Applies To: John Comaroff

  • Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction

    Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction

     

    Consider the following four fragments, four notes from postcolonial South Africa. Each is drawn from the archaeology of the fantastic in this new global age:

    The first. In 1996, in a far north-eastern village, a baboon, taken to be a witch in disguise, was killed by “necklacing,” the infamous way in which collaborators were dealt with during the late apartheid years. Baboons have long been thought of as potential witch familiars; indeed, a state commission recently referred to them as “professor(s) of witch-craft.” The animal in question “was huge…and was carrying a plastic [shopping] bag”–this last object suspect since it signalled an all-too-human capacity to transact and transport ill- gotten goods. Said the woman who set off the alarm, “There was definitely witchcraft here. Just look at how long [the beast] took to catch alight and at how small its body is now that we have…killed it.”

    The second. “Is it a duck? No, it’s the Howick monster,” wrote Ellis Mnyandu, also in 1996. Curious crowds are visiting the Howick Falls, in KwaZulu-Natal, to glimpse a myste- rious 25 foot creature. Says Absolom Dlamini, there is “a fearsome spirit here which makes you feel like you are being dragged [in]… [It] proves there is a monster down there.” Bob Teeney, a businessman, claims to have photographs of mom, pop, and baby monsters. But a local anthropologist, disappointingly matter-of-fact, assures us that there is nothing there at all; that the story recuperates an old Zulu myth about a water serpent. Still, people flock to the place. One sculptor, a crippled craftsman from Zaire, has become a convert. “First I believe in God and then the monsters,” he says. “I am making more money than [ever before]. I call it monster-money.”

    The third. Since 1994, notes Lumkile Mondi, there has been an explosion of pyramid schemes in the countryside. These undertake to pay three times the initial stake, de- pending for their viability on ever more people signing on. But many investors were not taking their money at maturity, waiting rather to cash in huge sums later. Mondi says that the management of one scheme found itself with R46m [$9], more than it could handle. So it asked a team of authorities–including Mondi himself–to intervene under the Bank Act. Mondi goes on to say that he had been manning a toll free line to answer investors’ questions. The callers had disconcerted him: accused of abetting government efforts to subvert local economic initiatives, he was even threatened with “necklacing.” Apartheid, they told him, had made them desperately poor. And the postcolonial state had not helped much. So “God brought the scheme and changed their lives.” Similar schemes are also rampant among whites. One, entitled “Rainbow,” demands a R10,000 stake and is run in great secrecy by an anonymous cabal with a Liverpool address. It is said to “conduct [meetings] with an almost religious fervour.”

    The fourth. Johannesburg, April 1996. A man is arrested in a shopping mall after “trying to sell a pair of blue eyes.” This incident, wrote the city’s largest newspaper, was “linked to the murder of street children for…traditional medicines.” Body parts, it added, were regularly used in potions for fertility, for success in business, and for luck in love. Those of white children fetched the best prices. The local press has been full of such cases, and courts have been kept busy trying those accused of disembowelling their victims, and either retailing organs or using them for their own magical ends. Not only body parts; who- le persons too. Witches are said to bring the dead back to life to work for them. Thus, in KwaZulu-Natal, two years ago, kin of 11 children killed in a bus crash refused to allow them to be buried because “witches [had] abducted them after bringing them back to life.” The bodies in the mortuary were no longer those of the people they knew. Soon after, an old woman, suspected of the evil, was dragged from her home and killed by schoolmates of the deceased, who, in turn, were jailed.

    These fragments may appear lurid from the cool distance of Academia Europa. In their own context they are not that at all. Each of them, moreover, has parallels elsewhere: those parts of Europe and the USA beyond the ivory tower, where ordinary people live, produce their own fair share of the fantastic. The Howick Monster recalls not only Loch Ness, which it is said to resemble. It also resonates with celluloid cosmologies of the Jurassic kind, making a mammoth montage of the Spielberg mindscape, the Scottish landscape, and Zulu mythology–all the while tapping into an increasing obsession with the return of extinct sub- yet superhuman creatures. The Leviathan of Natal belongs to a planetary species whose existence conflates the virtual with the veritable, the cinematic with the scientific, gods with godzillas, the prophetic with the profitable.

    Likewise the pyramid schemes. These recall the ten or so whose crash sparked the Alba- nian revolution in 1997. They also bring to mind other scams and stratagems, different yet similar, that flow from a promiscuous mix of scarcity and deregulation. Such schemes are springing up all over the place, especially in post-revolutionary societies. Often registered at addresses halfway across the earth from the site of their local operation, they escape control by insinuating them- selves into the slipstream of the global economy. These schemes cover a wide gamut, from chain letters, through national lotteries and offshore gambling, to aggressively speculative investment in the stock markets of the world, now heavily into global funds, which has led to an upsurge of “pump and dump” swindles. These things have a single common denominator, “the magical allure of making money from nothing.” Like efforts to weave gold from straw, an alchemy associated with an earlier transition in the economic history of Europe, they promise to deliver preternatural pro- fits, to yield wealth sans perceptible production, value sans visible effort. In its millennial moment, capitalism has an effervescent new spirit–a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist–waxing close to its core. Vide the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, an American pyramid scheme created “to change the world for the glory of God,” which persuaded 500 non-profit organizations, Christian colleges, and Ivy League universities to invest $354 million–on the promise of doubling their money in six months. So much for rational economics. And for the disenchantment of modernity.

    Neither are the narratives of witchcraft, body parts, and the brutalization of children uniquely South African. Everywhere the confident contours, and the boundaries, of the human are being called into question; hence the fascination with cyborgs, the fear of invasion by aliens cloth- ed in humdrum bodily form, the dangerous promise of cloning and genetic mutation. And from everywhere come stories of not-quite-human transactions in the corporeal. Postcolonial Africa is replete with accounts of the way in which the rich and powerful use freakish familiars and monstrous means to appropriate the life-force of their lesser compatriots in order to strengthen themselves and to satisfy consuming passions. Similarly, Latin America has, throughout the 1990s, witnessed mass panics about the theft and sale, by greedy gringos, of the organs of infants and youths. There, and in other parts of the world, this traffic–like the international commerce in adoption and mail-order matrimony–is seen as a new form of imperialism, the west siphoning off the essence, even appropriating the offspring, of impoverished “others” for ends both occult and ordinary. All of which gives ample evidence, to those at the nether end of the planetary distribution of wealth, of the workings of insidious forces, of potent magical technologies and mys- terious means of accumulation. That evidence reaches into the heart of Europe itself: note the recent scares about the satanic abuse of children; also reports, some now well-documented, of a transnational trade in people, again particularly women and young people, for sexual slavery.

    Precisely because they are at once parochial and translocal, these fragments raise the same conundrums. Why now? Why now does there appear to be a dramatic intensification–none of these things is new, of course–of appeals to enchantment, to the use of the bodies of some for the empowerment of others? Why now the acute moral panics? What, if anything, has any of this to do with processes of globalization and the forms of capitalism associated with it? With postcoloniality? Or with the sociology of post-revolutionary social worlds? We pose the problem both as a general matter of anthropological concern and, more specifically, of contemporary South Africa. Is it not extraordinary, for example, that the African National Congress saw it necessary, among its first gestures in government, to appoint a commission of enquiry into witchcraft and ri- tual murder in one of the new provinces? That it found itself presiding over an epidemic of mys- tical evil? That this epidemic, far from abating with the end of apartheid, is on the increase? That, according to the head of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services– itself a curious creature–the devil actually seems to be making a “revolutionary re-appearance” here?

    Finally, what might these things have to do with the memory of Max Gluckman? Or with the present and future of anthropology, about which he had such strong ideas? As we shall see, they challenge us with the problem of doing ethnography on an awkward scale, neither unambiguously local nor, obviously, “global”–but on a plane that, somehow, captures the dialectics of their mutual determination. And their indeterminacies.

    Let us take the last question first. Our memories of Max Gluckman go back to the early 1970s, toward the start of our professional careers, toward the end of his. We came to Manchester having read and heard a great deal of debate about his work, and not a few critiques–most of them emanating from certain institutions south of the Watford Gap. None of this, however, prepared us for our encounter with charisma, Mancunian-style. Or with conflict structural-functionalism as propounded, in the flesh, by Gluckman himself, a formidable interlocutor if there ever was one. Maxism, it is true, was not quite Marxism; very much a creature of its day, many of its founding principles are now dated. But they were essayed with vigor, certitude, and a bold sense of possibility. Anthropology, for Gluckman, was both a mission and an invitation to an argument; – though, in point of fact, he was always easier to argue with when not actually present, or, more permanently, when dead. His combative, creative spirit lives on, in our consciousness, for two things above all else. It is these that provide the mandate for our lecture today.

    One was his–emphatically pre-postmodern–insistence on discerning design in, on abstracting order from, an “illogical assortment” of disparate details, minutiae, even trivia (1963:1); recall his introduction to Order and Rebellion, which notes, with approval, how a co- herent anthropology grew out of “the study of oddments by eccentrics.” Max, of course, was not lacking in oddness or eccentricity himself. And coherence is no longer valued all that much. But so be it. The serious, if simple, corollary is that our skills and sensibilities ought to be put to the effort of detecting–from diverse, discordant acts and facts–emergent social processes and patterns; that the sacred charter of the discipline is to explain the existence of such partly-obscured, barely audible, often nascent phenomena in the world. Sometimes these phenomena, like the unruly events so memorably described in his Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (1940), bring into sharp focus, and serve to bridge, cultural and material forces of dramatically different magnitude or scale; as they do, they compel us to address the evanescent, ever present connec- tions between local concerns and world-historical movements. Herein, in this challenge, lies the essential distillate of the Gluckman heritage.

    The second thing is more specific. Max Gluckman is justifiably famed for his work in legal anthropology, for his studies of political and social processes, and the like. Amidst his lesser quo- ted essays, however, is one which warrants special attention today. Entitled “The Magic of Des- pair” (see n.1), it tries to make sense of the ritual practices of Mau Mau. Not only that. Those practices are run up against Central African witchcraft movements (Richards 1935), millennial cults of the middle ages (Cohn 1957), Melanesian cargo cults (Worsley 1957), zionist prophets in South Africa (Sundkler 1948), and various forms of social banditry (Hobsbawm 1959). The point? To explain why Africans should seek recourse to the occult in situations of rapid social transformation; under historical conditions, that is, which yield an ambiguous mix of possibility and – powerlessness, of desire and despair, of mass joblessness and hunger amidst the accumulation, by some, of great amounts new wealth (1963:3f). These circumstances, added Gluckman (p.145) presciently, do not elicit a “reversion to pagan ritual.” Just the opposite. “New situations,” he wrote, citing Evans-Pritchard (1937:513), “demand new magic.”

    Put these various pieces together–Gluckman’s concern to decipher patterns-in-the-making from oddments and fragments, his insistence on seeing connections among phenomena of widely different scale, his interest in mystical responses to contradictory historical situations–and the argument of this lecture begins to take shape. So, too, do our answers to the Big Questions.

    The essence of our narrative goes like this. The Howick monster and the pyramid schemes, the epidemic of witchcraft and the killing of those suspected of magical evil, the moral panic about markets in body parts; all are, alike, symptoms of an occult economy fourishing up behind the civil surfaces of the “new” South Africa. This economy, itself an integral feature of millenial capitalism, is an odd fusion of the modern and the postmodern, of hope and hopelessness, of utility and futility, of promise and its perversions. Its roots do not lie simply in poverty, however cruel it may be; nor are they merely a reflex of “social change.” They are to be found, rather, in a doubling, the very doubling spoken of by Gluckman in “The Magic of Despair.” On one hand is a perception, authenticated by glimpses of the vast wealth that passes through most postcolonial societies and into the hands of a few of their citizens: that the mysterious mechanisms of the market hold the key to hitherto unknown riches; to capital amassed by the ever more rapid, often immaterial flow of value across time and space. On the other hand is the dawning sense of chill desperation at- tendant on being left out of the promise of progress, of the telos of liberation. In South Africa, after all, the end of apartheid held out the prospect that everyone would be set free to speculate and accumulate, to consume and to indulge repressed desires. But, for many, the millennial moment has passed without palpable payback.

    The implication? That something has gone seriously awry; that arcane forces are intervening in the production of wealth, diverting the flow of value for evil purposes. This, in turn, underlies the essential paradox of occult economies, the fact that they operate on two inimical fronts at once. The first is the constant pursuit of new, magical means for otherwise unattainable ends. The second is the effort to eradicate people held to enrich themselves by those very means; through the illegitimate appropriation, that is, not just of the bodies and things of others, but also of the forces of production and reproduction themselves.

    Partly because of the nature of the struggle to end apartheid, partly because of the legacy of apartheid itself, partly because of the dawning of a new epoch in the history of production, most of those who experience postcoloniality here as privation, and who engage the commerce in enchantment, are young. It is they–the worldly progeny of an electronic age–who held out the greatest expectations for “the revolution.” They are the repressed for whom the promise of post- colonial return is most obviously blocked by the hardening materialities of life at this coordinate on the map of global capital. As a result, rather than the more familiar axes of social division– class, race, gender, ethnicity–the dominant line of cleavage here has become generation. But entry into the occult economy, on both its fronts, is not confined to youth alone; ultimately it transects color, culture, age, and sex.

    Like Gluckman, we have argued before that the practice of mystical arts in postcolonial Af- rica does not imply an iteration of “tradition.” Per contra, it is often a mode of producing new forms of consciousness; of expressing discontent with modernity and dealing with its deformities; in short, of retooling culturally familiar technologies as new means for new ends. New magic for new situations. Nor is this true only in Africa. It is characteristic of a surging, implosive economy of means and ends popping up all over the planet nowadays, albeit in a wide variety of local guises.

    As it does, it posits fresh ways of producing immense wealth and power–against all odds, at super- natural speed, and with striking ingenuity. We have hinted that the things of which we speak have to do with global processes; or, more precisely, with specific intersections of the global and the local. And we have implied that there is a lesson in them for the practice of anthropology. Before we can give either claim any cre- dence, however, it is necessary to focus on a particular ethnographic setting, one in which realities appear more than usually fragile, fluid, and fractured. We turn to the northerly provinces of the “new” South Africa, just before and after the end of apartheid.

    III.

    The Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province was established by the new provincial government in March 1995 in response to a mounting sense of emergency in the countryside. Official commissions were the stock-in-trade of colonial rule. But these are postcolonial times, in which politics often masquerades as culture. This commission was an unprecedented hybrid of government and ethnography. Chaired by a re- tired Professor of Social Anthropology it comprised nine members, all but one black. Their Report is a rich amalgam of informant accounts, case records, first-hand observation, and recommenda- tions. These recommendations reveal a tension between (i) civic rationalism, expressed in a call for rigorous control of witch-related violence, including a possible reinstatement of the death penalty; and (ii) frank, even assertive relativism. In respect of the latter, says the Report, most Af- ricans regard magical attacks as “normal events of everyday life,” a reality incompatible with Euro- pean law, which criminalizes witchfinding. What is more, it adds, the vast majority of black police believe in witchcraft and are reluctant to intervene when suspects are attacked. The conclusion? That there is “no clear-cut” solution to the legal problem. The commissioners went on to advocate various means of stemming the brute force with which accused witches are hunted down. But they did not question the actuality of witchcraft itself.

    On the contrary. The urgent tone of the Commission is underscored by a rising demography of violence: from 1985 to 1995 300 cases of witch-related killings were recorded in the North; in the first half of 1996 there were 676. No wonder people fear that witchcraft is “runn- ing wild.” The mood of alarm is well captured in the opening remarks of the Report: “as the Pro- vince continued to burn,” as “witchcraft violence and ritual murder” was becoming endemic, “something had to be done, and very fast.”

    The countryside was burning alright. But there were lots of ironies in the fire. For one thing, this was a moment, much heralded, of exodus from colonial bondage. And yet rural populations were convinced that their neighborhoods harbored trenchant human evil; that their familiar landscapes were alive with phantasmic forces of unprecedented danger; that the state had failed to shield them from malignity, leaving them to protect themselves. For another thing, it was young men, not people in authority, who felt most moved to execute “instant justice” and to cleanse the country. They marked Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, viewed by the world as a sign that reason had prevailed at last, with a furious spate of witch burnings–often to the chanting of freedom songs. All this was accompanied by a burgeoning fear that some people, usually old people, were turning others into zombies; into a virtual army of ghost workers, whose lifeblood fuelled a vibrant, immoral economy pulsing beneath the sluggish rhythm of country life. The – margin between the human and the inhuman had become ever more permeable, transgressed by the living dead and their monstrous owners. Along with a grisly national market in human body parts, these zombies bore testimony to a mounting confusion of people with things.

    As we have said, none of this is new. It is now clear that, in much of Africa, the colonial encounter played on pre-existing enchantments. At times, it multiplied the sorts of frictions that ignite witch hunts. Witchcraft has proven to be every bit as protean as modernity itself–thriving on its contradictions and its silences, usurping its media, puncturing its pretensions. Shifts in the cultural conception of witches often register the impact of large-scale transformations on local worlds. Indeed, their very durability stems from a genius for making the language of intimate, interpersonal affect speak of more abstract forces. It is this that underlies the sudden intensification of witch-finding in postcolonial South Africa–and elsewhere. The parochialism of witches, it seems, is an increasingly global phenomenon.

    Because they distil complex material and social forces into palpable human motives, then, witches tend to figure in narratives which write translocal scenes onto local landscapes, translocal discourses into local vocabularies of cause-and-effect. In rural South Africa, the recent rise in witchfinding has coincided with an efflorescence of other magical technologies that link the occult and the ordinary by thoroughly modern, even postmodern, means; means that parody the mechanisms of the “free” market.

    Thus ritual murder is said to have become “big business” across northern South Africa. In 1995, for example, stories spread widely about the discovery of dismembered corpses in the freezer of a casino in Mmabatho, in the Northwest Province. The casino was built for tourists during the apartheid years, when betting and inter-racial sex were illegal in South Africa but not in the ethnic “homelands”; here, over the border, in the grey interstices of the transnational, white South Africans came to purchase sexual services and to gamble. In the “new” South Africa, black bodies were again for sale, but in different form; the macabre trade now nested comfortably within the orbit of everyday commerce, circulating human organs to whomever had the cash to buy them in order to abet their undertakings. Much the same thing was apparent, too, in all the talk about the “fact” that some local entrepreneurs were turning their fellows into working zombies, a practice which simulates a foundational law of capitalism; namely, that rates of profit are inversely related to labor costs. But the most fabulous narratives were about Satanism, held in the Northwest to be the most robust, most global of all occult enterprises. Less a matter of awesome ritual than of mundane greed, dabbling in the diabolical was said to be especially captivating to the young. In 1996, when Mmabatho TV broadcast two programs on the subject, the ex-Satanists featured were all juveniles. As they took calls from the public they told, in prosaic terms, of the translocal power of the black arts–among them, an ability to travel great distances at miraculous speed to garner enormous wealth at will.

    We shall return to the substance of these things–to ritual murder and zombies and satanism–in due course. Here we note merely that what is at issue is an expanded array of enchanted, often unnervingly visceral, means of producing value. Visceral, yet also strangely banal. In colonial times, divination involved a private, clandestine consultation with an expert. Now anxieties about witchcraft, money magic, and unnatural death are ventilated in churches and comic strips, on the radio, TV, and the internet; almost every day, newspapers and magazines advertise “dial-in-diviners.” The public, multi-mediated quality of this communication is reflected in innovative ritual technologies. One is divining by “mirror” or “television.” An electronic update of water bowl oracles, the procedure requires that clients imbibe a fermented drink and watch a white cloth mounted in a darkened “screenroom.” Figures of miscreants take shape on the screen; their transmission and appearance mimic the manner in which satellite dishes, broadcast networks, and the long-distance magic of witches condense images, objects, and sounds from afar. While an adept might help to unscramble the ethereal pictures, these are received directly by his “customers”–mark the term–who sit in the archetypal posture of family viewing-and-listening.

    Who are the protagonists in these theaters of the banal, these mundane magical dramas? Who are the witches? And who takes responsibility for killing them? According to the Witchcraft Commission,

    …the youth who are called “comrades” are in the forefront. Note: ages of the accused range between 14-38 years. Not only were young men the most identifiable perpetrators of witch-related violence, but they seem often to have forced neighbors and ritual experts to do their bidding. The purported male- volents, on the other hand, were the usual suspects of African witchcraft–men and women of conspicuous, unshared wealth–although those who were physically attacked were overwhelmingly old and, often, weak and defenseless.

    Let us take a closer look at the most extended case recorded by the Witchcraft Commission, the Ha-Madura Witch-Hunt. The defendants, who ranged from fourteen to thirty- five, were charged with having murdered an elderly woman by “necklacing.” They were also accused of attacking two others, both of advanced age. Witnesses recounted that, in the afternoon of 21 March 1990, “the youths” of Madura–most of them unemployed, most of them with little to do– gathered near the Primary School. After speakers urged them to exterminate the witches in their midst, they went off in search of suspects. Neither of their first two intended victims was home, so they torched their property and assaulted a man suspected of raising the alarm. They then moved on to the yard of the deceased, doused her with petrol, and set her alight. She fled across her maize field and crawled through a fence, where the crowd caught her. At this point she wailed: “Why are you killing me, my grandchildren?” Her assailants responded: “Die, die you witch. We can’t get work because of you!” Garlanding her with a rubber tyre, they applied more petrol and ignited her one final time.

    There could hardly be a more bald statement of intergenerational antagonism. For these rural youth, “mass action” might have delivered the vote. But it brought them no nearer to the wealth and empowerment that the overthrow of apartheid was supposed to yield. Quite the re- verse. Trade sanctions had dramatically increased unemployment, especially in the countryside.

    The cruel irony of South Africa is that, as one of the world’s last colonies, it won its right to secular modern nationhood just as global processes were compromising the sovereignty and material in- tegrity of the nation-state, sui generis. Multinational capital is capricious: once apartheid had end- ed, it found cheaper, more tractable labor, and less violence, elsewhere. As a result, many corporations did not return and money flowed in other directions. What is more, alterations in the world economy during the 1990s–the dramatic rise of tourism and post-Fordist production, of the entertainment industry, the electronic market place, and new-age commerce–have made few inroads into the “backveld.” They engage uneasily, or not at all, with rural enterprise, and are experienced primarily as stories-from-the-city or as traces on television screens. The new era, it is true, has raised the living standards for sections of the African middle class. Very visibly. But, overall, work is harder to come by and poverty is still dire.

    It is no coincidence that the most spirited witchfinding occurs where conditions are most straitened. Also, where raw inequality has become most blatant. The north is, aggregatively, the poorest province in the country, and the remote regions of the northwest come not far behind. Agriculture, much of it on a pitiably modest scale, continues to be practiced, largely by women and, to a lesser extent, by older men. Petty business–beer-brewing, sex work, wood-cutting, thatching, carpentry, refashioning the detritus of used-up commodities for resale–supplements many household budgets. On the other hand, the migrant wages that had long subsidized faltering agrarian endeavors, and had granted young males a modicum of autonomy, are now diminishing. Concomitantly, cash resources vested in the elderly, like pensions, have risen in relative value; as disposable income, they are the object of fierce jealousy and mystical activity (cf Ritchken 1994:361). In addition, the establishment of the ethnic “homelands” under apartheid facilitated and funded the emergence of small new elites marked by their palpable prosperity and con- spicuous consumption. And so, in towns like Madura, new material distinctions, of widely variable magnitude, have become discernible among neighbors. Such differences are made incarnate, per- sonified even, in prized commodities: in houses, automobiles, televisions, cell-phones. The alleged witch of Madura was the occasional employer of several of her attackers, and sometimes let them watch her TV. The petrol that consumed her was seized from the few local men who now could afford cars.

    There is, in short, a good deal of evidence of widespread anxiety about the production and reproduction of wealth, an anxiety that translates into bitter generational opposition. Witch- hunting youth in the Northern Province acted much like an age-regiment in Sotho-Tswana society of old. Ridding the countryside of baloi, witches, was all of a piece with the other forms of “mass action” that had sought to subvert an oppressive social order; not long ago, it should be noted, urban “comrades” demonized the parental generation as passive “sellouts” to colonial oppression. Indeed, the war against mystical evil fused, in a synthetic of set of practices, political and ritual means of both recent and older vintage. In addition to singing songs of freedom as they carried out their exorcisms, “comrades” also intoned one of the best known local circumcision chants.

    Age, of course, is a relational principle. The youthful comrades forged their identity against the foil of a sinister, secretive, gendered gerontocracy; significantly, those attacked were referred to as “old ladies,” even when they were men (p.211). The antisocial greed of these predators was epitomized in the idea of unnatural production and reproduction, in images of debauched, un- generative sexuality. The Commission, for example, makes repeated reference to the inability of witches to bear children, to their red vaginas, and to their “rotten” sperm. Killing “perverts” by fire–itself a vehicle of simultaneous destruction and rebirth–bespoke the effort to engender a more propitious, constructive, mode of reproduction.

    Threats to local viability, as we said before, were also associated with the creation of the zombie workforce. Thus the following fragment from a case record:

    On a certain day, [when] the accused arrived, [people] shouted from the street that she is a witch with a shrinked [sic] vagina. They said she had killed people by lightning and has a drum full of zombies. They also said that her son “Zero” has no male seed and could not impregnate a woman.

    It is hard to imagine a more pointedly transparent portrait of perversion: of the zero-sum economy of witchcraft and its negation of life-giving material, sexual, and social exchange. In place of fertile procreation, the witch makes ghost workers out of the able-bodied, cannibalizing others, and robbing the rising generation of a legitimate livelihood and the wherewithal to marry or establish their own families; indeed, to become fully adult and to reproduce.

