pelago of faith-based sover­eign com­mu­­ni­ties no­to­r­ious for their aggressive self-asser­tion. Outside Israel,  throughout the Jew­ish diaspora, ultra-con­servative congregations have also ten ded to be highly protective of their integrity, clo­­s­ing themselves off to the world  and its in­­terventions, settling dis­pu­tes, enact­ing so­ci­ality, ma­naging their public  finances, and negotiating their own moral eco­no­mies, with rab­bi­ni­cal courts as  the arbiters of order and propriety. Some time back, Cha­n­nel 4 in the UK pre sented a television pro­g­ram en­titled “Jewish Law” in its se­ries Faith and Be­­lief.38 Focusing on just such a “self-contain­ed” com­munity in Man­ches­ter, it show­ed  sce­nes of religious authorities “enforc­ing an ar­ray of intricate regulations ‘gover n­ed by bibli­cal texts,’” rules that embrace “every ele­ment” of people’s lives and  deaths. The deg­ree to which ultra-conservative Jews seek sovereign autono­my  is of course variable. So, too, is the degree to which they are likely to suc­ceed in  attaining it. But that is a matter for the history of the future to determine. 

    IV. 

    I suggested earlier that the kinds of community most assertive of sovereignty  nowadays, and most given to theo-legality, are those founded on religious  and/or cul­tu­ral difference. Thus far, I have focus­ed entirely on the former, on communi­ties of faith as­­sociated with the ‘Great’ religions—religions, so to  speak, in the upper case. Those rooted in cultural difference, especially culture  ins­cri­b­ed in indigeneity, autochtho­ny, and common biogenetic substance, may  also lay claim to distinctive on­tologies, dis­tinc­­tive deities, distinctive ID-ologies—in other words, to religion in the lower case, at least in the sense that it  cannot be neatly ex­cised from the total cultural context in which it is historically  embedded or from the way of life that it indexes. Jean Coma­roff and I (2003)  have argued that ID-ology under the sign of culture and shared es­s­en­ce (“life  itself”), when transla­t­ed in­to a will to sove­reignty, yields poli-cultu­ra­lism. The  prefix ‘poli-’ denotes both plu­ra­lity and a po­litical claim to the ex­er­cise of go­vernan­ce over, well, ev­e­ry­thing, via the in­stru­men­­tation of a law under­written by  sac­red au­th­o­­ri­­ty. In South Africa, for example, it as­­serts it­self most ar­ti­culately  in the right of Zu­­lu, Xho­sa, Tswa­na, and others to rule and be ruled accor­d­ing to  their own ways and means under the tutelage of their own deities­. 

    Here, the politics of policulturalism has been most feverishly fought out— unsurprisingly, gi­v­­­en the fetishism of legalities—on the terrain of the South  Af­ri­can Con­­­s­titu­tion. The pri­ma­ry protagonist is the Con­g­ress of Traditional  Lead­ers of South Africa (Con­tra­le­sa). For more than a de­­cade, Contralesa has  sought to change the founding law of the land to give greater recognition to  vernacular life-ways, including those taken to fall with­in the purview of African  religion. Indigenous beliefs are in fact protected by the Constitution, but they  are sub­ject to the limitations of the Bill of Rights and the dictates of uni­versal  citizenship—to which, save in exceptional circumstances, all cultural difference  is subor­dinated.39 Con­tra­­lesa rails against these limitations and has pushed for  a constitutional amend­ment to remove them. Thus far it has not succeeded,  although the government re­pea­t­ed­ly makes conciliatory gestures in respon­se to  its demands and has passed laws that au­tho­rize ver­­na­cular prac­tices, in­c­lu­d­ing  some that had pre­­viously been dee­­­m­­ed repugnant.­­­­­­ 40 The state has al­so shown  tolerance toward ‘tradi­tio­nal’ religious rituals, such as initiation and ani­mal  sacri­fice, that tack close to, and often trans­gress, the boundaries of the licit;  this in a cli­mate of cultural populism that, at present, encourages asser­tions of  Africanity ag­ainst the per­­­­ceived Eurocen­tricities of liberal de­mocracy. As has  been widely reported, South Africa’s re­­cent­ly elected presi­dent, Ja­c­ob Zu­­ma, is  a po­ly­gam­ist with a professed be­lief in the power of the Zulu ancestors. 

    In fact, the struggle over sovereign indigeneity seems to be spreading ac­ross  the legal landscape of South Africa, as it is in some other nation-states. Usu ally fought out in terms of a right to difference based on the sacred­ essence of  so­cial being, it is phra­­sed either in the narrow lexicon of religion or in the more  encompassing lang­u­age of culture—or both. A few dramatic instan­ces have  become ico­­nic of this strug­gle. Some have pitt­ed indigenous peoples directly  against the government, while others manifest them­selves in bat­tles of belief  within Afri­can polities, although, even then, their ultimate res­pon­­­dent is the  state itself. One instance of the latter, a cause célèbre in the 1990s,41 cast Kedi bo­ne Tu­­ma­ne, a member of Je­hovah’s Wit­nesses, against Chief Nyalala Pilane  of the Kgat­la, un­der whose ju­ris­diction in the North West Province she then  lived. For rea­s­ons of faith, Tu­ma­ne had violated a rule that confines recently widowed women to their homes and re­quires­ that, when going ab­road, they  sprinkle a herb (moga­ga) on their paths. Not doing so is to risk spreading pollu tion with poten­ti­al­ly le­th­al conse­quen­ces. When Tu­ma­ne left her residence and  refused to broad­cast mo­ga­ga, she was arrested by the tri­bal au­tho­ri­ty. Reacting with a mix­ of fear and fury, many Kgatla call­ed for her ba­nish­­ment. With the support of the South African Hu­man Rights Com­mis­­sion (SAHRC),  Tumane took Chief Pilane to the High Court of South Africa.42 Her con­sti­­tu tio­n­al rights had been violated, she argued. Having been put under “house  ar­rest,” she had been forced to “live … [as] an out­cast.”43 In an affidavit sworn  prior to the case, Tumane claimed that in June 1998, Pilane had agreed to call a  mass gathering and had promised to ann­oun­ce the end of her confinement. But  he had not done so. Pilane replied that he could not “release” her at the meet ing in question, since his people had taken a unani­mous deci­sion there to the  contrary. He added that Tumane was “confin­ed” not by the tribal au­th­o­rity, but  “by her own custom,” which could not be altered save by the “con­­­sent of the  Kgatla na­tion,” of which she herself was a member. Her rights had been res­pec t­ed, he said, ex­cept where they were in tension with Section 36 of the Consti tu­tion, which ack­now­­led­g­es that some limita­tions on individual freedoms  are justifiable. For Kgatla, preventing the violation of a ritual taboo—one that  endangered lives in their community—was just such a jus­tifi­cation. What is  more, this had been determined at an open, de­mocrati­cal­ly constituted public  forum.44 The com­plai­n­ant, in turn, an­s­wer­e­d that while an indigenous people  is entitled to pro­m­ote its culture and reli­gion, it has to do so within the com pass of the Bill of Rights, which pla­c­es indivi­dual free­d­oms above all things.  Her argument won, at least in the short run: in July 1998, the cou­rt announced  that compulsory confinement and the performance of mo­gaga breached the  Consti­tu­tion. An in­ter­im order in­structed the chief to free Tu­ma­­ne forthwith. Nothing happened. Political pressure from the state mounted. Coun­­­ter pressure came from the House of Traditional Leaders, which challenged the  government to explain why the Constitution places individual legal rights  above collective cultural rights—es­pecially, it might have added, when both  pertain to religion, albeit one in the upper case, the other in the lower. For its  part, Pilane’s defense fused a truism of British functionalist anthropology with  a concept of sovereignty that might have come from Agamben: “Tradition is  the glue that holds the tribe to­ge­ther, gives it pur­pose, sus­tains its iden­ti­ty.”45 Virtually all Kgatla ob­ser­­ve mogaga, it went on. The trans­gression of mourning  rituals puts social life at risk, which is why “the nation” (mo­ra­fe), following  de­­mo­cratic pro­cedure, had de­ci­ded to sacrifice Tuma­ne’s “freedom” and con demn her to social dea­th­. This was their sovereign will. As the dispute came  to a climax, Pilane deployed a stra­ta­gem that seem­ed to re­ver­se his ear­lier  line of argu­ment. Mo­gaga, he stated, is a ritual that is voluntarily fol­lo­w­­ed  by Kgatla; there­fore, hav­ing elec­ted to live among them by her own choice,  Tumane had not suf­fer­ed any compulsion. Repeating the ruler’s statement that  the burial taboos were a mat­ter of volition, and ig­no­ring earlier evidence to the  contrary, the ben­ch, at its final hea­r­ing, dismissed the suit. It clearly did not  want to en­ter deep con­s­­ti­­tu­tio­n­al wat­ers by out­lawing an indigenous religious prac­ti­ce.46 In any case, Tuma­ne’s mour­n­ing pe­ri­od had ended. Chief Pilane’s  tactic had worked. In their own eyes, Kgatla had safeguar­d­ed­­ the sovereignty  of their ancestral rites—and, more generally, of their life-ways—by means of  effective lawfare. They had done so, significantly, not merely by re­writing their  own cultural jurisprudence into the thoroughly contemporary language of  con­stitutional­ism. They had also conjured with the foun­dational logic of liberalism, drawing up­on and rup­turing received distinc­tions be­tween the public  and the private, individual and collective entitlement, freedom and constraint,  sovereignty and democ­ra­cy, the sa­c­ral and the se­cu­lar. Rites and rights.  

    Similar things are occurring in other contexts as well. Courts ac­ross the  country are having to deal with out­lawed or unrecognized ritual prac­tices that  are integ­ral to the lives of much of the population. Nor only in the courts. The  sovereignty of African re­li­gious belief—and of the cultural worlds of which  they are an elemental part—is being proclaimed­­­ in everyday situations as  well, sometimes quietly, sometimes provo­ca­tively. What is more, this is being  exacerbated by the growing commodification of faith, cul­ture, and identity,  the sort of thing ex­em­­plified by initiation rites among the Pedi in Lim­po­po,  now a high-priced item in a regional ritual economy in which youths from all  over cla­mor to participate. It is also to be seen in the rendering of Islam into  in­tellec­tu­al property, of Native American sacred sym­­bols in­to co­py­righted  ob­jects, of Balinese temple dances into shows for fee-paying tourists. It is the  sort of thing, too, that has in­ter­­pel­lated neo-Pentecosta­l Christianity so dee­ply  into neo-libe­ral capita­lism (J. Coma­roff, this issue)—the sort of thing, more  generally, that may be des­cri­bed as Religiosity, Inc., Eth­nicity, Inc., and the  like (J. L. Co­maroff and J. Coma­roff 2009b). But it is not the mate­rial dimen sion of these things with which I am concerned here, except as a contributory  element to a more en­com­passing process. Assertions of so­v­er­eign­ty under the  sign of R/reli­gion, upper or low­er case—and especially the resort to theo-le­gality in its name—could well have world-altering repercus­sions for the future  of the liberal nation-state. This applies not only in South Af­ri­ca, to which I  have turn­ed for illus­tra­tion be­cau­se I know it best, but al­most everywhere, if  in different mea­­sure.  

    V. 

    Why? Why world-altering? What are the repercussions for the modernist  nation-state?  

    The broad outlines of an answer should be clear by now.47 Faith-based  com­munities that strive either to claim sovereign autonomy for them­selves or  to extend the dominion of R/re­­­ligion seek to overturn three root principles of  li­be­ral orthodoxy, each of them fundamental to its socio-juridical scaffolding.  Moreover—and this is critical here—they do so by recourse to a theo-legality  that rede­p­loys­­ liberal jurisprudence against itself in order to transform it. The  first of the three prin­ciples is the antinomy between the public and the private,  whose erasure wou­ld put paid to the exis­tence of constitutionally inviolable spaces of personal belief and practice, spaces beyond re­gu­la­tory oversight.  The se­cond is the separation of the sacred from the temporal. With its dis­ so­lu­tion—or ra­ther, with the collapse of the latter into the former—goes the  de­mise of uni­ver­­sal citi­zen­ship, of any form of political or legal sub­jec­ti­vity  out­side the reach of godly go­ver­n­an­ce, of the right to dissent or difference, of  the distinc­tion bet­ween church and state, of civil de­m­o­c­ra­cy, of politics sui  generis—each, self-evi­den­tly, an inexorable step toward theo­cra­cy. The third  is the te­los of mo­dernity it­­self, bas­ed on the per­fec­t­ibi­lity of life by the ap­pli ca­tion of secular rationality to the pro­duc­tion of new know­­l­edge, new truths,  new technologies of being, which is to be re­p­la­ced by a relian­ce on di­­vine  inspi­ration, divine veracities, di­vine eth­ics. In the pro­cess, the En­ligh­t­en­­ment  ep­is­teme of em­pirical reas­on gives way to an epis­teme of convic­tion, one that  sup­p­lants the search for forensic explanation with the di­vi­­na­tion of good and  evil; that sub­stitutes the logic of the law with the Schmit­­tian cal­cu­­­lus of friend  and foe; that de­nies any re­cog­nition to relativism; that calls for unmitigated  puni­ti­ve­ness as the pro­per treat­ment for trans­gres­sion; that sa­crifi­ces social  accoun­ta­bi­li­ty­ to the axi­om that indivi­duals before God are the au­th­ors of their  own predica­ments. Some of these things seem omi­n­ou­sly reminis­cent of Isaiah  Berlin’s (1980) counter-Enligh­t­enment. Whether or not this is so, one thing is  clear. God is not dead. Pace Nietzsche, God has se­cu­r­ed a new, en­larged niche,  one in which the spirit of the law bows to the hege­mo­ny of the holy. Un­der the  administration of Geor­­ge W. Bush, the United States gave forewarning to the  world of what a turn to this epis­teme could mean for humanity at large.  

    All this, I have argued, grows out of the simultaneous fetishism of the law  and the assertive rise of religiosity in the age of neo-liberalism. Why that dou ble, interlocking pro­­cess­ has occur­r­ed at all is a much more general problem,  one at which I have on­ly been able to gesture. In theory, it may be approached  from a number of per­s­­­pec­tives. One, for example, might attribute it to the  post-Durkheimean character of the contemporary mo­m­ent. For Durkheim,  God was society worshiping itself, and so­ciety was a mo­r­al order supported  by a sys­tem of legal sanc­tions. With the alleged death of the so­cial, the polity  be­comes a le­g­­al order governed by moral sanc­­tion, bac­k­ed by a pu­tatively aso cial God. Another might ascribe it­ to the ma­tu­­ration of neo-li­b­e­ral ca­pi­t­a­l­ism,  its triumphal conquest of the globe, arguing that this has brought in its wake  Ad­am Smith’s nightmare, a ‘society of strangers’, to which the only anti­do­te  is a universe rul­ed by the absolutist certainties of faith and law. Yet an­o­th­er  might suggest that the emergence of the ‘risk so­ci­e­ty’, of a world­ of fear and  inse­cu­rity—itself occasioned by a me­ta­morphosis in the na­ture of go­v­ernance  and its re­la­tionship to the market—has conduced to make conviction and le­gal  sanction, two ax­es of se­cu­rity, the answer to the me­ta­physic of dis­or­der with  which we live. Still another would have it that the corol­lary of the death of  politics and the end of ideo­lo­gy, often seen as twin signs of the time, has been  the displacement of the first by ju­ris­­pru­­dence and the se­cond by be­lief, thus  yiel­­­d­ing the dia­lectic of religiosity and lega­li­ty with which I have been con cerned here. Bear in mind, in this respect, Marx’s observa­tion that religion is  not just an opi­ate but also the spirit of a spiritless age. Perhaps it is in the spirit of the law—in theo-legality—that the bat­tle to redeem that spiritlessness is  ta­k­ing place. But these are theoretical speculations bet­ter addressed else­where.  For now, my objective is more modest. It is simply to open up to scru­tiny the  unfolding coun­ter­point of law and religion in the history of the present—in  particular, the sacrali­za­tion of the former, the juridifi­ca­tion of the latter, and the  connection between the two.  

    Patently, the struggle over the place of faith in society is far from played  out. In some nation-states, as we have seen­, efforts to oppose assertions of  R/religi­ous sovereignty have been quite de­ter­mined and have been backed  by counter-law­fare. Hence, for example, the legal action ag­ain­st the Islamist  ruling party in Turkey on behalf of its secular state; the exertions of more or  less liberal regimes elsewhere in the Muslim world to constrain the reach of  Sharia; the suit joined by the South Afri­can Hu­­man Rights Com­mission against  Chief Pilane’s ca­mpaign to establish the sover­eign autono­my of Kgatla belief  and practice in the face of the national constitu­tion. Conversely, in the United  States, from 2000 to 2008, it was the execu­tive branch of the federal government that sought to use lawfare to erode the Jef­fer­sonian wall between church  and state, thus to further faith-based agendas and the cause of religion—only  to run up ag­ainst re­p­re­sen­tatives of civil society who have taken to insurgent  legalities to protect Ame­rica from dominionism. 