    Precisely this sense of illegitimate production and reproduction pervades youthful discourses of witchcraft in much of South Africa. Many young blacks blame their incapacity to ensure a future for themselves on an aged elite that controls the means of generating wealth without working. Their concern is underscored, with particular clarity, by the preoccupation with zombies, long a feature of Caribbean vodoun but new here. Testimony to a diasporic flow of electronic images–but evocative of a state of “living-death” (sefifi) described by early missionaries to the Tswana–zombies have been spliced into local mystical economies and have taken on the color of their surroundings. As one of our opening fragments suggests, they are missing persons who are thought to have been killed and revived by witchcraft. These living dead exist to toil for their creators. Bereft of tongues to give voice to their affliciton, they are believed to work after dark, mainly in agriculture, but can also be magically transported to urban centers to accrue riches for their owners. In this era of increasingly impermanent employment, there are even “part-time zombies”: people who wake up exhausted in the morning, having served unwittingly in the noc- turnal economy to feed the greed of a malign master.

    Although they have no tongues, zombies speak of a particular time and place. The end of apartheid, as we said, was in part the product of a global moment, one in which the machinations of multinational capital and the fall of the Soviet Union drastically restructured older polarities. When black South Africans at last threw off their colonial constraints, much of the rest of the con- tinent had already learned the harsh truth about the postcolonial predicament, having experienced unprecedented marginalization and economic hardship. Or, at the very least, striking new distinctions of wealth and privation. Such conditions disrupt grand narratives of progress. But they do not necessarily dispel their animating desires; to the contrary, they may feed them. Hence the situation that Roitman (n.d.), writing of the Cameroun, describes as “negotiat[ing] modernity in a time of austerity.” In these circumstances there tends to be an expansion both in techniques of producing value and in the meaning of wealth itself. It is an expansion which often breaks the bounds of legality, making crime, as well as magic, a mode of production open to those who lack other means. Which is why violence, as an instrument of income redistribution, is such a ubiquitous feature of postcolonial economies, in Africa and elsewhere.

    The zombie is the nightmare citizen of this parallel, refracted modernity. Reduced from humanity to raw labor power, he is stored up in petrol drums or sheds like tools. His absent pre- sence suggests a link to otherwise inexplicable accumulation. Being solely for the benefit of its owner, the toil of the living dead is pure surplus value: it has, as Marx (1976:325) might put have it, “all the charms of something created out of nothing.” Zombie production is thus an apt image of the inflating occult economies of postcolonial Africa. As spectral capital, it will be evident why these forms of extraction are typically associated with older people of apparent means; why they are thought to have multiplied as wage work has become scarce. Not only does the rise of a phan- tom proletariat consume the life force of others. By yielding profit without cost, it destroys the labor market, conventional patterns of reproduction, and the legitimate prospects of “the commu- nity” at large.

    But zombie production is merely one means among several. Recall that there has also been an increase in the incidence of so-called “ritual murder,” of killing for the purpose of harvesting body parts. Hence our opening fragment about eyes for sale in Johannesburg. As the Witchcraft Commission explains:

    These body parts are used…to secure certain advantages from the ancestors. A skull may be built into the foundation of a new building to ensure a good business, or a brew con- taining human parts may be buried where it will ensure a good harvest.

    These practices seem to have been relatively rare in the past. But now a great deal of evidence confirms that, in this domain too, market forces have stimulated production; indeed, newspapers publish the going rate for various parts: R5,000 for testicles, R1,000 for a kidney, R2,000 for a heart ($1=R4.85). This commerce seems to be eroding conventional social, cultural, and moral margins; in December 1994, a white policeman was charged with having removed the insides of a cadaver at a state mortuary in Johannesburg for retailing as medicine. Meanwhile, in different parts of the country, two young couples, both jobless and expecting babies, confessed in court to slaying young girls for their organs. These young people acted on the understanding that the oc- cult economy feeds the malevolent ambitions of their elders, to whom the purloined parts were to be retailed: already in 1988 it was noted that any disappearance of persons, especially children, was “immediately linked to businessmen and politicians” by young activists.

    We reiterate, yet again, that the traffic in human organs is neither new nor restricted to South Africa; that there is now a global economy in body parts, which flow from poor to rich coun- tries, from south to north, east to west, young to old; that some national governments are widely rumored to raise revenue by farming corneas and kidneys for export; that, from the Andes through Africa to East Asia, mysterious malevolents are believed to extract blood, fat, members, and living offspring from the unsuspecting. At issue in these panics about corporeal free enterprise is a fear of the creeping commodification of life itself. Among Sotho and Tswana, as elsewhere, people speak, ever more apprehensively, of a relentless process that erodes the inalienable humanity of persons, rendering them susceptible as never before to the reach of the market.

    Notice the emphasis on distance. The translocal dimension of dealings in the occult economy is crucial to the way in which its workings are understood in rural South Africa. Throu- ghout the north, people ponder the interplay of mobility and compression in the production of new forms of wealth. These appear to be a consequence of the capacity to siphon goods, people, and images across space in no time at all. Movement, especially instant movement, adds value. But how? How are its mechanics to be mastered? As South Africa casts off its pariah status and seeks ever greater integration with world markets, the growing velocity of long-range transaction is dis- cernible all around. In the rural Northwest, as we observed earlier, its impact is made manifest in, among other things, the rapildy growing interest in Satanism.

    Once more, however, a planetary phenomenon takes on a strikingly particular local form. Among rural Tswana, discourses of the diabolical center widely upon the most recent in a long line of missions from “overseas,” the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God of Brazil. This new Protestant denomination promises instant goods and gratification to those who embrace Christ and denounce Satan; it is also rumored to issue charmed credit cards which register no debt whatsoever. Here Pentecostalism meets neoliberal enterprise: the chapel is, literally, a store-front in a shopping precinct. It holds services during business hours, appealing frankly to mercenary motives, mostly among the young. Tabloids in its windows feature radiant witnesses speaking of the employment, health, and wealth that followed entry into the Church; eloquent testimonies, these, to rapid material returns on a limited spiritual investment. The ability to deliver in the here and now, again a potent form of space-time compression, is given as the measure of a truly global God. Bold advertisements for BMWs and lottery winnings adorn the altar, under the legend: “De-light in the Lord and he will give you the desires of your heart” (Psalms 37:4). The immediacy of this, of religion at its most robustly concrete, resonates with a pragmatic strain long evident in black Christianity in South Africa.

    For those middle-class Tswana schooled in a more ascetic Protestantism, however, the hordes that pack the store front are being lured by the devil; this notwithstanding his ostentatious denunciation. With the radical reorientation of local contours of desire and despair, of wealth and inequality, the diabolical has been invested with provocative and ambiguous powers. Its interven- tion into everyday life is hotly debated. We were ourselves witness to an intriguing argument among history graduate students at the University of the Northwest: Is the Universal Church the work of the Antichrist or a vindication of Max Weber? To be sure, if Satan did not exist, crusading Christianity would have had to invent him: in order to assume its global mandate, neo-Pentecos- talism summons up a world-endangering antagonist to conquer. Like the Universal Church–with its page on the world wide web–Satanism is a globalizing discourse: “The devil and his demons,” it says on that web page, “have been deceiving people all over the world.”

    Remember, in this respect, the television programs we mentioned earlier; the ones in whi- ch “reformed” devil worshippers spoke to callers. When asked to explain the relationship of the diabolical to boloi (witchcraft), one laconic young man said, in a mix of Setswana and English: “Satanism is high-octane witchcraft. It is more international.” By such means are old ideas extended and novel tropes domesticated to meet altered conditions. These devil worshippers were rumored to travel far and wide, fuelling their accumulation of riches with human blood. The “high octane” petrochemical image suggests that the basis of their potency was a capacity, as David Har- vey (1990:31) puts it, to “ride the tiger of time-space compression”: to move instantly, that is, between the parochial and the translocal–here and there, then and now–thus to weave the connections of cause-and-effect that hold the key to the mysteries of this new, postcolonial epoch.

    IV.

    Perhaps the overriding irony of the contemporary age–this Age of Futilitarianism, in which the promises of late capitalism run up against postmodern pessimism–is how unanticipated it was by modern social thought. None of the grand narratives of the orthodox social sciences came anywhere near predicting the sudden transformation of the twentieth-century international order, the fall of the Soviet Union, the crisis of the nation-state, the rapid deterritorialization of culture and society, the ascendance of an unevenly regulated global economy. The surprising recent past of South Africa is one refraction of this world-historical process. Here, too, the end came unexpectedly.

    Apartheid might not have ended in a bloodbath or a race war. But the birth of the “new” nation has nonetheless been tempestuous. Most perplexing, to many, is the apparently post- political character of the turbulence. Violence, by common agreement, is epidemic. Almost none of it, though, is clothed in an ideological agenda, a social vision, a political program. Not yet. Which is why, perhaps, it is traumatizing the populace at large. The new nightmare is of street terror run amok; of a state in retreat; of crime as routinized redistribution; of police unwilling to protect ordinary citizens, preferring to profit from the privatization of force and the sale of arms; of a new topography of public space marked by few zones of safety and many of danger; of gated communities and uncivil city scapes contested by youth gangs, Islamic vigilantes, drug dealers, car- jackers; of an economy, as much underground as above board, in which “new” black bureaucrats and businessmen, politicians, celebrities, and criminals grow rich while the rest struggle to survive.

    This, we stress, is a popular nightmare, a fast materializing mythos for the post-revolutionary moment. Sociological reality, as always, is much more complex, much less coherent. Not all is apocalypse. In the wake of apartheid, all sorts of legitimate new ventures flourish alongside older ones. From the quiet backyards of rural homesteads through the teeming taxi ranks of large “townships” to sedate urban corporations, inventive African entrepreneurs “do business.” Postcolonial commerce ruptures and dissolves long-standing racial lines in its millennial pursuit of virgin markets. A politics of optimism is actively purveyed by the ANC, not altogether in vain; refreshingly, the media envisage a future in which black is not bleak. What is more, some forms of cultural production–often exhilaratingly experimental–thrive just off the meanest of streets. Still, the fright nightmare persists. Indeed, it grows increasingly baroque, medieval almost, as it is represented with ever greater facticity.

    Reports of escalating witchcraft and ritual murder, of zombies and satanism, must be situated on this restless terrain. The specter of mystical violence run wild is a caricature of post-apartheid “liberty”: the liberty to transgress and consume in an unfettered world of desire, cut loose from former political, spatial, moral, sexual, and material constraints. Socialist imaginings, like utopian ideas of a new society, falter. In their place reigns the rhetoric of the market, of free- dom as the right to exercise choice through spending or voting or whatever, of personhood as constructed largely through consumption. Talk in the public sphere about violence gives voice to a pent up lust for all that apartheid denied, from iconic objects (notably, the BMW) and an omnivorous sexuality to extravagant self-fashionings and the flamboyant sense of independence communicated by the cell phone. But it also evokes a world in which ends far outstrip means, in which there is a high velocity of exchange and a relatively low volume of production. And yet, we repeat, it is a world in which the possibility of rapid enrichment, of amassing a fortune by largely invisible means, is always palpably present.

    The preoccupation with the occult is closely connected to all this. At one level, it is about the desire and the effort to discover the secret of those invisible means; at another, it is concerned to stem the spread of a macabre, visceral economy founded on the violence of extraction and abst- raction (i) in which the majority are kept poor by the mystical machinations of the few; (ii) in which employment has dwindled because of the creation of a virtual labor force from the living dead; (iii) in which profit depends on learning the secret of compressing space and time, on cannibalizing bodies, and on making production into the spectral province of people of the night; (iv) in which the old are accused of aborting the natural process of social reproduction–and youth, reciprocally, are demonized. The fact that none of this is truly new makes it no less sig- nificant to those for whom it has become an existential reality.

    Witch hunts are, among other things, instruments of social divination, dramatic discourses of discovery in the public sphere, whose unspoken object it is to yield explanations, to impress cla- rity on bodies and persons. That ambiguity concerns many aspects of the “new” South Africa: the rights of citizens, the role of the state, the significance of cultural identity and of social difference, the meaning and the point of post-apartheid politics, the infinitely complex articulations of race, class, and ethnicity; the legitimacy of an economic order that has sanctioned dramatic polarities of wealth and caused intense jealousy among neighbors. But, most of all, there is perplexity–in this Hobbesian universe where everything appears at once possible and impossible–about the very nature of human subjects: about their secret appetites, about dark practices of the heart that show themselves in spectacular new fortunes and orgies of consumption.

    Here, then, are the answers to our questions. It will be clear now why, in the South African postcolony, there has been such a dramatic intensification of appeals to enchantment. And why it is, in a world alleged to be filled with witches and ritual murders and zombies, that generational antagonisms loom so large. The rise of occult economies here and elsewhere in postcolonial, postrevolutionary societies seems overdetermined. For one thing, these tend to be societies in which the promise of the free market confronts the realities of neoliberal economics; of unpredictable shifts in centers of production and labor markets; of the difficulties of exercising stable control over space, time, or the flow of money; of an end to old political alignments, without any clear lines, beyond pure interest, along which new ones take shape; of uncertainty surrounding the proper nature of civil society. Such are the corollaries of the rise of millennial capitalism as they are felt in much of the contemporary world. Perhaps they will turn out to be en- tirely transitory, a mere passing moment, in the longue dureé. But this makes them no less mo- mentous now.

    Which takes us to our final question, our final point. What is the relevance of our narrative for the present and future of the discipline, for a postcolonial anthropology of the global age?

    “Globalism” and “globalization,” as everyone knows, have become tropes for our times. Like all catch-words and clichés, they are cheapened by over-use and under-specification, by confusing an expansive metaphor for an explanatory term. As a result, much of what is currently being written about them in the social sciences is Anthropology Lite, fact-free ethnography whose realities are more virtual than its virtues are real. At the same time, it is important not to overreact: not to treat anything labelled “global” either as a feckless fashion or as a threat to the existence of a discipline traditionally concerned with the parochial; this last by dissolving all things culturally contingent and close to the ground into the great Eurocentric solvent of late ca- pitalism. In point of fact, the processes involved in the rise of novel forms of planetary integration and compression–especially in the electronic economy, in mass communications, in flexitime flows of labor and capital, in the instantaneous circulation of signs and images, in the translocal commodification of culture, in the diasporic politics of identity–challenge us by re-presenting all the most fundamental question of our craft: how do human beings construct their life-worlds at the shifting intersections of here, there, elsewhere, everywhere.

    This, finally, is a problem of scale: of determining, in respect of any given ethnography– contemporary, historical, or both–the stretch of relations, concrete processes, imaginings, spatial planes commensurate to its realization. “Locality” is not everywhere, nor for every purpose, the same thing; sometimes it is a family, sometimes a town, sometimes a nation, sometimes a flow or a field, sometimes a continent or even the world; often it lies at the point of articulation among two or more of these things. Similarly, translocal, planentary connections and forces do not impinge equally or in like manner on all aspects of human thought, action and interaction. In this respect, it is important not to forget that “the local” and “the global” do not describe received empirical realities. They are analytic constructs whose heuristic utility depends entirely on the way in which they are deployed to illuminate historically specific phenomena. Which is why we have taken such pains here to trace the causal determinations of the occult economy in post-apartheid South Africa across generations and genders, villages and provinces and regions, and a nation-state intransition–not to mention along the labile vectors of a post-Fordist, millennial economy.

    As all this implies, there is little to be gained any longer from avoiding the methodological challenge posed by the global moment, a strategy effected, on the part of some anthropologists, by retreating back into the local. This move is typically rationalized by affirming, sometimes in an unreconstructed spirit of romantic neoprimitivism, the capacity of “native” cultures to remain ass- ertively intact, determinedly different, in the face of a triumphal, homogenizing world capitalism. Apart from being empirically questionable, this conjures up an anachronistic, ahistorical idea of culture. Of culture transfixed in opposition to capitalism. It is also to misrepresent the hybrid, dialectical, historically evanescent character of all contemporary social designs.

    Here lies one future for anthropology, at least as the discipline looks from the vantage of the South African postcolony. It is to interrogate the production, in imaginative and material prac- tice, of those compound political, economic, and cultural forms by which human beings create community and locality and identity, especially on evanescent terrains; in terms of which they fabricate social realities and power relations and impose themselves on their lived environments; through which space and time are made and remade, and the boundaries of the local and the glob- al are actualized. Observe the stress on the active voice: from this perspective, the epistemic objects of our enquiry are no longer nouns–culture, society, institutions, or whatever–but compound verbs describing the construction and deconstruction of more-or-less stable practices, conventions, forms, commodities, abstractions. As we have before (1992), even the most overdetermined, most complex, most inchoate of world-historical forces–colonialism, the global market, cyberspace, “late” capitalism–take shape in sociocultural processes that inhabit particular places during particular periods in particular persons. Without human agents, without specified locations and moments and actions, realities are not realized, objects not objectified, nothing takes place, the social is not socialized, the present has no presence.

    These locations and moments, people and practices–to return one last time to the spirit of Max Gluckman–comprise the fragments from which an anthropology of millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism is to be constructed; from which we may recuperate, by positing imaginative sociologies and legible processes, the mechanisms by which the local is globalized and the global localized. For in these processes lies an explanation for the most parochial of things, like the new occult economy in South Africa. Also for the most universal. Like the fact that enchant- ment, far from slipping away with the resolute march of modernity, seems everywhere on the rise.

  • Reflections on the Colonial State in South Africa and Elsewhere

    Reflections on the Colonial State in South Africa and Elsewhere

    [W]hat happens to people without nations…? Are they human beings if they are not citizens?– Julia Kristeva, Nations Without Nationalism

    I. PARADOXES OF THE COLONIAL STATE

    Let me begin with a truism. Whatever else it may be concerned with, the so-called “anthropology of colonialism” exists, above all else, to interrogate the construction, objectification, and negotiation of difference. Difference in 3-D, so to speak. As distinction, dualism, discrimination; also as dissension, duplicity, and discord. But not just difference between colonizer and colonized, that manichean op- position drawn by imperial regimes–often speciously–to separate ruler from subject, light from dark (Cooper and Stoler 1997:3, 9). Also, in a more reflexive register, differences in the way in which colonialism has been conceptualized and characterized in Western scholarship.

    As we have ourselves pointed out (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a),1 a new revisionism has arisen. In retreat are received forms of modernization theory, with their confident liberal humanist teleologies, their utopian narratives of progress; si- milarly the Marxist (and Marxoid) alternatives, which treat imperialism as a reflex of the global expansion of capitalism, of the articulation of modes of production, of unequal exchange between centers and peripheries, of underdevelopment and de- pendency. Alongside them has emerged a growing concern with the contingent, constructed, cultural dimensions of colonialism (e.g. Dirks 1992; Thomas 1994; Cooper and Stoler 1997:4f): a concern with the making of imperial subjects by means of objects, via the manufacture of desire and the commodification of need; with the reconstruction of nonEuropean “others,” after Foucault, through dispersed disciplinary regimes (e.g. Thomas 1990; Mitchell 1991); with colonies as “labora- tories of modernity” (Stoler 1995); with the agency of the colonized and its im- pact on Europe and Europeans (cf Trotter 1990:5f). At its most extreme, the grand narrative of colonialism in the Western academy has been replaced by one which treats the phenomenon as protean, almost incoherent. Even among the less postmodern, dialectics have often given way to dialogics, political economy to poe- tics, class conflict to consumption, the violence of the gun to the violation of the text, world-historical material processes to local struggles over signs and styles, European domination to post-Hegelian hybridity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a:15).

    This is something of an over-statement, obviously. There are still many who argue, influentially, for older perspectives. And some who essay a range of positions in between.2 Indeed, I myself hold that neither image of colonialism is right or wrong; that each refers to different moments in, different perspectives on, different aspects of its workings over the long-run. I also believe that the pendulum swing across this range of positions has had a liberating effect on the anthropological study of the encounter between Europe and its significant “others,” pushing it in new, creative directions. But I do have one lingering concern.

    It has to do with the question of the colonial state.

    George Steinmetz3 commented three years ago, that, for all the recent at- tention given to colonialisms of various types and times, the colonial state itself is rarely theorized.4 True, its functions are often spelled out: for some, they lie primarily in the regulation of material processes; for others, they are to be found, more generally, in the establishment and maintenance of social order through the imposition of legal and other administrative mechanisms; for yet others, they derive from an ensemble of institutions created to open a space for, and to protect, various projects of European expansion; for a few, they inhere in violence, terror, and coercion, framed as the guarantee of physical security for the colonizer against the colonized. This inventory is not exhaustive, of course. For one thing, postmodern notions of the workings of the colonial state, as we shall see, include a broad range of disciplinary and regulatory practices, the object of which is twofold: to recast the experienced reality, the existential world, of the colonized and to re- present back to Europe its own modernist sense of self, thus to naturalize its world picture and the forms of knowledge legitimated therein (see e.g. Mitchell 1991:xf). But, I stress, these are all functional descriptions, a mode of knowing the beast by its effects (cf Corrigan and Sayer 1985:2). What is more, their conceptual and empirical bases are far from established. Hence Steinmetz’s caution. If he is correct, we have yet to answer some fairly fundamental questions.

    What precisely is “the colonial state?”

    Is it a definite or an indefinite article? One thing or many things or nothing at all?

    Is it a process? A series of institutional mechanisms? A specific form of governance? A cultural construct? An existential state of being-in-the world?

    Do the various functions typically ascribed to it, from different theoretical and ideological perspectives, amount to a convincing account of its historical workings? And how does it differ from its European counterpart, the metropolitan state “at home”?6

    Is there anything of interest to be derived from the fact that, just as the term “state” has two connotations in its noun form–the state, that is, as political order, structure, institution; the state as a condition-of-being–so as a verb it denotes to “give voice,” to “articulate,” to “narrate”? Does anything lie hidden in this fortuitous homonym?7

    It is to these questions that I direct my reflections on the colonial state in nineteenth- and twentieth-century South Africa.8 And elswhere. I do so by exploring, in a manner deliberately eclectic and fragmentary–at times, even, frankly elementary–some of the dominant facts and fictions surrounding its social archaeology. Also by interrogating the dominant theoretical approaches to its description. The point of doing a parallel, paradigmatic “reading” and of these alternative narratives is not, I stress, to tender a literature review. It is to cast radically new light on the nature of colonial governmentality, modernity, and the culture of legality at its core.

    II. MODERNIST MASTER NARRATIVES, LEFT AND RIGHT

    [T]he state is a territorial entity struggling to impose its will upon a fluid and spatially open process of capital circulation. It has to contest within its borders the factional forces and fragmenting effects…of capital[ism]…To do so effectively the state must construct an alternative sense of community to that based on money, as well as a definition of public interests over and above the class and sectarian interests and struggles that are contained within its borders. It must, in short, legitimize itself.

    David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p.108

    There is no need, in this context, to open up the question of why European colonizers–first Dutch, then British9–found their way to southern Africa; or how “the colonial state,” in its various guises, established itself here from the late seven- teenth century onwards. At first, European governance covered a relatively limited, though gradually expanding, coastal territory (see e.g. Krüger 1969:325f; also below). Pragmatically speaking, it set itself a fourfold mandate, the cumulative “responsibilities” of empire which were later to be seen and rationalized as the “white man’s burden” in Africa: (i) the “discovery” of dark, unknown lands, which were conceptually emptied of their peoples and cultures10 so that their “wilderness” might be brought properly to order–i.e., fixed and named and mapped–by an officializing white gaze; (ii) the “pacification” of native “tribes” seen to be endemically unruly and thus requiring, even desiring,11 Pax Britannica or another European equivalent;12 (iii) the facilitation of “commerce and adventurous industry” (Barrow 1801-4,1:8f), both metropolitan and local, thus to civilize the savages, to draw them into the virtuous beneficence of empire, and, simultaneous- ly, to enrich the “mother country”; and (iv) rational administration–itself taken everywhere to be a condition of possibility for the economic “management” (read “exploitation”) of colonies (cf Ajayi 1969:505)–which consisted in part of the maintenance of law and order,13 in part of a regime of predictable bureaucratic and fiscal practices. As Weber (1968:1394) would later put it, writing of states in general:

    …the bureaucratic state, adjudicating and administering according to rationally established law and regulation, is…closely related to the modern capitalist development, [which] rests primarily on calculation and presupposes a legal and administrative system, whose functioning can be ra- tionally predicted…just like the expected performance of a machine.

    “Sociologically speaking,” he was wont to say “the modern state is an `enterprise’ just like a factory.” This, certainly, is how colonial administrations in many parts of Africa liked to represent themselves–though, as Lord Lugard (1997[1922]:574) stressed, it was always deemed important to make it clear, alike “to the educated native, the conservative Moslem, and the primitive pagan,” that “Government [was] not antagonistic but…sympathetic to his aspirations,” protective of “his natu- ral rights,” and “in touch with [his] thought and feeling.”14

    The fourfold mandate taken upon themselves by colonial regimes in Africa– discovery, pacification, commerce, and rational administration–implied that the master narrative of European imperial expansion, its narrative of mastery, would place “the state” at the center of the story: that “the state,” in the singular, would be at once the ur-protagonist, the organizing trope, and the fons et origo of an epic history; that its heroic personages would, for the most part, be public figures- -statesmen–who were agents of overrule and governance, broadly conceived;15 also, as a result, that this history would, in its authoritative telling, be political ra- ther than cultural, social, or even, in the first instance, economic.
    <
    Which, of course, has turned out to be the case.

    It has been said, quite often recently, that history in its modernist form–as a chronicle of public events and heroic actions–is re-presentation (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992;176); the authoritative self-representation, in particular, of the nation-state (cf Anderson 1983). And, since colonialism everywhere has been in- extricably imbricated in the making of European modernity (Stoler 1995), in the maturation of its sovereign communities (Cooper and Stoler 1997:18f), it is hardly surprising that imperial encounters should have been written as the political histories of states acting out their destinies on other peoples, other places.

    In South Africa, as much if not more than anywhere else, both liberal and conservative histories16 place almost exclusive emphasis on the role of the colonial state in the domestication and development of the subcontinent; or did until very recently.17 Owusu (1975:34-5), although writing in a more general key, describes nicely the epistemic bases of the orthodox historiography of South Africa. He observes that accounts in this tradition are, wittingly or otherwise, grounded in “theories” of modernization. (The quote marks, signs of irony, are his.) These acc- ounts take as axiomatic the inevitability of modernity; again, his italics his skepticism. They emphasize its gradual, excruciatingly long-term evolution, presume the centrality of government in effecting its progress or retardation, and treat its narrative, ultimately, as political, even when focusing on material pro- cesses.