    As I have said, a luta continua. The point, though, is that wherever it is  being engag­ed, the battle itself is changing both faith and the law: faith, by  infusing its imaginations and identities and exertions with a contemporary  culture of legality; the law, by com­pel­ling it to come to terms with sovereign diffe­rence as never before and to adapt itself accordingly. To wit, as a result of the  lawfare conducted in the name of R/religion—as a result, more ge­nerally, of  the rise of policulturalism—cour­ts everywhere are having to deal with the con crete fact of theo-legality. This, after all, is what the arch­bi­sh­op of Canter­bu­ry  meant when he observed that Sharia had beco­me a living reality in the UK,  that some of its pro­­­visions “are already recognised in our so­ci­e­ty and under  our law.” It is what the Pa­kistani judiciary authorized when it recog­ni­zed Islam  as intel­lec­tual property. It is what the South African state has legitimized in  en­­ac­ting into law pre­viously repug­nant cul­tu­r­al ‘traditions’ and what some of  its judges have accepted, citing constitutio­n­al exception, in giving priority to  ‘customary practi­ces’ over those sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. The examples  are endless. They merely reiterate what was noted earlier about the insinuation  of difference into the twenty-first-century nation-state and its judicial scaffolding, what we have seen to occur with the fetishism of the law and the rising  tide of heterodoxy under the sign of R/religion in the post-millennial world,  what we shall continue to see as the unruly dialectic of faith and legality works  itself out. The process is less likely to yield winners or losers or clear outcomes  than a myriad of uneasy, unstable compromises, the stuff of a politics of the  long run. An eternity, maybe.

    John L. Comaroff is the Harold H. Swift Distinguished Service Professor of Anthro pology at the University of Chicago, Research Professor at the American Bar Founda tion, and Honorary Professor of Anthropology at the University of Cape Town. He  is also a former president of the Association for Political and Legal Anthropology in  the United States. His current research in post-apartheid South Africa is on crime,  policing, and the workings of the state; on democracy and difference; and on the  nature of post-colonial politics and law. Recent books include, with Jean Comaroff,  Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism (2000), Law and Disorder in  the Postcolony (2007), and Ethnicity, Inc. (2009). Another volume, Theory from the  South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa, is in advanced preparation. 

    Notes 

    1. In accessing the online version of Dalla Torre’s essay, note that it is to be found under the  title “The Holy Spirit Is the Breath of Life,” not under its own. The URL in the reference  list is correct, how­ever . Jean Comaroff and I have cited this essay before (J. L. Comaroff  and J. Comaroff 2006: 25). 

    2. There are, of course, parts of the contemporary world ruled by theocracies. I shall return  later to this topic and to ongoing efforts to extend theocratic governance into the heart  of the global North. 

    3. I owe the phrase ‘legalized illegalities’ to Henry Giroux (2008), who uses it—to powerful  effect—in describing neo-li­be­r­al gover­n­ance in the con­tem­porary United States. 4. Aqui­n­as said this in the thirteenth century, long before the separation of lex naturae from  lex dei, yet the statement has directly modernist foreshadowings. 

    5. In point of fact, as I note in the text below, African Independent Churches in South Africa  have written constitutions for them­selves since the early twentieth century, a process  encouraged by their desire for govern­ment recognition and its be­nefits—which few ever  actually achieved (Sundkler 1961). Twenty-first-century constitutionalism, patently, is  grounded in very different historical circumstances.  

    6. On the example of the post-apartheid South African Constitution and its dif­fe­r­ences in  this respect from that of the US Constitution, see Davis and Le Roux (2008). Davis is a  High Court judge in South Africa, and Le Roux is a member of the Johannesburg Bar. 7. For just one very acute account, see Grey (2000). 

    8. In the course of his election campaign in 2008, John McCain, the Republican pre­sidential  candidate, “promised to appoint only conservative judges to the Supreme Court,” the  clear implication being that they would be practicing Christians. See Pilkington (2008). 

    9. Thousands of accounts of the case were published in the US media, especially in 2004– 2005. Tom DeLay’s threat to the judiciary is quoted from Harper (2005).  10. A briefer, amended version of this section and the next is published in J. L. Comaroff and  J. Coma­roff (2009a). 

    11. Interestingly, the root of the word medina, which names the most sacred city in Islam,  is din, whose con­no­tations in Qur’anic Arabic include several that implicate the jural:  sovereignty, domi­nion, law, con­s­titution, govern­ment. In modern Hebrew, din is usually  rendered as ‘judgment’, legal or rab­bi­ni­cal; it is the root, also, of medina, which denotes  ‘state’ but had a wider fan of referents in biblical vernacu­lar.  

    12. Note, in this respect, Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann’s (2008: 86) observation  that “[in] Christian charismatic communities in Africa remarkable processes of juridifica tion seem to be taking place.” 

    212 | John L. Comaroff 

    13. Although Arjomand (2007) does not say as much, these are ideal-types. If we take, for  instance, Turner’s (2006: 110, passim) description of Morocco, it fits with the second model— but not entirely. There are other nation-states that also resist easy classification; however, this  is not to say that Islamic constitutionalism does not figure centrally in their politics of state.  

    14. Feldman, a professor at Har­vard Univer­sity who specializes in constitutional law, law  and religion, and Islamic studies, has recently published The Fall and Rise of the Islamic  State (2008a).  

    15. There is no pagination for this quote as it is taken, with permission, from a draft of  Walton’s doctoral disserta­tion. Walton (n.d.) goes on to note that in the case of the Nur  Cemaati religious community, formed around the teachings of Said Nursi, adherents  “adamantly deny any involvement in politics.” 

    16. I learned of the case from a Reuters report syndicated in South Africa (De Bendern 2008). 17. Turner (n.d.: 2) notes that the movement, which arose in the Souss in 1999, “did not derive  from Moroccan Islam itself … [I]ts ideology was propagated by non-Moroccan teachers.” 18. The co-existence of Islamic law with other legal regimes is a parallel topic beyond my  present scope. It has its own fairly large literature: on Indonesia, for example, see John  Bowen (2003), and Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (2006).  

    19. See “Carey Weighs into Sharia Law Row,” BBC News, 10 February 2008, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7236849.stm (accessed 14 March 2008). 

    20. See “Archbishop Defends Sharia Remarks,” BBC News, 9 February 2008, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7236174.stm (accessed 13 March 2008) and “Sharia Law in  the UK Is ‘Unavoidable,’” BBC News, 7 Febru­a­ry 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ uk_news/7232661.stm (accessed 14 March 2008). 

    21. I was made aware of this by the activities of Islamic Relief Worldwide in South Africa.  The or­ga­nization provided food to homeless families that, after a bitter legal battle, had  been evicted from a hou­s­ing project in Cape Town in which they had squatted. See  Chance (2008).  

    22. There is no pagination for this quoted text. It is taken from the abstract of Hussin’s  (2008) doctoral disser­ta­tion. 

    23. Abdur Rehman Mubashir v. Syed Amir Ali Shah, PLD 1978 Lahore 113. 24. Zaheeruddin v. The State (1993; Supreme Court Monthly Review: 1718); again, see Ahmed  (2006: 40–41). 

    25. A few years back, Fogel (2000) argued that a “Fourth Great Awakening” had occurred in  the United States dur­ing the 1960s and 1970s. Skeptics argue that this fourth awakening  was not as ‘great’ as the previous three; in­deed, they claim that it was not sub­s­tantial  enough to warrant the adjective ‘great’ at all. Such things, of course, are hard to read  from close up in history. 

    26. This statement by the late Pastor D. James Kennedy of Coral Ridge Ministries is quoted  from “The Rise of the Religious Right in the Republican Party,” Theocracy Watch, http:// www.theocracywatch.org (accessed 14 March 2008).  

    27. So, of course, have liberal Christians in their struggles against injustice and inequality,  not least during the civil rights movement. They, too, have become ever more adept at  deploying the law. But that is beyond my pre­sent scope. 

    28. See “Prison Fellowship Ministries/PFM/Chuck Colson,” MinistryWatch, 22 Febru ary 2008, http://www.ministrywatch.com/mw2.1/F_SumRpt.asp?EIN=620988294  (accessed 18 March 2008). 

    29. “Lawsuits against Prisons: Texas Prisoners’ Religious Rights Violated,” North Coast Xpress,  http://www.sonic.net/~doretk/Issues/01-03-SPR/lawsuits.html (accessed 9 August 2005). 30. See “Prison Fellowship Ministries/PFM/Chuck Colson,” MinistryWatch, 22 February 2008,  http://www.ministrywatch.com/mw2.1/F_SumRpt.asp?EIN=620988294 (accessed 18  March 2008). All quoted words and phrases in this passage are drawn from this source. 31. For an acute, detailed critique of PFM in the public domain, see “Court Rules against  ‘Faith Based Coercion’ Programs” by Dogemperor, Talk To Action, 5 June 2006, http:// www.talk2action.org/story/2006/6/5/0566/59215 (accessed 10 March 2008).

    Reflections on the Rise of Legal Theology | 213 

    32. The quote is from Blum (2008). This is one of a very large number of me­dia analyses of  the case pub­lished soon after the appellate decision. 

    33. In the wake of the 2006 elections in the United States, several commentators on religion  in politics shared the view of the editor of Religionlink.com, who stated that the “Demo cratic takeover of Congress heralds a new dynamic in the long-stan­ding tug-of-war” bet ween them and Republicans who “have projected their agenda … which tend­ed to mir­ror  the stands of Christian con­ser­vatives.” See “Elections 2006: The Out­look for Religion in  Politics,” Religionlink.com, 8 November 2006, http://www. religionlink.com/tip_061108. php (accessed 14 March 2008). While it is true that evangelical Christians may find it  more difficult in the short run to give political expression to that agenda, the role of faith  in American public life is not determined primarily by shifts in partisan politics.  

    34. See Hein, Director, White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, et al.  v. Free­dom From Religion Foundation, Inc., Supreme Court of the United States, No. 06- 157. The FFRF was represented by the Yale Law School Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic.  For its own account, see http://www.ffrf.org/legal/hein_supremecourt07/ (accessed 7  May 2008). The case was argued on 28 February 2007 and decided on 25 June 2007. My  summary is drawn primarily from the Syllabus of the Supreme Court record. See http:// www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/06-157.pdf (accessed 11 July 2008). 

    35. For an account of the effort of the US military to have the case dismissed, see “US Gov ernment Wants Atheist Soldier’s Lawsuit Dismissed,” Associated Press, International  Herald Tribune, 11 July 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/10/america/ NA-US-Military-Religion-Lawsuit.php (accessed 11 July 2008). It is from this report that  the quotes in the previous two sentences are drawn. 

    36. Michael Weinstein was also heavily involved in this widely reported case. For a relatively  detailed account, see Winn (2006).  

    37. See the Mail & Guardian’s special edition on religion, 20–27 March 2008, in parti­cular,  the article by Davis and Le Roux (2008: 12–13). 

    38. See http://www.channel4.com/culture/microsites/C/can_you_believe_it/debates/ jewishlaw.html and http://www.channel4.com/culture/microsites/C/can_you_believe_ it/debates/jewishlaw3.html (both accessed 24 March 2008). 

    39. Section 36 of the Constitution allows­­­­ that some constraints on the universal rights of  citizens are “jus­ti­fia­ble in an open and demo­c­ratic society.” But it adds that any such  constraint­ is to re­main bound by the Bill of Rights. As we shall see, pro­tagonists of  the sover­eign­ty of tradition have invoked this “justifi­a­b­le” li­mitation in their struggles  against the state. 

    40. The Cus­­tomary Marria­ges Act (No. 120 of 1998), for example, allows polygamy, this not withstanding the fact that it had long been treat­ed by South African law, and by ‘native  administration’, as ‘repug­nant’ to civilization. The Act also raises ques­tions of gender  equality, to which the Constitution and statutory law give a great deal of at­tention. 

    41. See “Clash of Custom, Constitution,” The Mail (Mafikeng), 31 July 1998, 17. Jean Comaroff  and I have also analyzed the case in extenso (J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff 2003). 42. High Court of South Afri­ca (Bophuthatswana Provincial Division), Case No. 618/98. 43. Ibid., Foun­ding Affidavit, 3. 

    44. Ibid., Answering Affidavit, 13 November 1998, 7–10. 

    45. Ibid. All the quoted phrases in this paragraph are from the same passage in the Answer ing Affidavit. 

    46. The SAHRC regretted Pilane’s pronouncement that mo­gaga was a voluntary practice, an  ambiguity that left un­clear whether he meant it as a statement of existing practice or a  change of rules. It sought to contest chief­ly authority, not by criminalizing tradition, but,  more subtly, by pre­venting indigenous rulers from interfering with the free­dom of movement  and other fundamental rights of their sub­jects (J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff 2003). 

    47. Note that I am spe­cifi­cally concerned here with the juridical as­pects of these questions.  Elsewhere in this issue, Jean Comaroff addresses them in more wide-ranging terms.

    214 | John L. Comaroff 

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    ______. 2008b. “Why Sharia?” New York Times Magazine, 16 March. http://www.nytimes. com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Sharia-t.html (accessed 18 March 2008). Fogel, Robert W. 2000. The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism. Chi cago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 

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  • The Pariah to Messiah Moment

    The Pariah to Messiah Moment

    Chicago – Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, John L. Comaroff discusses his hope for a renewed public discourse in an Obama administration with Chris Lydon on Radio Open Source. The discussion took place in The Watson Institute’s Jukowsky Forum on Friday the 7th, 2008. The radio show is titled ‘The Pariah-to-Messiah-Moment: John Comaroff’ and you can listen to the entire piece at www.radioopensource.org

  • John Comaroff speaks with Chris Lydon

    The Obama Moment in America reminds the Chicago anthropologist John Comaroff of the Mandela Moment in his native South Africa in the early 1990s. The whole world has embraced the Obama Moment as its own, Comaroff says, because it marks “the reentry of a pariah nation into the world” on the terms of a revived democracy.

    There’s a bracing analysis here from a man who makes it his business to jar our perspective — whose definition of anthropology boils down to “critical estrangement.” Anthropology won the election, Comaroff says, only half kidding. He means not just that Barack Obama is the son of an anthropologist but has a mind to stand outside the consensus when he must.

    “We’ve seen something like the the birth of a counter-Enlightenment in the Bush years,” Comaroff says. “‘Give me faith, and I’ll tell you the answer. Take my heart… as sufficient justification for the Iraq War, or for judging good and evil.’ Anthropology says: ‘Wait a moment. What do we sacrifice when we sacrifice reason?’ Digging at surfaces is the anthropological act. Anthropology as a discipline has a mantra: estrangement. Take nothing for granted. Whatever appears to you in the surfaces of everyday life is not an answer to anything; its a question about something. Obama, though trained as a legal scholar, is an organic anthropologist.”

    The Obama Moment is an invitation to restore politics and a public space where nationhood “in any collective sense” almost died. President Bush’s invocation of the shopping cure after 9.11 helped define “a nation of individuals held together by a market.” The Obama Moment “reenvisions America as the sum of its differences.” The Bush years gave us “lying as a national practice,” with political impunity. “Forensic journalism” marks the path back to the estate of truth. Forensic journalism — argumentative interpretation of the evidence — is embodied differently in the Nobelist Paul Krugman of The New York Times, John Stewart of The Daily Show, and Charlie Savage, who broke the Bush “signing statement” scandal for The Boston Globe. But it will take more than a few heroes to sustain the euphoria in this unfamiliar Obama Majority. The rest is up to us.

    JC: I have the audacity to hope that the return to democracy is going to be about hearing. But that, of course, throws a moral obligation on journalism. I think that the press let us down very badly over the Iraq war. I think it gave a free ride to a president who didn’t deserve a free ride, even when there were plenty of critics making very strong arguments, well-backed arguments about the falsity of the claims [justifying the war in Iraq]. They were cowards. They were self-censoring. In a democracy, no one self censors.

    I have an enormous respect for forensic journalism. Forensic journalism is basically anthropology for the public: the kind of journalism that precisely takes as its obligation the probing of surfaces: why are we hearing what we are hearing, why are we being told what we are being told, who is asking the questions on our behalf. I think that journalism is the first estate, not the third or fifth or whatever, it is the first estate—the estate of truth. And it can only be the estate of truth to the extent that it represents its population. We know now that politicians don’t–they represent capital, they represent capacity to turn financial assets into votes in congress. They don’t necessarily, when they vote, represent us… But, the press is always there and always ought to be representing us.

    CL: Wouldn’t Rupert Murdoch claim that he is practicing forensic journalism at Fox News?

    JC: I have never heard news on Fox, I have heard representations of partial realities… We’re in the tragic situation, as Jon Stewart once said, where we get our news from Comedy Central. We certainly don’t get it from Fox.