    As told from this perspective, the story of the colonial state in South Africa over the longue durée is usually divided into four broad periods: (i) 1652-1806, the phase of Dutch mercantile rule, interrupted briefly by an English takeover (see n.9); (ii) 1806-c.1870, the early British years, in which imperial governance was restricted in both geographical and administrative scope, and during which two breakaway white settler republics were established in the interior; (iii) 1870- 1910, the age of the great mineral and industrial revolution–and “scramble for Africa”–when the United Kingdom sought to extend its control over the subcontinent as a whole; and (iv) 1910-1994, the epoch of the Union of South Africa, a dominion within the British Commonwealth, which culminated in the rise and fall of apartheid.

    Each of these periods is narrated around a few dominant motifs; these are the topoi that mandate the selection and interpretation of historically significant events. One is the role of the state in regulating (often bitterly agonistic, antago- nistic) relations among whites; in particular, between those Europeans who later congealed into the Afrikaner “people,” an agrarian population which came to
    resent the liberal social attitudes of the British administration toward Africans,18 and English settlers, who regarded themselves as much more cosmopolitan and enlightened (see Coetzee 1988:9f; Streak 1974:5f).

    Another is the centrality of the colonial state in governing “native” populations, in overseeing their “discipline” and “development.” This took many forms, all clothed in a mass of legalities: among them, the introduction of so-called “indirect rule,” which ostensibly retained local government in the hands of tradi- tional authorities (Lugard 1922) but, in fact, made most chiefs and kings into menial civil servants of empire; the delimitation of African land into “reserves” and “locations”; the regulation–often by the naked manipulation of black economic viability–of flows of people, primarily as “labor units,” to centers of industrial (and, less frequently, agrarian) production; the claim to be civilizing those people through enlightened rule, by such modernist means as the provision of education, the extension of public health facilities–and, more baldly, through wage work it- self (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:199, 204).

    A third motif is the function of the state as a site for, and a mediator in, struggles between Europeans and Africans, especially over land and labor, property and rights (cf Gann and Duignan 1969:5); this in spite of the fact that it was often an interested player in those very struggles, sometimes annexing territory and imposing regulatory mechanisms to further its own material interests (cf Lonsdale and Berman 1979:496f). Its adjudicatory role was most dramatically enacted in the innumerable official commissions of enquiry held by the British administration over the years (cf Ashforth 1990; see below). These arbitrated disputes of widely varying kinds. And, in doing so, they served also to reinforce the legitimacy of the state as a superordinate structure of governance.

    The last theme, some would say the most significant, is the engagement of colonial states in the economics of empire, both at home and abroad. Liberal and conservative histories alike pay exquisitely detailed attention to the ways in which these states intervened–with greater or lesser efficacy, in the face of greater or lesser resistance–to promote European commerce; to protect the agrarian and other enterprises of expatriate settlers and frontier farmers; to facilitate the extraction of raw materials and “native” labor power; to develop trade networks and markets of various kinds; and, from the 1870s onward, to interpolate itself into an unfolding mineral and industrial revolution.

    As I have said, all event histories of colonialism in South Africa, written from orthodox perspectives, are ultimately distilled into sequences of actions and processes around these topoi. What is more, such histories usually treat the state as an intrinsically benign force,19 one which sought to balance the interests and welfare of the various parties under its sovereign jurisdiction. Its excesses, its ten- dencies toward brute domination and its descents into violence, its scandals and corruptions, its inefficiencies and incoherences, its deployment for the enrichment of some at the expense, even destitution, of others–to the degree that they are recognized at all–are typically treated as aberrations, as ruptures in an otherwise seamless narrative of progress. And they are, by and large, blamed not on the sys- temic contradictions of colonialism itself, or on any kind of structural consideration, but on misanthropic or misguided individuals. In this respect, Harvey (1989:108) is correct: the state is portrayed here–much as it represented itself–as embodying, serving, and protecting a public good, a collective interest and sense of being-in-the-world, against the sectarian differences and struggles contained within its borders.20

    Neo-Marxist historians21 of colonialism in South Africa, highly influential in the 1970s and 1980s, contest all this on a number of counts. In the first place, they question the primacy of politics. For them, it was the development of industrial capitalism, its material logic, that motivated the story of empire and its aftermath; from their standpoint, the state was the administrative, bureaucratic armature of capital, a superstructure with limited autonomy, will, or agency of its own. Its power, its physical and fiscal capacity for coercion, is held to have served one end above all others: the exploitation and regulation of labor–and, concomitantly, the construction of a homogenous black underclass–in the cause of capitalist development (see e.g. Wolpe 1988; Magubane 1979; cf Unterhalter 1995:218-9 et passim). Interestingly, this is a view that Weber (1968:1394), typifying the modernist state in general, comes close to articulating: The “separation” of the worker from the material means of production, destruction, administration, academic research, and finance in general is the common basis of the modern state, in its political, cultural and military sphere, and of the private capitalist economy…

    But it is to Marx, not Max Weber, that these historians have looked in dealing with the state in Africa. Says Harvey (1990:108, after Marx), writing of “Modernization”:22

    [t]he state, constituted as a coercive authority that has a monopoly over institutionalized violence forms a[n]…organizing principle through which a ruling class can seek to impose its will not only on its opponents but upon the anarchical flux, change, and uncertainty to which capitalist modernity is always prone.

    Its tools of coercion vary, he adds. They include the imposition of taxes and levies; the provision or withholding of social and physical infrastructure; control over wa- ges and salaries in the public sector; and a monopoly of the means of surveillance, of military might and police repression. For his own part, Harvey (1990:109) goes on to argue that “the relation between capitalist development and the state has to be seen…as mutually determining rather than unidirectional.” Neo-Marxist historians in South Africa are wont to see political institutions more unidirectionally; less as a response to the anarchical flux or uncertainties of modernity–less, also, as a “principle” through which “ruling classes” impose their will–than as a creature of the inexorable logic of capital itself (cf Corrigan and Sayer 1985:2f). But they would agree about the tools of coercion typically used by colonial regimes. They would also go one further step with Marx himself. In his essay on colonialism in Capital (1967,I:765), he argues that

    [In the colonies] the capitalist régime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance of the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself, instead of the capitalist. The contradiction of these two diametrically opposed economic systems, manifests itself here practically in a struggle between them. Where the capitalist has at his back the [state] power of the mother-country, he tries to clear out of his way by force, the modes of production and appropriation, based on the independent labour of the producer.23

    The integration of black South Africans into the capitalist economy of colonial South Africa–through the forcible destruction of their modes of production–is narrated in a manner reminiscent of various species of dependency and world- systems theory. Notwithstanding arguments over the details, we are told repeatedly, and with considerable persuasiveness, how African societies were deliberately impoverished and their economies subverted–“underdeveloped” is often the verb of choice–thus to make them dependant on a mix of underpaid migrant wage labor in the urban industrial sector (done mainly done by men) and underproductive rural agriculture (done largely by women). For example, most of the contributors in the landmark volume, The Roots of Rural Poverty (Palmer and Parsons 1977) show how one or other

    …vigorous African economy became subordinated to the special conditions of capitalist development in Southern Africa…By overt political controls, as well as through “unseen” and natural factors affecting production and trade, [the mining industry and other capitalist interests] restricted local production and trade, manipulated the terms of trade to create a structure in which the black periphery invariably paid tribute to the white center in capital funds and resources as well as labour (Parsons 1977:137).

    The same argument, broadly, is reiterated throughout the neo-Marxist historical canon, some of it very finely wrought (see e.g. Bundy 1972, 1979; Marks and Rathbone 1982; Marks and Trapido 1987). It is capitalist development that is the prime mover of the process of underdevelopment and social transformation. The role of the state is to provide the “overt political controls” with which to facilitate that process.24 No more, no less.

    A qualification here. From other parts of Africa have come efforts to write a more nuanced version of the neo-Marxist narrative. Lonsdale and Berman (1970:487), for example, hold that government was never just “a loyal minister to capital’s needs.” Regarding colonialism, fundamentally, as an “articulation of modes of production” (after Rey 1971, 1973; Foster-Carter 1978), they argue that the state was “relatively autonomous” (cf Wallerstein 1974:402). Why? Be- cause it had to appear as a “factor of cohesion,” an “even-handed arbiter” presiding over the conjoining of different, often inimical, material and social worlds (p.489); echoes here of Harvey (see above). Moreover, government could not simply oblige the political and financial interests of colonizers, as these were often contradictory and excessive. But, if the state could “not be the servant of capital,” it certainly was “the protector of capitalist social relations” (pp.489-90). Here then is the nuance: it was capitalism, rather than capital, of which governance was a reflex. Indeed, the state is itself defined by Lonsdale and Berman as “the historically conditioned set of institutions in any class society which…secures the social conditions for the production of the dominant mode of production” (p.489). Rela- tively autonomous? Maybe. However, far from being “a disinterested…arbiter,” co- lonial administrations “never ceased to provide the conditions for the reproduction of settler capitalism” (p.504). Which implies that, for all the effort to refine its role, the state remains, literally, a supporting player in the political economy of colonialism.

    We shall return to this in due course.

    III. PANOPTICS, POWER, AND POSTMODERN COUNTER-NARRATIVES

    Aylesbury Prison, England, 1918. He was stripped and put in a cell with a stone floor and no glass in the window–this is January, mind…[But] he said in his letter that it was not the cold that bothered him, it was being watched all the time. The eye in the door…an elaborately painted eye [inside the cell]…, was deeply dis- turbing… `’S not so bad so long as it stays in the door. You start worrying when it gets in [your head].’25
    Pat Barker, The Eye in the Door, p.36

    A new chapter has recently opened up in the historical anthropology of colonialism in South Africa. It is one which is evoking a great deal of alarm among scholars of various stripes,26 largely because it subverts a host of conceptual certainties and methodological mantras. Born of the revisionism of which I spoke at the outset–and grounded in Michel Foucault’s discourses on power, govern- mentality, and the modernist subject–it has not yet been fully worked out in this part of the world. Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt (1991) is perhaps the most completely realized example in Africa, and it is written about the other end of the continent. As this suggests, the alarm is somewhat premature, anticipatory. Nonetheless, it is a harbinger of postmodern, post-structuralist, and post-Marxist perspectives that are beginning to make themselves felt here as never before.

    It is not my intention to offer a systematic introduction to Foucauld on power and governmentality; there are enough published expositions on the topic to render it redundant. I should like, instead, to make a few summary points of typification, sketching briefly the ways in which a postmodern “reading” of the co- lonial state might proceed in the South African context.

    From a Foucauldian perspective, the state is itself a disciplinary formation. In its modernist mode, its power is less instrumental and institutional than it is “capillary”; which is to say that it stretches, autonomically and unseen, into the very construction of its subjects, into their bodily routines and the essence of their selfhood. Indeed, it is by inculcating a deeply interiorized, individuated sense of self-regulation–through its various techniques of surveillance; its clinics, schools, prisons, and other sites of control; its censuses, surveys, and cognate forms of serialization and accounting; its modes of knowing and objectifying personhood through the “human sciences”; its “natural” institutions like the family and father- hood, established religion and organized recreation, competitive sports and com- modified regimes of consumption–that the state imposes order on its citizenry. Order, that is, in both the sense of regularity and regulation, of convention and command, of civility and servility. This involves the fabrication of an entire space-time world–and the insinuation of its logic into the mundane practices of human beings-as-citizens. Thus are subjects subjected to modes of social control that are rendered invisible in their very enactment.

    In order to analyze the workings of colonial states, then, it follows that we ought to look to their capillary techniques of regulation; to the ways in which they sought (and seek) to instill a dispositional sense of self-discipline in their subjects. But there is a caveat here. Unlike the European polities with which Foucault him- self was concerned, and of which Benedict Anderson (1983) has written so influentially, colonies were never places of even tenuously-imagined homogeneity. For the most part, their administration was vested in states without hyphe- nation, as it were: in states without nations. Here, in a nutshell, lay the roots of the contrast between metropolitan and colonial governance, even when the second was merely an extension “overseas” of the first: one depended, for its existence, on the ideological work of manufacturing sameness, of engendering a horizontal sense of fraternity; the other, despite its rhetoric of universalizing modernity, was concerned with the practical management, often the production, of difference. Consequently, imperial regimes abroad were always caught up in a “doubling,” a contradiction: at the very same time as they spoke of transforming colonized peo- ples into civilized–i.e. “modern”–free, right-bearing citizens, they dealt in hete- rogeneity by naturalizing ethnic difference and essentializing racial inequality.27

    The former was entailed, if nothing else, in converting “savages” into proletarians.28 The latter was implicit in the grammar of cultural diversity, and in the organic anthropology, on which were erected the hierarchical structures of nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial rule. This, we have argued elsewhere (1997a), is the base contradiction of colonialism. Its teleology pointed one way (toward secular modern citizenship and, eventually, nationhood), its reality another (toward a racinated world of ethnic subjection). In the European optic of Empire, “natives” were always subject/citizens in the making.

    But how, precisely, did colonial states set about (re)constructing the identities, the being-in-the-world, of those over whom they extended their governance? Wherein lay their applied anthropology? On the understanding that these were parallel processes–indeed, two sides of the same subject-in-formation- -let us look, first, at the making of the serialized, modernist citizen, then at the fashioning of the ethnicized “native.”

    In Africa, the construction of the aboriginal as a colonial citizen, from the vantage of the state and its functionaries, had a great deal to do with the political economy and pragmatics of overrule. As long as they lived in their own com- munities, ruled by their own chiefs and customs, “natives” might remain faceless and nameless. But the moment they became imbricated in colonial society–be it as workers or commodity farmers, as subalterns or servants, as sellers or buyers– they had to have individual identities, first and family names, rights and responsi- bilities.29 How, otherwise, could they enter into binding contracts or be prosecuted for wrongs? How, otherwise, could they be made to pay various monetary tariffs and levies? How, otherwise, could their movements, their marriages and divorces, their persons, property, and possessions, be regulated?

    In short, the making of “savages” into “citizens”–itself a highly variable, always incomplete process–was, typically, a corollary of (i) the mobilization of a stable army of (often migrant) workers into the capitalist sector, which demanded that employees be tied by legal agreements and that defection from factory, farm, or mine be criminalized; of (ii) taxation, in cash, through which the cost of colonial governance could be more-or-less offset and people coerced into the labor market; of (iii) the introduction and administration of “privately” owned assets, including land, which entailed the recognition of deeds and titles, testaments and estates; and of (iv) the oversight of domestic life, in the name of which states sanctioned the formation, location, reproduction, and dissolution of families, thus reaching deep into the everyday existence of their members.

    All this was effected, over the long run, by a range of now familiar me- chanisms of enumeration, serialization, individuation, and identification. These, as Weber would have had us expect (above, p.00), included the official registration of births (hence, also, of names) and deaths (along, in time, with the execution of wills); the certification of legal wedlock and its dissolution; population censuses (of both humans and animals),30 the establishment of tax rolls31 as well, often, as the introduction of identity papers; and the increasing bureaucratization, documentation, rationalization, and registration of all aspects of social and personal life. In many places, not least in nineteenth-century South Africa, these processes were actively resisted. Tswana, for example, referred to them as “the English mode of warfare”: they were held to reduce “human beings [and their relations] to pieces of paper,” and were seen as instruments of violence by which indigenous peoples were dispossessed of their property and freedom of movement.32 Throughout the country during the twentieth century, moreover, “pass books,” a notorious form of identity document which “Bantu” had to carry on them,33 were periodically burned in public, leading to mass struggles with police. In the late apartheid years, in fact, protesting blacks frequently targeted state offices, seeking to burn tax registers, pass records, census files, and the like.

    In its effort to create colonial citizens of color, the state was abetted, if sometimes unwittingly, by other European expatriates. The most notable were Protestant evangelists, among the earliest colonizers in South Africa. Also the most thoroughgoing: as Bohannan (1964:22) notes, they sought not just to extract la- bor power, raw materials, or real estate from “heathen nations,” but to recast their life-worlds tout court. The civilizing mission was intended to effect a “revolution in the habits” of Africans (Philip 1828,2:355), above all, by making them into discrete individuals (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1997a): by breaking down their “semi-communistic ways”34 and severing the “promiscuous” webs of relations that bound them together; by clothing them in “proper” garb, so that their “private parts” would be modestly hidden, their bodies would be appropriately enclosed, and their physical secretions would not “rub off” on each other; by persuading them to treat marriage as an ensemble of rights and duties, a contract between two consenting people–and to live, monogamously, in “decent” nuclear family homes on neatly fenced-off squares of land; by taking their children into schools and teaching them to be self-controlled, self-motivated students, capable of advancing by dint of personal effort; by encouraging each man to work on his own behalf as wage-earner and breadwinner for his family, and to appreciate the virtues of money, the market, and private property; in short, by seeking, through every means available, to ensure that their would-be converts were self-contained beings, at once biologically and legally complete unto themselves.

    If these were the techniques by which colonizers sought to recast Africans as citizens, their fabrication as ethnic, racialized subjects followed a somewhat different (dis)course.

    The transformation of the southern African landscape into an ethnoscape depended, first and foremost, on a colonizing cartography. I noted earlier that the “dark continent” was treated as an empty space until it fell under the European gaze, thence to be mapped, by means of conventional graphic images, onto an ex- pansive imperial world-picture. As a much-quoted contemporary poem by Jona- than Swift had it (Curtin 1964:198; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:324, n.6)

    …Geographers in Afric-Maps
    With Savage Pictures fill their Gaps.

    Colonial cartography replaced those pictures, and the epistemic gaps they covered, with charts based on “scientific” observation; charts grounded in a political geography that was intended, explicitly, to facilitate imperial command. It entailed the compilation of an atlas on which aboriginal “tribes” and “peoples”–invented sometimes, and ascribed a collective identity if they did not already share one35– were labelled, classified linguistically, and placed in bounded territories; each of the latter being designated as the realm of a legitimate political authority, be it a king, chief, headman, or potentate of some other kind.36 For the British, in fact, European rule without this kind of cartography did not actually amount to co- lonialism, sensu stricto, at all (see n.10). As Harvey (1990:255) has noted, quoting Foucault:

    If space…is always a container of social power, then the reorganization of space is always a reorganization of the framework through which social power is expressed.

    Not only a reorganization, of course. Also a re-presentation. Especially a representation of new ethnological fixities, of the geographies of governance implied in reducing the living, three dimensional worlds of indigenous populations to timeless, two dimensional abstractions. Such were things that functionaries of the colonial state understood well, whether they put them into words not; to be sure, they underlay the imposition of “indirect” rule,” the creation of “tribal reserves,” and the transformation of indigenous sovereigns into the lowest civil servants of empire, its rural tax collectors and labor recruiters. Hence the obsession of imperial bureaucracies with mapping–and all that went with it.

    One thing that did go with it, with palpable regularity, were so-called “government commissions of enquiry” (see Ashforth 1990). These commissions took a variety of forms and addressed a wide range of issues. Among other matters, they investigated existing territorial arrangements, laid down formal boundaries between political communities, and dealt with land claims and disputes; interro- gated the nature of indigenous authority and defined the scope of “native” admi- nistration, particularly in respect of “law and custom”;37 inquired into labor relations and contracts, and framed the terms of wage work for blacks, including so-called master-servant provisions, which tied employees to their employees.38 Some had specific mandates,39 others were charged with very general briefs.40 But, whatever else they did, these government commissions tended to see their task as ethnological; they documented vernacular life-ways–all the better, ostensibly, to reduce chaos to order and to facilitate fair and just rule on the part of the colonial state. In this regard, it is no exaggeration to say that they compiled the first official ethnographic records of the peoples of the region. True, they often relied on the earlier (and much more detailed) writings of missionaries and “scientific” ex- plorers. But they also did their own research, interviewing informants, predominantly chiefs and elders, to ascertain their “habits” and “traditions.” Many of their descriptions were very thin by modern anthropological standards; still, these documents became compendia of authoritative information about local cultures. Later they gave way to (i) annual reports, submitted by administrators of “native” districts, which reported on continuity and change in customary practices; and, after the formation of the Union of South Africa, (ii) ethnological surveys written by the professionally-trained staff of the Department of Native Affairs in Pretoria.41

    Government commissions, in sum, gave bureaucratic currency and practical reality to the categorical structures and cultural divisions that formed the emerging ethnoscape of Southern Africa. What is more, by treating those categories and cultures as primordially given, the state naturalized them–and, in time, elevated them into hegemonic, taken-for-granted forms of naming-and- knowing (cf Cooper and Stoler 1997); until, that is, anticolonial struggles began to unravel them. But that was to occur later. As we have shown,42 the encounter between autochthonous peoples and the civilizing mission in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was deeply implicated in the genesis of modern ethnic identities and differences here. But the official inscription of such identities and differences increasingly became the business of colonial governance. In legitimizing labels and authorizing images of otherness–and in laying an anthropological basis for its dispersed regimes of regulation–the state tried hard to ensure both the consent and the collaboration of the colonized. Glimpses here of Gramsci, foresha- dowings of Fanon.43

    Mirroring back to the colonized images of themselves as ethnic, racialized subjects occurred in many contexts, both ordinary and awesome. Such images–at once verbal, pictorial, even musical–saturated the everyday life of the public sphere and its popular media. They also found formal representation in museums, where “traditional” cultures were marked off, their “folkways” displayed in timeless dioramas; in scholarly treatises and manuals on language and orthography, habits, lore, and customs; in national ceremonies, monuments, and rituals, especially those evocative of the “discovery” and forceful domination of South Africa; in the theology and practice of white settler Christianity; and in a range of other specular and spectacular events. Most potently of all, perhaps, they pervaded schooling at all levels, infused alike in formal syllabi and “hidden” curricula (see Comaroff and Comaroff n.d.); all the more so as “native” instruction passed from the purview of Christian missions to that of the state. There is no need here to explain why European pedagogy, with its invasive technologies of mind and body, was a crucial vector in the effort to insinuate new signs and practices among colonized peoples. For all their disagreement over the means and ends of education, liberal apologists and Marxist critics appear to agree on one thing: its efficacy in colonizing the con- sciousness of imperial subjects. And in recasting the epistemic topography of the world they inhabited, fixing its images along new axes of knowing-and-being.44

    Those images, moreover, had a distinctive cast to them. They came from a particular, and particularly refractory, angle of vision, portraying the essential “native” as a primitive conservative.45 Having had their cultures labelled, objectified, and dehistoricized–and their differences primordialized–ethnic sub- jects found themselves all alike depicted as benighted, anachronistic antimoderns. They were said to be governed by the primal sovereignty of their customs and cus- tomary rulers (J.L. Comaroff 1995)–under conditions that encouraged them to cling unquestioningly, and in the face of all reason, to their ancestral traditions and taboos.46 In response, the colonial state, practicing its own politics of unreason, criminalized some cultural practices (those, for example, surrounding “witchcraft,” polygyny, marriage payments, and “ritual murder”) and endorsed others (like so- called “customary law”)–depending, in no small measure, on the exigencies of go- vernance. It also appealed to the primal hold of custom to prevent social change, even when (no, especially when) it was demanded by indigenous peoples; also, in some celebrated instances, to restrict or remove their rights.

    Thus, to take one very specific case, the British Bechuanaland Land Com- mission of 1886 (Great Britain 1886) invoked the “ancient tribal system” of “communal tenure” to prevent a Tswana sovereign from introducing individual rights of property ownership in one of the provinces under his dominion; this in spite of his having had strong local support, and sound economic and political rea- sons, for the move (Schapera 1983). Prior to overrule, such a legislative innovation would have been well within his jurisdiction (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a:399- 400; Schapera 1970). Now, however, the colonial state authorized itself to decide that his subjects were “not ready” for the change. Similarly, and more seriously, the South African Native Affairs Commission (South Africa 1905) argued against universal franchise by claiming that Africans preferred “traditional” forms of collective representation. On this basis, it went on to recommend a reduction of black voting rights in national and provincial elections. The Commission also declared that economic and social arrangements based on “individualism,” to which they had long been told to aspire in the name of modernity, was not suited to aboriginal peoples; being under the primal sway of ancestral custom, they were “unready” for this too. In the upshot, these peoples were encouraged to see them- selves as faceless Zulu or Tswana or Sotho or Xhosa or whatever, with no consideration of their class or gender or generation or personal circumstances. As Sartre (1955:215; see Zahar 1974:19) once said, the distinctive experience of colonialism is being made to feel, and then to re-cognise one’s self, as a “native” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a:19). It was an experience to which the actions of the colonial state were strongly to conduce.

    This brings us back full circle to the doubling, the contradiction, at the core 39 of the colonial encounter. In South Africa, the state47 spoke, in a promissory voice, of making modern citizens–autonomous, named, right-bearing members of the body politic–out of “natives” whom it persisted, at the same time, in treating as unmarked ethnic subjects. On one hand, “Non-Europeans,” the official term of negation by which people of color were known, were said to be on the high road to civilization and citizenship, prosperity and propertied individualism. On the other, they were portrayed, to themselves and the world, as anonymous antimoderns, condemned to live for the foreseeable future in the primal mire of ancient custom. The colonial state often engaged in its own internal arguments over this doubling; it was a recurring register in a broader discourse on “The Native Problem.” The basic question in this discourse, as Cooper and Stoler (1997:7) have noted,48 was: “How much civilization was appropriate” for aboriginal peoples? It was a question that was answered in many ways over the long-run. But invariably with an eye to reproducing distinction, discrimination, and dualism. Difference, once again, in three dimensions.

    IV. THE COLONIAL STATE IN CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE: absence, absurdity, incoherence

    The actual history of states has been one of continuous growth, both in their claim to regulate the lives and property of their subjects, and in their physical capacity to enforce such claims…Yet, paradoxically, the increase in the state’s range and power has produced countervailing decreases in effectiveness.

    Kenneth Minogue, “State,”

    How persuasive, then, are these paradigmatic perspectives on the colonial state, in South Africa and elsewhere?