    CL: Is Jon Stewart practicing forensic journalism?

    JC: Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert did a service during the Bush administration. They were really very serious people by pointing out the contradictions, the stupidities of administration speak—of regime speak. They weren’t producing the news but they were producing a forensic discomfort about it that made one think… They served notice about what it was we were not seeing by virtue of it being half-hidden by the likes of Fox and the liberal press, which didn’t do much better. A return to forensic journalism is about news analysis. It is about the relationship between the production of fact and its interrogation, after all the fact does not float free in space. The fact is as manufactured as anything else. And understanding the process of its manufacture and asking how we are being fed these kids of representations. Of course Obama must be held accountable, too. Otherwise we live in a world made totally of spin.

    CL: Is it possible that Google has killed journalism?

    JC: I think it is a threat to journalism. It poses the threat of trivialization, which is to say that we live in an oversupply of information and an under supply of facts and analysis.

    I really think that this is a wonderful call for the universities to reassert their relevance. We have seen the trivialization of the university as an institution. Sarah Palin was talking about just cutting funding for research without knowing what that research was about. We need bridges into the recesses of knowledge; we need bridges into the reeducation of America, which has become de-schooled in fundamental ways since the 1980s. I think that the university’s own obligation is not only to policy (a cheap way of looking at the application of knowledge) but to critical analysis. Think about public culture in Germany or South Africa, some of the more enlightened states in the world, where critical analysis is a public obligation. The levels of discourse are so much higher, the notions of trying to understand what is going on in the world are so much higher. The conversations that I cannot have outside of the university in America, which are perfectly comfortable in Berlin, or perfectly comfortable in Barcelona and perfectly comfortable in Johannesburg. The vast majority of Americans have no idea what anthropology or sociology or economics really are. We have business schools, but that is something else entirely. In that sense we have lost our purchase on enlightenment: the notion that understanding the world makes it a better place. That goes back to strategic optimism about Obama. He is a truly intelligent and enquiring mind and that could bring the focus back to education because there is enormous cultural capital there.

    The American empire is threatened: we are threatened by the economies of Russia and China, we are threatened by the resurgence of the Middle East and, in a sense, Europe. The notion that the American economy will triumph in the end is deeply under threat. How are we going to restore it? We are going to restore it not simply by investing money in the stock market but by investing money in human beings. That is how value is produced.

    If we are to reenter the world as a positive force, a force that doesn’t presume that we can civilize others but instead learn from the civilizations of others… If we realize that the global moment is an opportunity to learn. If we understand that there are other points on the planet that are far in advance of us: in understanding the history of capitalism that we are living through; the history of democracy we are living through; the threats to world order; the identity politics that are surfacing. The moment that we begin to take those seriously is the moment we reenter the globe as equal partners, neither as dominators nor as pariahs. Domination and pariah status kill nation states, they don’t make them.

  • Ethnicity, Inc.

    Ethnicity, Inc.

    PROLOGUE: toward the ethnologist-future

    In October 2000, Business Day, a leading South African newspaper, published an extraordinary story. Its title read: Traditional Leaders Form Private Firm for Investment.1 Contralesa, the Congress of Traditional Leaders, is the voice of ethnicity in this postcolony. It speaks for culture, customary law, and the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Also for the authority of chiefs who, as a power bloc, seek to change the national constitution. Their objective is a nation-state that accords them sovereign autonomy over their realms, a nation-state that puts the dictates of indigeneity before the universal rights of citizens.

    According to Business Day, Contralesa had decided to move ethnicity into the global market place: it was creating a corporation to investin mining, forestry, industry and tourism, that archetypical site for the commodification of culture. Said Patekile Holomisa, powerful Xhosa head of the organization: “We have concentrated for too long on the political fight for constitutional recognition.” The time had come to empower their peoples by venturing out from their traditional capitals into the realm of venture capital. Since then, Contralesa has become a truly cosmopolitan concern, a multi-million dollar business with interests carefully diversified across the planetary economy.

    Could it be, pace all social science orthodoxy, that the future of ethnicity – or, at least, a future – lies, metaphorically and materially, in ethno-futures? In taking identity into the market place? In hitching it to the world of franchising and finance capital? Leruo Molotlegi, King of the Bafokeng,2 a wealthy South African chiefdom, intimated as much in an address on “corporate ethnicity” at a leading American university. The Wealth of ETHNO-Nations is a topic about which he knows a lot. His people is famed throughout Africa for its lucrative platinum holdings. In 2000, soon after he succeeded to his throne, Leruo was picturedon the cover of Mining Weekly under the caption, “Meet the New CEO of Bafokeng Inc.”3

    Cut away to another time, another optic, another part of South Africa.

    In 1994, in the North West Province, there appeared an op-ed piece in The Mail, the local weekly,4 by one Tswagare Namane. “Our futures,” he predicted, are going to rely increasingly on tourism. To attract it, however, demands not just hotels or game parks. It requires “uncovering,” and marketing, “what is authentically Tswana.” Recourse to the cargo of cultural tourism, as we all know, has become a global panacea, an autonomic reflex almost, for those with no work and little to sell; this despite the fact that it seldom yields what it promises. But Namane had in mind something more than simply the tourist dollar. The commercialization of identity, he argued – pace Frankfurt School orthodoxy – does not necessarily reduce it to a brute commodity. Per contra: marketing what is “authentically Tswana” is also a mode of self-construction, of producing Tswana-ness. And an assertion, thereby, of universal being-in-the-world.

  • Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and Sovereignty

    Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and Sovereignty

    I. PROLEGOMENON

    Just over a quarter century ago, Simon Roberts and John Comaroff opened Rules and Processes, their study of African jurisprudence, with a statement that did not win them many friends among their colleagues at the time. “It is doubtful,” they wrote (1981:3), “whether [legal anthropology] should exist at all.” Their point was not that the comparative study of law was too insignificant or too marginal to claim a discursive do- main of its own. Quite the contrary. It was because its subject matter – and especially its theory-work – was too important to be confined to a island unto itself. Nor were they alone in thinking this. Max Gluckman was wont to assert that legal anthropology was the root of all anthropology: not only did much of modernist Western thought owe its un- derstanding of the social to one or another version of contract theory, but it rested on the implicit truth that homo sapiens was, everywhere, homo juralis. Gluckman also liked to say that, were apprentice anthropologists to read just one text, there was no question what it should be: Henry Maine’s Ancient Law (1919). Anthropology in the Maine- stream, some of his younger Manchester colleagues used to joke (Comaroff 2002).

    Now, an epoch later, this seems more than a little overdrawn. Comparative law is not everything. Nor, patently, ought it to be the primary source of social theory. But there is reason to believe that legal anthropology warrants a more prominent place at the core of the social sciences than ever before: that it is fundamental to making sense of our Brave Neo World, a world whose lineaments are only beginning to make them- selves visible, a world for which we do not yet have adequate analytic equipment. If the idea of anthropology in the Maine-stream appeared first as farce, it returns to history a second time in deadly earnest. So much so that, in thinking out loud here about the pre- sent and future, we shall concern ourselves with two things, in counterpoint: One is to consider why it is impossible to approach the contemporary global order without close attention to law; to law especially in its polyvalent relation to governance. We shall ar- gue, in this regard, that the latest chapter in the longue duree of capital, the chapter often titled “neoliberalism,” has led to a hyper-extended, often counter-intuitive deploy- ment of legalities in the social, geographical, political, moral, and material reconstruc- tion of the universe, a process most usefully estranged, and grasped, by a critical legal anthropology. Our second objective is part programmatic, part problematic: it is to sket- ch three potential directions for that anthropology, three directions – among many, we stress – in which it may do both forensic and theory-work at the vanguard of the social sciences.

    Before we begin, let us digress for just a moment. Much of what we shall say would have been impossible without the development of a discursive field now known as “legal pluralism,” a field productively cultivated at the Max Planck Institute in Halle, under whose aegis this essay began its life.1 Notwithstanding the critiques it has attracted (e.g. Roberts 1998, Merry 1988, Moore 1978), legal pluralism – as an orienting sensibility, as a call to reconceptualize the scope of the law, as provocation (von Benda-Beckman 2002:37) – sent a wave of creative energy through our discipline. Intersecting with other scholarly initiatives, it has compelled us all to look anew both at the colonial past and at the neomodern present; in particular, at the legal institutions, practices, and processes to which they have given rise. The question for us now, though, is not what has been ac- complished. That has been answered cogently by the von Benda-Beckmans (2006) and others. For us, the question is the future. Where do we go from here? As we shall see, the move from legal pluralism, as orienting gaze, to law and governance, as problemati- que, turns out to be a highly productive one.

    CARDINAL POINTERS: MAPPING THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

    We begin with the most general of our three cardinal directions. For want of a better signpost, since it will take us down several intertwined pathways, let us refer to it as…

    1. THE FETISHISM OF THE LAW

    The modernist nation-state, we hardly need say here, has always been erected on a foundation of legalities.2 Nor only the modernist nation-state. Among the premodern Nuer of the Sudan, who had no government sensu stricto, the line between a tribe and its exteriors, that Schmittian frontier between friend and enemy, was, according to Evans-Pritchard (1940:278-9), precisely the point at which the law gave way to war, the legal to the lethal. Similarly in classical Greece, where, Hanna Arendt (1998:194-5) observes, “the laws [were] like the wall around the city.” Since the destruction of The Wall that marked the end of the Cold War, law – specifically, that species of law held to un- derpin public order – has been yet further fetishized; even as, across the world, ever more forbidding walls are put up to protect the propertied from the unruly. Note that, in speaking of fetishism, we refer to the process of displacement whereby an abstraction – in this case, “the law” – is objectified, ascribed a life-force of its own, and attributed the mythic capacity to configure a world of relations in its own image.

    Striking, in this regard, is the number of new national constitutions written since 1989: a hundred and five, and rising.3 Even more striking is the millennial faith in their capacity to conjure up equitable, ethically-founded polities (cf. Ackerman 1997:2,5) – and social order. It is a faith owed largely to the fact that the promulgation of a new Le- gal Order, in the upper case, signals a break with the past, with its embarrassments, its nightmares, its torments, its traumas. Throughout the global south, moreover, these na- tional constitutions have become the paradigm for a wide range of lower order analo- gues. In South Africa, everyone is acquiring them: chiefdoms, churches, NGO’s, taxi dri- vers, even street gangs. As salient as the sheer quantum of new national constitutions, though, is a change in their content. This, David Schneiderman (2000) argues, is owed to a global shift in “constitutional design” from a state capitalist to a neoliberal model – it- self the product of an epochal transformation in the relationship between the economics and politics of capitalism; also of a re-visioning of the relationship between law and governance. Thus, whereas post-World War II constitutions stressed parliamentary sove- reignty, executive discretion, bureaucratic authority, and cultural homogeneity, recent ones focus, if unevenly, on the primacy of civil and political rights, the freedoms of the citizen, the limitations of state power, the tolerance of difference, and the rule of law.

    This is the case even when both the spirit and the letter of that law are despoiled, distended, desecrated. Even as more regimes suspend it in the name of emergency, ex- pediency, exception. Even as they expropriate its sovereignty unto themselves. Even as they franchise it out.

    The enchanted faith in constitutionalism speaks to something yet deeper: a “cul- ture of legality” seems to be infusing everyday life almost everywhere, becoming part and parcel of the obsession with order that haunts many nation-states nowadays. The term itself – “culture of legality” – underwrites a new citizenship education program in Mexico, for example.4 It also describes the object of a game invented in Sicily, mythic home of northern banditry; the game is called Legalopoli.5 Even the Vatican is using it. In 1998, Jubilaeum carried an essay entitled “A Strong Moral Conscience for a Culture of Legality” (Torre1998). It said, among other things, that we have entered an age in which humanity knows itself by virtue of its rights. Spelled r-i-g-h-t-s. A new chapter in the “judicial experience has been opened,” the essay added, a chapter we might “call the `rights of [individual] desires’…” In fact, this age appears to be one in which rites and rights conjoin in parallel significance as rarely before: faith and the law, arguably, are the twin fixations of this-worldly being at the new millennium. Ours is the epoch not of theodicy or theocracy, but of theo-legality. Pace Karl Schmitt, it is not just about political theology that we ought to be vexing ourselves. It is also legal theology. Nor is this true only of the Judaeo-Christian world. As we shall see, it applies as much to Islam.

    That humanity knows itself more than ever before by virtue of its rights – or, at least, that more of humanity knows itself in these terms – seems evident from the plane- tary explosion of human rights advocacy; also from the spread of law-oriented NGOs, especially in the global south. The civilizing missions of the new century, these NGOs, which ply the intersection between the public and the private, encourage citizens to deal with their problems by legal means. In the upshot, even those who break the law appear ever more litigious. In South Africa – which introduced a “law train” in 1998 to traverse the country giving free counsel6 – a plumber recently convicted of drunk driving sued the state for imprisoning him when, by rights, it should have had him in rehabilitation.7 And alumni of the liberation struggle, members of the Umkhonto weSizwe Veterans Association, squared up for a struggle in the courts in 2005 over the assets of the organization.8 In times past, this intra-ANC conflict would have been fought by political means. But then, in times past, Umkhonto would not have been an investment company as a com- mons for ex-guerillas.

    The global effect of all this is such that it is not unusual any more to hear the Euro-language of jurisprudence in the Amazon or Aboriginal Australia. Or among the poor of Mumbai, Madagascar, Cape Town, and Trench Town. Even in places where traf- ficking outside the law is as common as trafficking within it – Nigeria, Russia, Zimbabwe – the self-imaginings of citizenship, and actions taken in its name, tend to be infused with that language. Nor is it just rights, interests, identities, and injuries that have beco- me saturated with legality. Politics itself is migrating to the courts. Conflicts once joined in parliaments, by means of street protests, media campaigns, strikes, boycotts, blockades tend more and more to find their way to the judiciary; note Julia Eckert’s (2006:46 et passim), observation that, in India, the “use of the law” now “complements or repla- ces” other species of counter-politics. As we have noted before (2006:27), class strug- gles are giving way to class actions in which people drawn together by material predica- ment, culture, race, sexual preference, residence, faith, and habits of consumption beco- me legal persons as their common plaints turn them into plaintiffs with common identi- ties. Citizens, subjects, governments, congregations, chiefdoms, communities, and cor- porations litigate against one another in an ever mutating kaleidoscope – changing “con- stellations,” legal pluralism might call it – often at the intersections of tort law, human rights law, constitutional law, and the criminal law. Even democracy has been judicializ- ed: few national elections these days go by without some resort to the courts. No need to mention the American presidential election of 2002, which was decided by an ideologically-stacked judiciary, thereby aborting the democratic process; this in the imperium that imposes its political theology of “freedom” upon much of the rest of the planet.

    For their part, states are having to defend themselves in courts against unprece- dented sorts of things in unprecedented ways. And against unprecedented sorts of plain- tiff. The legal struggle between the ANC and AIDS sufferers in South Africa is legend. But there are many others. Like that of the Brazilian government which, in 2000, was ordered to pay damages, by its own high court, for the death and suffering of Panará Indians. Or Nicaragua, held to account a year earlier by the Inter-American Court for violating the ter- ritory of Tingni Indians by granting a timber concession to a Korean company.9 Suits of this species – which exemplify Eckert’s (2006:50-4) “legalism from below” – are often ab- etted by advocacy groups. In them, the law connects political means to political ends. At times, too, legalities are directed against unexpected sites of authority – in a manner that reverses the Foucaultian notion of capillary biopower. Thus 16,000 graduates of Indian schools recently filed suits in Canada against the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic Churches, alleging physical, sexual, and cultural abuse.10 They won. But many such ini- tiatives fail. Thus the Ogoni lost a claim against Shell for its complicity in killing those op- posed to its presence in Nigeria. Patently, the law often comes down on the side of the powerful. And of big business, which also flexes its legal muscles as far as possible to create deregulated environments conducive to its workings.

    In sum, while the law has always been a battle-ground, it appears ever more so; ever more, people seek, and find, legal justifications and jurisdictions on the basis of which to attack rogue capital, the state, and their enemies, real or imagined – extending, in the process, what has long been known as “forum shopping.” Note, here, the increas- ing appeal to the Alien Torts Act in the USA, which allows those who have suffered wrongs at the hands of American parties abroad to take their suits to federal courts. Their efforts have enjoyed some success. Unsurprisingly, mega-corporations have responded by trying to have the Act repealed, and by offering as an alternative “corporate social res- ponsibility,” and “soft law”; that is, self-regulation and mediation. A luta continua. But what this means is that the political geography of the planet is no longer sufficed by the kind of thing taught in school, the kind of geography that began with Kant and von Humboldt. The cartography of our times transects the order of nation-states with another, equally significant set of coordinates: the jurisdictional axes of effective collective action. Indeed, an urgent task of legal anthropology, which will have to await another occasion, is to esta- blish the epistemic basis for this new geography.

    Let us return, though, to the judicialization of politics.

    It is not only the politics of the present that are being judicialized. The past, too, is being fought out in court. As Anja Peleikis (2006) and Judith Beyer (2006) have shown for Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan, history enters the law in diverse ways, often insinuating it- self into the cultural underpinnings of everyday jurisprudence, into its ways and means, its materialities and motivations. But we mean here something yet more specific: the struggle actually to repossess and reposition the past. Just as Brazil has had to recognize its part in the ethnocide of the Panará Indians, and to make material amends for it, so Britain is having to answer for atrocities in East Africa (cf. Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders at whim, for having alienated land from one people to ano- ther, and for other such illegalities. By these means is colonialism itself rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to break its silences, to submit to the scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash equivalent, payable as the tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism is being indicted for, above all, is lawfare: the use of penal powers, administrative procedures, states of emergency, mandates and warrants to discipline its subjects by means of violence made actual by its own sovereign word.

    As a species of displacement, lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the viol- ence inherent in the law, for political ends – becomes most visible when those who “serve” the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens. Outside the USA, the most infamous instance right now, perhaps, is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime con- sistently passes statutes to justify the silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, which forced dissidents out of urban areas under the banner of “slum clearance,” took this to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, said the authorities, was merely an appli- cation of existing statutes to raze dangerous “illegal structures.”11 Lawfare may be limited or it may reduce people to “bare life.” And it may mutate into necropolitics. Typically, it seeks to launder power in a wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or enlarge the capillaries of capital, all under the sign of governance. Hence Benjamin’s (1978[1921]) thesis that the law originates in violence and lives by violent means; that the legal and the lethal animate one another. Of course, in 1921, when he wrote his critique, Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility that lawfare might also become a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty.

    But this still does not lay to rest the key questions: Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its wider implications?

    Modernist nationhood seems to be undergoing a tectonic shift: the ideal of cultural homogeneity on which it was founded, always more aspiration than achievement, is giv- ing way to a recognition of greater heterogeneity. It is a move marked almost everywhere by nervous xenophobia, a move closely linked to the rise of neoliberalism, to its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of images, objects, desires, identities, on new geo- graphies of production and accumulation. And heterogeneity begets more law. Why? For one thing, because legal instruments appear – we stress, appear – to offer a means of commensuration: a repertoire of standardized signs and practices that, like money in the realm of economics, permit the negotiation of values and interests across otherwise in- transitive lines of difference. Hence the planetary flight into a constitutionalism that expli- citly embraces heterodoxy in highly individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less of those bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more global, ever more authoritative discourse. Hence the extension of the model of the market to ever more domains of everyday existence – and, to close an epistemic circle, to legal theory itself. Hence the displacement of so much politics into jurisprudence.

    But there is something else at work too. Another well-recognized feature of the neoliberal turn has been the outsourcing by government of many of its conventional ope- rations, including those integral to the management of “bare life.” The Weberian bureauc- ratic state has mutated into a rather different beast: a state that is not just a corporate management enterprise – although, as Rancière (1999:113) says, it is ever more overtly just that – but one whose principal regulatory work lies in franchising and licencing, not least in the realm of policing and warfare. Where the modernist state undertook the redis- tribution of private wealth for public ends, the neoliberal state redistributes public wealth into private hands. Bureaucracies do retain some of their old functions, of course. But most regimes have reduced their administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the mark- et. And devolving ever more responsibility to citizens as individuals, communities, or clas- ses of consumer. This has a number of corollaries, variably felt across the world. One is that, with states no longer the sole guarantor of the security of citizens – with many shrin- king their policing operations and relinquishing their monopoly over the means of violence to the private sector – populations tend to become more fearful about the prospect of dis- order, more anxious about criminal violence, real or imagined. Of which more later. A se- cond corollary is that, with the outsourcing of government, counter-politics tends to be cri- minalized; this because it is treated not as the expression of democratic dissent, but as il- licit action against the property, persons, and prerogatives of those who act, contractually, in the name of authority. Which, in turn, quickens the resort to lawfare on all sides. A third corollary is that, with the sacrifice of the originary ideal of leviathan to the deities of self- regulation, self-protection, and self-interest, the court – one institution still securely under the purview of the state, the one ostensibly capable of commensuration – becomes a utopic site to which human agency believes it may turn in order to pursue a widening horizon of ends.

    Put all this together and the fetishism of the law seems over-determined. Not only is public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and in dealing with others, are sub- and transnational “communities”: cultural communities, corporate communities, residential communities, communities of faith or interest. Sometimes, as in India, these communities appropriate the law of the state unto themselves, which, Eckert (2006:47-8) notes, dissolves legal pluralism into judicial pluralism; sometimes they assert autonomy in specific domains, but leave others to government. And sometimes, as we shall see, they seek juridical independence. Nor is it only the communities of civil society that are saturated with legality. So are its criminal undersides. In the US, South Africa, Brazil, Russia, and elsewhere, “gangs” of various scale, i.e. organized crime, mimic both the state and the market. Many provide their “tax-paying” clients with the policing and protection that government has stopped supplying; some have shadow judiciaries to try offenders against the persons, property, and social orders over which they exert sover- eignty. In South Africa, recall, a number have constitutions. Several are structured as franchises. A few even offer “alternative citizenship” to their members. Charles Tilly (1985:170-1) once noted that the modern state operates much like organized crime. These days, organized crime is operating ever more like the modernist state. Concretely, we mean. Not just, as Derrida (1994) once suggested, in the manner of a specter.

    In the process of becoming ever more legalistic, communities of all kinds, including outlaw communities, appear increasingly to evince a will to sovereignty; by sovereignty we mean the exercise of control over the lives, deaths, and conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview – and the extension over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law (cf. Hansen and Stepputat 2005). “Lawmaking,” said Walter Benjamin (1978:295), “is power making.” But “power [is] the principal of all…lawmaking.” In sum, to transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture of legalities. Or their simulacra. Perhaps because of changes in the relationship between law and gover- nance in the age of neoliberalism, perhaps because so many of the operations of the bu- reaucratic state now live within the realm of the market, perhaps because the outsourcing of its authority has stretched so deep into the management of “bare life” – in short, be- cause we live in a world at once post-Weberian – more and more non-state institutions, from corporations through cultural communities and churches to criminal organizations, are asserting sovereignty of greater or lesser scale. Modernist political theory, of course, allows only one sovereignty to any nation, a vertically integrated one invested in the state. Increasingly, however, polities consist in a horizontal tapestry of partial sovereignties: so- vereignties over terrains and their inhabitants, over people conjoined in faith or culture, over transactional spheres, networks of relations, regimes of property; sovereignties at war or peace with each other; sovereignties longer or shorter lived, protected by more or less violence. Under such conditions, the social world tends to be imagined as an archipelago of zones of civility, of Arendt’s “walled” spaces of legality, under one or another sovereign jurisdiction; civil zones joined by corridors of tenuous safety in environments otherwise presumed to be, literally, out of control – inhabited by criminals, warlords, druglords, immigrants, and other alien non-persons – with the mediating reach of government over the whole being distinctly uneven.

    If vertical and horizontal sovereignties are archetypical ends of an imaginary continuum, the states of the global north tend to be associated more with the former, those of the south, with the latter. But the global north seems to be edging southward. Russia has found as much with Chechnya and Tatarstan, two notable, if very different, instances of centrifugal sovereignty; so has Great Britain with the devolution of its Celtic fringe; also the US, where Native Americans are claiming ever more autonomy under the sign of ex- ception, where mega-churches are asserting ever more regulatory control over the lives of their congregants, and where inner cities, increasingly seen as a problem of human waste-management by the state, are the exclusionary domain of underworld syndicates. And these are only the most dramatic instances of a thoroughgoing, often dispersed pro- cess. The more general point? That sovereignty – as Agamben, Arendt, Bataille, and Benjamin understood – is the root construct, the encompassing algorithm, on which the unfolding, labile relationship between law and governance is wrought. How it is exercised, by whom, in what name, and with what effect; how it interpellates itself in the state, the market, civil society, faith, identity, even criminality; how it constructs a geography of jurisdictions and a cartography of violence; in these things lie the present and future of the Brave Neo World, of its social character, of its political life, of its architecture, of its ethics, even of its aesthetics. It is toward a confrontation with this clutch of problems, towards interrogating the nature of sovereignty, we believe, that legal anthropology is being inexorably drawn. A great deal hangs on it.

    This first cardinal direction leads directly to our other two. But, before we move on, we should like to stress that several things rather quickly passed by demand more atten- tion from legal anthropology. We have only scratched the surface of the problems of so- vereignty, of constitutionalism, and of the fetishism of law. The triangulation of these three axes mundi – and, concomitantly, the move from a world in which politics reigned over law and economy to one in which law seems to reign supreme – may turn out to be as consequential to our understanding of the neoliberal age as, say, the process of ratio- nalization was to Weber’s analysis of modernity, or the commodity to Marx’s reading of capitalism; both, interestingly, were also concerned with enchantment and commensura- tion. Indeed, what we have called legal theology – or theo-legality, the twenty-first century mutation of Carl Schmitt’s political theology – is, we would suggest, a critical grail to be followed, to whatever theoretical end-point it leads. So, we believe, is the mapping of a new jurisdictional geography through which to make sense of the unfolding logic of collec- tive action in the world. All of these questions are profoundly the subject of a legal anthro- pology that, as we said at the outset, ought to play a key part in theorizing the twenty-first century.

    But let us move off in our second direction. We signpost it as…

    2. DIFFERENCE, ID-OLOGY, AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM

    The turn toward legal self-imaginings on the part of communities of diverse kinds, like the changing cartography of sovereignty, is, we reiterate, not just uneven. It is visibly polymorphous. So, too, is the relationship between sovereignties and the sorts of legality on which they base themselves. Some operate with shadow juridical orders that replicate or replace those of the state, some stress their alterity, some resort to modes of regula- tion that are only tenuously law-like, some strive for very limited autonomy. For their part, states tend to regard such sovereignties with deep ambivalence: those that contend in the economy of violence, or spill over into polite, propertied society, are likely to be criminalized – or recommissioned – by government, if it has the capacity to do so. Others may be tolerated, particularly if they limit themselves to the “private” sphere, which, according to the liberal theory at the core of modernist governance, is the domain in which difference ought to express itself.

    One species of sovereignty poses particular problems for states on this front: so- vereignty based on cultural or religious difference of the kind that refuses altogether the antinomy between the private and the public; the kind that invokes intransitive, and often intransigent, ontologies of being-in-the-world; the kind whose alterity extends, as well, to governance. These sovereignties may be willfully self-limiting. Amanda Pirie’s (2006:78- 9, 93) Tibetan pastoralists, for example, are fiercely protective of the autonomy of their cultural patch when it comes to managing internal affairs and conflicts – and defer volun- tarily to the Chinese authorities in matters of criminal violence. But the appeal to the so- vereignty of culture or faith against government seldom stops at this felicitous border, the border of disorder. With neoliberal nationhood having to admit ever increasing heterodo- xy, with its explicit recognition in post-1989 constitutional design, ontological otherness is widely invoked these days to make substantial claims to autarkic self-regulation; claims that exceed the polite politics of recognition proffered by liberal philosophers as a pana- cea for the demands of difference in multicultural times. We have written of this in respect of South Africa (2003), which may exemplify a phenomenon spreading with exponential gravity.

    South Africa, being a postcolony, was erected from the first on difference. Like most other places, it has seen a significant shift in the dialectic of law and governance. Here as elsewhere, neoliberalism has emerged triumphant, its language spoken as a national vernacular, albeit not without challenge. Here too, it has hidden its ideological scaf- folding, reducing government to, and representing it as, technical management. Here too, partisan politics has become a tournament in the promise of competing profitabilities and efficiencies. Here too, there has been a displacement from the struggle between political visions to struggles in the name of interest and affect. And interest and affect, in their col- lective voice, congeal in identity – itself naturalized, as though it were a generic and ge- netic condition of human being. For more and more people, the site of politics has shifted from ideology, the -ology of the idea, to ID-ology, the -ology of identity.12 Notwithstanding all the noisy debate about the future of the country that swirls around the African National Congress, its leadership and its policies, the “vast majority” of South Africans think of themselves first and foremost as members of “an ethnic, cultural, language, religious or some other group” to which they “attach their personal fate” (Gibson 2004:2).

    The most comprehensive assertions of ID-ology, as we have already implied, are those made in the name of culture and faith; most comprehensive because they are exis- tential in their foundations – based, in the instance of faith, on transcendent truths and sacrally sanctioned ways and means, and, in the instance of culture, on shared essence and bio-genealogical alterity. Let us take each in turn.

    ID-ology under the sign of culture and shared essence, when it is translated into a will to sovereignty, yields poli-culturalism. The prefix, poli-, denotes both plurality and a political claim to the exercise of governance over, well, everything; this through the instru- mentation of a law accountable to no temporal authority. In South Africa, it asserts itself most articulately, perhaps, in the argot of cultural jurisprudence, of the right of Zulu, Xho- sa, Tswana, and others to rule and be ruled according to their own customary ways. Note that this is taken to be quite different from the custom of colonialism, although it may un- wittingly reproduce some of its effects. It is, quite expressly, a living, Afro-modern law (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004b), one that – now unencumbered by the ancien regime – is said, from within, to be vital and growing, but in vernacular ways that apply long-standing principles of Africanity to the life and times of the postcolony.

    The cause of policulturalism here has been most fervently fought – no surprise, gi- ven what we have said about the fetishism of law – on the terrain of the South African constitution. Its primary protagonist is the Congress of Traditional Leaders (Contralesa). For the past decade, Contralesa has put pressure on government to change the Bill of Rights, which subjects all forms of difference to the universal rights of citizens;13 it argues that “chiefs and kings” ought to enjoy sovereign authority over their realms. By statute, their formal powers, although amended several times, are confined to the administration of “customary law,” the coordination of cultural activities, any “function…delegated by a competent authority,” and such odds-and-ends as “the gathering of firewood.”14 Matters came to a head at a national conference held in August 200015 to discuss “[indigenous] leadership and institutions” with a view to producing a parliamentary White Paper.16 Contralesa refused to take part, although many of its members were physically present. Even more, it declined to talk to anyone other than the president – and only about constitution- al change. There have been times when the organization was sure that the state had been persuaded to do its bidding. And times when it has declared that the ANC, acting in bad faith, has never intended “to accommodate [chiefly authority in] the making of the new South Africa.”17 Such assertions have typically drawn denials from government, leav- ing behind them a trail of ambiguity, to the extent that there remains “considerable con- fusion as to what exactly the constitutional recognition [of chiefs] implies.”18 All the more so since the state has enacted laws, like the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (No.120 of 1998), that authorize some vernacular practices – including ones once deem- ed “repugnant”19 – and, by implication, delegate to indigenous rulers the sovereign authority to administer them.

    The upper echelons of the judiciary, which occasionally embrace Africanity in their jurisprudence,20 have added to the confusion by acting incoherently on the sovereignty of culture and, by extension, of those institutions in which it is vested. On one hand, for ex- ample, in May 2000, in Mthembu v. Letsela, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that women married under African customary law were subject to the rule of male primogeni- ture – and, thereby, excluded from inheriting conjugal property. The “interests of the com- munity” as expressed in its “mores and fundamental assumptions,” said the bench, were of paramount importance in cases of this sort.21 In short, it declared that there are situa- tions in which culture ought to take precedence over the Bill of Rights; in this instance, over its gender equality clause. The decision drew criticism from some quarters, notably feminist, but that is another story. On the other hand, in a vividly contrasting, controversial judgment four years later, Bhe and Others v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, the Constitutional Court concluded that “the rule of male primogeniture…is…inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid…”22 This outcome, too, evoked outrage, now from those who rule over the polities of indigenous South Africa, many of whom retain a high level of legitimacy among their subjects (see e.g. Oomen 2005); they complained that the Court had violated the constitution by criminalizing their culture.

    Nor did Bhe bring an end to the confusion. Or to the struggle over policulturalism. As we write, a female ANC member of parliament, Tinyiko Nwamitwa-Shilubana, is emb- roiled in a dispute that replays, in a new key, the uneasy dialectic of sovereignty against the state. Ms. Shilubana claims that the chiefship she inherited from her father, Fofoza – who ruled the Valoyi, of Limpopo Province, until his death in 1962 – has been “stolen” by her cousin, Sidwell Nwamitwa. The intricacies of the conflict need not detain us, save to say that Fofoza died without male heirs at a time when daughters could not succeed to office and was, therefore, followed by his brother, Richard, also now deceased, and then by Sidwell, Richard’s son. Most significant about the story is the fact that, in 1996, when Ms. Shilubana approached the Valoyi people with her desire to become their ruler, they agreed, citing the gender equality clause of the Constitution and recognizing her genealo- gical status. But Sidwell went to law, asserting the principle of patriliny, and won a deci- sion from the Pretoria High Court and then from the Supreme Court of Appeal; why either entertained a quarrel that, by “tradition,” fell within the purview of the sovereign politics of an African chiefdom, was never broached (cf. Tebbe 2008). Both benches ignored the publically-sanctioned change in Valoyi succession rules; they paid no heed when Ms. Shilubana insisted, correctly, that “customary law” is constantly evolving. And both, acting like colonial tribunals, held that male primogeniture ought to prevail since, “pursuant to tri- bal custom and tradition, a Hosi [chief] is born not elected.”23 Which simply ignored Bhe. The case, not surprisingly, has been taken on by the Constitutional Court. What is surpri- sing, however, is that Ms. Shilubana is opposed by many of her ANC parliamentary com- rades, who think that a victory for her would lead to “`instability’ throughout Southern Africa’s traditional communities.”24 To tamper with vernacular sovereignty, they believe, is to enter a policultural minefield, with explosive consequences. Not to do so, of course, is to affirm that sovereignty, at least by omission. And to limit the jurisdictional reach of the Constitution.