    The differences between them are fairly stark, of course. Which is why the weaknesses of one appear to be the strengths of the other. For example, modernist approaches, both orthodox and Marxist, would seem to be on secure, uncontentious ground in interrogating political economy–in its formal and institutional dimensions–to get at the workings of the colonial state; the absence of these very dimensions, it is often said (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a:15f), is the most serious deficiency in postmarxist, postmodern accounts of the same thing. On the other hand, Foucauldians have been quick to point out that the very construction of something called “political economy,” hardly a category given by nature, itself occurred as a function of the history of modernity. And of its endemic forms of power. From this perspective, the reciprocal inattention of pre-Foucauldian sociologies of the colonial state to its technologies of discipline and representation– to the ways in which it made its subjects by means of commodities, embodied rou- tines, and other capillary processes at once cultural and material–is an even more egregious absence.

    These complementary allegations carry considerable weight; each has some right on its side. But the matter is more complex than it may first look. For one thing, the obvious corollary does not follow: it is not possible simply to add a measure of political economy to postmodern approaches–or more concern with the mechanics of capillary power to older orthodoxies–and expect a prescription for better understanding the colonial state. As I have already intimated, “political economy” is an analytic term with its own archaeology, not a species of empirical phenomena. What it describes, how it is to be understood, is highly contested, both within and across theoretical paradigms–not to mention ideological positions; hence the undertitle of Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Marx 1967). Con- versely, capillary processes of governmentality, while obviously important to take fully into account, pose a paradox of their own: the more comprehensive they were, the more persuasive in explaining colonial domination, the less colonial states ought ever to have encountered any resistance, any antagonistic forces at all. They did, everywhere. And their historical epoch came to a crashing end. Of which more in a moment.

    But, even taken purely on their own terms, both modernist and Marxist perspectives, in all their variants, suffer from critical flaws, fallacies, failures. Let us mention just a few and allow the matter to rest; this on the understanding that paradigmatic critique–by contrast to more specific forms of theoretical exegesis– occurs at a level of generality to which there will always be exceptions and qualifications.

    Modernist approaches, left and right alike, may be taken to task on four basic counts. First, in dealing with imperial governance, they seldom distinguish sufficiently between its various spheres and levels; most notably, but not only, between the metropolitan and the colonial state. I have already remarked the on- tological difference between them (above, p.00). Its political outworkings are equally crucial. Often cadres and functionaries “at home” and “abroad,” and in dif- ferent ministries and departments, fell into bitter conflict with one another over questions of policy, the material and moral economics of colonization, and the proper means of extending European dominion. It is here, in fact, that some of the most acute “tensions of empire,” to use Cooper and Stoler’s (1989, 1997) felicitous phrase, manifested themselves. These tensions were in part structural, in part per- spectival: the imperatives of colonialism, like the fiscal commitment necessary for effective governance, did not appear the same, or equally compelling, to everyone engaged in the business of overrule; such things varied a great deal according to the changing exigencies of time, place, and position. To take one Southern African instance, Sir Charles Rey (1988), self-styled “monarch” of Bechuanaland, spent years in an acrimonious tussle with Westminster and Pretoria over the appropriate investment of the British exchequer–and, concomitantly, the most suitable form of administration–in the unprofitable Protectorate. Conflicts of this kind, at their most extreme, determined the historical destinies of particular colonies and their indigenous populations. But even when they did not, they affected the ways in which the state exercised its authority, extracted labor and taxes, related to the industrial and/or agrarian economy, and mobilized different technologies of control over both settlers and aborigines.

    Second, in treating the colonial state as a generic entity, a monothetic class of phenomenon, modernist discourses have tended to elide an enormously wide spectrum of political, ideological, and imaginative forms. The point is almost too obvious to warrant remark: to speak of the Raj, at the height of its elaboration, in the same breath as the administrations of, say, Lesotho or Zanzibar is not unlike treating an elephant, an emu, and an egret as the same kind of creature because they are all animals. The implication that follows is also self-evident: that “the colonial state” describes not a thing but a genus of forms and processes, and of historically fluid, evanescent ones at that; that “it” cannot be typified or theorized in the singular, in the indicative mood, or in the continuous past or present tense; and that generalizations or abstract statements about its workings, especially those derived from paradigmatic cases, are inherently open to deconstruction. For example, Mitchell’s (1991) account of imperial governance in Egypt, cogent as it may be, can simply not be replicated for Swaziland or Uganda. Similarly, when Kaviraj (1995:25f) argues that the state was the “controlling structure” at the epicenter the colonial world, he seems to take South Asia as his unspoken point of reference; writing from much of Africa in the nineteenth century, this claim would be flatly wrong.

    Third, modernist discourses–again, conservative, liberal, and Marxist alike- -have failed adequately even to note, let alone to explain, what we may call “the Minogue Paradox.” Recall Kenneth Minogue’s (1987:239f; above) observation: while states in general have had a history of cumulative growth–in their institutional complexity and the range of their formal authority over the lives and property of citizens–their elaboration has been accompanied by a contrapuntal decrease in the efficacy of their control. This has had many manifestations, from the dramatic collapse of once potent regimes, most recently in Central and Eastern Europe, to the creeping inability of others to exercise a monopoly over the means of violence, to contain the workings of the market or the flow of money, to guarantee the commonweal or ward off moral panics, to meet the costs of reproducing infra- structure or to turn back the expansion of the “private” sector; these things being widely, if somewhat crudely, taken as signs of the coming “crisis” of the nation- state (J.L. Comaroff 1996). Colonial administrations, likewise, appear to have evinced the Minogue Paradox. The more powerful they became, the more they monitored and managed the life-worlds of those over whom they ruled, the less effective they seem to have been, over the long run, in realizing their own objectives: in making “natives” into compliant subjects, in yielding up a profit to the metro- pole, in stifling resistance, sometimes even in sustaining the coherence of their own modes of governance (Bissell 1998)–and, in the finality of history, in surviving the onslaught of anticolonial forces. The Minogue Paradox, in other words, raises a fundamental challenge: how to explain the exquisite counterpoint of legitimacy and limitation, of regulation and resistance, of power and paralysis that animated the history of the colonial state. It is a challenge as yet unmet, a dialectic as yet insufficiently interrogated in modernist narratives of the encounter between Africa and Europe.

    The fourth has to do with the relationship between the colonial state and capital. As we saw earlier, both Marxist and liberal traditions have emphasized the close connection between them. From the perspective of the first, recall, the state was a reflex of capital(ism), its ensemble of political, legal, and coercive mechan- isms for regulating the labor market; in particular, for overseeing the formation, reproduction, and exploitation of a black proletariat. For the second, grounded in so-called “modernization” discourses of one kind or another (above, p.00), it was an essentially benevolent institution that existed to administer the economy for the common good; to mint, manage, and monitor the supply of money, guarantee the banking system, and levy taxes to finance public spending; to ensure law and ord- er, especially among laborers; to facilitate the development of commerce and industry. While this view has been taken to task, repeatedly and effectively, for its ingenuous, roseate view of colonial governance–and for ignoring the role of the imperial state in creating, racinating, and naturalizing inequality–the Marxist alternatives also underplay the complexity of its relationship to the workings of political economy.

    Indeed, the state was never just a reflex of capital. It often did serve capitalist interests, of course. Even more, there were periods in which government and business appeared indistinguishable (see n.24). But there were also times when the private sector found itself locked in struggle with the administration–and when the latter took direct action against the former (Lonsdale and Berman 1979:489f). Thus, for instance, in the late nineteenth century, British officialdom demanded, on more than one occasion, that gold mining companies improve the occupational and living environments of their employees. It also stepped in, on occasion, to legislate minimal conditions in other spheres of the economy. Furthermore, for all the idea that the primary function of colonial authorities was to oversee the recruitment and regulation of labor, a function discharged with variable success, the reality was a lot less straightforward (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a:Chap.4). All else aside, many “natives” migrated in search of work volunta- rily, sometimes under the impact of missionary teaching, long before an imperial bureaucracy intervened (loc.cit.). In this respect, it is worth noting that the state, as a forcible presence, was a relative late-comer on the scene in much of the South African interior.49 All of which points to a rather obvious conclusion: that, for all their interconnections, affinities, and articulations, the history of governance is irreducible to a history of political economy or vice versa.50

    Some of the same critical points apply as well to postmodern, poststructuralist, postmarxist analyses of colonial governance. There is no need to expatiate here on the oft-made allegation, noted above, that these analyses short- circuit the manifest materialities of colonial capitalism, not to mention the imbri- cation of the state in them. More interesting, for present purposes, are three other lines of critique, each of which takes seriously the achievement–never to be trivialized–of Foucauldian histories in illuminating the relationship between power, governmentality, and the making of the modern subject.

    One is that the disciplinary processes associated with the capillary power of colonial regimes–the inculcation of a self-regulating, self-controlled, self- motivated, self-conscious sense of human be-ing, of being at once biologically discrete, legally constituted, and socially individuated–were not a function of the state alone. Or even primarily. In most places, they were the provenance of the ci- vilizing mission undertaken by Christian evangelists, social reformers, and other “noncommissioned” agents of empire.51 In part, this had to do with the unspoken division of imperial labor, in part, with the pragmatics of overrule. Even when, in South Africa and elsewhere, European overseas administrations were at their most elaborate, their instrumental mastery over the everyday lives of indigenous peoples was always incomplete; at times, notably limited. This is not to say that colonial governance was never intrusive, coercive, or violent. It certainly could be. But, in many places, it quickly ran up against the limits of its own possibility; which, in turn, led its functionaries to rely on other expatriates–including those who took pains to distance themselves from political authority–to achieve the end of cons- training, chastising, regimenting, and refining “the native.” In sum, to see states as the primary vector in the making of racialized subjects, in colonizing consciousness, in remapping space, time, and personhood, in exercising capillary power, is to misplace the deus ex machina of empire and the export of capitalist modernity.

    But there is another, yet more obvious problem with the poststructuralist, postmarxist stress on the capillary character of colonial governance. Put plainly, it is this. Colonial states, like states everywhere, depend(ed) at once (i) on instrumental, institutional, tangible forms of coercion, (ii) on means of violence either immanent or manifest, physical or symbolic, (iii) on diffuse, invisible modes of surveillance and discipline, and, in some measure, (iv) on the positive production of consent. As this implies, the instrumental and the capillary are dimensions of all state power; conditions, in fact, of its very existence. True, their proportions vary, with concrete consequences. But, insofar as power, in its modernist guise, is the relative capacity to construct realities–to fashion human subjects and social for- ms, material value and truth-value, perceptions and intentions, and appropriate modes of action in the world–it always has latent and patent, interiorized and exteriorized, spoken and unspoken, private and public, productive and repressive coordinates. It makes no historical sense, therefore, to reduce colonial rule, sui generis, to the insinuation of a singular kind of subjection; all the more so in light of its often unsystematic, murky, even incoherent executive practices. And its si- multaneously civilizing, criminalizing, promissory, exploitative, humanitarian and punitive tendencies. One thing that Foucauldian approaches have not done, signifi- cantly, is to explain the limits of the capillary. Until they do, the term remains a suggestive adjective, a partial description of colonial governance, not a theory of its workings. Nor is it a description that has elicited unanimous consent. Cooper (1994:1533), for one, makes the case for a competing metaphor: power in colonial societies was more arterial than capillary–concentrated spatially and socially, not very nourishing beyond such domains, and in need of a pump to push it from moment to moment and place to place.

    Which leads to the third line of critique. It is often said that Foucauldian analyses of governmentality leave no room for resistance; indeed, this is now a rather tired reproach. There is, however, a related point to be made, a point both more telling and more troubling. To put it in the interrogative voice: If the capil- lary techniques of the colonial state were effective, if they did inculcate disciplined subjection, why did imperial regimes abroad differ so widely in deploying them?52 Even more mysterious, why, ask Cooper and Stoler (1997:8), did colonizers spend so much time defining and defending categories and representations which were untenable–and which interfered with their mastery over indigenous populations? Why did they sometimes go to absurd lengths to display their firepower, especially when it was fairly flimsy?53 Why, in short, were colonial states so prone to failure, to drawing disruptive attention to their own administrative practices and procedures? And why, when they did rely on those very capillary techniques–os- tensibly silent, invisible, innocent means of imposing control–did they frequently incur angry reactions?

    Colonial subjects, it seems, were not easily hoodwinked. Among Tswana, for instance, the figure of the government agent–ah-gent, as he was called (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:295)–was despised precisely because of his role in counting, taxing, and otherwise regulating the minutiae of their everyday lives. A few of these men were actually put to death.54 But still more instructive, as a counter- narrative of noncapitulation, is something I alluded to above: that these same people spoke of the colonial culture legality–the reduction of everything to official documents, contracts, and titles–as “the English mode of warfare” (J.L. Comaroff 1997:256). Tswana, clearly, knew violence when they saw it. Or, more accurately, when they could not see it. There is every reason to believe that their heightened awareness of invisible forms of coercion, of silent technologies of surveillance and control, arose out of the contradiction at the core of overrule; out of the fact that “natives” were promised full, right-bearing citizenship in an enlightened new world, but found themselves delivered into ethnic and racial subjection (above, p.00). This “doubling” could not but draw their attention, at times ruthlessly, to the means of colonial governance–rendering even the most subtle of those means at once starkly visible and resonantly audible.

    As a result, far from instilling self-discipline, the capillary techniques of colonial states played a great part in sparking the dialectics of challenge and ripos- te, of action and counter-action, of transgression, transformation, and hybridiza- tion; greater than did the brute exercise of imperial instrumentalities. All of which amounts to the exact opposite of what a Foucauldian narrative, at least in unedi- ted, vulgar form, might lead us to expect. That narrative does not, cannot,
    account for the essential paradox of colonial governance: its capacity to be ordered yet incoherent, rational yet absurd, violent yet impotent; to elicit compliance and contestation, discipline and defiance, subjection and insurrection. Sometimes all at once. And, disconcertingly, in ways that blurred the boundaries between these, apparently antithetical, species of action.

    V. RE-STATING THE PROBLEM, PROBLEMATIZING THE STATE(S)

    States, if the pun be forgiven, state…They define, in great detail, acceptable forms and images of social activity and individual and collective identity…Indeed, in this sense `the State’ never stops talking.55

    Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch, p.3

    It is this paradox, among other things, that makes it impossible to arrive at a point of closure by (re)formulating a neat ideal-typification of “the colonial state.” Or of its historical physics. To wit, the very object of composing my reflection as a series of contrapuntal critiques has been to show that the beast resists two-dimensional representation; that its variabilities, fluidities, hybridities, limits, and disarticulations over time and space were an overdetermined expression of its inner workings and its dealings with significant “others”; that it was an immanent structure of divers possibilities whose concrete political, material, and cultural forms were made, remade, and sometimes unmade in historical practice. As this suggests, the intent behind this somewhat didactic excursion is not to prove recei- ved accounts wrong. It is to demonstrate that, while each describes an important aspect of the dynamics of colonial states, all of them are partial, perspectival, incomplete. This, I would submit, flows from paying disproportionate attention to their generic properties rather than to their generative processes; to their existence as an abstract noun rather than as an active verb.

    Which takes us back to the conundrums, the Big Questions, I posed at the outset. Recall them: What precisely is “the colonial state?” A definite or an indefinite article? One thing or many or nothing at all? A process? A series of mechanisms? A specific form of governance? A cultural construct? A condition of be- ing-in-the world? Do the various functions typically ascribed to it amount to a convincing account of its historical workings? How does it differ from its European counterpart, the metropolitan state “at home”? And, finally, is there anything to be made of the fact that the word itself also connotes to “articulate,” to “give voice,” to “narrate”? We are now in a position to engage these questions–those that remain unanswered56–and, in doing so, to direct the discussion toward its conclusion, re-stating the problem of the state as a discourse in the interconnec- tions of governmentality, materiality, modernity, and legality.

    Let us begin with the first. The colonial state, in South Africa as elsewhere, was always an aspiration, a work-in-progress,57 an intention, a phantasm-to-be- made-real. Rarely was it ever a fully actualized accomplishment. An “ideological project,” Philip Abrams (1988:76) called it58–adding, provocatively, that, being “essentially [an] imaginative construction,” a “triumph of concealment” (p.77) even, it was “the distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies” (p.75).

    Shades, here, of things written long ago. Corrigan and Sayer (1985:7) remind us, in paraphrase, that Marx (1967) believed `the State’ to be in an important sense an illusion. Of course, institutions of government are real enough. But `the’ state is in large part an ideological construct, a fiction: [it] is at most a message of domination–an ideological artifact attributing unity, structure and independence to the disunited, structureless and dependent workings of the practice of government.

    Not just Marx either. Weber (1948:78) too. For him, it was

    a claim to legitimacy, a means by which politically organized subjection is simultaneously accomplished and concealed, and it is constituted in large part by the activities of institutions of government themselves (loc.cit.).

    A truly curious force of history, this, at least if we agree with Marx and Weber: simultaneously an illusion,59 a claim to authority, a cultural artifact, a present absence/absent presence, a principle of unity masking institutional disarticulation, and a potent construct which manifests itself, with tangible effects, in the quo- tidian activities of government and politics. But ought we to concur with Marx and Weber,60 whose perspectives, as we all know well, derived from a very particular place in the modernist political history of Europe?

    In nineteenth- and twentieth-century Africa, the colonial state was often an elusive entity, even when agencies of government asserted their presence most vociferously. Typically, too, it was many things at once, even when imagined as one: less a singular, definite article than an indefinite, variably integrated ensemble of sites, institutions, narratives, and material processes, it was the political frame (i) in which power, qua human agency, sought to authorize itself, against resistance sometimes, thus to speak and act for a politic community, for its past and its future;61 (ii) in which executive and bureaucratic cadres ruled with differing degrees of autonomy, entering into common cause at times with various social fractions, usually defined by (if not named in the language of) class, race, and/or gender; (iii) in which taken-for-granted cultural conventions, their coercive aspect camouflaged in the habits of everyday life, were posited as a precondition of collec- tive being-in-the-world.

    Colonial regimes in Africa varied widely in the extent to which they managed to condense legitimate power in themselves, to suppress a politics of difference, to manufacture consent, and to ritualize the subjection of citizens to the state. Such things, patently, depended on a range of historical contingencies too broad to list here. (Not least, the [re]actions of colonized peoples to overrule, and relations, especially over their dealings with “natives,” among settlers, missionaries, and political cadres at home and abroad; Cooper and Stoler 1997, Comaroff and Comaroff 1997a.) So, too, did the degree to which partisan blocs–often, but not always, colonial capitalists of one kind or another–succeeded in insinuating them- selves into, and in appropriating, the mechanisms of government, including the use of force. Which is why some overseas administrations were weak, others strong; some highly intrusive, others scarcely visible; some energetically protective of expatriate business, industrial, and agrarian enterprises, others less so; some brutally violent, others barely coercive at all; some frequently contested, others at least acquiesced in; some prone to ostentatious ceremony, others very matter-of- fact in their regulatory routines; some institutionally integrated, well-ordered, and fairly efficient in their technologies of rule, others in more-or-less constant disarray, their component agencies so independent of one another as hardly to be parts of a single order of governance at all. Indeed, the explanation of these pat- terns of variance, of their historical formation and transformation, is the task awaiting the anthropology of colonialism once its conceptual groundwork is done.

    According to modernist political sensibilities, as every foundational college course in Political Science teaches, there can only ever be one state in a territory. Hence the difficulty, in scholarly discourses as well as in populist ones, of contemp- lating imperial governance without speaking of “the colonial state.” Even when, as in some historical contexts, the term describes a largely unconnected set of administrative practices and institutions. Or, in extreme situations, almost none at all. Insofar as the state–the singular, definite imagined article–is the sine qua non of modernist politics, it exists, alike at the metropole and the colonial margin, as a narrated and enacted description of order: order, again (see above, p.00), in the double sense of regularity and regulation, of convention and control, of civility and sovereign command over a land mass and all who dwell within in. In other words, whatever its organizational lineaments, the state is a statement, an ongoing assertion: it gives voice to an authoritative worldview, sometimes backed by (open or concealed) displays of might. To return to an intimation made earlier (p.00), there in the interrogative mood, the homonym–the state (n), to state (v)- -does have a more than fortuitous connection. The noun is the abstract entity en- unciated, realized, made manifest by the verb. And by the power that it takes to speak, persuasively, in the active voice.

    But, and here is my point, the argot spoken by colonial regimes was not arbitrary. Their vernacular, the language of modernity, was the language of the law. Modern state-formation, Corrigan and Sayer (1985:1f) note, was a “cultural revolution.” At its heart lay the spirit of legality. Many have tied industrial capital- ism, modernity, the nation-state, governmentality, the right-bearing citizen, and the rise of lex naturae into a single historical equation; the equation on which is founded the logos of the present epoch, beginning with the Age of Revolution, 1789-1848. What I seek to add here, modestly, is the proposition that it was the deployment of this language of the law, its ascent to hegemonic authority, that held colonial states together, even at their most disarticulated, least coherent, most impotent; that afforded them a means to make fact appear out of phan- tasm, illocutionary force out of illusion, concrete realities out of often fragile fictions, one thing out of many; that allowed them to represent themselves, and to act, as guarantors of civility against savagery and barbarism; that legitimized all aspects of their power, capillary and coercive, volitional and violent, arterial and instrumental; that mandated their right to manage and mediate diverse identities and interests.

    This lexicon–if another pun may be forgiven–constituted two interrelated public spheres. On one hand, it laid down both the terms and the terrain of cooperation, commerce, competition, and contention among settlers and expatriates, thus establishing the state as the axis mundi of European colonial society. On the other, it provided an ostensibly neutral medium for people of different cultural worlds, different social endowments, different material circumstances to enter into contractual relations, to transact commodities, and to deal with their conflicts. In so doing, it created an impression of consonance amidst contrast; of the negotiatibility of incommensurables; of the existence of universal normative standards which, like money in the domain of the market, facilitated exchanges across otherwise intransitive boundaries. But the language of legality was also mobilized to delineate the moral frontiers of civil society, criminalizing “native” cultural practices deemed uncivilized, politics deemed primitive, counter-moder- nities deemed dangerous (cf Stoler 1985:passim). To be sure, law was the hydra- headed, blunt instrument by which colonial states sought, in the name of moder- nity and progress, to assert control over the space and time of their subjects: over the continuity and change–the duration and disjuncture, if you will–of “traditio- nal” habits and habitats, ways and means.

    As Charles Taylor (1989; see n.29) has said, there are good reasons for the primacy of the law, and the discourse of rights, at the heart of European cultures of modernity. Its special significance here, however, lies in the convergence of two eatures of African colonial states, both of which we encountered earlier.

    The first is that most of these states were states sans nations; as I said above, states without hyphenation. This was the case virtually everywhere until the late years of the Age of Empire. True, white expatriates, many of whom persisted in talking of Britain or France or Germany as “home,” always liked to think of the colony as a proto-Euronation. It was an affectation in which colonial regimes participated by creating many of the figurative trappings, the signs and symbols, of nationhood; indeed, given that the imperial gesture represented itself as a civilizing mission, and as political modernity incarnate, they had no alternati- ve.

    Lord Lugard might have had it that British administrations abroad were protective of the “natural rights” of “natives,” in touch, even, “with [their] thought and feeling” (see p.00). But the colonial state, precisely because it was not constitutive of a nation, was founded largely on the legalities of exclusion and the politics of difference. It barred the vast majority of the autochthonous peoples–those over whose territory it asserted sovereign jurisdiction–from full membership in the polity, rationalizing racial restriction in the righteous language of statutory “protections”; in the claim that, if they were allowed to by law, Africans would alienate their land, sell their birthright, and lapse back into savagery. It will be remembered that colonial commissions, discussed above, regularly (de)limited and/or removed the rights of ethnic subjects; this, along with a panoply of executi- ve orders, prevented all but few blacks from becoming right-bearing citizens, equal before the law and unmarked by color, in a secular modern political community.

    Under these conditions there was little prospect of the emergence of a sense of nationhood based, imaginatively and affectively, on horizontal connection (An- derson 1983)–even if colonial regimes had wanted it otherwise. Most colonies were, in any case, carved out with careless inattention to their cultural integrity or sociological viability, and were subjected to long periods of divide-and-rule. What is more, the very act of narrating, representing, and ritualizing a nation that did not exist–a practice often carried to symbolic excess–merely drew the attention of indigenous elites to their legal disempowerment. Even more, to the impossibility of their incorporation, as anything but demeaned persons, into colo- nial society; “pariah” was the word used, in 1913, by Sol Plaatje (n.d.:17), one of South Africa’s first black polemicists. This, in turn, is often taken to explain the rise of mass political resistance across Africa, particularly after World War II.62

    Whether true or not, many decolonization movements at the time did congeal into (often uneasy) nationalisms: that early counter-claims for an independent African modernity should have appropriated the terms of European politics, with its deep roots in the culture of constitutionalism and the language of the law, seems overdetermined.63

    So too, in this light, was the Minogue Paradox, also referred to earlier: namely, that the more elaborate colonial states became–the wider the reach of their formal authority, the greater the extent to which they monitored and ma- naged the life worlds of those over whom they ruled–the less effective they appear to have been in making “natives” into acquiescent subjects, in stifling dissensus and defiance, sometimes even in sustaining the coherence of their own modes of governance. At least, not without a heavy measure of force, much of it self-defeating over the long run. This, to round out the circle, tended to drive im- perial administrations abroad to ever further binges of legalistic regulation, especi- ally in dealing with insubordination and counter-violence. The latter were usually treated not as politics but as crime (see above); in extremis, they elicited forms of repression intended, in good proportion, to instil into settler populations and “res- pectable natives” a faith in law and order. And in the rights and responsibilities attaching to citizenship.

    Which leads to the second feature of the culture of legality at the core of the unhyphenated colonial state. Julia Kristeva (1993:26; above, p.1) hinted at it in asking, pointedly, “what happens to people without nations…? Are they human beings…? The answer, in the African context, is clear: their humanity was rendered incomplete, ambiguous. This, after all, was entailed in the effort of colonial regimes to convert “natives,” simultaneously and contradictorily, into both right-bearing citizens and culture-bearing ethnic subjects. The former–in the guise of au- tonomous, free individuals–epitomized the European bourgeois sense of refinement. The latter, by contrast, were specimens of a primordial, imperfect homo sapiens, barely above beasts in their “natural” proclivities and their pro- miscuous, “primitive communism.” (In colonial South Africa, blacks were regularly referred to by terms connoting animality, among them skepsels, Dutch for “creatures”; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:52f).

    There is no need to reiterate the implications of this bipolar construction of the colonial subject/citizen–of its promises, its paradoxes, its unfulfilled telos– save to say that it had the widespread effect of inculcating in Africans a “double consciousness” of their place in the world (cf DuBois 1968 on black America). And to note that, in the mass anticolonial struggles of the twentieth century (above, p.00), it expressed itself in the uneasy coexistence of two counter-discourses of constitutional entitlement. Many of those who contested European domination in the name of nationhood and self-determination spoke articulately of jural equality and universal human rights; rights, that is, for individuals. Especially to the new African middle classes, and to members of the orthodox Christian churches, this li- beral discourse of rights was always appealing; hence the tendency for popular political movements–among them the African National Congress in South Africa, whose leaders were predominantly mission alumnae–to frame their aspirations and objectives in the language of legality, equity, and due process.

    But there was another discourse of rights as well. This one made political claims, and pursued the ways and means of empowerment, in the name of ethnic groups, many of them formed during the colonial epoch. It subordinated individual entitlements to those of collective, culturally-defined identities, asserting–also in the language of the law–the liberty of indigenous peoples to sustain their soverei- gn self-determination within a federated national polity. And it made a case for a plural legal system cognizant of “customary law,” for allowing a great deal of au- tonomy to “traditional” authorities, and for a moral order based on “ancestral” conventions. This, in South Africa again, is the kind of political community to which the Zulu-centric Inkatha Freedom Party gestured; along, interestingly, with other racially and ethnically based political organizations, black and white.

    In sum, these two discourses of rights arose, dialectically and in complementary opposition, out of the contradictory manner in which the colonial state sought to construct its subject/citizens. Each fashioned its own vision of the present and future. Each essayed its own idea of modernity. Each spoke its own version of legalese. And each aspired to its own political culture, its own form of postcolonial governance.

    VI. CODA

    And so to a conclusion. Or, more accurately, a coda.

    The problem of the colonial state begins with its very (mis)conception. With the fact that, much of the time, we speak of it loosely, sans any sense of specification. Even worse, we take its presence so for granted that it is virtually absent from our theoretical discourses. By juxtaposing orthodox approaches of the left and the right against Foucauldian revisionism–and by subjecting both to the kind of critique intended to cast the nature of the beast itself in a fresh light–I have sought to problematize it anew. And in such a manner as to make sense, at least in broad lines, of the alternative African modernities fashioned in the late colonial epoch and transported into the postcolony.

    It will be clear now why I have insisted on treating colonial governance as a process of becoming: as both a verb and a noun, as a state and a statement, as an aspiration made real in varying proportions through historical practice. Why it is, too, that “the colonial state,” notwithstanding its singular imagining in modernist politics, was always both one thing and many; always at once an ideological project and a (more or less articulated) institutional order; always both a fantasy and a reality–indeed, a reality with the capacity to affect the everyday lives, and deaths, of those human beings who fell within its purview.

    As I said earlier, the historical variability with which colonial designs were accomplished in Africa, the contrasts over time and space among states, remains to be documented and accounted for. In the meantime, I suggest that, beneath all the diversity–indeed motivating the multivocal, polyvalent, disparate character of imperial governance abroad–lay a number of contradictions. These arose, in large part, from the most fundamental constitutive feature of the colonial state: from the fact that it was, until just before its demise, a state sans nation. It was this that expressed itself in, even impelled, the construction of an oxymoronic subject/citizen, that embodiment of “double consciousness”; which set in motion the Minogue Paradox, the inverse correlation between the elaboration of the colonial state, its institutional and capillary technologies of rule, and its efficacy in regulating “native” life without resistance; which threw even more than usual emphasis on the language of legality in constructing an ordered world; which yielded two different counter-discourses of rights, and, with it, two alternative conceptions of modernity.

    It is this last phenomenon, the production of alternative modernities, that is likely to be the final legacy of the colonial state in Africa; of the way in which it condensed a particular order of governmentality, legality, materiality, and civility. Perhaps also its most bloody and terrible. The two images of nationhood and of political order–one based on a liberal ethos of universal human rights, of free, autonomous citizenship, of individual entitlement; the other assertive of group rights, of ethnic sovereignty, of primordial cultural connection–are, more than ever before, arraigned against each other in struggles for the determination of the continuing present and millennial future of many postcolonies. In South Africa they almost derailed the end of apartheid. Elsewhere they have produced genocides. Al- most nowhere yet have they yielded easily habitable hybrids, new political orders that address the problem of postcolonial empowerment. This is the heritage of the colonial state and its imperious civilizing mission, the “black man’s burden” of which Basil Davidson wrote (see n.63). It is also the challenge that awaits Africa as a new epoch, the epoch of global capitalism, dawns. And spreads new shadows over old horizons.

  • Figuring Democracy

    Figuring Democracy

    12.01 a.m., 25 April 1994. Wale Street, Cape Town, South Africa: The last strains of the anthem of the ancien regime – part requiem, part death- rattle – drift off into the night. A local choir, carefully rehearsed for the occasion, begins to belt out the new national song, with its familiar, once- banned libretto of liberation, its hymnnotic harmony of hope. The old flag, long an emblem of colonialism and apartheid, is folded away for the last time. Its replacement, a brash, multicolored icon of consensus, is raised. The symbolism, by intent, is too obvious to miss. Calico curtains ring down and up as the world’s latest Midnight’s Child, the “new” South Africa, is born.

    1

    Perhaps it was sacrilegious, at that precise moment, that moment of unreserved optimism, to recall Malcolm Bradbury’s Doctor Criminale. In this novel about a postmodern philosopher, a fictional fusion of Foucault and Derrida, the Hungarian ex- wife of the hero, one Gertla Riviero, reflects upon the recent transition to democracy and free market economics throughout much of the contemporary world (1992:276):

    “Democracy, the free market,” she muses, “do you really think they can save us?…Marxism [was] a great idea, democracy [is] just a small idea. It promises hope, and it gives you [Kentucky] Fried Chicken.”

    Ms. Riviero’s commentary is sad, cynical, salutary. Especially so when read in the cooling afterglow of post-election South Africa. Especially so as we call to mind the queues that waited for hours outside polling stations in those last heady days of April, 1994, some in almost sacral silence, some in carnivalesque revelry. Those snaking, eternal queues reminded us of the interminable lines that graced McDonald’s in Moscow a few years back as people voted with their feet not merely for hamburgers or cheeseburgers, but for a market economy and capitalist consumerism. The association may seem irreverent. Yet Gertla Riviero’s question carries an obvious, ominous punch, precisely because it calls into doubt our taken-for-granted narrative of democratization, a heroic liberal myth which links the conventional practices of modernist politics to the prospect of material and social salvation. So, too, if in a different way, does the image of patient, passive people standing in millennial lines to choose either cheap food or political candidates; all the more so as we recall Bayart’s (1993) discomforting aphorism for African public life, to wit, “the Politics of the Belly.”

    Let us pursue this question, and follow these lines, for a while. They lead us into an unexpected encounter with very different philosophies of governmentality, democracy, and modernity.

    II.

    It became commonplace during the 1990’s, especially in Europe and North America, to ascribe the fin de siècle push for democracy in many parts of the world to the end of the cold war and the triumph of the free market over communism. In fact, as many have pointed out, this view was flawed from the first. Apart from all else, the push began well before 1989. But no matter: the association is itself a symptom, often misrecognized, of something much longer in the making, namely, a fundamental reconstruction of the modernist world-order. We have ourselves suggested before that the events of 1989 were evidence of an unfolding Age of Revolution, an epochal process akin to the one that began in 1789 – the European Age of Revolution, that is, which gave us modernity, the seeds of the nation-state form, industrial capitalism, the second colonialism, and much besides (J.L. Comaroff 1995). The present revolution has been marked, in particular, by the rise of a planetary political economy in which sites of production and consumption are widely dispersed; in which social class is rendered barely visible by being scattered promiscuously across the earth; in which finance takes precedence over fabrication, flexibility over fixity, the short-run over the long; in which the state outsources many of its received operations, not least those involving the exercise of violence; in which the nation is confronted by the irreducible fact of increasing demographic heterogeneity; in which governance is represented primarily in the argot of technical oversight; in which politics, more a matter of ID-ology than ideology (see Chapter 3), is increasingly focused on the simultaneous calculi of right, interest, and entitlement, often pursued by judicial means.

    For many, these things are cause for despondency. Let us return to Dr. Criminale, Bradbury’s figurative philosopher. Ours, he says (1992:330), is the media age, the age of simulation…The age of no ideology, only hyperreality…Too little reality, also too much. Everywhere, wild fantasies, everyone wants a violent illusion. Life is a movie, death a plot ending, no stories are real. And even the philosophers think in unrealities, [as] they describe a world of no ethics, no humanism, no self.

    In this new Age of Revolution, fear of the atomic bomb subsides. But anomic bombs explode all over the place. People across the globe – alienated, disempowered, dispossessed – commit extraordinary acts of violence in the name of ethnic and national aspiration. The “me” generation folds into the “we” generation. And the end of politics, at least politics as anything more than the pursuit of brute interest, appears visible on the horizon.

    The scenario, like Doctor Criminale himself, might be fantastic. It is, however, becoming ever less fictional, ever more recognizable.

    But how is this darkly pessimistic view of the contemporary world to be reconciled with the rise of late 20th century democratic movements in so many far-flung places? Were those movements not a positive, liberatory sign of the times in that premillennial moment, that Great Time of Signs? And how, in particular, ought we to understand them in Africa, long seen in the West as the continent-least-likely-to- democratize-itself?

    It is difficult to gainsay those who draw connections between the recent rise of democracy and the triumph of consumer capitalism – even if the line of causality that joins them is at once complicated and the subject of ongoing debate. Capitalism, to be sure, does not require democracy; it has done perfectly well under authoritarian regimes in the past, and continues to do so in many parts of the late modern world. But those nation-states that seek to democratize themselves appear, these days, to require at least the figment of a free market. An elective (or is it electoral?) affinity connects the ballot box to business. Nor is it a passive affinity (cf. Young 1993:299f). U.S. overseas aid has become largely conditional on the establishment of “democratic institutions.” For which read “regular elections.” To wit, in 1996, Robert Mugabe – then still a leader of some standing, now a discredited dictator who takes every opportunity to censure the West – drew a direct connection between ballot box, business and foreign involvement in African politics: “Western countries,” he said, push “multi-party [systems] for Africa because it enables them to “buy influence” and “manipulate parties” into creating congenial economic environments.2

    The contemporary Western concern with the democratization of the global south, however, is not reducible to utility alone, important though that may be. It has roots in the hegemonic, indeed ontological, association throughout the global north of freedom and self-expression with choice. Democracy has become to homo politicus what shopping has long been to homo economicus: a sacred, cosmic fusion of free will and righteous human satisfaction. They are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin, two regimes of consumption underpinned by the same mode of ideological and material and production.

    On 1 May, at 11.48 p.m., during the counting of votes after the first free election in South Africa, SATV Channel 2 broke into its local news coverage to broadcast a meta-advertisement, an advertisement for advertising. “ADVERTISING,” blared the message on the primal screen, “THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE.”

    It is no coincidence, then, as several theorists have observed, that democracy has increasingly been reduced, in practice, from the substantive to the procedural (e.g. Farer 1989; Barsh 1992); that, purged of any ideological density, it has come to connote little more than the periodic exercise of preference, the satisfying of desire, the physics of pure interest. To wit, it does not take a political theorist, or the fictional Ms Riviero, to make the point that, understood thus, democracy is a small idea, one that is more likely to bring with it Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald’s than an amelioration of the human condition. We might go yet farther: to argue that processes of democratization bespeak a historical paradox, namely, that “the people” are being empowered in the politics of state at the very moment when, as we have noted, the politics that count are moving elsewhere — to global processes and institutions, into the corporate world and non-governmental organizations, the media and the law, new social movements, “grass roots” coalitions, and other domains of civil society.

    To phrase all this in the interrogative voice, is it possible that Dr. Criminale is correct: that democratization is a product of the death of politics, of its dispersal to everywhere and anywhere and nowhere in particular? Is democracy rising because it has become politically beside the point?

    An echo here from home. Speaking of democracy in a workshop at the University of Chicago many years ago, Wayne Booth – author, tellingly, of The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) and The Rhetoric of Irony (1974) – observed that freedom of speech is guaranteed in America only to the extent that no one is listening; that, while everybody has a right to talk, nobody has an obligation to pay attention; that democracy disempowers by encouraging a cacophony in which voices cancel each other out.

    Put these two things together – the reduction of the Idea of Democracy to the exercise of choice and the decentering, de-institutionalization of politics – and what do we get? For one thing, some of the concerns that many Africans, academics and intellectuals and every-persons alike, raise about the export of modernist European models to the global south: that they are founded on an “extremely narrow” conception of public life, one that places too much emphasis on “votes and free-market economics”3 and too little on the realization of universal human rights, civil liberties, the commonweal, and transparent, accountable government – all of which, according to recent survey research, tend to be embraced in popular African definitions of democracy (cf. Bratton 2002:5), definitions that also take on heavy local inflictions across the continent. Given that the meaning of the term is hardly unambiguous or uncontested in the global north, as Mahmood Mamdani (1986, 1990, 1992) has noted – we paraphrase him heavily here – how much more murky does it become in Africa, whose vast array of dynamic, evanescent cultures have their own theories and practices of politics, of personhood, of power, of representation. As this suggests, the cultural transitivity of the concept cannot simply be presumed, as it so often is by comparative political scientists. The more general implication? That the common presumption in the West according to which Africa ought to adopt the liberal modernist Euro-American model (see e.g. Bratton and Mattes 2001), an ideology floating free of its social and historical moorings, leaves Africans with a unenviable dilemma: to opt for either (i) a highly un-African political order, wherein the body politic is composed of autonomous, individualized, right-bearing citizens whose primary political being is congealed in the exercise of the ballot;4 or (ii) an “indigenous” alternative, usually characterized as anti-modern, ethnically-based, patriarchal, traditionalist, customary, communalist, clientalist, and authoritarian – and/or, more insidiously yet, populist. What kind of choice is this? Even more fundamentally, what, in its own terms, might democracy actually mean in Africa?

    Mikael Karlstrom (1996:485) observed, in the mid-1990’s that, notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on democracy in contemporary Africa, surprisingly little heed had been paid to this last question. As long as it is not adequately addressed, he added, we have little hope of grasping postcolonial politics at all, little hope of making sense of such things as, say, the Ugandan insistence that political parties are inimical to representative government. But there is yet another corollary here. Some African counter-discourses on democratization, as we have already intimated, are grounded in a vernacular political anthropology that offers a substantive critique of conventional Western political theory and practice. By confronting this narrative we stand not merely to understand African politics better than we do now – to understand what lies beyond the “politics of the belly,” beneath the “banality of power…in the postcolony.5 We might also arrive at a more reflexive, critical appreciation of our own received political forms.

    On the Levi-Straussian principle that one good case may illuminate an entire world, let us offer an exemplary instance to make our argument. Our choice will be surprising perhaps. We do not take a country in which representative government or electoral politics have been repudiated, subverted, or misappropriated. Such examples are either too easy or too stereotypic to be useful. Rather, we take Botswana, the African nation-state most widely regarded as a “model” democracy6 – and the closest, by common agreement, to the Western ideal. This very similarity, at least in appearances, will serve to underscore a brace of revealing differences.

    III.

    Consider the following facts. In October 1974, Botswana held its third national elections, in which the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won an emphatic 85 per cent majority of the seats in the national assembly.7 Both before and after the ballot there was a great deal of public discussion, seemingly spontaneous and unprovoked, of the advantages to be gained from the introduction of a one-party state. Many people, clearly, favored a move away from the existing British-style multiparty system; so much so, in fact, that the president at the time, Sir Seretse Khama, felt compelled to comment repeatedly on the subject, to refuse even to ponder the possibility – and to encourage people both to vote and to consider the merits of all parties. His public statements were featured prominently in the Botswana Daily News at the time.8

    In hindsight, and from the vantage of the global north, this expression of popular support for a one-party system would seem odd. First, it did not come primarily from BDP voters. Adversaries of the government were among its more enthusiastic protagonists; to wit, Puo Phaa, official organ of the opposition Botswana National Front – which was led by Bathoen Gaesitsiwe, the ex-ruler of a large chiefdom – urged the formation of a “national government, fusing all political groupings into a single administration.9 Second, it was not engineered by a cadre of bosses or captains in the name of a mass ruling party. At the time, as Colclough and McCarthy (1980:41) note, the BDP was anything but that: “indeed it scarcely exist[ed] between elections.” Third, in refusing insistently to change existing electoral arrangements, much to the delight of South Africa and other Western powers,10 the Khama regime was aware that the BDP was passing up its best chance to gain a legitimate monopoly of the organs of state. Fourth, and most puzzling of all, demands for a one-party system were typically justified on the ground that it would foster both better government and more participatory democracy.

    These demands resonated with informal views we encountered in rural Botswana at the time, especially in the south.11 As we shall see, they were consistent with the way in which village populations tended to participate in electoral processes. What is more, they echoed opinions we had heard before. During the previous general election, in 1969, we had been delivered a memorable lesson in comparative political anthropology by a local teacher, an organic intellectual from the edge of the Kalahari. This man, who described himself as “neither a radical nor a traditionalist,” had argued that one-party systems were the “only true social democracies.” With due respect for old European verities, he added politely, the very idea of a multiparty democracy is a contradiction in terms. It abases politics, shrinking them to nothing more than an occasional act of choice. And, by erasing all real government accountability between elections, it licenses the indifference of regimes in power both to popular participation and to public criticism – thereby alienating the citizenry at large from the everyday functioning of the state. President Khama seems to have been aware that views of this ilk had been gaining currency among people in the countryside. Speaking before the 1974 election at Oodi, a small town near the capital, he went to great lengths, in defending multiparty democracy, to stress that “the Government’s intention was not to fetter or discourage… criticism.” That, he said, would be “against our Setswana tradition.”12 Of which more later.

    How, then, do we explain such manifestations of antagonism against multiparty democracy, especially where it seems to have taken root so successfully? Why did it appear to these people as an oxymoron, as antithetical to participatory politics, even as an elaborate Western mystification? What accounts for the positive light in which a one- party system came to be regarded here? And to historicize these questions, one or two more: Was this outburst of vox populi merely a passing moment in the history of the public sphere in Botswana, its civil society crying out, ever so briefly, against the postcolonial state? Or did it speak to something more enduring. If so, what? And how?

    After all, foreign observers have been quick to comment on the non-involvement – “apathy” or, worse yet, “ignorance” are the words commonly used – of the electorate in matters affecting national politics in the 1970’s and 1980’s.

    In order to address these issues, we begin by turning to so-called “traditional” Setswana political theory and practice, a vernacular theory and practice that, albeit contested and constantly transforming itself, persisted through the colonial epoch; then to its conjuncture with the postcolonial politics of the nation-state. For it is here, we believe, that the answers lie. Observe, in all this, that we have three subtexts, three not- so-hidden agendas. One is to show that African political anthropology, despite repeated criticisms of theoretical aridity, has something yet to add to the analysis of world- historical phenomena. The second grows out of an old axiom. Long ago, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940:4) said that Western political philosophy, because of its lack of comparative perspective, has had nothing useful to say to political anthropology. We seek to turn this on its side: to argue that a political philosophy found in another social world may be the basis of a critical anthropology of our own. The third is to provide a corrective to the persisting tendency in the global north to reduce Africa to adjectives – communalist, clientalist, patriarchal, and the like – thus to reproduce tired racist archetypes. And, worse yet, to mistake those archetypes for empirical descriptions in which to ground political theory.

    IV.

    Botswana, until 1966 the Bechuanaland Protectorate, is usually said to be made up of eight distinct chiefdoms (“tribes”). These, prior to incorporation within the British Empire in 1885 and with modifications during the colonial period, were the major, but not the only,13 political communities into which indigenous populations were grouped.14 Although the system of local government has changed over the years, and chiefs have been denuded of much of their authority,15 the eight chiefdoms still exist. Some of the larger ones are today (more-or-less) coterminous with the jurisdictions of districts and their councils. Moreover, while its urban centers have grown enormously, Botswana is stereotypically seen as a predominantly rural nation: much of its citizenry was raised in, and sustains active links with, “villages.”

    While chiefdoms varied in size and in the minutiae of their institutional arrangements, the dominant features of their political organization, cultures, and ideology were broadly shared. These have been thoroughly documented;16 although there does remain some controversy about the politics of succession to high office17 – and an unfortunate tendency among Western social scientists to typify the public sphere in Tswana communities, often glossed as “the kgotla system” (see below), in rather too simple terms.18 For present purposes, the briefest of summaries will do.

    From the earliest documentary accounts we have of centralized “Bechuana” polities, dating from the first half of the 19th century, three things are clear.19 The first is that the chiefship was seen to be the axis mundi of the social world. It was, as one Tshidi-Rolong elder said to us in 1969, like the pinnegare, the central pole, of houses of old. Everything – the fertility of the earth and the abundance of the rains, security from attack and success in war, the passing of the seasons and “giving of the seed-time,” material wealth and spiritual well-being, the crafting of legislation and courts that judged fairly – all these things, and much besides, turned around the apical office. Its holder, in principle at least, personified his people, signified their sovereignty and subjectivity, embodied their essence. He was known by an honorific whose form was the metonymic singular of the name of his “nation” (morafe): Mokwena, the ruler of the Bakwena (mo-, sing; ba-, plural), Mongwaketse, the ruler of the Bangwaketse, and so on.

    But, second, a clear line was drawn between chiefship (bogosi) and chief (kgosi), office and incumbent. The former stood for the very existence of the polity. It was the public sphere incarnate, the morafe made manifest and represented back to itself as a political principle. The authority vested in it – albeit historically shifting over the long-run – was taken, at any moment in time, to be beyond question. The latter, by contrast, was merely human. He might be more or less effective a ruler, more or less influential, more or less adept at mobilizing the political capital available to him. Early European visitors to the Tswana were impressed by the charisma and command of some “kings” who, it is said, struck awe into their followers and whose slightest whim elicited the strictest compliance. But they were also fascinated by the frankly critical way in which most sovereigns were addressed at their own courts. And by the fact that their power was often constrained by the sheer unwillingness of their subjects to do their bidding.20 Elsewhere (e.g. J.L. Comaroff 1975, 1978; see n. 17) we have shown that a chief who lost all legitimacy, who was said publicly to be “not fit to rule” (Campbell 1822,2:157), was likely to find his genealogical status successfully contested by a rival. This in spite of the prevailing rules of ascription according to which sovereigns held office by virtue of birth, not election. It was always possible to unfix the fixities, to unscrew the inscrutabilities, of ascribed rank by reconstruing the relations that gave rise to it.

    The third thing of note is that great store was placed here on what might be glossed as “good government.” Substantively speaking, chiefs were responsible for all aspects – political, judicial, administrative, material, spiritual – of collective well-being; that is, for everything in the public domain. This, furthermore, is to be understood in historical terms: sovereign responsibility embraced the fluid realities of time, space, and situation. Where transformed conditions demanded, say, that the colonial state be dealt with in a particular fashion, or that dams and storage depots be built for purposes of agrarian “development,” rulers were held to account for the discharge of these functions. But, and this is the crucial point, the ideology of good government paid less attention to the content of public affairs than to the means by which they were managed.

    Tswana ideas about the proper means of governance were elaborate, nuanced, and enduring; we heard any number of discourses on the topic in the 1970’s. Above all, they stressed (i) the participatory, consultative aspect of the public sphere, in which there was, ostensibly, “perfect freedom of debate” (Philip 1828,1:133), and in which all male citizens (more recently, all adults)21 were entitled to a voice – just as they had the right to be represented by headmen on chiefly councils; (ii) the proportional relationship between the performance of any ruler (assessed against the cannons of good government) and his legitimacy (as indexed in his recognized capacity to wield control over people, policy, and public life); and (iii) the fusion of what, in Western social science, is nowadays distinguished as civil society and the state.

    In sum, chiefs were expected to rule “with” the people. Kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe went the most quoted adage in the Tswana political lexicon; “a chief is chief by the nation.” What this meant, in practice, is that sovereigns were expected to surround themselves with advisors to guide the everyday life of the polity, men for whose advice and actions they were held responsible; to hold regular meetings of councils of headmen and other chiefly conclaves; to summon public assemblies of various kinds from which emerged policy that reflected popular views and attended to the common weal; to ensure that the hierarchy of courts over which they presided did not favor the rich over the poor, royals over commoners, or men over women (even though the latter, as “jural minors,” had to be represented by male kin); to be open always to approach by their subjects, whose physical welfare they were also obliged to heed, redistributing food and other requisites in times of need.

    In Southern Tswana chiefdoms, in fact, past rulers were — in some places they still are – recalled by the legislation they introduced (cf. Schapera 1943) and by the wisdom of those whom they recruited as advisors. They are also remembered by their capacity to bring rain, itself a sure spiritual gauge of political mastery; but that is another story. Ultimately, in this respect, chiefly success was numbered in observable achievements: “improvements,” in the Protestant-saturated language of modernist governance. But delivering improvements, in turn, hinged on the public cooperation that a ruler could command. Which, tautologically, depended on the degree to which he was seen to measure up to the ideals of good government. Note, by way of example, the following text, which we published more than thirty years ago (J.L. Comaroff 1975:145). It comes from a speech made by a local elder statesmen in February, 1970 at the installation of Besele, the new ruler of the southernmost chiefdom of Barolong:

    A chief can only be judged by what he does…If you treat [people] with respect, they will treat you with respect. If you shun them, they will shun you. And if you frighten them they will run away… We will be watching to see whether you are going to make improvements. Chiefship is not an easy job. A chief never sleeps. A chief does not discriminate. Batswana say that a chief is chief because of the nation. If we cannot see you in the court [kgotla] we shall draw away from you. And if we do will you still call yourself chief?