    The struggle for sovereign indigeneity – and against Euromodern liberal democra- cy, conventionally conceived – seems to be spreading across the legal terrain of the country. A few instances, true social dramas in the old anthropological sense of the term, have come to stand as paradigmatic of this struggle. While often arising out of conflicts of value within African polities, their intended audience, and ultimate respondent, is the state itself. And, not infrequently, they play on the incoherence of the judiciary in dealing with Afromodern “custom.” One, a cause celebre in the late 1990’s,25 pitted a staunch Je- hovah’s Witness, Mrs. Kedibone Tumane, against Chief Nyalala Pilane of the Bakgatla, under whose jurisdiction in the North West Province she was then resident. For reasons of faith, Mrs. Tumane had violated a burial taboo which enjoins bereaved women to re- main confined for a specified period and, when going abroad, to sprinkle a herb (mogaga) on their paths; not to do so is to risk spreading death pollution (sefifi), with potentially leth- al consequences for the “nation” (morafe). When Mrs. Tumane tried to leave her home and refused to broadcast mogaga, she was stopped from doing so by the Tribal Authori- ty. Some of her neighbors, reacting with a mixture of fear and fury, called for her banishment. In contemporary South Africa, riddled with AIDS and other perennial threats to life, dicing with death evokes deep existential anxieties. And mass anger.

    To cut a tortuous story short, Mrs. Tumane, abetted by the Human Rights Com- mission (SAHRC) took Chief Pilane to court late in 1998.26 Her constitutionally-protected rights had been deliberately traduced, she said. Having been put under “house arrest” – note her use here of an apartheid-saturated term – she had been forced to “live…[as] an outcast.”27 In an affidavit sworn prior to the case, Mrs. Tumane claimed that, in June 1998, the ruler had agreed to call a mass gathering and had promised to announce the end of her confinement, but had failed to do so. Pilane replied that he could not “release” her at the meeting in question, since “the tribe” had taken a “democratic” decision there to the contrary. He added that Mrs. Tumane was “confined” not by the tribal authority, but “by her own custom,” which could not be changed save by the “consent of the Kgatla na- tion,” of which she herself was a member. Her rights had been respected, he said, except where they were in tension with the Section 36 of the Constitution, which acknowledges that some limitations on individual freedoms are “reasonable and justifiable in an open… society” (see above, n.13). For Kgatla, a received practice whose transgression present- ed a clear and present danger to their community, and was recognized as such in a de- mocratically-constituted public forum, was just such a justification.28 To this, the complain- ant answered that, while an indigenous people is entitled to promote its culture and religion, it had to do so within the compass of the Bill of Rights, which placed individual free- doms above all things. This argument won, at least in the short run: in July 1998, the cou- rt agreed that the compulsory performance of mogaga violated the Constitution. An inter- im order instructed the chief to lift Mrs. Tumane’s confinement immediately.

    Nothing happened. Political pressure from the state mounted. Counter-pressure came from the House of Traditional Leaders, which put three questions to the state. In paraphrase: Why did the constitution place the individual rights above those of “tribes”? Why were cultural practices not similarly protected? And why was the Tumane case be- ing handled by the high court and not by their own house, where it belonged? For its own part, Pilane’s defense fused British functionalist anthropology with Agamben on sovereig- nty: “Tradition is the glue that holds the tribe together, gives it purpose, sustains its identi- ty…” Virtually all Kgatla, irrespective of religion or education, observe mogaga, it went on. The transgression of death rituals endanger social life. Only Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse to comply. This explained why his people, following due democratic procedures, had de- cided to sacrifice Mrs. Tumane’s “rights” and – deploying the exception authorized by Section 36 of the Constitution – to condemn her to social death. This was their right as a sovereign nation; his sovereign obligation was to do their will. What is more, the SAHRC, clearly seen here as a cipher of government, had exploited the circumstances to crimina- lize an unobjectionable rite in the hope of bringing a cultural practice under the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Pilane added, in a subtle legal stratagem that seemed to reverse his earlier statement, that mogaga was a ritual voluntarily followed by Kgatla and that, there- fore, Mrs. Tumane had not suffered compulsion. Per contra, being “eccentric,” she had shown contempt for a constitutionally-protected practice.29 Stressing that mogaga had been “declared voluntary” – that it belonged to the “private” domain of individual choice and did not compel anyone to violate their religious beliefs – the court dismissed the case. It clearly did not want to enter deep constitutional waters by being seen to outlaw an indigenous rite. As it happened, Mrs. Tumane’s period of mourning was by then long over.30

    Here, then, is a paradigmatic instance in which policulturalism expresses itself. Here the sovereignty of a vernacular jurisprudence, and the political order in which it is embedded, is asserted against the state.31 Here the fundamental lines drawn by the Con- stitution – between the private and the public, the religious and the secular, the prerogati- ves of the individual and the imperatives of the communal – are directly challenged. Here an existential struggle over sovereignty itself is conducted by means of lawfare, displac- ing the political into the legal. Note that this is also a confrontation between Euromod- ernity and Afromodernity: Pilane did not simply invoke “custom.” He sought to re-write it into the thoroughly contemporary language of democratic decision-making, jural excep- tion, freedom of choice, rights-talk. Thus do constitutional jurisprudence and culture re- cast each other – and the political geography of a nation-state now built on the irreducibility of difference. Thus does policulturalism, its imbrications and its effects, become the urgent object of legal anthropology.

    But it is not merely on the rarified scape of constitutionality that policulturalism is making itself felt. The confrontation between the Euromodern and the Afromodern, the displacement of the politics of sovereignty into the juridical, and the reworking of legal subjectivities are occurring in more mundane contexts as well. For example, so-called customary courts across the country are constantly having to deal with practices that are outlawed or unrecognized, yet are part of everyday life for much of the population. Most notable in this respect are conflicts arising out of the African occult – whose practice, real or alleged, remains illicit – which call into doubt the capacity of the state to impose both its rule of law and its monopoly over the means of violence (cf. Geschiere 2006). Precise- ly because they do, they provide a theologico-legal space for indigenous rulers to assert sovereign control over their realms. On occasion, these kinds of conflicts also filter into the lower reaches of the judiciary, where they compel the authorities to deal with the ine- luctable pragmatics of difference. Which, at times, has called forth a strikingly novel, and an analytically unexpected, species of jurisprudence (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004b).

    Because we know it best, we have taken South Africa as the ground on which to open up the matter of policulturalism, of the processes it sets in motion, of its capacity to transform the interiors of both the national and the native, of its challenge to liberal no- tions of legality, of the analytic and theoretical issues that it raises. We could equally have looked elsewhere; for example, to France and its treatment of Muslim head scarves or to the banning of female circumcision most lately in Eritrea or to the outlawing of sati in In- dia. Also, as in our discussion of the fetishism of the law, we have barely scratched at its surfaces. For now, though, let us turn to the other domain of ID-ology that poses import- ant questions of sovereign difference, and its implications, for legal anthropology: faith. We said earlier that faith and the law are the twin obsessions of the 21st century,

    that we are living in an age of legal theology, of theo-legality: faith, it seems, is taking more and more to the law to re-make the world in its own image, to extend is sovereignty, to police populations. Not everywhere, patently, nor always in the same way. But palpab- ly. Many religions, of course – not least those that bear the capitalized adjectives “Great” or “World” – have long had a juridical scaffolding. What appears different nowadays is the degree to which they are resorting to lawfare to extend their imperium. And to displa- ce liberal reason, albeit often by liberal means.

    Take orthodox Islam. Where there have been efforts to recast the foundations of nation-states in its name, they have been deeply invested in the rule of Sharia law. The same applies to regions within states, as in Northern Nigeria, and Aceh, Indonesia; also to Muslim initiatives that would extend the dominion of both the faith and the faithful, like the Salafiyya movement in Morocco, which propagates a “return” to legal Islam (Turner 2006:101). Indeed, the force of Sharia law in the lives of Muslim populations was dramati- cally affirmed in early 2008 when, of all people, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, suggested that some measure of official recognition be given to it by the British state for purposes of everyday governance in predominantly Islamic communities; per- haps the first time, this, that a religious leader of his stature has called for the policultural acceptance of (even partial) sovereignty for another faith. “As a matter of fact,” he noted, “certain provisions of Sharia are already recognised in our society and under our law” – as they are in India and Egypt – to the extent that their adoption was “unavoidable.”32 Predictably, his statement sparked a bitter controversy. Said his predecessor, Lord Ca- rey, “there can be no exceptions to the laws of our land.”33 What is significant, however, is that the argument has been joined at all. Clearly, we have reached an historical juncture in the convergence of faith and the law at which it has become thinkable.

    But it is not only for the governance of everyday life that Muslim theo-legality has been evoked in policultural assertions of sovereignty. The religion itself is being reframed in these terms. A dramatic instance is to be found in Pakistan. It began in the 1970s, when the ulema, orthodox religious authorities, sought and won an injunction against the Ahmadis, a movement they declared heretical, to prevent them from using any of theSha’ir (“signs”) of Islam; these, said they said, belonged solely to “proper” Muslims (Ah- med 2006:19-24, 40-45). When, in 1978, the Ahmadis appealed to the Lahore High Court,34 counsel for the ulema again argued “that Muslim-ness [is] the exclusive property of Muslims alone, that certain Muslim terminology [is] analogous to copyright and trade- marks,” and that their improper is, therefore, “an infringement of the rights” of the faithful (p.21). On this occasion, the judge found against the religious authorities on the technical ground that they could not show that a material loss had been incurred (p.41). But fifteen years later, in 1993, in a Pakistan Supreme Court case35 that addressed the constitutional bases of Muslim identity, the same argument was accepted by a majority of the justices: they argued that certain signs were not just distinctive characteristics and practices but the exclusive property of Islam” (loc. cit., pp.41-2). Thus was Islam transformed “into property, something that could be owned, possessed and bounded off from others” (Ibid.), something whose true nature vested in the law. In some religions, as we have ob- served elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.), divinities may themselves have a jural identity. In 1986, when the Indian government sued for the return of a 12th-century bron- ze Shiva that had been looted from a village in Pathur, “it did so on behalf of the offended god himself,” who was the “named…plaintiff in the case” (Keefe 2007:60-1; emphasis ad- ded). Thus does a Deity, and the faith for which it stands, become a legal person.

    Contemporary Christianity is also interpellating itself into the law – and, through it, into governance – in the effort to extend the reach of faith-based sovereignty. This, too, has precedents: Protestant and Catholic missions have, throughout their history, sought to create more-or-less closed, sovereign communities, thereby to exercise an authority over their citizens at once institutional and capillary. And the church, in its various deno- minational guises, has always taken pains to exert influence on political society and the state. But we appear to be seeing an acceleration, and an accretion, of this tendency, evident both in small Christian movements and in large evangelical awakenings across the world. Henning Mankell, the noted crime novelist and organic anthropologist of Swe- den, writes of these movements in One Step Behind (2003). “No longer [are they] simply charismatic,” he observes, “They are corporate franchises run by lawyers and account- ants” (p.351), legal persons that strive to change the world by means of legal ploys. The extent to which this is true has been brought to light in the US, on unprecedented scale, since the turn of the new century: reminiscent of the rise of Christian Political Economy (CPE) at the dawn of the modern Age of Capital (Waterman 1991), conservative Protes- tantism would render social, moral, and material life according to the dictates of faith – al- though, in its second coming, CPE seems much more anxious to insinuate itself directly into the workings of state.

    Witness, in this respect, the spread of so-called dominionism, whose “global `king- dom’ agenda” is founded on the belief that Jesus will not return “until the Church has tak- en…control of the earth’s governmental and social institutions” (Leslie 2008:2, 3), includ- ing the market and the courts; its “3-legged stool” subsumes the state, business, and civil society (ibid.:6). Even among Christians who do not explicitly see themselves as part of this movement, many support the effort to entrench “godly dominion over our neighbor- hoods, our schools, our government, our literature and arts, our sports arenas, our…me- dia, our scientific endeavors – in short, over every aspect and institution of human socie- ty.”36 For some, the longer term objective is to make the country over into a theocracy, thereby to reverse the course of history. And to put an end to the hegemony of secular reason. The ideology of the religious right is too familiar to bear repeating: its assaying of “family values” and laissez faire, its antipathy to abortion, homosexuality, welfare, and stem cell research, its hard-nosed positions on poverty, the environment, theological and cultural relativism, immigration, “just” wars, and the like. In pursuing its imperial ends, conservative Christianity has been quick to resort to the means of lawfare.37 Recall the disturbing Jesus Camp (2006, dir. Rachel Grady and Heidi Ewing), a documentary about the indoctrination of very young people, who spend their summers learning to “seize back” the USA for Christ. The film may seem extreme in its choice of subject matter and in the matter of its subjects’ choices. But it captures a rising tide in modern America. Oth- er than footage of a Christian leader claiming to have open access to the White House and its decision-making processes, its most potent motif is a life-size cardboard effigy of George W. Bush, the ultimate American Idol: prayers are said for (to?) him, urging that he install “righteous judges” – the youths chant the mantra “righteous judges,” over and over – who would conjure into being a truly Christian commonwealth. The fight for domi- nion, in short, gives yet further impetus to the fetishism of the law and, and, with it, the ju- dicialization of politics. Legality is the secular instrument by which civil society is to be re- made in the image of the sacred.

    Also uncivil society. Over the past decade or so, penitentiaries have become a ma- jor target of Christian movements in many countries (Burnside 2005); in the US, this initi- ative is associated primarily with PFM, the conservative Prison Fellowship Ministries foun- ded in 1976 by Charles W. Colson, ex-Watergate conspirator and alumnus of an Alaba- ma correctional facility. Neither Durkheim nor Foucault would have been surprised, of course, given their grasp of the constitutive relationship between the prison and the world, the disgraced and the disciplined. PFM’s “cultural commission” is to assist the church in evangelizing inmates, to promote “biblical standards of justice in the criminal justice system,” and, more broadly, “to cultivate righteousness in society, strengthening the work of God’s kingdom.”38 In its Utopia, the Lord’s Leviathan – about which Hobbes (1986:Pt III) himself would have felt distinctly queasy, given his belief that religious power ought al- ways to be subordinate to civil authority – would be ruled by a seamless fusion of the Laws of Leviticus and the Laws of the Land. Again, the Protestant presence in prisons has a deep history: the Bishop of Norwich, Barry Unsworth (1992:158) reminds us in Sac- red Hunger, owned one of England’s more notorious houses of detention in the late eigh- teenth century. But there was less concern then for the promiscuous interpellation of church into state. Ironically, as Governor of Texas, George W. Bush was sued by a con- vict for violating the constitution by turning the pastoral care of the penitentiary over to PFM, hence to advantage evangelical Christianity over other faiths or no faith at all.39 PFM has had to answer to the law on its own account as well: its InnerChange Freedom Initiative (IFI), partly funded by the state under President Bush’s Faith Based Community Initiatives Program, was the object of a suit filed in Iowa in 2003 by Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. It “is unconscionable” said the plaintiffs, for “govern- ment to give preferential treatment to prisoners based solely on their willingness to under- go religious conversion and indoctrination.” The real controversy here, argued Ministry-Watch, a Christian Organization sympathetic to PFM and IFI, is about whether “our na- tion’s basic approach to solving social problems [is] secular humanism powered by big government and void of transcendent values [or] real and lasting social change…effected by `armies of compassion’… working for true justice based upon unchanging principles.”40

    Critics of PFM accuse it of religious coercion, indeed, of theologico-lawfare. They point out that the evangelical Christian Ministry, committed to dominionism, has persuad- ed several states to make its programs, paid for by tax dollars, a requirement of parole – and to give better carceral treatment to those who sign on.41 As it turned out, the Iowa
    suit was successful. Both the lower courts and a federal appeals court, the second in late 2007, found that IFI does violate the constitutional separation of church and state. Althou- gh the plaintiffs took the ruling to be “a major setback for the White House’s `faith-based initiative’,” the IFI was banned only if it continued to operate with government funds.42 In other words, as long as it is privately financed, it will continue to have access to prisons, and be free to press its convictions on convicts. At the time of writing, PFM was consider- ing an approach to the ideologically-stacked Supreme Court – in respect of whose com- position Mr. Bush has answered the prayers of the Jesus Campers – there to persuade the highest levels of the judiciary that government should pay for its work. And that the constitutional wall between church and state, the sacred and the secular, ought to be re- aligned. A luta continua. Nor only in the USA. In South Africa, where the constitutional protection for religious expression is much greater than it is in the USA, there is ongoing debate about the place of faith in civil society and its governance, not to mention ongoing efforts on the part of religious parties to deploy the judiciary to extend their sovereignty.43

    Similar things might be written about other faiths, other places. For example, the popularity of fundamentalist Judaism has grown strikingly over the past decades. In Is- rael, the role in government of the religious parties – in particular, their control over family law – has long posed a problem for the full accomplishment of a secular liberal democra- cy. With the occupation of Palestine and the expansion of settlements dominated by or- thodox Jews, the West Bank has become an archipelago of faith-based sovereign com- munities notorious for their aggressive self-assertion. Outside Israel, throughout the Jew- ish diaspora, ultra-conservative congregations have tended to be highly protective of their integrity, closing themselves off to the world and its interventions, settling disputes, enact- ing sociality, managing their public finances, and negotiating their own moral economies – with rabbinical courts as the arbiters of order and propriety. Some time back, Channel 4 in the UK presented a television program entitled Jewish Law in its series, Faith and Be- lief.44 Focusing on just such a “self-contained” community in Manchester, it showed scenes of religious authorities “enforcing an array of intricate regulations ‘governed by biblical texts’,” rules that cover “every element” of people’s lives. And deaths.

    The degree to which ultra-conservatice Jews seek sovereign autonomy, and suc- ceed in attaining it, is highly variable, of course – as it is among other communities of conviction, be they evangelical Christians or orthodox Muslims, Mansions of Rastafari or ancestor-worshiping Africans. But the overall trend seems clear. The sovereignty of diffe- rence, of ID-ology under the sign of culture or faith or the fusion of the two, is decreasingly a matter of indifference, increasingly the stuff of lawfare, ever more world-altering in its will to self-expression.

    Note: world-altering.

    It is not simply that faith or culture are becoming more significant. In claiming sov- ereignty for culture and/or faith, the turn to ID-ology is having a fundamental impact on the very nature of political society. Nation-states may seek to subordinate these sover- eignties to them; although, in the USA, it often seems the other way around. But, inevita- bly, they find themselves locked in a dialectic of mutual transformation, albeit an under- determined, as yet far-from-decided one. How so? Because assertions of sovereign diffe- rence, of policulturalism, seek to reconstitute the lineaments of the universe. Not only do they insist on a realignment of the relationship between the public and the private, the sa- cred and the secular, the empirical and the ineffable, and other founding oppositions at the core of liberal modern society. They also demand that the authority of the state – in respect of governance, legality, the means of violence, the fiscus, and many things besi- des – no longer be cast as universal, that it be parsed rather along lines of difference; of different universalities, that is, those of god rather than government. Similarly citizenship, whose rights and responsibilities are no longer to be defined purely in relation to the body politic, but to identities than nestle within it, transcend it, or transect its boundaries. Which returns us, full circle, to the historical shift of which we spoke earlier, the shift from a wor- ld built on vertical sovereignties to one erected on horizontal, partial ones.

    Once again, the theory-work in all this for legal anthropology is to plumb the dialec- tic. It is a complex one, we reiterate, not one of winners or losers, domination and subor- dination, or even simple syntheses. It is one of translucent subtleties of substance, alter- ing, as we have said, the political ontology of the lived world in such a way as to reground the future-history of democracy, of law and governance, of our ways of being-and-knowing. Of the Order of Things, tout court.

    Could this be why so many people in so many parts of the world are concerned right now with order – and, conversely, with disorder? That is the question that points us finally, and very briefly, toward our third cardinal direction…

    3. ON THE METAPHYSICS OF DISORDER, OR TOWARD A CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY

    We live, it seems, in an age of anxiety, an age of fear, an age of ambivalence. It is not the first, nor will it be the last. To the contrary, apprehension and uncertainty – at times acute, often just naggingly there – are the perennial undersides of social existence.

    But what is notable about this age, if we tap into populist discourses across much of the globe, is the extent to which social angst manifests itself in the gathering idea that criminality is almost everywhere out of control, everywhere excessive, everywhere a dan- ger to life, limb, liberty, property (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004a). Even to society itself.

    Moreover, it is common cause, among many national publics, that the fight against law- lessness and disorder can no longer be won. Except maybe in fiction, film, melodrama. Bertrand Russell’s (1950:143) “arduous journey,” that great modernist march toward “a social organization which curb(s) private violence and gives a measure of security to daily life,” appears to have ground to a halt. Moral panics have surfaced in many places: the Netherlands, Guatemala, Argentina, El Salvador, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Japan, Aust- ralia. Brazil, we are told, lives with a “culture of fear” (e.g. Caldeira 1996:303f, 2000). In sedate Sweden, citizens have come to see their country as “a place of dark crimes and vicious psychopaths, of fractured families and a fraying society.”45 In Britain, the “rule of lawlessness” was a major issue in the 2001 national elections. At the time, England, which today has more students of criminology than students of sociology, was so vexed by the problem of social disorder that Polly Toynbee spoke of it as being on the verge of a “nervous breakdown”;46 things have not improved appreciably since. In North America, where panics over crime peaked a little earlier, they have given way to a terror of terror- ism, of warfare made criminal.

    In sum, criminality has become a more-or-less global trope of undoing, of the im- minent demise of civility, democracy, social order; just as economic meltdown, contagion, nuclear holocaust, moral decay, ecological catastrophe, and other things have been in previous historical epochs. Seldom seen as political in its causes or effects – or, for that matter, as having anything at all to do with political economy – lawlessness is now, in vernacular imaginations, exactly what Durkheim’s normative sociology long ago made it out to be: a human pathology that, unchecked, threatens the viability of modernist polities. Concomitantly, policing has come to “stand for…order” in twenty-first century notions of governance (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:4). It – or, more generally, security – is now the state function par excellence. It is also a major criterion by which the strength of regimes is measured; hence its rhetorical significance when those regimes perform themselves for their citizens (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004a). This is in spite of the fact that, all over the world, the work of enforcement and incarceration is being ever more displaced into the private sector. Or, more likely, because of it: there is good reason to believe that contemporary obsessions with disorder, themselves fed by a mass-mediation, are a corollary of the outsourcing of many of the operations of government, leaving the national citizen unsure of who or what might be the guarantor of life-and-death, of private property and public space. As Kevin Haggerty (2001:197) puts it, mass anxieties with lawlessness and punishment have more to do with “the late-modern breakdown of a host of… social secu- rity systems” than with the brute fact of “criminal victimization.”

    This, in turn, raises a number of questions, among them, whether felony rates are not in fact rising precipitously, fed by the massive economic impact of upward flows of wealth and rising Gini coefficients, by the retreat of the welfare state and morphing labor markets. Some criminologists of both the left and the right have argued that they are. And crime statistics seem to bear them out; although the crime statistic is itself an inherently unstable knowledge-object (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006b). Whatever the “truth” in this respect, there is a well-established disproportion in many places – including the USA (see.e.g. Garland 2001:10f) and UK47 – between fear and risk: those who fear lawlessness most do not typically suffer it worst, those who suffer it worst do not tend to fear it most. In Cape Town, South Africa, for instance, where 350 murders occur in the poor black township of Khayelitsha for every one in wealthy, white Camps Bay, residents of the latter evince far greater concern with criminal violence. This disproportionality is why police departments often spend more these days on fighting the fear of crime than on fighting crime itself (cf. Haggerty 2001). It also points to something more general: that criminality is an ethical vernacular, a reflexive language in terms of which populations frame their discourses of deficit, arguing among themselves about what it is that stands between them and the good life. Which is why it always takes on a profoundly contingent, local content: such things as the alleged incapacity of the government of the day to deliver on its responsibility to it citizens, or, worse yet, the corruption of its personnel; the inherent unruliness, incivility, violence of racialized others (a.k.a young black men); the insidious presence of immigrants (a.k.a. “Illegal aliens”); the evil of those whose jealous terror wou- ld wilfully destroy our civilization (a.k.a. Muslim fundamentalists). It is, conversely, by vir- tue of their translation into the argot of criminality that racism, xenophobia, and their ilk may be spoken, and enacted, without being named.

    Crime, to invoke Foucault, is productive: it is productive of emergent discourses of politics and law, of economics and ethics, of liberty, civility, sociality, and religiosity – all of which it defines by its transgressions. As Durkheim (1938:xxviii) noted, Carol Greenhouse (2003:276) reminds us, “a society…free of crime would fall into chaos, since it would be bereft of the signs of its own existence as an authoritative order.” Like the African witch, in other words, the felon is a “standardized nightmare” (Wilson 1951): an embodied figure by means of whom, as camera obscura, a civil order may conceive of itself – and, to the degree that nightmares are historical in their content, locate itself in its own contempora- neity. If, therefore, we are to interrogate law and governance at the dawn of the new cen- tury, if we are to understand the nature of its socialities and sovereignties, one way of do- ing so is to develop, within legal anthropology, an anthropological criminology that takes as its problem (i) what criminality and policing mean, what they convey and communicate in the here-and-now, (ii) how we read crime “facts and figures,” even fictions, as a spe- cies of political and social knowledge, (iii) what kinds of governmentality they bespeak, (iv) what sorts of world they conjure up. We already have some extraordinary examples, of course: James Siegel’s New Criminal Type in Jakarta is one. So, too, is Malcolm Young’s An Inside Job. Each, in its own way, shows how it is that uncertainty and ambi- valence, congealed in the specter of lawlessness – in a metaphysic of disorder, so to speak – have come to haunt the present. Both underscore the contention with which we began: that a critical legal anthropology is foundational to the theory-work required to make sense of the twenty-first century.

    Which brings us to one or two words by way of conclusion.

    ENDS, ENDINGS

    Our three cardinal topoi – the fetishism of the law, ID-ology, and anthropological criminology – converge. They are triangulated dimensions of the same thing: of the grow- ing centrality of a culture of legality, broadly defined, in the post-Cold War (neoliberal?) Era, in its politics and sociality, in its economics both moral and material, in its emergent forms of sociality, religiosity, and citizenship, collective consciousness and subjectivity. In short, in world-making in the wake of the millennium. We have tried to take the measure of this “legal turn,” of its expression in such diverse things as the judicialization of political life, changing patterns of sovereignty, the rise of policulturalism and new faith-based movements, and spreading obsessions with lawlessness and disorder. But our primary objective has been more general, more programmatic. It has been to show why it is that a critical legal anthropology – one unafraid to take on Big Issues, even as it continues to interrogate small things – is so crucial to contemporary social theory at large, especially to theorizing the 21st century. In sketching one possible set of horizons for that anthropology, we seek to claim for it its proper place in the mainstream.

  • Nations With/out Borders:

    Nations With/out Borders:

    Anthropologists are fond of stories and riddles. The stranger, the more puzzling, the better. So let us first pose a riddle, then tell a story.

    The riddle: What might the Nuer, a remote Nilotic people in the southern Sudan, have to do with Carl Schmitt, the noted German philosopher, notorious apologist for Nazism, and, of late, one of the most quoted social theorists in the English-speaking world? For their part, the Nuer are famous among anthropologists, not least because, in the 1940s, they were held to pose an epistemic challenge to received Western political theory (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:4). This was largely due to the fact that they had a political system without government. According to Evans-Pritchard (1940a, 1940b), their storied ethnographer, they lived in ‘ordered anarchy’: a state of being without a state to rule over them. In this respect, they were the archetype of so- called ‘acephalous’ African political systems, systems that were later to be evoked, by Michael Barkun (1968) and others, in efforts to account for the segmentary oppositions on which the fragile coherence of the Cold War world system sustained itself. Contra Hobbes, order here did not congeal in offices or institutions, in courts or constabularies, in finite territories or fixed geo- graphical borders. It inhered, rather, in a virtual logic of action encoded in the idiom of kinship: in an immanent socio-logic of fission and fusion, of relative social distance, that brought people together or forced them apart in situations of conflict. Thus, if a homicide occurred within the ‘tribe’, it was dealt with by established means of self-help and retribution; if it occurred beyond its margins, what followed was warfare between polities. Practically speaking, though, those boundaries between inside and out were renegotiated, dialectically – they were objectified and made real – in the process of dealing with the very transgressions that breached them. The Nuer polity, in sum, was a field of potential action, conjured by the need to distinguish between allies and antagonists, law and war.

    Which is where Carl Schmitt comes in. In his study of the nature of the political, Schmitt (1966) portrays politics, Nuer-like, as a pragmatic matter of the will to make life-or-death dis- tinctions between friend and enemy. In other words, as a matter of making order by drawing lines: of inscribing the political in collective identities, at once physical and metaphysical, carved as much out of the logic of who we are not as who we are; indeed, of entailing the one in the other and both in the sublime act of arriving at unequivocal oppositions when they count. Like those, for example, of radically different theologico-civilizations caught up in an apocalyptic clash between the good and the bad in the ugly days after 9/11; days in which the planet was terrified by uncertainty because it was so uncertain about terror, specifically, by the capacity of violence without sovereign signature to ambiguate formerly clear axes of global geopolitics; days in which US came to spell not just the United States but ‘us’. As Nuer might have put it, in an orderly world, a world of absolutes, everything is relative since all things are relatives. Except those who are not, who fall beyond the law, beyond the ethical margin and who, therefore, are to be excised, outlawed or, in extremis, unsacrificially disposed of (cf. Agamben 1998). Order, in short, is wrought from disorder, political existence from anarchy, by virtue of drawing the line. It is at that line that the riddle is resolved: that line where the Nuer and Schmitt meet, there to agree on the inscription of the normative in a grammar of difference, made manifest by enacting boundaries at once existential, ethical and legal – and, as we shall see, immanently violent.

    Fire, last time

    So much for the riddle, to which we shall return. Now for the story. It is about a fire, about aliens, about a nation-in-the-making and about its borders, both internal and external. It is also about a world in which borders, sui generis, are becoming ever more enigmatic, ever more troublesome. We have recounted this story before, but think it worth revisiting in light of recent global events. It raises a host of questions: What might natural disasters tell us about the architecture of twenty-first-century nation-states? How might the sudden flash of catastrophe illuminate the meaning of borders and the politics of belonging? And to what extent are those two things, borders and belonging, morphing – along with the substance of citizenship, sovereignty and national integrity – in this, the neoliberal age, an age frequently associated with states of emergency? These questions have a number of deeper historical implications hidden in them. But we are running ahead of ourselves. Let us title our tale …

    Apocalypse, African style

    The millennium passed in South Africa without incident; this despite public fears, before the event, of murderous violence and mass destruction. Then, two weeks later, Cape Town caught fire. On a hot, dry Saturday, the veldt flared up in a number of places across the greater metropolitan area. High winds carried walls of flame up its mountain spine, threatening historic homes and squatter settlements alike. As those in its path were evacuated, the TV projected disjunctive images of civic cooperation: of the poor helping each other their carry paltry possessions from doomed shacks; of the wealthy, having dropped their silverware into their swimming pools, lining up to pass water buckets to those dousing the flames.1 As the bush continued to burn, helicopters dumped ton after ton of water on it. Round-the-clock reports told horrific tales of beasts grilled alive, of churches incinerated, of vineyards razed. The city sweltered beneath a blanket of smoke as ash rained down on its boulevards and beaches.

    In total, 9,000 hectares burned. The mountains smouldered sullenly for weeks. So did the tempers of the populace. Blame flew in many directions, none of them politically random. Fire is endemic to the region. But, being of calamitous proportions, this one raised fears about the very survival of the natural kingdom at the Cape. Its livid scars evoked elemental anxieties, saturating public discourse as it called forth an almost obsessive desire to construe it as an apocalyptic omen, an indictment, a call to arms. The divinations that ensued – in the streets, the media, the halls of government – laid bare the complex social ecology whence the conflagration itself had sprung, casting a sharp light on the state of a nation then barely six years old.

    Apocalypse, of course, eventually dissolves into history. Therein, to borrow Mike Davis’s phrase, lies the ‘dialectic of ordinary disaster’ (Davis 1995). Thus, while early discussion of the fire was wild and contested, it reduced, in time, to a dominant interpretation, one that, while not universal, drew enough consensus to authorize strong state action and broad civic collaboration. Here, clearly, was an ‘ideology in the making’. As such, it played upon an implicit landscape of affect and anxiety, inclusion and intrusion, prosperity and loss. Via a clutch of charged references, it linked the fire to other public concerns – concerns about being and identity, about organic society and common humanity, about boundaries and their violation – at the heart of contemporary nationhood. But its efficacy in this respect rested, first, on producing a plausible explanation for the extent of the blaze.