    In analyzing this text when we first published it, we noted, in particular, how it underscored the significance attributed, in the local political imaginaire, (i) to the Hegelian interdependency between ruler and subject; (ii) to the measurability of chiefly success in terms of practical, palpable accomplishment (“what he does, his industry…[his] improvements”); and (iii) to the possibility that an authoritarian or an inattentive sovereign may be repudiated [“shunned”], even removed (“if we [draw ourselves away from you, will you still [be able to] call yourself chief”), notwithstanding the ideology of ascription in terms of which succession to high office is represented (see above; also n.17).

    This, self-evidently, implied the existence of a model of incumbency, a paradigm of political legitimation in terms of which the actions of rulers were evaluated and their authority negotiated; by which, that is, the equation of performance to power was given practical, realized form. At the core of this equation was a simple socio-logarithm: the willingness of political subjects to comply with the commands of a chief was held to depend on the degree to which he could demonstrate, in public, that he had properly discharged the obligations of his office.

    It follows – pace received wisdom that goes back to African Political Systems (1940) and persists in some quarters – that the “rights and duties” of Tswana (and, for that matter, other African) sovereigns was never immutable, never fixed by “tradition.” To the contrary. Their authority varied widely. As we have already said, some appeared, alike to their subjects and to outsiders, as mighty kings. Having established their legitimacy, they could exercise almost dictatorial power. Others found it hard to impose their wills, or their executive decisions, at all. Most, however, traversed the line between these extremes during their reigns.22 To be sure, many of the scholarly arguments that surround the analysis of Tswana politics, past and present, flow from an inattention to precisely this capacity for transformation over time and space.

    How, then, did the model of incumbency, the equation of performance-to-power, work out in everyday practice? The answer to this question begins with the fact that, whatever their formal agendas, public meetings were also forums in which chiefly regimes were subjected to debate and evaluation. The process was founded on a crucial assumption: that there existed, tacit but nonetheless well understood, an incremental scale of sovereign authority; that, as the legitimacy of a ruler increased, the more inclusive (and exclusive) became his recognized right to regulate the various ways and means, the instruments and institutions, of governance23 – expanding, potentially at least, until it embraced virtually all aspects of social life. Thus, for example, before the passage of the Tribal Land Act (1968), a strong chief enjoyed, among other things, sole control over the distribution of fields, pasturage, and residential plots – either allocating them himself or appointing surrogates to do so – and a monopoly over the creation of new political constituencies (wards, sections, villages, provinces), along with the offices that ruled over them. He also could expect to be obeyed when he summoned labor for communal works and improvement projects, to receive sundry forms of tribute, to minister over the timing of the ritual and agricultural cycles, and to have his legislative initiatives, executive orders, and legal judgments implemented with dispatch.24

    Conversely, a ruler who lost his legitimacy, a process that occurred slowly rather than suddenly, found it ever more difficult to exert control as, cumulatively, he forfeited the various rights of office. The exact composition of this scale of rights differed from chiefdom to chiefdom. But it appears to have existed in some form everywhere; again, with contrasting degrees of explicitness. In Barolong, for instance, the first thing a chief would lose was his sway over the activities of voluntary associations, which were likely to listen to him politely and then ignore him utterly; thence he would forego his monopoly over the allocation of land, this usually being effected by public demand that a committee be appointed to “help” him make decisions. Next went the taken-for- granted presumption that judgments and sentences handed down in his court would be executed without question. This was followed by the erosion of other capacities and entitlements: to call people to labor on public works, to enact legislation, to establish new constituencies or regulate space and time, to demand tribute, finally even to summon meetings.

    But this leaves one part of the question unanswered. By what rhetorical means and concrete measures was the indigenous equation of performance to power actually resolved? How was the legitimacy of a reigning chief – the substance and scope of his command over the public sphere — actually negotiated? How, in short, did sovereign authority actually come to expand or contract?

    Through mahoko, words. Words spoken in kgotla, in the public sphere, which were assumed to have great pragmatic power to affect the world; words spoken in the genre of political oratory, a genre not specifically named in Setswana but one for which Tswana are justly famed. Theirs is a rich aural culture, in which the aesthetics of utterance are potent indeed. And in which the negotiation of chiefly legitimacy takes on a very particular form.

    Before saying more about that genre, however, a point of clarification. The kgotla might have been where chiefly authority was negotiated, but the production of that authority, and the power that lay behind it, was an altogether more complex matter. To hold that legitimacy was determined by the unconstrained consent of the governed, that it was decided purely by argument in town meetings, or that rulers bore passive witness to their own evaluation – all of which is implicit in the vernacular model of incumbency – is to simplify reality. Public debate, always the object of careful strategy and management, was a site of struggle, not a neutral enactment of vox populi. The distribution of support to which it gave voice depended, in major measure, on prior power relations, relations forged in offstage dealings of various kinds. The discourse of chiefly evaluation provided a medium by which the invisible calculi of patronage and influence congealed into social “facts,” collectively recognized lines of alliance and antagonism. There is a tautology here, of course: civic discussion was taken both to reflect and to determine sovereign legitimacy. But the tautology is more apparent than real. Verbal exchanges in kgotla made manifest, and so converted into the currency of politics, all the transactions that occurred, dispersed and individuated, across the axes of everyday life.

    Tacit in all this is a political dynamic of some moment for the more general question at hand. Inasmuch as discourses of chiefly evaluation expressed alliances and antagonisms, support and opposition for the ruler – inasmuch, that is, as they were a partisan theater of the political, they tended to be articulated around identifiable factions. The existence of (usually a pair of) such factions was endemic in local public life. (The reasons for this are too complex to go into here. They flow from the fissiparous character of Tswana polities of the past, which were often wracked by rivalries over the chiefship. These invariably pitted the reigning sovereign against an agnatic adversary, thus dividing the morafe into two blocs, each around its royal leader.) One of the factions was always composed of “king’s men,” core supporters from among whom the personnel of his regime were drawn; 19th century missionaries, tellingly, sometimes referred to them as “the chief’s party.” The other, which might be more or less articulate(d), bounded, and assertive, depending on circumstance, typically clustered around senior royal patrikin who were, potentially and often in practice, the ruler’s primary adversaries for position and property. Again, all this been well documented. The point, as far as we are concerned, was the taken-for-granted, almost inevitable presence of factional alignments in local politics. For out of these blocs came the primary players, the dramatis personae, of the public sphere — as well, significantly, as the political and dialogical motivation that gave shape to discourses of chiefly evaluation.

    The aesthetics of public discourses about governance and chiefly performance – the poetic play, that is, of form and substance – held the key to their politics. The latter derived from the juxtaposition, in “parliamentary” speeches, of two kinds of utterance; two styles, whose difference was closely connected to the vernacular distinction drawn between office and incumbent. One style (elsewhere we have referred to it as a “formal code”; J.L. Comaroff 1975) spoke of the ideals of good government, and of the regnant ideology of chiefship, largely in idiomatic form; phrases like kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe (see above), batho ga se ba melamu, ba bokwa ka lotlhare (“people are not ruled with clubs, they are waved with winnowing fans”), and others that specified expectations of office-holders. These utterances relied heavily on formulaic speech, were rarely phrased in the first person singular, their author usually being the collective “we” (“We Barolong say that…;” “It is our way/custom…” “Our fathers taught that…”). What is more, because they invoked shared values, they presupposed the consensual agreement of speaker and audience.

    Strikingly different to these formulaic utterances, the second kind addressed the performance of the chief. Phrased always in the first person singular (“I must speak my mind, Chief!…”; “I have heard what others say. It is my view that …”), statements made in this register were not formulaic at all. Typically frank and forthright, sometimes even brutally censorious, they tended to be syntactically more elaborate, to deploy a wider vocabulary, to rely more on evidentiary argument than on shared assumptions, and to be voiced with a view to their persuasive force. These statements were made in a spirit of political argumentation. In observing such speech acts, we were also struck by the fact that, in contrast to more formal utterances – which, at best, were heard in polite silence – they were typically listened to in rapt attention.

    These two styles were deployed in careful counterpoint to one another during the course of most political speeches. For their part, “king’s men” sought to convince the public at large of the convergence between the ideals of good government and the reigning incumbent’s record of actions and accomplishments; this by iterating the first, in formulaic speech, as a point of reference, a template almost, against which to mount first-person polemics, propositional claims and political arguments. Conversely, opposition factions would try to force the greatest plausible divergence between the mantras of good government and the material performance of the office-holder, at least as they construed it in their narratives of failure.

    For chiefly protagonists, it follows that the greater the degree of convergence they could establish in the public eye between ideal and performance, the broader the claims they could make for expanding the authority of the ruler. Ultimate success, in theory, was when office and office-holder became as one, when statements in the formulaic mode about the first might be said to apply to the second; in practice, this condition of absolutism was never reached in Tswana polities, there being counter- forces which put constraints on the accumulation of sovereign power beyond a certain point. The inverse is also true. For opposition blocs, final victory occurred when the divergence between the ideal of good government and the performance of an office- holder became so great – and, concomitantly, sovereign authority so truncated – that the ruler was no longer a “real chief.” Whereupon, as we implied earlier, he could well be deposed.

    Participation in discourses of chiefly evaluation was not confined to those who identified with one or other faction, although the close supporters and active antagonists of a ruler were likely to be most vocal; also the most caught up in the political tactics and intrigues that often lay behind, and broke through to the surface, in the dramaturgy of public dialogue. The unaligned, however, did not merely add their voices to the debate. They acted, at once, in the manner of a chorus and a jury, echoing or disagreeing with the arguments of those more partisan, commenting on their plausibility and persuasivess, and suggesting implications that might follow for the standing of the chief. From these interventions a measure of consensus was likely to emerge as speakers began slowly to draw closer in their views; this measure serving to confirm, expand, or redelimit the state of sovereign authority for the time being.

    In sum, the kgotla was more than a forum for the discussion of social policy, although it certainly was that too. Nor was it just an African analogue of the classical polis (see n.18). It was also (i) a context for ongoing discourse about governance and sovereign authority – and, simultaneously, (ii) a space of contestation in which the powers of a living ruler were negotiated and given social currency. Its primary constituencies were factions rather than political parties, one a chiefly bloc and the other an opposition. These constituencies, patently, did not differentiate themselves according to ideology or matters of principle. Their arguments, recall, were about the means of government, not its content. In striking contrast to Western nation-states, where policy is seen from within to be the provenance of partisan politics, here it was taken to be a product of public discourse.

    There is much more to the subtleties and the substance of Tswana political culture, past and present. Also to the workings of its public sphere. Enough has been said, however, to allow us to revisit, and to make sense of, contemporary discourses of democracy and the postcolonial politics of this nation-state.

    Two brief, final observations before we do.

    One is that there has been a revisionist tendency, in some circles, to portray “the kgotla system” as an altogether more repressive, more authoritarian institution than we and others allow. Good (1992:70; cf. Parson 1984:6f), for instance, says that “the kgotla essentially operated to facilitate social control by the leadership,” the implication being that it had less to do with the politics of public deliberation than with the sheer exercise of power by ruling cadres (cf. van Binsbergen 1995). This might have been true, some of the time, of some of the stronger, more centralized chiefly regimes – such as that of the Ngwato, the largest of all “tribal” polities in Botswana and the one usually treated as paradigmatic. But, as a general statement about the Tswana public sphere, the claim does not bear scrutiny. The documentary record shows that the kgotla was always a site of active political contestation in which, far from merely being exercised, sovereign authority had to be negotiated. And could be forfeited as well as fortified, withdrawn as well as won.

    The other point is that, in the passage from the past to the postcolonial, the kgotla has remained a crucial element in the political imaginaire of Botswana. This in spite of its roots in the “village.” Or its “traditionalist” connotations. Since independence, in fact, public forums, called “freedom squares,” have been created all over the country, including in urban contexts. The resonance with an older vernacular public sphere could not be more obvious. Furthermore, as we shall see in a moment, national politicians have found themselves drawn back to the kgotla even in the course, and cause, of distinctly nonparochial political processes. In short, what we speak of here is far from a quaint anachronism, a romantic remnant of days gone by. It describes a cultural context, and a set of discursive practices, that are very much of the continuing present.

    V.

    Let us return, then, to postcolonial politics and discourses of democracy.

    In 1965, some months before Botswana became independent, national elections were held for the first time. Here, as in many other parts of Africa, decolonization – in the formal, political sense of that term – was fairly rapid. Three years earlier, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had been established under the leadership of Seretse Khama and “other bourgeois nationalists” (Good 1992:72) drawn largely from a cattle-owning elite with strong connections to the countryside. From the start, the BDP promised to relegate chiefship and “tribalism” to the peripheries of postcolonial governance. It pledged itself to the evolution of a secular liberal nation-state, European in style; to the growth of a secure capitalist economy based on a mix of agrarian and industrial development, conventionally conceived; to a politics of moderation, the rule of law, and broad principles of social justice.

    From the start, too, as Picard (1987) notes, the BDP groomed itself to be a “government party.” Enjoying strong support from the colonial administration, it acquired “a monopoly of the resources and apparatus of the state” (Good 1992:72). Other parties were formed as well, some of them earlier. But they never approached the levels of organization, the material and cultural capital, or the broad-based following of the BDP. The latter was helped by the fact that its members of parliament and district councillors “frequently [had] close kin ties with the traditional aristocracy” (Colclough and McCarthy 1980:41). Although the party set out to marginalize chiefs, and to distance post-independence Botswana from its indigenous political culture/s, there is no question that Seretse’s own popular status at the grassroots was due, in part, to his royal rank –which had been dramatically underscored by imperial intervention. Heir to the Ngwato chiefship, he had famously been forced, by Her Majesty’s Government, to renounce his rights to office as a condition of return from an involuntary exile occasioned by his marriage to a white woman.

    That first election, as we said above, yielded an overwhelming victory for the BDP. What was most notable about it, though, was the very high turnout: 74% of all those registered. This was in spite the fact that, in some parts of the country, voter education had been severely limited. Moreover, because distances to polling places were often large and transport was not always available, it was physically difficult for many actually to cast a ballot. Nor was the organization of the election entirely problem- free. All of which made the high rate of participation altogether remarkable. And interesting, too, in light of accusations, voiced in the media and by foreign observers in the 1980’s, that a disturbing proportion of the populace of Botswana evinced indifference to, or ignorance of, the democratic process. It is even more striking in light of what was to happen later.

    What, then, did happen later?

    Several things, of which four stand out. The first was a radical drop in voter turnout in subsequent elections, down, for example, to 31% in 1974. There is one conspicuous exception, however: 1984, the national ballot after Seretse Khama’s death, when his successor, Quett Masire, had to go to the country as its new president-in- waiting. And go to the country he did. Literally. He went from kgotla to kgotla in an effort to persuade people to vote, to prove his willingness to listen to their demands, and to assure them that he would govern them well (Shepherd 1984:28.) An explanation for these patterns of voter turnout? According to Holm (1987:124), “a segment of the public” thought that, “as has always been the case with a chief, there is no need to reelect the President. Thus they do not go to the polls until a new President is chosen.” He is correct to draw the parallel, although we would take it further. As incumbents of apical offices, chiefs and presidents were subject to similar ideologies of governance (cf. Charlton 1993:331): both were expected to demonstrate their acumen and accomplishments in office; neither could assume their legitimacy; each was held to account for his actions, for the wisdom of his advisors, for the performance of his regime; and each had to subject himself to evaluation – all of which Masire appears to have appreciated. But, as long as they ruled “with the people,” and delivered the fruits of good government, there was no particular need to vote for or against them; under which conditions, ironically, as Colclough and McCarthy (1980:44) conclude, “declining turnout [may] be taken as a mark of approval.” Indeed, Holm (op. cit.) implies, it is only when a new incumbent has to be designated, for reasons of death or deposition, that there is a felt need for an expression of mass public opinion. Then, too, the process runs in close parallel. In each instance, a candidate is identif ied by a ruling cadre (the majority party in the case of the president, powerful royal factions in the chiefdoms), and is presented to the polity for its consideration. Hence the high turnouts in 1965 and 1984. And the indifference on most other occasions.25 In such circumstances, procedural democracy – defined (i) by elections whose primary justification is the abstract passage of time, (ii) by an ethos of choice and change, and (iii) by mass public participation – seems a somewhat curious creature. Of which more in a moment.

    In this respect, second, another statistic is noteworthy. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, it was said that only a small proportion of the populace “knew” their parliamentary representatives, except where they were major public figures. Struck by this at the time, we did a preliminary survey, asking the question of 105 people in five southern villages. Around 55% said that they had no idea of the person concerned. Another 30% could give a name, but nothing else. Just under 15% answered in the affirmative. Yet more remarkable was the fact that over a quarter offered, unsolicited, that it made little real difference: that BDP members of parliament were the advisors and councillors of the president and that he was responsible both for appointing them and for their actions. Echoes, again, of a model of governance whose genealogy stretches deep into setswana, “Tswana ways.” In point of fact, politicians have become less anonymous in recent years. Still, one part of the idea, that a leader is responsible for the personnel of his/her regime, remains firmly intact.

    Third, notwithstanding low voter turn out and the relative anonymity of political representatives, election meetings held by the BDP tended to draw crowds in the countryside. Among the opposition parties, in contrast, only those visited by important personages – an ex-chief back home, a charismatic with a big following, and the like – were well attended. We sat at many with only the candidate and a few of his friends. At BDP meetings, too, local people expected the president or a “close advisor” (i.e. a cabinet minister), to present themselves. Constituency politicians, those parliamentarians whom they “did not know,” were not good enough. After all, and this is the point, these meetings were knowingly modeled on the kgotla, that space of intersection between civil society and the state, between the public sphere and the politics of incumbency. Their object was not just to discuss matters of social concern, to play at popular, consultative democracy. It was also to evaluate the performance of the president and his party. And to hold him accountable for the extent to which the BDP had met the demands of good government. In this light, it seems injudicious to conclude, as van Binsbergen (1995:25-8) does, that the appeal to “the kgotla system,” dubbed a “neotraditional facade,” is merely a cynical effort by an authoritarian “state elite” to subjugate, appropriate, and manipulate local institutions. This was not the spirit in which Masire went to the country in 1984, nor the tenor of the BDP meetings which we attended over the years. Perhaps, though, it is the trend of the present and future. But that is another story.

    In both their poetics and their politics, BDP election meetings evoked earlier discourses of chiefly authority. Speakers tended to line up into blocs of pro- and antagonists – the former being local party members, the latter, a coalition of dissent – surrounded by an unaligned public. Most of them spelled out the requirements of good government, typically in formulaic terms and in the authorial name of the transcendant “we” of nationhood and/or setswana. And then they offered their appraisals, often in starkly frank, pragmatic prose, always in the first person singular. In so doing, depending on their political positioning, they either proclaimed a convergence or a divergence between ideal and reality. Supporters, in particular, told a teleological tale of improvement. They spoke of the very successful “material performance of the post- independence state” (van Binsbergen 1995:27); also, usually, of the disbursement of resources “to all parts of the country equally” and the absence of clientelism (Charlton 1993:341). Others disputed just these things. The specifics of their counter arguments were contingent on place and circumstance, but they were frequently couched in accusations that government had “forgotten them.” (A popular pun in the south played on the name of the capital, Gaborone, named for the local chiefly dynasty; BDP critics called it ga re bone, “it does not see us.”) On both sides of the debate, however, there was the tacit assumption, utopian perhaps, that the BDP could only expect to enjoy legitimacy and the cooperation of the populace to the degree that it established the quality of its governance.

    This is not to say that the electoral process mimicked the workings of the kgotla, past or present. The politics of the nation-state were not those of the chiefship writ large, nor are they today. Nonetheless, they did converge in two things. One was a deep aversion to autocracy at all levels of governance; hence Khama’s insistence that to “fetter criticism” is “against…Setswana tradition.” The other was the unspoken conviction, widely distributed across the various publics of Botswana, that substantive democracy depended on the simultaneity of (i) discourses of policy, seen here, as we said, to be the product of deliberative processes, not of partisan interest; and (ii) discourses of accountability, in which the proportionate relationship between performance and power was negotiated. The outcome of that negotiation, expressed in a quantum of sovereign authority, might have been heavily influenced by offstage dealings, by the capillary workings of the state, and by the social capital mobilized by ruling elites. And it might have been perverted by the covert forms of authoritarianism of which van Binsbergen speaks. But, for now, what is significant is this: underlying all public spheres was a civic culture that specified the means of producing a certain kind of participatory politics, a politics grounded in an articulate, popular ideology of good government.

    In this civic culture, it will be clear, elections were important to the degree that they opened up a space, periodically at least, for substantive democracy. On the other hand, voting – procedural democracy – was much less salient, save at moments of crisis. Which is why people in the countryside would attend protracted political meetings and then often not cast a ballot, or do so more to express their dis/approval for the governing party than to exercise choice. Thus, for example, in 1974, the Botswana National Front (BNF) candidate from Barolong, O.B. Marumolwa, voted for the BDP – against himself. After hearing the president and a cabinet minister speak at several meetings, and give account of their performance, he declared that they should remain in office. “You do not just remove a ruler,” added Marumolwa, himself of royal descent.

    This brings us, fourth, to the curious character of political parties here. Recall Colclough and McCarthy’s (1980:41) comment that the BDP was “not a mass party” at all; that it barely existed between elections; that it was, more than anything else, an immanent reservoir of support centered on the president and his cabinet. Nor, for their part, have any of the minority parties been an enduringly significant presence in the public domain. Even at their most active, these parties have served less as coherent ideological alternatives to the BDP than as a critical opposition, pure and simple. Some of them have been odd ideological hybrids. The BNF, for one, grafted a “traditionalist” wing, headed by a former chief, onto a “radical” one, led by a left wing Euro-intellectual. Custom and communism partying together is hardly what Weber had in mind in his classic typification of this species of voluntary association. In fact, both the BDP and BNF seem to have behaved more like the factional blocs we encountered in kgotla. This impression is reinforced by their conduct in the national assembly (Colcough and McCarthy 1980:46):

    [T]he daily business of the National Assembly is conducted in a manner closer to the best of the African one-party states than to the Westminster model. The alignment is not so much the government benches against the opposition as Ministers against the backbenchers. Sometimes, indeed, opposition members are seen to support the Government when its own backbenchers are critical. Thus the role of the National Assembly, like that of the traditional Kgotla, is to audit proposals made by those in authority: to approve them and occasionally reject them. The Ministers respect this function of the assembly.

    Talk here, once more, of a one-party state, and its juxtaposition to the workings of the kgotla, brings us full circle to the problem with which we began, and to the denouement of our argument.

    VI.

    Put together these various points and it will be clear what the call in the 1970’s for a one-party state was all about. It was an argument, in effect, against procedural democracy. Against democracy as the mere exercise of electoral options. Against the idea that freedom may be equated with choice. Against democracy, to return to Gertla Riviero, as a small idea, the kind of European export that promises the world and delivers Kentucky Fried Chicken. Given their own conception of participatory politics, their own ideologies of sovereign authority, legitimacy, and accountability, it is obvious why so many citizens of Botswana were alienated by the Western model, at least as presented to them. And why, by threatening to confine mass public involvement to a fleeting season every five years, it opened up a chasm between the state and civil society. For some, the very fact that the BDP leadership was so keen to sustain a Euro- styled multi-party system was itself an indictment.

    More positively, the agitation for one-party government – towards which, interestingly, the national assembly was then moving in its own routine procedures – was a demand for a (re)turn to substantive democracy, to a civic culture in which participatory politics would be the stuff of everyday life. And in which the ruling regime was authorized to act for the nation in proportion to its warranted performance in office. Put another way, it called for a vernacular, indigenously rooted version of the kind of liberal democracy that Euromodernity has long idealized but scarcely realized – let alone implanted successfully elsewhere, especially when other interests have intervened. In hindsight, the gesture might appear to have been utopian, quixotic even. It also dated to a particular moment in the early history of this postcolony. But it gave voice to a deeply felt critique of taken-for-granted European political practices and institutions.

    That critique spoke of a specifically African alternative, one that demanded not less popular sovereignty but more, not less accountability but more, not just choice but a public culture of criticism. All of which, of course, the global north has been moving steadily away from in recent times; prescient here is Julius Nyerere’s piquant comment, made already in the 1960’s, to the effect that the United States has “only one political party, but…[has] created two versions of [it].”26 Euro-American heads of state tend these days to act with ever greater impunity, to claim ever wider executive authority, and to promise as little government as possible. Concomitantly, large numbers of their citizens appear willing to forego freedoms, sovereignty, and the rule of law in the name of security and material well-being; vide the Patriot Act in the USA and the introduction of detention without trial in the UK, both post-9/11 measures that recalled the days of high apartheid in South Africa. Except in moments of rupture, moreover, levels of political involvement in the north seem steadily to wane, amidst accusations of epidemic apathy. In some European countries – Spain, Portugal, and Sweden being notable cases – an even smaller proportion of voters are currently able to name electoral candidates than was the case in Botswana in the first years of its independence (Norris 2004:230-48).27 As citizens of that nation-state sought ways to move from procedural toward substantive politics, so the West seems intent to move in the opposite direction.