    Initially, cigarette ends and cooking fires were held responsible. But this soon gave way to talk of arson, pointing, specifically, to a campaign of urban terror attributed to Muslim fundamentalism that had gripped the Cape long before 9/11.2 Then the discourse abruptly changed direction, alighting on an aetiology that took hold with unusual force: whatever sparked it, the catastrophic scale of the fire was blamed on alien plants, plants that burn more readily and fiercely than does native vegetation. Outrage against those plants grew quickly. Landowners who had allowed them to spread were denounced for putting the population, and its ‘natural heritage’, at risk.3

    Note: ‘natural heritage’. Heritage has become a construct to conjure with as global markets and mass migration erode the distinctive wealth of nations, forcing them to redefine their sense of patrimony. And its material worth. A past mayor of Cape Town, for example, was wont to describe Table Mountain as a ‘national asset’ whose value is ‘measured by every visitor it attracts’.4 Not coincidentally, South Africa was then engaged in a bid to have the Cape Peninsula declared a World Heritage Site in recognition of its unparalleled biodiversity. This heritage is embodied, above all, in fynbos (Afrikaans, ‘fine bush’).5 These small-leaved evergreens that cover the mountainous uplands and coastal forelands of the region have come to epitomize its organic integrity and its fragile, wealth-producing beauties. And, as they have, local people have voiced ever more anxiety that their riches are endangered by alien vegetation, whose colonizing effect is to reduce it to ‘impenetrable monotony’ (Hall 1979:134). Ours, to be sure, is an age in which value and profit reside, perhaps more than anything else, in the creation of variety, difference, distinctiveness.

    The blaze brought this to a head. ‘Wake up Cape Town’, screamed a newspaper headline set against the image of a lone red fire lily poking, phoenix-like, from a bed of ashes. Efforts by botanists to cool the hysteria – to insist that fire in fynbos is not abnormal – had no effect. A cartoonist, casting his ironic eye on the mood of millennial anxiety, drew a flying saucer above Cape Town. Peering down on the city as it sinks into a globally-warmed sea, its mountain covered by foreign flora, a diminutive space traveller exclaims ‘Glork plik zoot urgle’: ‘They seem to have a problem with aliens’.6

    The satirist touched a raw nerve: the obsession with alien plants gestured toward a scarcely submerged sense of civic terror and moral panic. Significantly, when the fire was followed two weeks later by floods to the north, another headline asked: ‘First fires, now floods – next frogs?’.7 By then, it was not surprising to read that vast forests of alien trees, owned by logging corporations, were held to have ‘caused all the trouble’.8

    What exactly was at stake in this mass-mediated chain of consciousness, this litany of alien nature? What does it tell us about perceived threats to the nation and its patrimony? To the conception of social cohesion, ethical citizenship and shared humanity at its core? Observers elsewhere have noted that an impassioned sense of autochthony, of birthright – to which alienness is the negative counterpoint – has edged aside other images of belonging at the end of the twentieth century; also, that a fetishism of origins seems to be growing up the world over in opposition to the effects of neoliberal laissez-faire.9 But why? Why, at this juncture in the history of the modernist polity have boundaries and their transgression become so incendiary an issue? Could it be that the public anxiety here over invasive plant species speaks to an existential conundrum presently making itself felt at the very heart of nationhood everywhere: In what does national integrity consist, what might polity and society mean, what moral and material entitlements might it entail, at a time when global capitalism appears almost everywhere to be dissolving sovereign borders, almost everywhere to be displacing politics-as- usual?

    In order to address these questions – in order to make sense both of our narrative of catastrophe and of the more general matter of why it is that aliens of all kinds have become such a widespread preoccupation – we must take a brief detour into the interiors of ‘the’ late- modernist nation-state.

    The nation-state in perspective, retrospectively

    Euro-nations – as Benedict Anderson (1983) has emphasized – were founded on the fiction of cultural homogeneity: on an imagined, often violently effected sense of fraternity. Much has been said about that imagining: that Euro-nationhood was always more diverse than its historiography allows, always a work in progress. But that is another story. Since the late twentieth century, those polities have had increasingly to come to terms with difference. Historical circumstance has pushed them, often unwillingly, toward ever greater heterodoxy. Hence the growing concern, scholarly and lay alike, with citizenship, sovereignty, multiculturalism, minority rights and the limits of liberalism. Hence, too, the xenophobia that haunts contemporary nationhood almost everywhere, of which more later.

    The move toward heterodoxy is itself part of a more embracing world-historical process, one in which 1989 figures centrally. That year, symbolically if not substantively, heralded the political coming of age, across the planet, of neoliberal capitalism. While its economic roots lie much deeper, this, retrospectively, is typically taken to have been the juncture at which the old international order gave way to a more fluid, market-driven, electronically articulated universe: a universe in which supranational institutions burgeon; in which space and time are recalibrated; in which geography is rewritten in four dimensions; in which a new global jurisprudence displaces its internationalist predecessor, overlaying the sovereignty of national legal systems; in which transnational identities, diasporic connections and the mobility of human populations transgress old frontiers; in which ‘society’ is declared dead, to be replaced by ‘the network’ and ‘the community’ as dominant metaphors of social connectedness; in which governance is reduced to a promiscuous combination of service delivery, security provision and the fiduciary; in which liberty is distilled to its postmodern essence, the right to choose identities, subjectivities, commodities, sexualities, localities and almost everything else. A universe, also, in which older institutional and instrumental forms of power – refigured, now, primarily as biopower – depart most states as never before, dispersing themselves everywhere and anywhere and nowhere tangible at all: into transnational corporations and NGOs, into shadowy, privatized parastatal cabals, into syndicated crime and organized religion, and into unholy fusions of all of these things.

    In the upshot, ‘the’ state, an entity ever more polymorphous and amorphous, is held, increasingly, to be in constant crisis: its legitimacy is tested by debt, disease, poverty and corruption; its executive control is perpetually pushed to the limit; and, most of all, its hyphen- nation – the articulation, that is, of state to nation, nation to state – is everywhere under challenge. This is especially so in postcolonial nation-states, whose ruling regimes often rely on theatrical means to produce state power, to conjure national unity, and to persuade citizens of the reality of both (Mbembe 1992; Worby 1998). They are not alone in this, of course. Resort to mass-mediated ritual excess – not least ritual orchestrated in the name of security – features prominently right now in the politics of states in many places.

    This broad historical transformation – the move, that is, from an imagined homogeneity to the inescapable realities of heterodoxy – has any number of corollaries. For present purposes, we raise just three.

    The first is the refiguration of the modernist subject-citizen. One corollary of the changing face of nationhood, of its growing diversity, has been an explosion of identity politics. Not just of ethnic and cultural politics, but also of the politics of, among other things, gender, sexuality, age, race, religiosity and style. While most human beings still live as citizens innation-states, they tend only to be conditionally citizens of nation-states. Which, in turn, puts ever more stress on their hyphen-nation. The more diverse nation-states become, the higher the level of abstraction at which ‘the nation-state’ exists, the more dire appear threats against it. And, at least for those affectively attached to it, the more urgent become the need to divine and shadowy, privatized parastatal cabals, into syndicated crime and organized religion, and into unholy fusions of all of these things.negate whatever endangers it. States, notes David Harvey (1990:108), have always had to sustain a definition of the commonweal over and above sectarian concerns. One solution that has presented itself in the face of ever more assertive claims made against it in the name of identity is an appeal to the primacy of national autochthony: to the ineffable loyalties, the inter- ests and affect, that flow from rootedness in a place of birth (see above). Nor is this just a tactic, one that appeals to those in the business of government. It resonates with deeply felt populist fears – and with the proclivity of citizens of all stripes to deflect shared anxieties onto outsiders.

    Autochthony is implicit in many forms of identity of course; it also attaches to places within places, parts within wholes. But, as a specifically national claim against aliens, its mobilization appears to be growing in direct proportion to the sundered hyphenation of the sovereign polity, to its popularly perceived porousness and impotence in the face of exogenous forces. Citizens in many contemporary states, whether or not they are primarily citizens of those states, seem able to reimagine nationhood in such a way as to embrace the ineluctability of internal difference: ‘multiculturalism’, ‘rainbow nation’ and terms like them provide a ready argot of accommodation, even amidst political conflict. However, when it comes to the limits of that difference, autochthony constitutes an ultimate line, the fons et origo of fealty, affect, attachment. Whatever other identities the citizen-subject of the twenty-first century may bear, s/he is unavoidably either an autochthon or an alien. Nor only s/he; it too. Non-humans, also – flora, fauna, commodities, cultural practices – may be autochthons or aliens.

    The second transformation of the modernist polity concerns the regulation of borders – and, hence, the limits of sovereignty. Much of the debate over the ‘crisis’ of the nation-state hinges upon the contention that governments no longer control the mobility of currencies and commercial instruments, of labour and goods, of information, illegal substances and unwanted aliens. What is more, goes the same argument, they tend to enjoy limited or no dominion over enclaved zones, the frontiers within their realms, under the sway of organized crime, religious movements, corporations and the like; all of which has led many contemporary nation-states to resemble patchworks of sovereignties, laterally arranged in space, with tenuous corridors between them, surrounded by terrains of ungovernability (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). National frontiers have always been more-or-less porous, of course. But technologies of space– time compression do appear to have effected a sea change in patterns and rates of global flow – of the concrete and the virtual, of humans, objects, signs, currencies, communications. Which is why so many states, most maybe, act as if they were constantly subject both to invasion from the outside and to the seeping away of what ought properly to remain within. South Africa, for instance, laments the pull of the market on its human capital,10 while anguishing, xenophobically, over the inflow of migrants. And the global North, despite its so-called ‘demo- graphic winter’, agonizes over the ubiquitous presence of racially marked, criminally inflected ‘others’ of various provenances, not to mention the spectre of a future Muslim Europe.

    Our object, though, is not just to remark the heightened concern with borders and their transgression. It is also to observe that this concern is the product of a paradox. Under current global conditions, given the logic of the neoliberal capitalist economy, states find themselves in a double bind. In order to garner the value spun off by that economy, they are required at once both to open up their frontiers and secure them: on the one hand to deregulate the movement of currencies, goods, people and services, thus to facilitate the inflow of wealth; on the other, to establish enclaved zones of competitive advantage so as to attract transnational manufacture and media, investment, information technology and the ‘right’ kind of migrants – tourists, corporate personnel, NGOs and the sorts of labourer who will work cheaply and tractably without the entitlements of citizenship. In this way, the nation-state is made, in aspiration if not always in reality, into a meta-management enterprise: a business both in itself and in the business of attracting business. In sum, part franchise, part licencing authority. This in the interest of its ‘stakeholders’, who desire simultaneously to be global citizens and yet also to be corporate national subjects with all the benefits that accrue to membership of a sovereign nation. The corollary is plain. The border is a double bind – ‘schismogenic’, to recall Gregory Bateson’s (1972) term – because the commonweal appears to demand, but is threatened by, both openness and closure. No wonder the angst, the avid public debate in so many places, about what should or should not be allowed entry, what is or is not in the collective interest. And who ought to share it. Hence the arguments, also, between those who would globalize capital by erasing all barriers and those protective of the national patrimony.

    The third salient feature of the predicament of the nation-state is the decentring of politics into other domains: into the law, religion, the media, the non-governmental sector and, above all, the economy.11 The conventional argument goes like this: neoliberal capitalism, in its triumphal, global phase, appears to offer no alternative to laissez-faire; nothing else seems even thinkable. The primary question left to public policy is how to succeed materially in the ‘new’ world order. Why? Because this order hides its ideological scaffolding in the dictates of the ‘free’ market, of capital growth and the accumulation of wealth, in the exigencies of technology, in the imperatives of national security, in drawing sharp lines between friend and foe. Older axes of ideological commitment seem ever more anachronistic as public action tends to be articulated around urgent questions of the moment, often sparked by catastrophe, be it ecological, terrorist or whatever. Each takes the limelight as it flares into public awareness, becomes ‘hot’ for a while, and then burns down, its embers consigned to the recesses of collective consciousness – only to flame up again if kindled by contingent conditions or vocal coalitions – or both.

    Our evocation of the imagery of fire returns us to South Africa, but to a South Africa now situated, if all too summarily, in the contemporary history of capitalism, governance and the nation-state: a history that implicates altered forms of citizenship, an obsession with boundaries, aliens and autochthony, and various displacements of the terms of modernist politics as we have come to know it.

    Naturing the nation

    A lesson from fynbos

    The full impact of the fire in January 2000 flowed from the capacity of the burning bush, of the flowers and flames, to signify. To signify charged political anxieties, many of them unnameable in everyday discourse. To signify the aspiration that, from the ashes, might arise a distinctly local, new South African sense of community, nationality, civil society. The question, patently, is how: How did those flowers and flames come to mean so much?

    First, the flora. Flowers have long served as national emblems. The giant protea (Protea cynaroides) which typifies fynbos, has been South Africa’s for many years. It stands in a totemic relationship to the nation; a relationship, that is, of people to nature, place to species, in which the latter enriches the former – so long as it is venerated and not wantonly consumed. But it is also a fetish, a natural displacement of emotively charged identities rooted in acts of ethno- racial exclusion.

    It was not always so.

    For a start, the use of the term fynbos for the indigenous plants of the southern Cape is recent. It was only at the end of the 1960s that the word, and the category to which it now refers, became established in either popular or botanical parlance.12 This was precisely the time when international demand for local flora took off, and a national association was formed to market it; fynbos export is now a huge industry. It was also the point at which statesmen began to dub these flora a ‘natural asset’ – and at which botanists first asserted that they were a fragile species worthy of conservation as a ‘unique biome type’ (Kruger 1977). Not long before then, in 1953, an authority on the subject actually described fynbos as an invader that threatened the local grassveld (Acocks 1953:14, 17). What is now said of aliens was being said, a half-century ago, of this ‘South Africa treasure’, this passionately protected icon of national, natural rootedness.

    But it is not just as fragile natural heritage that fynbos has captured the imagination of the South African public. It is also as a protagonist locked in mortal struggle with invasive aliens that threaten to take over its habitat and choke off its means of survival. A parenthetic note here: similar anxieties about plant invaders have manifested themselves in other Western nations as well: nations, tellingly, where human in-migration is a mass concern – in the USA for example, and in Australia, where, ironically, South African flora are demonized (Carr et al. 1986; Wace 1988); also Britain, where huge expanses of alien rhododendrons, once very popular, are to be removed at great cost from National Trust properties.

    Time was when there was great enthusiasm for non-indigenous vegetation. In the high colonial age, British expatriate rulers encouraged the import of exotics for what seemed, at the time, like good, ‘modern’ ecological reasons (Hall 1979). It took a long while for desirable imports to become ‘invasive aliens’, ‘pests’, ‘colonizers’, even ‘green cancers’.13 It was only in the 1950s that the Botanical Society of South Africa started to promote awareness of the problem; only in the 1960s that the first volunteers took to the veldt to cut down the interlopers; only in the 1970s that the Department of Nature and Environment Conservation at the Cape published its popular sourcebook, entitled, like a pornographic work of science fiction, Plant Invaders, Beautiful but Dangerous (Stirton 1978); only in the 1980s that ‘hack groups’ spread in upper-middle-class rural white areas. And it was only in the 1990s that aliens came to be held largely accountable for the fragility of Cape flora. This is abundantly clear from the way in which attitudes to fire in the fynbos has shifted over the past decade, culminating in the catastrophe of January 2000.

    Playing with fire

    Which takes us to the matter of fire: as we have said, fires are endemic to the Cape. While the media usually speak of them as ‘devastating’ (Fraser and McMahon 1988:140), expert opinion acknowledges that the conservation of biodiversity actually depends on natural conflagration (van Rensberg 1986:41).

    Such caveats, however, were muted in the debate that raged after the millennial blaze in Cape Town. Most salient to us here is the changing place accorded to aliens in this argument, and in the politics and the perceptions that informed it. In the past, foreign plants were only one of many factors held to produce fires of distinct kinds; in fact, an authoritative report on the topic published as late as 1979 does not even list them as a concern (see Kruger 1979). Neither, remember, did public blame in 2000 alight immediately upon them – although when it did, they became a burning preoccupation. Literally.

    As we said earlier, not everybody held alien flora to account (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). One view attributed the inferno to global climatic change.14 It was paid no heed. This was a calamity that seemed to demand a local explanation. Another argument came from the Afrikaans press, which glossed the event as an indictment of the African National Congress, of its inefficiency in government.15 For yet others, excluded altogether from the public debate, foreign plants have a totally different value. Many of the jobless poor who reside in informal settlements around the city, a large number of them recent migrants, depend on those plants for their survival.16 Their unelectrified communities in the bush comprise row upon row of square shacks built mainly of thin slats of Australian wattle (Acacia Cyclops; Afrikaans, rooikrans). This ‘imported’ kindling is their chief fuel (van Wyk and Gericke 2000:284). It is also a vital source of income for them: they sell it at roadsides to white commuters for whom alien trees, like rooikrans, are an important component of the braaivleis (barbecue), a key ritual of commensal sociality in South Africa. Non-indigenous vegetation, in short, has long been a critical part of the local economy – the underclass part, which only tangentially touches the lives of those for whom aliens are held as anathema; and those by whom they are seen to jeopardize civic order and national heritage. Not unexpectedly, the material salience of foreign flora to the poor did not divert the drama of alien nature as it became a public passion play.