    In September 2009, a public intellectual and journalist in the USA, well known for his centrist political views, could quite plausibly title a widely syndicated essay on contemporary America, “One-Party Democracy.” Echoes of Nyerere, several decades on.28

    The process that we have described here, we reiterate, was firmly located in the social realities of Botswana at the time: in its comparative ethnic homogeneity, its small size, its proximity to a particular historical past, all of which made the dream of a demos founded on popular sovereignty and direct state accountability appear eminently viable. These realities do not obtain everywhere. To the contrary: Botswana was, and is, relatively unique. And yet the vernacular political forms found there bear strong similarities to others in Africa (cf. Chabal 1986), some of them clearly visible, some submerged, some violently suppressed. Which raises a familiar conundrum, if in unfamiliar terms: Why it is that, for the most part, “democracy,” however it may be defined, is so fragile across the continent? What is it that intervenes between the conditions of its possibility, which are patently present, and its practical realization? How is it that the possible is rendered, if not quite impossible, then so difficult to accomplish? Why, where “democracy” may be said to prevail in the nation-states of the global south, does it seem more procedural than substantive, more “thin” than “thick”? Could it be that Euro-America’s contemporary move in the same direction, toward a “thinned out” version of representative government, provides a clue? That Africa has merely seen the emptying out of the large idea, its reduction to a small one, before the global north? That, in this regard too, the latter is evolving toward the former? And for the same reason, namely, that politics itself is escaping the formal public sphere and the institutions of state more and more as it migrates elsewhere. Could the de- democratization of north and south simply be a devolutionary counterpoint coming to us everywhere as part of the neoliberal age — an age in which, Archbishop Ndungane of Cape Town recently argued,29 citizens everywhere are valued purely as “voter fodder,” in which “good government, transparency, accountability, integrity and honesty” are known largely by their absence? If so, does it not demand that we address this counterpoint in taking on the Big Question of Theory, ca. 2010: Wherein lies the future of politics and the public sphere, sui generis, as the new century unfolds? Is it, as we have begun to suggest in previous chapters, in new social and religious movements and other forms of mass action, in politics of life, their strident mobilization of “the street,” their ever more assertive resort to lawfare, their deployment of the internet, and all the other means of experimental insurgency that have emerged so powerfully in the south and appear to be migrating northward?

  • Africa Observed

    Africa Observed

    Excerpted from Of Revelation and Revolution, Volume 1, Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in Colonial South Africa (1991), this analysis of early to mid-nineteenth century European images of Africa explores the ways in which the “dark” continent was represented in scientific, religious, and secular public discourse as a foil to emerging concepts of modernity and enlightenment, as their negative underside. It traces the rise of racist evolutionary models of the human condition and their moralizing corollaries, contemporary arguments about slavery and abolition, emerging religious and secular sensibilities concerning savagery, civilization, and salvation, personhood and reason; in short, discourses of the imperial imagination that constructed Africa as fertile ground for colonization.

  • Postcolonial Politics and Discourses of Democracy in Southern Africa

    Postcolonial Politics and Discourses of Democracy in Southern Africa

    Beginning with a critical reflection on the export of democracy from Europe and America to Africa, this essay–which opens with the birth of the “new” South Africa–explores a question of increasing significance across the continent: What might “democracy” actually MEAN in postcolonial Africa? How does it engage with vernacular cultures of participatory politics and with the construction of new public spheres? We take, as an example, Botswana, widely regarded as a “model” democracy–but where, in the 1970s, there was some demand for a one-party system. This case compels us to rethink, fundamentally, our understanding of processes of democratization, sui generis.

  • Legality, Modernity, and Ethnicity in Colonial South Africa

    Legality, Modernity, and Ethnicity in Colonial South Africa

    INTRODUCTION

    In The Campaign, a Carlos Fuentes novel of colonialism and liberation in South America, there lurks, amidst a welter of heroic acts and epic events, a brief, enigmatic exchange:

    `The Law’, says one revolutionary, `is the greatest thing imaginable.’

    `That’s true’, answers his compadre, `because it’s absurd.’
    A luta continua. The battle goes on. But the revolutionaries–alibis all for Fuentes’ reading of history–agree to one thing: the almost absurd centrality of law in both European overrule and the struggle against it.i

    As with Latin America, so with Africa. It has become commonplace to remark the salience of the legal culture of Britain in the colonization of the continent; commonplace to assert its role in the fashioning of new European hegemonies, in the creation of subjects of Empire, in the rise of various forms of resistance, in the demands of so-called “Third World” peoples for both individual rights and collective entitlements.ii

    Perhaps the most coherent statement of received wisdom is to be found in Martin Chanock’s consistently insightful writings on the invention of customary law.iii Treating property, after Bentham, as the quintessential context in which rights and legalities are constituted, conjured with, and called into question, he argues that European colonizers took possessive individualism iv to be the axiomatic basis of civilized society; the corollary being that private property was unknown in “savage” Africa. Early administrators, themselves caught up in the optimism of the age of revolution in Europe, encouraged “natives” everywhere to embrace the idea of indivi- dual rights in the name of a universal modernity, in the cause of effecting the “evolution of human societies from status to contract”.v But in due course, Chanock goes on, colonial govern- ments did a volte face, claiming that communalism and customary law, not individualism and a law of contract, were more “naturally” African. The reasons for this change of heart? If Tswana or Zulu or Ngoni or whomever had no idea of rights, only premodern “customs”, it was easier to dispossess them of their land, easier to extract their labor power, easier to legitimize their subordination to a superior European law.vi In short, the practical stress on communalism and custom, and the concomitant erasure of rights, was “hugely convenient” for the colonial state.vii As Stamp puts it, somewhat summarily:viii

    Customary law, as distinct from precolonial jurisprudence, was introduced…as a tool for pacifying and governing the colonized peoples. While elements of preco- lonial jurisprudence survive in customary law, they have been made to serve the needs of the capitalist colonial and postcolonial states.

    But is it all quite so simple? The answer, of course, is no. Apart from all else, the manner in whi- ch British legal sensibilities and practices entered into colonizing processes, into their dramatic gestures and prosaic theaters, turns out to have been much more complex, less audible, murkier, than is often suggested. And a great deal more contradictory.

    Let me offer a foretaste of my concerns by observing a rupture in the received narrative of the connection between colonialism and law in Africa. On one hand, we are told how the colonial state denied Africans the very rights they themselves essayed as the sine qua non of modernity–enforcing, instead, a custom custom-built for the purposes of political control. Yet we are also told how some agents of imperialism–most notably, but not only, missionaries–succeeded in inculcating distinctly modernist ideas of private property and possessive individualism; of ownership, citizenship, and civil rights.ix

    Surely there is a paradox in all this? In the fact that, while colonial officials perpetuated the “premodern” by eschewing individual rights for Africans, their righteous compatriots, colonial evangelists, sought to do the exact opposite in the name of civilization? This paradox, I shall argue, was not a superficial tear in the otherwise seamless fabric of imperialism. To the contrary: it reveals many of its contradictions, many of the disjunctures that were to play into the (re)making of Africa–its structures of ethnicity and class, gender and generation–and the forms of resistance to which they would give rise. It also reveals that, for all their materialities and brutalities, colonial regimes were shaped as much by cultural forces as by the facts of political economy; as much by those seen now as bit-players as by the heroes inscribed in history books. For the colonial process was never monolithic, never merely a matter of States and Politics. And, far from being an encounter between two clearly defined “sides”, all the parties involved were as much remade by it as it was by them. In all this, moreover, in the building of new identities, of newly imagined worlds of possibility and political reality, the discourse of rights and rightless- ness loomed increasingly large.

    But I am running ahead of myself. I mean here to explore how the civilizing mission, in nineteenth-century South Africa, sought to instill new forms of subjectivity, sovereignty, and identity among “the (Southern) Tswana”, today recognized as one of South Africa’s larger ethnic groupings. In this, the discourse of rights was not only to feature centrally. It was to feature paradoxically. For it played itself out simultaneously, polyrythmically, in two cultural registers: one may be dubbed the register of radical individualism, the other, the register of primal sove- reignty. The first, based on the liberal modernist idea of citizenship, was to express itself in the individuation and internal stratification of black South Africa, in the rise of its new elites; the second, founded on a mythos of premodern “tribalism”, was implicated in the historical genesis of such ethnic groups as “the” Sotho and “the” Tswana. The coexistence of these two registers within the colonial discourse of rights had some less-than-obvious consequences. For one thing, it established a repertoire of signs and instruments by means of which it was possible for colonizers to divide and dominate others within a racialized world. But it also laid out the terms in which those “others” could strike back. As this implies, it is to the cracks, crevices, and contradictions of the colonial discourse of rights that we may look for the seeds of modern South Africa’s troubled identity politics.

    II. RIGHTS STUFF: COLONIZING AFRICAN SUBJECTS, SUBJECTIVITIES

    Nonconformist evangelists first settled permanently among the Southern Tswana (Bechuana)x peoples in the 1820s. The vanguard of the British presence in the South African interior–overrule was only to occur in 1885–they were, of all colonizers, the most far-reaching in their imperial vision, seeking not to rule Africans but to reconstruct their very being. I cannot, in this context, say much about the contemporary Tswana world, save for the fact that it was caught up in a period of subcontinental turmoil, allegedly sparked by the rise of the Zulu state, which destabilized many communities in the interior and gave evangelists access to several chiefdoms, whose rulers saw advantage in whites with guns, commodities, and the capacity to protect them by diplomatic means.xi

    Nor shall I say much here about the background of the evangelists. Their civilizing mission was an epic quest cast in the fervent images of a rising bourgeoisie in Europe; images that spoke in an optimistic, democratizing voice of the values of universal truth and rational knowledge, of the capacity of man–as we all know, it was a deeply gendered fantasy–to bend History to His own Heroic will. The terms of this vision are familiar. They are, to be sure, part of our own cultural heritage. Among them, two themes–tropes, really–featured with special clarity at the frontiers of Empire.

    The first was the modernist figure of the civilized, radically free individual. An autonomous citizen, this person was ideally possessed not only of private property, but, as importantly, of a divided, hyphenated self; one that could be self-conscious, self-righteous, self-made, and, as Foucault would have us remember, self-disciplined.xii Much has been written on the nature of modern personhood; much of it suggesting, as Taylor puts it,xiii that “[w]hat is peculiar to the modern West” in this regard–and, especially, to the “bourgeois ethic”xiv–is that the respect accorded to human beings is “[formulated] in terms of rights”; specifically, of universal “sub- jective right[s]”,32 enjoyed by “disengaged subjects”.xv The larger this universalist image of right-bearing Man loomed in the discourses of English modernity,xvi the more it was assumed to be absent from “savage” sensibility. Almost all of the early missionaries told tales of people dispossessed or put to death at the summary command of an African “king”;xvii the premodern monarch, it seems, had a whim of iron. This picture of an Africa lacking all civility, citizenship, and civil rights was to persist for a very long time. Indeed, writing in a philosophical key more than a hundred years later, Margaret MacDonald xviii echoed a view shared by early nineteenth-century missionaries: “[O]nly at a certain level of intellectual development do men claim natural rights. Savages do not dream of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. For they do not question what is customary.”xix It followed that only self-interested, self-obsessed human beings might be, in both senses of the term, right-minded.

    The second trope of salience to the colonial mission was the emerging European nation-state. Conceived as a secular universe of persons who were free and equal before the law, it was held to share language and culture, territory and history, values, sentiments, and interests. This, of course, is the “imagined community” of which so much has been (re)written lately: the modernist polity that, as ideological formation, came to maturity in the age of revolution, 1789-1848. And it was constituted as a state in the double sense of being both a political order and a condition of mind-and-being.xx As such, it had become the taken-for-granted social space in which the right-bearing citizen was implanted, in which modern subjectivities paraded as political subjects. Founded on a social contract and codified law, it was the measure against which other, more “primitive” modes of government were to be evaluated and remodeled. After all, declared long-time Superintendent of the London Missionary Society in the Cape Colony, the Rev. John Philip,xxi “the character of a people depends on the influence of the laws and govern- ment under which they live.” By this criterion, unsurprisingly, Southern Tswana were to be found lacking: Edward Solomon,xxii in specifying what was particular to their “government” in the mid-nineteenth century, offered sadly that “They have no regular code of laws,…[but] customs…to [which] they rigidly adhere.”

    These, then, were two of the more significant tropes born to the tropics and beyond by evangelists and other Europeans. They were to figure with special force in the colonial process.

    The onslaught of the colonial mission on the Southern Tswana occurred on many planes and in many places at once. In particular, it sought to release “the tribal African” from his “simple socialistic life”. It is here that the first register of the discourse of rights, the register of radical individualism, was to play itself out.

    The Politics of Personhood

    To the extent that no practice was too petty, no “tradition” too trifling to escape evangelical attention, the struggle to refashion African individuality saturated the daily routines of the Protestant mission. Nor was the concern of the Christians with “ordinary life” itself coincidental. The “affirmation of the everyday”, Taylor stresses,xxiii was integral to the bourgeois idea of the new civility. On the assumption that Southern Tswana learned by mimesis and habituation, their lessons were conveyed primarily through living example and “kind conversation”.xxiv And they began with the “native” body. The Nonconformists were quick to grasp the relevance, for colonizing purposes, of the management of the gendered human physique; all this long before Foucault or Van Gennep or Bourdieu. They also sensed the link, analogical and substantive, bet- ween bodily politics and the body politic: it was the Rev. Philip,xxv not Emile Durkheim, who first commented that the “different members of a state [are] beautifully represented by members of the human body.”

    Southern Tswana bodily practices were seen by the evangelists to be nakedly promiscuous. Their clothing was “scanty”, their skins “greasy”, their habits “dirty”, and their sexuality uncon- trolled. And so the Nonconformists sought to cloth them in European garb, all the better to close off their bodies from one another; to disseminate “modern” notions of hygiene, all the better to control their bodily extrusions; to speak to them of the Godly virtues of monogamy, all the better to contain their sexuality; to have them live in nuclear families, all the better to confine females to the home, and to put men to honest work in the field.

    Where better to address all this than in the context of marriage? xxvi The documentary record shows not just that the missionaries tried especially hard to reform Southern Tswana conjugal relations, but that, in doing so, they relied heavily on the language of legality. The point was to do more than simply convince men to marry monogamously, in church, and without “buying” their wives. It was to persuade them to treat the wedlock as a contract, an ensemble of enforceable rights and duties, and to disseminate a legalistic view of selfhood sui generis. To the Nonconformists, moreover, matrimony and the family were also the key to those most vital sites in the struggle for modern personhood: property relations and material life.

    It was here, in fact, that the lessons of radical individualism were most avidly taught and the “communal” tendencies of Africans most fiercely fought. Once the principles of private ownership and property rights were inculcated, believed the evangelists, all the other bases of modern right-bearing citizenship might take root.

    In order to teach these principles, the Christians set out first to purchase the land on which to plant themselves, their churches, and their gardens. They insisted on ownership: their rights had to be clearly given, clearly grasped by the Africans, so that they might learn to do the same.

    In 1820, Robert Hamilton “bought” ground from a local man, “the first…ever purchased in the Bechuana country.”xxvii A few years later, Robert Moffat could himself report that the “ground belonging to the Mission…was purchased…for 40 lbs. of beads.”xxviii And this in spite of the fact that the missionaries knew well that the Africans found their gestures, and the very idea of “sale”, utterly incomprehensible.

    Once they had their land, however, the evangelists went about enclosing and planting gardens. Here they enacted their everyday theater of Protestant industry: Act I, the forceful conversion of nature into private property; Act II, the cultivation of a fruitful field by self-pos- sessed labor; Act III, the harvesting of individual wealth and value to be enjoyed as just reward for virtuous toil. Immediately around their stations, we are told, some Southern Tswana took these practical lessons to heart. By 1842, at one settlement, “numerous gardens…[had] lately been walled in” and were being brought under cultivation. At another, “sixty large gardens [had] been enclosed, and upward of two thousand trees planted.”xxix The dawn of African modernity, it seemed to the optimistic missionaries, lay just beyond the horizon.

    As it turned out, their optimism proved premature. Beyond the compass of the mission stations, the privatization of commonage made little sense to Southern Tswana. Neither agri- cultural nor pastoral land was scarce here: it had no exchange value, was held by chiefly favor, and was given to social groups, in de facto perpetuity, as the basis of their membership of the po- litical community. All this notwithstanding, the Nonconformists did not give up their efforts to inculcate “healthy” individualism. The most tenacious among them was John Mackenzie, a “humanitarian imperialist” with ambitious plans to make Bechuanaland into a Wordsworthian xxx paradise of enlightened, land-owning yeomen. xxxi In a treatise aimed at the British parliament and public, Mackenzie argued that every African “ought to feel that his house and his cornfield are his own.” Many Tswana, he said, perhaps more sanguinely than accurately, now saw the disadvantages of living in concentrated “traditional” villages, far from their fields and cat- tle-posts; they would prefer to stay, like European farmers, at their own smallholdings. Already there were instances “where Bechuana industry [had] turned [a] mere cattle or hunting station into a civilized man’s farm.” Given the introduction of private property–and freedom from chiefly command– might not Bechuanaland become a haven of African enlightenment and prosperity?

    The tireless Mackenzie seized every opportunity to convince those Southern Tswana who were not yet persuaded of the benefits of adopting European practices. Take this fragment of a reported conversation between himself and a local ruler:xxxii

    “You should fully face the change that has come and is coming. In the olden time you had all your gardens and cattle stations, and no one interfered with the one or the other. Now you see the coming wave of white men…Where they find open country they will build and put in the plough, and will tell you that the unoccupied country is God’s and not yours. But white men respect hard work, and if you improve your houses and your lands you may depend on it no English officer would dispossess you…Why not meet together once more as a tribe…and introduce a better custom as to land? Every fountain or farm should be apportioned to him who cultivates it, and he should have a title to it ac- knowledged by the tribe.”
    “But”, said the chief in response, “there is great deception about papers–the European agents deceive stupid people, and white men find ways to take away the land.”

    Here, over the issue of dispossession, is where the liberal idealism of the mission ran up against the raw realities of the colonial frontier. And where the evangelists found it necessary to modify the kind of propertied personhood of which they dreamed–or leave their would-be converts open to the rapacity of other colonizers.xxxiii And so:

    “I have thought of all that”, [Mackenzie] replied. “You ought to have individual rights and title-deeds, but it ought to be printed on every one of them, `Not saleable–not transferable’.”

    This was a new idea–individual titles, but unsaleable. It was declared on all hands that this would exactly meet their case…[the] idea of individual right to land beyond the power of the clever agent.

    How this form of title differed from existing tenurial arrangements is not obvious. It may have sustained the fiction, for the evangelists, of private property. But the Africans gained nought. To wit, as they knew, it was the very language of “papers”, of title and rights, that was being used by Europeans to expropriate African land. Somewhat less triumphantly, Mackenzie reports another conversation: xxxiv

    “…why don’t the white men stay in their own country?” said some intelligent natives to me one day…”Perhaps it is [the Queen] who sends them. Some say this is the English mode of warfare–by `papers’ and agents and courts.” This was said with contempt.

    In short, Mackenzie’s text discloses the emerging contradictions of the colonial frontier, a world 11 in which the worldview of the mission stood little chance against white expansionism, avarice and overrule. But more of that later.

    I reiterate that the domain of landed property was not the only one in which rights talk and radical individualism were centrally involved in the effort to remake Southern Tswana personhood. There were many others: the effort to construct a domestic sphere, enclosed in a residential architecture founded on the British idea of “home”;xxxv the treatment of the church as a rule-governed, voluntary association made up of spiritually autonomous individuals; the estab- lishment of schools in which pupils were subjected to individualistic disciplinary regimes; the practical dissemination of notions of time and money, of free wage labor and the private estate, of refined consumption as a reward for virtue; and so on and on.

    In what measure, then, did the evangelists succeed in implanting the modernist individual on African soil? This question is not simply answered. For now, however, it is enough to note that one of the effects of colonialism, of its unresolved dialectic, was to set in motion complex processes of class formation, leaving the late nineteenth century Southern Tswana world divided into a mass of poor peasant-proletarians, a small bourgeoisie largely associated with the mission church, and a population of “middle” peasants caught precariously in between. For those trapped, at the behest of colonial capitalism, in a promiscuous cycle of underpaid migrant labor and un- productive agriculture, the Christian message made little sense: these people had no prospect of being propertied and found themselves with ever diminishing rights. For middle peasants, both the Protestant ethic and the promise of capitalism held greater attraction; material pressures, though, tended to push them toward the abyss of poverty. For the elite, as we would expect, identity with the ideology of the civilizing mission grew increasingly strong. But everyone, whatever their ideological orientation or social status, now lived in a colonial society dominated by the authoritative rhetoric of rights –even if, for most black South Africans, those rights were experienced either by their absence or, worse yet, as instruments of dispossession.

    But the discourse of rights, as I said, was not restricted purely to the register of radical individualism. It was also to resonate in the language and the practices of primal sovereignty.

    Before the arrival of the European evangelists, it seems, there were no Bechuana in Bechuanaland, merely batho, “human beings.” Or so says Mackenzie: xxxvi

    The name Bechuana is a word used at an early period by white men to denote the tribes of Batlaping and Barolong, with which they first came into contact. These people do not use the word of themselves, or of one another; nevertheless, they accept of it as the white man’s name for them, and now begin to use it themsel- ves…The Bechuana belong to the large Bantu family of people.

    Not only did the Europeans name “the Bechuana”. They contrived for them an ethnology, dividing them into “tribes” and ascribing to them a primordial identity based on common ances- tors and origins, language and customs, sentiments and interests.xxxvii So much so, that most – early missionary texts came to include an elementary classification of tribal groups and material on economy, society, religion, government, and “natural” characteristics. This material later found its way into ethnographies, dictionaries, grammars, maps, typologies of languages and “dialects”, and, perhaps most significantly for the formation of ethnic consciousness, into vernacular school texts. It was also to prepare the ground for the cultural geography of South Africa, the ethnoscape on which colonial rule (and, later, apartheid) was to be built.

    Ethnic consciousness, I would argue, always has its roots in encounters between peoples who mark their asymmetries–in power, in historical imaginings, in political ambitions and economic ends–by cultural means; collective identity is everywhere a relation, nowhere a thing.xxxviii Regarded thus, the construction of “the Bechuana” as “a people”xxxix–their transition, that is, from humanity to ethnicity–occurred initially in response to the terms in which they were challenged by colonial evangelists. This challenge took the form of an unremitting insistence that the Africans give coherent account of their own practices–and hear, from men and women schooled in the universalist sureties of enlightenment knowledge, why European ways were the more rational, the more advanced. And why, therefore, things local ought forever to be put aside. Consequently, Southern Tswana found their own culture, now dubbed setswana, objectified by contrast to sekgoa (“European ways”).

    The documentary record is replete with conversations about the differences between setswana and sekgoa. These account are revealing. On one hand, the evangelists often claimed that Tswana pronounced the ways of the whites clearly superior.xl On the other, we are told that they “could not see…anything in [European] customs more agreeable…than in their own.” Worse yet, they would–sometimes “laughing extravagantly”–“pronounce our customs clumsy, awk- ward, and troublesome.”xli In truth, the Africans seem to have been more bemused than amused. They found it hard to understand why setswana and sekgoa should not coexist as the Europeans enlightenment, with their absolutist post-enlightenment notions of universal knowledge, insisted they could not. Thus, as the colonial encounter took its course, many would cull new cultural practices from the fusion of the two. Meanwhile, however, they responded to the Nonconformists’ demand to choose between customs, knowledges, deities by recourse to a bland, baffling relativism: “the God of the Whites,” said a rainmaker to the insistent Robert Moffat, “dwells in the south…the Bootshuana God dwells in the north.”xlii Neither should covet the terrain of the other, he implied. And neither was about to take himself off.

    It goes without saying that the content of any ethnic identity is a product of complex, drawn out processes; being a fluid ensemble of (variously empowered) signs and practices, a living culture is forged not merely in conversations, but also in the minutiae of everyday action–and sometimes in the course of struggle and contestation. Here, however, I wish to highlight three things about the manner in which Tswana identity was re-presented by the evangelists back to the Tswana themselves and, then, to the whites of colonial South Africa.

    First, “the Bechuana” were portrayed as a people governed by “custom” (mekgwa: the word now had vernacular denotation). No matter that they were ruled by different chiefs. No matter that they lacked any overall political identity, nor even, until now, shared a proper noun. Every last one of them was, allegedly, bound together by an allegiance, an ineluctable attachment, to setstwana, the ways of their ancestors; it was their very “nature”, moreover, to follow these ways without question.xliii Which is why, explained the missionaries, it had been so difficult to sow the seeds of “healthy individualism” among them. Even when they took on the trappings of civiliza- tion, they still “prefer[ed] the customs in which they [had] been brought up. In short, the primal sovereignty of setswana–seen here as a kind of social glue which bound people together–was inherently presumed to be conservative, communal, antimodern. By very virtue of being ethnic Bechuana, these Africans were benighted subjects in a prehistoric kingdom of custom. Echoes here of an idea which, until recently, enjoyed wide currency in Anglo-American social science: that ethnicity is inimical to modernity. Also, its corollary: that the removal of difference is a sine qua non of the worldly progress toward universal civilization.xliv

    Implicit both in the invention of the term “Bechuana”, and in the imputation of a shared allegiance to the primal sovereignty of mekgwa, lay a vision which spread largely unremarked among colonial evangelists: the vision of a supra-tribal Tswana ethno-nation. Here lies the second point: that, increasingly, “the Bechuana”, in the singular, were represented as a grouping with common concerns above and beyond those of the highly autonomous chiefdoms which formed their everyday political communities (see below). At times, in fact, this entity was depicted as something akin to a primitive European nation-state. This becomes clear from a novel about a scientific expedition to South Africa written by Jules Verne in 1872. Taking its ethnographic background from early mission texts, it tells of the arrival of the scientists at a Tswana capital and of a ceremony in which they and the local ruler pulled each others’ noses “according to African custom”. All of which, wrote Verne, made the Europeans into “naturalized Bechuanas.”xlv

    It was a short step from the conclusion that Tswana shared a collective identity to the assumption that they “naturally” shared rights and interests. And so, from the 1830s onward, the missionaries allude repeatedly to what might harm or advance the commonweal of “the Bechua- na people.” Here, as elsewhere, the road from primal sovereignty to the “rightful” claims of an ethnic group was tarred with chimeras, myths, mirages. But it was also paved with good intentions. Take just one striking instance: at the Bloemhof Commission of 1871, set up to adjudicate the territorial disputes that had arisen after the discovery of diamonds along the fron- tier, the Southern Tswana were represented by Joseph Ludorf, a WMMS missionary.xlvi

    Although they were “awarded” a portion of the land–having lost much of their country to white settlers–Ludorf feared that it would nonetheless be seized by the neighbouring Boer republics. Consequently, he drafted a manifesto for a “United Tswana Nation”. Ludorf went on to propose the establishment of a representative parliament, a bounded territory, an army, a judiciary, an independent economy, and a constitution that fused setswana and European statecraft.xlvii The plan came to nought. But some years on, two “Bechuana” polities were established, albeit as colonies of the United Kingdom: British Bechuanaland (later absorbed into South Africa to be- come, under apartheid, Bophuthatswana) and the Bechuanaland Protectorate (after 1966, Botswana). The role of missionaries in their formal creation is a complicated issue.xlviii But there is no denying that colonial evangelism made these ethno-national polities thinkable in the first place. It also shaped the kind of collective consciousness that persuaded Southern Tswana them- selves to respond to overrule in ethnic terms. Thus, for instance, the first local newspaper owned and published among these people–by prominent mission school alumni–was called Koranta oa Batswana, “The Newspaper of the Tswana”. This newspaper began to give voice, in the ver- nacular, to a “national” culture and to “national” interests and concerns.xlix In time, such Tswana voices would come to speak easily in terms of collective rights and entitlements. In 1884, for in- stance, the ruler of the Tshidi-Rolong, a large Southern Tswana grouping, agreed to a treaty with the Crown written in the following terms:l

    I give the Queen to rule in my country…I give her to publish laws and to change them when necessary, and to make known the modes of procedure of the courts, and to appoint judges and magistrates, and police, and other officers of government as may be necessary, and to regulate their duties and authority…[Also] to collect money (taxes)…which will go to defray the expenses of the work done in this country by the Queen; and to levy court-fees, to impose fines, and to employ the money thus obtained according to the laws of the Queen.