    But how, precisely, did that passion play take shape? To what anxieties, interests and emotions did it – does it – respond? Which brings us to …

    Aliens and the African renaissance

    Until the fall of apartheid, the term ‘alien’ had archaic connotations in South Africa, being enshrined in laws aimed primarily at barring Jewish entry in the 1930s. These laws remained in place until amended in the mid 1990s (when they were replaced by the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 and subsequent amendments), when immigrants became a fraught issue in a society seething with a surplus of the unemployed, the unwaged and the unruly. It was at the same time that foreign plants became both the subject of ecological emergency and an object of national renewal (Hall 1979:138). The most striking symptom of this was the Working for Water Programme, launched in 1995. Part of the post-apartheid Reconstruction and Development Plan, the scheme, a flagship project to create jobs and combat poverty, centred on routing out alien vegetation. Its tone was urgent: alien plants are like ‘a health epidemic, spreading widely out of control’, said the programme’s home page.17 Out-of-work women and youth, ex-offenders, the disabled, even the homeless would be rehabilitated by joining eradication teams – and by toiling in industries that turned the invaders into commodities. Meanwhile, the public was exhorted not to buy foreign plants. Alien nature, in other words, was to be the raw material of communal rebirth.

    The blaze in Cape Town gave yet further impetus to this. As popular feeling focused on the foreign ‘scourge’, the African National Congress seemed intent on coaxing ‘a spirit of community’ from the ashes. Ever more overt connections were made, in official discourse, between the war against aliens and the prosperity of the nation. A much-publicized symposium was held to discuss international cooperation in dealing with invasive species, drawing four ministers of state and several high-level representatives from other nations – notably Australia, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom – all of which evinced similar anxieties.18 Global trade and tourism, the participants noted, had created a new class of ‘unwanted traveler’ in foreign flora and disease-bearing insects.19 But the most portentous words were those of President Mbeki: alien plants, he said, ‘stand in the way of the African renaissance’.20

    Foreign objects: the politics of estrangement in the postcolony

    And so invading plants became embroiled in the state of the nation. But this does not yet answer our key question. To what precise anxieties, interests and historical conditions did the allegory of alien nature speak? An answer is to be found in the public discourses of the time: in a cluster of implicit associations, indirect allusions and organic intuitions that, together, give insight into the infrastructure of popular consciousness under construction – specifically, into the way in which processes of naturalization made it possible to voice the unspeakable, thus to address the challenge of constructing a nation under neoliberal conditions. Conditions, that is, that involve precisely the transformations of which we spoke earlier: the changing meaning of citizenship and belonging, borders at once open and closed, people unavoidably on the move, irreducible social and cultural heterodoxy, the displacement of politics and a shrinking commonweal. Take this satirical comment by a well-known South African journalist:

    Only the truly patriotic can be trusted to smell the roses

    Doubtless there are gardening writers who would not think twice about sounding off in blissful praise of something as innocent … as the jacaranda tree … But … you may be nothing more than … a racist. Subliminally that is21 … Behind its blossoms and its splendid boughs, the jacaranda is nothing but a water-hogging … weed-spreading alien.

    In times past, the jacaranda was regarded as ‘almost South Africa’s national tree’ (Moll and Moll 1994:49). Now, in a bizarre drama in which flora signify what politics struggles to name, it has become an object of estrangement, even racialization. It is not happenstance, then, that, in the heat of the millennial moment, public discourse went as far as to bespeak the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the countryside.22 This in a land obsessed with who is or is not a citizen, with constitutional rights and wrongs, with routing out all vestiges of racism. But it was a wry letter from a West African scholar to the Mail and Guardian, the nation’s most serious weekly newspaper, that made the political subtext most brutally plain.

    It is alien-bashing time again. As an alien … I am particularly prickly about criticisms of aliens even if they are plants … Alien plants cannot of course respond to these accusations. But before the Department of Home Affairs is dragooned into investigating the residence permits of these plants I, as a concerned fellow alien, wish to remind one and all that plants such as maize … soybean, sunflower … originated outside of the continent of Africa. In any case, did the fire-and-flood-causing alien plants cross the borders and establish plantations … by themselves?23

    For this human alien, ecology had become the site of a distressingly familiar crusade: the demonization of migrants by the state and its citizenry alike.

    It has been noted that the migrant is the spectre on whose wretched fate the triumphal neoliberal politics of the ‘new’ Europe has been founded.24 In South Africa too, a phobia about foreigners – above all foreigners from elsewhere in Africa – has been the offspring of the fledgling democracy, waxing, paradoxically, alongside appeals to ubuntu, a common African humanity. Over the past decade that phobia has congealed into an active antipathy to what is perceived as a shadowy alien nation of ‘illegal immigrants’. The qualifier (‘illegal’) has become inseparable from the sign (‘immigrant’), just as, in the plant world, ‘invasive’ has become locked, adjectivally, to ‘alien’. Popularly held to be ‘economic vultures’ who usurp jobs and re- sources,25 and who bring crime and disease, these anti-citizens are accused – in uncanny ana- logy with non-indigenous flora – of spreading uncontrollably, and of siphoning off the wealth of the nation.26 This is in spite of the fact that their role in its economy, especially in the ‘informal’ market sector, is wealth-producing, and often remarkably innovative.

    Aliens, then, are a distinctive species in the popular imagination. In a parodic perversion of the past, they are ‘profiled’ by colour and culture, thence to be excluded from the moral community. Once singled out, ‘illegals’ are seldom differentiated from bona fide immigrants.27

    All are dubbed makwerekwere, a disparaging term for incompetent speech. Not surprisingly, they live in terror that their accents will be detected.

    The fear is well founded. With the relaxation of controls over immigrant labour, South Africa – Africa’s ‘America’ – has become the destination of choice for many people from the north; a decade ago, estimates already ran as high as 8 million.28 This influx has occurred amidst transformations in the domestic economy that have altered relations of production, leading to a radically downsized job market in which over 80 per cent of employers opt for ‘non-standard’, casualized work (Adam et al. 1998:209), much of it done by low-paid, non- unionized ‘illegals’, whom farmers and industrialists claim are essential to their survival in competitive global markets.29 These transformations have also placed a strong emphasis on entrepreneurial initiative and small business ventures, a domain in which many migrants from elsewhere in Africa have prospered. Small wonder, then, that routing ‘the’ alien – who has come to embody the threat to local work, wealth and welfare – presents itself as a persuasive mode of confronting economic dispossession and regaining a sense of organic community.

    Thus it is that dark strangers have become objects of hatred, of hostility, even of homicidal violence across the nation,30 a process in which the state is an ambiguous actor. On the one hand, it insists volubly on upholding universal human rights and has supported a ‘Roll- back Xenophobia Campaign’.31 On the other, it contributes to that xenophobia: its law enforcement agencies, their capacity to deal with rampant crime and lawlessness deeply in question, have taken to ‘waging war’ on the foreign spectre. Every now and again, official announcements are made of ‘US-style bid[s] to rid SA of illegal aliens’.32 So-called ‘gentle- men’s clubs’ said to traffic in undocumented sex workers have been subject to high profile raids.33 So, periodically, have immigrant businesses, all in the name of removing ‘all criminal elements and illegal[s]’.34 At the Lindela Repatriation Centre, a privately owned deportation facility, foreign nationals – and some South Africans mistaken for aliens – have been harshly beaten, their human rights seriously violated, their property looted.35 The state has taken no steps to put a stop to this. And public outrage has been, at best, muted.

    Reference here to the ‘US style’ of alien management is telling. In the United States, too, shows of decisive action in the face of the ‘immigrant problem’ exist alongside an almost farcical legal paralysis on the issue at a national level. A long history of official double-speak makes plain how acutely that ‘problem’ underscores the paradox of borders at once porous and assiduously policed, highlighting the contradiction between sovereignty and deregulation, neo- conservatism and neoliberalism, national protectionism and a globalized division of labour. In the United States, too, spectacles of enforcement serve as futile attempts to redress the anomaly of strangers who have become essential to domestic reproduction; who mix intimate local knowledge and foreign loyalties, real or imagined, raising spectres of crime and terror; who are simultaneously indispensable and disposable, visible and invisible, human and abject; who reside ambiguously inside and yet beyond the law. In December 2006, for example, ‘dozens of armed immigration agents, supported by local police in riot gear’ stormed a meat-packing factory in Greeley, Colorado, one of five simultaneous, well-publicized raids on similar facilities across the nation.36 Termed Operation Wagon Train, these raids were hailed by US Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE by name and nature – as a ‘major blow’ in its ‘war against illegal immigration’. Many of those deported were back within a week. Their labour, like that of an estimated 12 million other undocumented workers, is essential to American industry, agriculture and the service sector; this being evidence of just the kind of late modern boundary-making impasse we witnessed in South Africa – although, in the United States it is exacerbated by the conflict between transnational agreements like NAFTA, which liberate capital, and local politicians, who seek to criminalize foreign labour and keep it imprisoned within the ‘developing world’. Here, observes Gary Younge, the politi- cal border is no longer coterminous with the physical borders of the nation-state. The former, the de facto frontier, is now more a matter of ‘economic expediency and political opportunism than either law or order’. And it criss-crosses the country, mobilizing ethnic profiles and securing the homeland by dividing citizens from aliens wherever they might be, which is how, on that December day, ‘the border came to Greeley’, a town more than 700 miles from the nearest national boundary line.

    Shades, here, of the kind of contingency we identified at the outset as characteristic of the Nuer polity and Schmittian philosophy. In Nuer politics, recall, in the absence of fixed geographical borders, the objectification of boundaries between inside and out occurred in the process of dealing with the very transgressions that breached them. For Schmitt, the essential political gesture lay in drawing the line, making life-and-death distinctions, between friend and enemy. This is exactly what happens when aliens in South Africa are flushed out by the police, with little attention to their rights, legal or ‘human’ – or worse yet, summarily killed by vigilante mobs of unemployed locals. It is also what happens in the United States, where would- be illegal migrants may be apprehended not only at points of entry into the country, but anywhere that their difference from nationals comes to light, anywhere that lines are crossed, anywhere that they may be espied and reported by citizens. Operation Wagon Train is no arbitrary turn of phrase. Its cavalier reference to the conquest of the Wild West frontier – a historical process, incidentally, that made America’s first autochthons into aliens – reveals a deeper truth. It returns the United States to a language of state-making as a species of colonial heroics, in which, as one anti-immigrant group put it, ‘citizen control’ is to be re-established.37 Seen in this light, armed raids on migrant enclaves might not seal the border, but they do create an ‘impression of effectiveness’ on the part of the state in a political context in which illusion has become, perforce, ‘as important as reality’.38 Here, in short, is an instance of the sort of symbolic activity of which we spoke earlier: the mass-mediated ritual excess, directed at producing state power and hyphen-nation that features so prominently in efforts to secure sovereignty in a neoliberal age.

    Ends and meanings

    Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) have noted the growing stress, in Africa, on the exclusion of the stranger, not least in reaction to the kinds of social and economic uncertainties, and the destabilization of borders, set in motion by ‘global flows’. This is true of post-apartheid South Africa, where outrage against aliens has provided a versatile call to arms, forcing a new line of separation that unifies a home-grown population otherwise divided by class, colour, culture and other things; not fully or finally, of course, but nonetheless visibly and volubly. Nor, as we have intimated, is South Africa alone in this. Similar processes are evident more or less everywhere that the nation-state is perceived to be plagued by conditions that threaten to dissolve it borders, opening them up to unwanted aliens of all sorts, undermining the coordinates of moral and material community – and making them seem more like contested colonial frontiers than the secure boundaries of the Euro-modernist polity, at least as conventionally imagined.

    The ambiguation of those boundaries, we have noted, arises from the absorption of contemporary nationhood into a global economy whose neoliberal ways and means have altered received patterns of production and consumption, the articulation of labour to capital, the movement of persons and commodities, the nature of sovereignty and civic identity, geographies of space and time, normative expectations of order and security, and much else besides. Because of their particular histories, postcolonies like South Africa manifest these transformations in especially acute form. But, in many respects, they are merely condensed, hyper-extended prefigurations of what is becoming increasingly visible elsewhere. Indeed, almost everywhere. As Western states resort more audibly to the language of ‘wagon trains’ and frontiers, as journalists talk of an ‘apartheid planet’,39 as the post-Cold War seems ever more to be giving way to a state of ‘ordered anarchy’, we may be forgiven for thinking that the colonial societies of the global South were less historical inversions of the metropole than foreshadowings of what, in a postmodern world, the global North might become.

    This speculation is not idle. European colonial regimes managed the political and economic contradictions inherent in early capitalist modernity by means of a politics of spatial separation. The segregation of metropole from colony, their distantiation, not only obscured their material and cultural interdependence. It also served to keep well apart the humanitarian, rule-governed, rationalizing, freedom-seeking geist of liberal democracy from the exclusionary, divisive, violently secured forms of subjection and extraction on which it was erected. Colonial societies were zones of occupation, sites in which the civilizing mission was counterposed against the immediate dictates of command, control and profit – and against the need to secure the contested frontiers seen to insulate order from chaos. Defending those boundaries in the name of ‘progress’ often warranted the suspension of enlightened ways and means, even in the face of humanitarian outrage and righteous resistance.

    The long process of decolonization that set the stage for a new, twenty-first-century Age of Empire has disrupted this spatial logic. The Cold War era might have marked time between two imperial epochs, but it came undone when economies were deregulated and capital moved offshore, escaping state control, globalizing its day-to-day operations, deterritorializing sovereignty and jurisdiction, trafficking in ever more abstract, virtual species of wealth and scrambling received relations between politics and production. As neoliberalized enterprise relocated its polluting factories to distant sites of cheap labour and low or no taxation, new forms of enclaved colonial extraction were invented, extraction with minimal costs, sans state apparatuses, safety restrictions, legal liability or civilizing missions. At the same time, workers who could move from devastated postcolonies sought access in exponentially greater numbers to the underclass reaches of cleaner, post-Fordist, Western economies. In the process, the structural and geographical segregation of metropole and colony has been deeply eroded. And as it has, camps for illegal aliens and asylum seekers, inner-city wastelands, zones of occupation and burning banlieus project colonial conditions and modes of governance into the heart of First World polities – there to draw the line, once again, between friend and enemy, law and war. Reciprocally, states in the South and East take on many of the features of the global North, from the growing preoccupation with democracy and the law to an inventive engagement with modern urbanism, electronic communications, global finance and the like.

    In the face of all this, liberal democratic models of society and politics have undergone drastic revision in the West – among scholars and statesmen alike. The image is fading of an organic society, suivant Comte and Durkheim, in which divisions of class, race, religion and culture were contained, ideally at least, within national boundaries; in which, also, criminals and other pathogenic fractions of the population were believed, through welfare and reform, to be recoverable ‘citizens in waiting’. On the rise is a rather different archetype, that of the polity as citadel: of national territory as embattled homeland; of prisons as sites not of recuperation but of the warehousing of those deemed disposable; of borders as elusive lines to be drawn and redrawn within the nation-state and beyond against the endless onslaught of enemies who threaten its moral and corporeal integrity – enemies who take the form of aliens, migrants, terrorists, home-grown saboteurs, felons, criminals, deviants, the indigent poor. This, once more, is the world of Carl Schmitt, in which politics is less about national participation and redistribution than about securing the frontier between autochthon and intruder, good and evil, citizenship and subjection. It is also the world of the Nuer, with their constantly shifting lines between inside and out, law and war. Is it any wonder, then, that conditions that nurture phobias of alien nature and campaigns of ethnic cleansing should also have generated a newly animated, newly designated industry, the so-called ‘homeland security sector’? Or that the signature products of this industry, which is rapidly gaining ground on a global scale, are ‘high-tech fences, unmanned drones, biometric ID’s, video and audio surveillance gear, air passenger profiling and prisoner interrogation systems’, many of them originating in Israel, recently des- cribed as ‘a living example of how to enjoy relative safety amid constant war’? [36] All this may seem a world away from allegories of alien plants and natural autochthony. But the link between them is patent. Both speak to efforts to bring to order the anarchy of our late modern age. Or, to be more precise, to make sense of, and act upon, some of the contradictions and contingencies, the uncertainties and insecurities, the ambiguities and ambivalences, that come with a world-historical disjuncture: the disjuncture, that is, between the modernist universe as we once knew it and the neoliberal universe now rapidly taking shape around us.