    And in 1903, his heir would ask the Colonial Secretary, on behalf of his “Nation”,li to recognize “our rights and privileges as loyal citizens”. This kind of rhetoric, which became the common tender of colonial diplomacy, was uttered with growing fluency by local leaders. And once its terms were internalized, in the parole of “tribal” politics, they were duly extended to ethno- national imaginings. That is how Tswana came to speak in the modernist argot of entitlements and legalities about a political community that did not exist, a community that was imagined for them long before it was imagined by them.

    Third and finally, parallel to the construction of Tswana ethnicity went the progressive erosion of chiefly authority; this being a result of interventions on the part of the colonial state which I cannot describe here. Ironically, the more Tswana asserted a collective identity based on “traditional” affinities, the less any “traditional” political figures had the wherewithal to represent them. Some royals, it is true, remained quite influential into this century; a few, on occasion, took it upon themselves to act on behalf of “the Bechuana”. But such things occurred less and less as the administrations of British Bechuanaland and the Cape Colony undermined local au- thority and divided as they ruled: the objectification of “the Bechuana,” as an ethnic group with an awareness of its own objectives, unfolded amidst a deepening legitimation crisis. Or, more properly, in a deepening political void. It was a void that would only be filled when new bases of black political association, action, and representation began to emerge in South Africa during the twentieth century.

    Drawing all this together, then, the discourse of primal sovereignty led to the construction of “the Bechuana” as an ethnic group with “inalienable” rights. At the same time, however, setswana, the primal “stuff” that made these people what they were, was taken to be inescapably primitive; the kind of thing that had to be erased if Africans were to be made into moderns. The fact that the precolonial Tswana world had had its own elaborate repertoire of rights, its own theories of sovereignty and representation, its own practices of personhood and property, simply went unrecognized.lii

    In the colonial discourse of rights, as this suggests, primal sovereignty had a paradoxical, impossible quality. In order to make “the Bechuana” into civilized moderns, it was necessary to unmake what it was that made them Bechuana in the first place, to remove the differences that made them different–notwithstanding that it was the civilizing mission that had conjured “them” up to start with, at least in this form. But that is only where the paradoxes began. Colonialism in many parts of the world led to the invention of groupings, with no previous existence, that were said to have rights which were only made palpable by virtue either of their absence or of their being given up. It was only because “Bechuana” land was being seized by Europeans that “Bechuanaland” was said to exist by right and to require protection (if only so that it might be “voluntarily” alienated to European control); only because indigenous authority was being superseded by the state that a right to sovereign autonomy was articulated (if only so that local rulers might formally “petition” for European overrule); only because the language of command had become English that the right of self-expression in Setswana was essayed (if only so that Tswana might submit to the Crown in their own tongue). Here, in short, was a world of virtual realities, in which things were reified primarily by the recognition of their non-being. But there was also something more sinister at issue. Since people were held to have rights as a consequence of their membership in an ethnic group, it was also possible to remove those (or other) rights on the same basis. As we shall see, because of its putatively “premodern” in- frastructure, primal sovereignty was to be used to limit, dispossess, and disenfranchise Tswana from the time of colonial overrule onward. But more of that in a moment.

    III. CONTRADICTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, CONTESTATION

    Contradictions, recognized and unrecognized

    Most of the evangelists saw no disjuncture, in the discourse of rights, between the register of radical individualism and that of primal sovereignty; indeed, they did not explicitly distinguish them at all. The effort to implant modern individualism might have pointed toward a society of free universal citizens, while the conjuring up of a primordial Bechuana identity gestured toward the creation of ethnic subjects. From their perspective, however, the two things were part of a seamless campaign to rework the indigenous world, the latter describing that world as it was, the former as it ought to be. One, in short, was a narrative of being, of congealed “tradition”; the other, a narrative of becoming, of revealed “modernity”.

    In fact, for the mission and later the colonial state, the universal citizen and the ethnic sub- ject, liberal individualism and primal sovereignty, were conditions of each other’s possibility. British colonialism was everywhere two-faced, everywhere a double gesture. On one hand, it jus- tified itself in terms of difference and inequality: the greater enlightenment of the colonizer legitimized his right to rule and to civilize. On the other, that legitimacy was founded, ostensibly, on a commitment to the eventual erasure of difference. Of course, had the difference actually been removed, the bases of overrule would themselves have disappeared. It was not; they did not. Colonialism, in short, promised universal rights but kept the ruled in a state of relative rightlessness; it promised individual advancement but produced ethnic subjection. In South Af- rica as elsewhere, the discourse of radical individualism and modern personhood bore the promise; the discourse of primal sovereignty and ethnic subjection, the brute reality. It was by virtue of the latter, too, that “the Bechuana” were engrossed within a larger, more inclusive form of marking, of coloration and devaluation: that of race, in which all shades of non-European ethnicity, all kinds of colonial otherness, were finally submerged.

    Double Consciousness, Double Standards, and the Denial of Rights

    As I have already intimated, the chimera of primal sovereignty was to be used to disenfranchise and disable black South Africans, especially by the cumulative actions of the colonial state, sometimes in opposition to the mission. In this respect, recall my earlier point that Southern Tswana, one and all, had been familiarized with the authoritative rhetoric of rights by the realpolitik of the frontier; that some discerned in it the “English mode of warfare”; that others, most notably the rising elite, had internalized the Protestant ethic and the spirit of liberal individualism. It was predictable, then, that “the Bechuana” should fight the implications of overrule in the language of individual and collective entitlement, invoking it to protest against their loss of autonomy, the seizure of their territory, the imposition of taxes, the conditions of wage labor, and so on; and that colonizers should speak back in the same language, often wielding it as a blunt instrument.

    Let me give just one example in lieu of a history of the struggle over rights in this colonial theater. It concerns a Land Commission set up by the British authorities in 1886 to clear up conflicting territorial claims among local “tribes”, and between them and white settlers, thus paving the way for overrule. Among the disputes heard by the Commission was a wrangle between two neighbouring chiefdoms over some remote pasture in their mutual borderland. Montshiwa, the chief to whom it was awarded, used the occasion to press for the introduction of individual land ownership, registered by title-deed. A canny ruler, he had learned well the language of liberal individualism and was aware of the salience of private property to the British. Among other things, Montshiwa had been persuaded that, if freehold were granted and deeds lodged with the government, the latter would have to protect Tswana owners from settler expro- priation. What is more, he argued the case in a manner that would have done any utilitarian philosopher proud: those who had occupied the land, he said, deserved to own it because they had “improved” it. And they would do so even more if they had secure, permanent, heritable pos- session.liii

    The Commission rejected the argument on the ground that “the Bechuana” were “not ready” for individual ownership; governed still by primal custom and primitive communalism, they were insufficiently civilized. The old “tradition”, whereby the chief was the owner of land as custodian for the tribe, ought yet to prevail. As a subsequent Commission, the influential South African Native Affairs Commission (1903-5), was to say in its Report, “the Native population as a whole instinctively cling to and cherish the communal system.”liv What is more, the Report went on:lv

    [While] it is largely held to-day, that individualism is ultimately conducive to greater industry, enterprise and production,..our limited experience has not in all cases furnished proof of this.

    Having been told for almost a century that “healthy individualism” was both the means and the measure of their move toward modernity, black South Africans were to be informed that, even if they no longer “cherished” their communal ways, their kind of individualism was somehow dif- ferent, somehow lesser. More immediately, however, in dismissing Montshiwa’s case for private tenure, the Land Commission of 1886 simply ignored the fact that most of the intended recipients of titles were highly educated mission school alumni and members of a propertied new middle class. To wit, the Commissioners never deigned to ask who the landowners would actually be. Their rationale for rejecting the request–the tacit appeal to the sovereignty of custom–did not admit a discourse of individuation. Even more, it actively denied it. After all, the nub of primal sovereignty is the specious notion that, in their “natural” (instinctive?) attachment to their ways, ethnic subjects are all alike, faceless, nameless.

    In short, the Commission of 1886, like innumerable others to follow, did not just deny the possibility of individual property (and other) rights in the face of indigenous demand. Nor did it merely abort a move in the direction of liberal individualism. It also negated the collective capacity of a community and its leaders to remake their own world by due process. Until overrule, Tswana chiefs regularly legislated changes in social policy, often transforming institutional, residential, and material arrangements in response to historical contingencies and shifts in popular opinion.lvi Prior to the British presence, there was no reason why Chief Montshiwa should not have introduced some form of individual tenure through internal le- gislative procedures. Certainly, other Tswana sovereigns had made laws (melao) in the spirit of liberal modernity. But official administrative practice effectively put paid to that possibility by asserting the primal sovereignty of custom above all else. At a stroke, the historical dynamics of Tswana politics were severely debilitated.

    This, I stress, is just one example. There are many more. From the notorious Land Act of 1913lvii through a series of laws, proclamations, and other measures, “non-Europeans” were de- nied individual rights or prospects of citizenship. The process began when the Commission of 1903-5 recommended that blacks should only have limited, indirect franchise.lviii And it culmi- nated in the thoroughly racialized culture of apartheid, which was legitimized by direct appeal to primal sovereignty: to the notion, first, that “natives” naturally preferred their own traditions over the alien practices of European modernity, and ought therefore to live by them; and, second, that they lacked the enlightenment, as individuals, to determine their own being-in-the-world. But that is a well-known story, a terrible tale that runs right up to the present.

    Colonialism in South Africa, then, from its genesis in the civilizing mission to the age of apartheid, inculcated in Southern Tswana a double-consciousness to match the two-faced character of the discourse of rights itself.lix One and all, they were encouraged to embark on the road to modernity, to fashion themselves into citizens of the civilized world. At the same time, as black Africans, they were made into ethnic subjects, ineluctably tied to their fellows, to their primal origins, and to the customs which marked them as premodern. Precisely because of the paradoxi- cal, polymorphous nature of the discourse of rights, as I said before, Tswana came to know themselves, and their objectified “tradition”, at once by attribution and erasure; by virtue of a po- sitive construction of identity and by its negation. Setswana, to those who shared it, was a highly valued possession, the cultural product of a proud history. Yet, through much of the colonial epoch, “the Bechuana” had to hear that it was better set aside. Is it any wonder that resistance to overrule should have taken root in the crevices and contradictions of their colonial experience, on the terrain between its promise and its reality? Or that Tswana should have contested European domination sometimes by asserting their universal rights as citizens of empire, some- times through outburts of violence, rites of rebellion, and uprisings that bore the distinctive stamp of setswana? These forms of protest–which came to give voice to the double consciousness of the colonized, racialized, class-confined ethnic subject–have hardly been restricted to South Africa, of course. Ethnicity everywhere at once constructs people, placing them definitively in the world, and effaces them, submerging their individuality and opening them up to the captivity of othernesses. In some circumstances, it also affords them a basis to contest the con- tours of the world as they find it. Clearly, the discourse of rights is one of the terrains on which all of this occurs, especially under colonialism. For Tswana, it was central in shaping their identi- ty, past and present.

    And future.

    Contestation: Back to the Future

    In the recent (and ongoing) struggle over the destiny of South Africa, the two dominant styles of formal black political engagement–represented (if not exhausted) by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)–are each heir to one of registers in the colonial discourse of rights. The ANC has always stuck close to the ideology of liberal modernism implanted by the Protestant mission. It grew out of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), formed in 1912 to protest the Land Act, and was led primarily by mission products, many of them Southern Tswana. The SANNC spoke the language of civil and constitutional rights, relying heavily on rhetorical styles learned in church. In its dealings with successive governments, moreover, it took a line more notable for its liberal, non-racial in- dividualism than for its populism. Ethnic affiliations were deliberately ignored: the SANNC was steadfastly supra-tribal, even pan-African, in its composition and its horizons, and avoided any hint of identity politics. It was also emphatically British in orientation and, for a very long time, non-violent in its technologies of protest. As we all know, its efforts were not rewarded. While there were some important differences, lx the ANC retained much of the style of its predecessor. It continued, and continues still, to talk the language of rights and universal citizenship; as Hobsbawm recently intimated, lxi it sustains a commitment to a classically European form of nationalism. lxii Significantly, in negotiating the future, its leaders have paid painstaking attention to the promulgation of a liberal democratic constitution–even while being pressurized to concede collective rights and protections along ethnic and racial lines.

    By contrast, the assertively Zulu-centric IFP owes its origins to the politics of primal sovereignty; in particular, to the creation, under apartheid, of “homelands” for tribal groupings constructed during the colonial era. The ideology and political style of Inkatha has always been ethno-nationalist in tenor: since cultural identities run deeper than any other kind of attachment, goes the familiar argument, their bearers have a natural right to determine their own affairs and to be ruled by their own (“traditional”) authorities. The objective here is to secure collective enti- tlements in a loosely federated, pluralistic polity. The kind of politics that pursues this objective is typically fought along lines of ethnic cleavage, and with so-called “cultural” weapons, both verbal and violent. The colonial discourse of rights–its contradictions, paradoxes, and perver- sities intact–continues to make itself felt as a new dawn rises on the South African post- colony.lxiii

    IV. CONCLUSION

    A concluding point. Or two.

    Colonialism, pace received wisdom, was never a monolithic movement through which an expansive Europe imposed itself, systematically and inexorably, on the peripheral populations of the planet. It may have been a world-historical process. But it played itself out in multiple registers and in disconcertingly ambiguous ways. Never just, nor even mainly, an affair of states and governments, an epic orchestrated by heroic figures, it was carried on in thousands of contexts, both mundane and magisterial, by castes of characters with different means and ends. What is more, it was often a very messy business, wherein Europeans–settlers, evangelists, capitalists, administrators, army colonels–fought among themselves to impress their wills on the bodies, the being, the terrain of insignificant others. These differences among the colonizers, to be sure, did not do much to ease the experience of the colonized. Still, they did create an awareness of fissures in the seams of European domination; fissures at which local resistance of varying kinds was directed as the effects of overrule made themselves felt.

    Note, too, that many of the “civilized” practices exported from Britain to the colonies were anything but uncontested at the metropole–not least rights to property, to fair labor conditions, to the franchise. As even a cursory reading of J. S. Mill makes clear, lxiv peasant proprietorship and private small holding were not deeply entrenched in the English countryside, despite efforts to essay their virtues by, among others, Mill himself. Some contemporary “condition of England” novels, like Disraeli’s Sybil, actually rehearse the arguments for and against individual tenure;lxv and they suggest that struggles over civil and constitutional rights in the colonies were implicated in debates about the situation of the British working class at home.lxvi Patently, the imperial frontier was not a place where a mature ideology of rights was presented, fully tried and tested, to premodern Africans. It was a space in which the unfolding sociolegal and political histories of Britain and Africa met–there to be made, reciprocally, in relation to each other. Indeed, colonialism, in the nineteenth century, was as much about reconstructing metropolitan England in the image of a triumphant bourgeoisie as it was about enlightening blacks abroad.lxvii

    In this respect, an important qualification: for all its association with legalities, the introduction of a modernist discourse of rights to “the Bechuana” and other African peoples was not merely a matter of law. It involved a cultural revolution. For this discourse bore within it an elaborate ideology of personhood, of social contract, of material relations. The fetishization of rights, in short, was itself part of an embracing worldview. In such a culture, the language of legal entitlement appears liberatory; which is why colonial evangelists saw liberal individualism as an emancipation from the enchantment of custom and communalism–and from the tyranny of tradition and the chiefship. For Tswana, things seemed somewhat different, somewhat less sanguine. It always does from the perspective of the colonized. Endowed with a culture whose faiths and fetishes were not the same, they were quick to learn–to return to Carlos Fuentes’ The Campaign–that “[without] equality…all rights are chimeras”, that the law may indeed have been the greatest, most absurd thing imaginable (above, p.1). On one hand, it was a devastating instrument of warfare, like no other in its capacity to annihilate and dispossess without being seen to do anything at all. And yet the appeal to rights was a means that, over the long run, came to be used by black South Africans in self-protection. Not always successfully, and not always in the same way, but not always in vain either. Shades here of African American critical race theory. More to the point, it often seemed to be the only real means to hand, since it was part of the technology of rule on which rested the inequalities and disablements from which they suffered. This is why the language of the law sui generis is reducible neither to a brute weapon of control nor simply to an instrument of resistance. The inherently contradictory character of the colonial discourse of rights–its duality of registers and the double consciousness to which it gave rise–ensured that it would be engaged on both sides of the dialectic of domination and defiance. It still does. Everywhere.

  • The Discourse of Rights in Colonial South Africa

    The Discourse of Rights in Colonial South Africa

    It has become commonplace to note the centrality of law in the colonization of the non-European world: commonplace to assert its role in the fashioning of new Eurocentric hegemonies, in the creation of colonial subjects, in the rise of various forms of resistance. Historically-speaking, the manner in which legal sensibilities and practices entered into colonizing processes, into their dramatic gestures and prosaic theaters, turns out to have been more subtle, less audible, murkier, than is often suggested, all the more so as Euromodernist regimes of rule encountered vernacular (so-called “customary”) law at various edges of empire. This essay seeks to explore how imperial legal sensibilities and the discourse of rights figured in the colonization of the South African interior – one rather more complex and nuanced than is captured by received oppositions between citizen and subject, colonizer and colonized. In particular, it focuses on the frontier at which the earliest emissaries of empire engaged peoples who would become known as “the” Tswana, thus to interrogate the forms of identity and imagining to which the encounter gave rise as two cultures of legality engaged with one another. As it would tune out, that encounter would have effects of the long run that have reached into the political life of post-apartheid South Africa.

  • Democracy, Fried Chicken and the Anomic Bomb

    Democracy, Fried Chicken and the Anomic Bomb

    Drawing on ethnographic observation in South Africa in 1994, during the first post- apartheid election and the installation of Nelson Mandela as president, this essay reflects critically on the relationship between consumer capitalism, democracy, and nation-building. Democratization promised both a better life for all and the making of a “rainbow, non-racial” nation. But, over time, it yielded little to most South Africans. Instead, it ushered in an era of market-driven, neoliberally-oriented economic policies that, under the imperative of “structural adjustment,” radically deepened inequality, poverty, joblessness, and fears of criminal violence. It also ruptured the dream of a “new” nation, calling into question the very claim of nationhood and the rights of citizenship. This has raised a number of more general questions about the future of democracy under the impact of late capitalism, questions that have been felt increasingly across the world. To put it in the interrogative, is it possible that democracy is dying under the impact of new forms of capitalism, making its promise impossible and rendering it irrelevant? And what does the South African story tell us, more generally, about the unfolding history of the present?

  • Home-Made Hegemony

    Home-Made Hegemony

    The ideological struggle to naturalize the doctrine of domesticity was, from the first, part of the middle-class endeavor to secure its cultural hegemony. Vested in dispersed regimes of surveillance and in the texture of everyday habit, goes the general argument, the doctrine of domesticity facilitated new forms of production, new structures of inequality. In violation of the bourgeois ideal of domesticity, Tswana houses were enmeshed in dense kinship networks and social units; marriages were bonds between groups; polygyny seemed no more than undignified promiscuity. Tswana farmers were to be encouraged to grow sufficient surpluses to link them through trade with Christian Europe; this, believed the evangelists, would put them on the universal path to progress, albeit many paces behind white Britons. The Benthamite goal of advancement through profitable production and trade, then, was achieved by reducing a growing number of Tswana to economic dependency.

  • Humanity, Ethnicity, Nationality

    Humanity, Ethnicity, Nationality

    At a superficial level, contemporary Soviet studies of ethnicity and nationalism bear more than passing similarity to their Western counterparts. They pose many of the same insistent, obvious questions: How do we explain the rise of ethnic conflict? Is it a “natural” social phenomenon, the inevitable corollary of collective identity in the active voice? Or just an aberration, an unfortunate blip in the normally untroubled history of multi-ethnic societies? How, more ambitiously, do we go about its resolution? And, in like vein: Wherein lie the origins of moder nationalism(s)? Are all late twentieth-century assertions of national consciousness attributable to the same causes? Exploring the rising tide of ethnic assertion in the former USSR in light of these questions, this essay suggests that it may be explained, at least in part, by bringing a post/colonial Africanist perspective to bear on early post-Soviet history.

  • Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution

    Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution

    Conservative thinkers, most notably Francis Fukuyama, may speak confidently of the “end of history.”l But there seems little doubt that ethnie and nationalist struggles-in fact, identity polities sui generis-are (re-)making the his tory of our age with a vengeance. So much so, that it has become almost commonplace for discourses on the subject to begin by noting how embarrassingly wrong Euro-Ameriean social science has proven to be in accounting for the phenomenon. The explosive vitality of ethnic and nationalist consciousness has played havoc with the confident historieal predietion-from left, right, and center-that cultural pluralism would wither away in the late twentieth century. Remember? All “primordial” cultural attachments, we were told, would be done to death by “modernity,” by the maturation of the nation-state, and by the globalization of industrial capitalism. As Geertz (1963) noted many years ago, and Gellner (1983, 1987) continues to assert as both theory and ideology, “modernity” has classically been measured in terms of universalist criteria. Its teleology has always involved the removal of difference, the erasure of relativizing systems of value and knowledge in the cause of world-historical processes of rationalization. Hence the almost millennial faith, across all the grand theoretical traditions, in the inevitable demise of culturallocalism.Published in The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power, eds. Patrick McAllister and Edwin WIlmsen, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,

  • Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods

    Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods

    Abstract

    Among the 19th-century Tswana, we argue, cattle were like commodities; they linked processes of production and exchange, embodied an order of meanings and relations, and had the capacity to reproduce a total social world. They were, in sum, prime media for the creation and representation of value in a material economy of persons and a social economy of things. But they also had particular historical salience. As the Tswana were colonized, the encounter between periphery and center, local and global economies, was played out—materially and ideologically—in the contest between beasts and money, a contest which has given rise, also, to such token currencies as “cattle without legs.” The double character of cattle—as icons of a “traditional” order and as weapons in the struggle to assert control over modern life—has significant implications for our understanding of commodities in noncapitalist, non-European contexts, [cattle, commodities, money, colonialism, South Africa]

  • Bourgeois Biography and Colonial Historiography

    Bourgeois Biography and Colonial Historiography

    Based on an account of the flogging of a white man, Phinehas McIntosh, at the behest of an African ruler in colonial Bechuanaland, and on the edited diary of a British ruler in the same colony, this review essay offers a critique of received liberal approaches to imperial history, one that treats biography and event as largely unmoored – conceptually, methodologically, and theoretically – from the structural conditions that produce those biographies and events. Bourgeois biography and colonial historiography, it argues, are integral to the regimes of knowledge on which imperial hegemonies are founded and sustained – and, therefore, call for deconstruction in favor of critical, dialectical approaches to writing the past.

  • Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience

    Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience

    This chapter explores the models of colonial domination in South Africa. It examines the making of the nonconformist missionaries to the Griqua and Tswana as agents of empire, and discusses the works of the evangelists of the London Missionary Society and Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (WMMS) in South Africa. The chapter traces the missions back to the society that spawned them in Britain circa 1810–1840 and follows the evangelists onto the colonial stage itself.

  • Through the Looking-Glass

    Through the Looking-Glass

    Notwithstanding Gramsci or Foucault. there remains a tendency, in historical sociology. to explain processes of domination in terms of political and economic forces. In the study of state formation and imperialism. realpolitik is given precedence over ritual, material factors over the moral suasion of the sign. Yet European colonialism was also a cultural project. In Southern Africa, nonconformist missions. the vanguards of empire, conjured up new maps, new systems of relations, new notions of time, production and personhood. From their very first encounters with native communities, it is argued, they sowed the state of colonialism on which the colonial state and a more enduring condition of dependency was founded

  • Of Totemism and Ethnicity:

    Of Totemism and Ethnicity:

    Is Ethnicity an object of analysis, something to be explained? Or is it an explanatory principle capable of accounting for significant aspects of human existence? Because it has been treated in both ways, sometimes simultaneously, there is disagreement over even the most fundamental issues: What is ethnicity, one thing or many? Does it have the capacity to determine social and material life? Or is it determined by other historical forces and structures? And how does it relate to race, class, and nationality? Drawing examples primarily from Africa, and drawing a theoretical distinction between it and totemism, this essay posits five propositions about the nature of ethnicity in an effort to illuminate its historical character and its diverse experiential forms.

  • The Madman and the Migrant

    The Madman and the Migrant

    At its broadest, this essay explores the nature of historical consciousness among a South African Tswana people. On the basis of the imagery of two Tswana men – a “madman” institutionalized by the apartheid regime and a former migrant laborer – it examines the content of Tswana historical consciousness as expressed in vernacular cultural practices, specifically in relation to productiv work and wage labor. These differ from the narrative modes of representation associated with “history” in Euromodernist contexts, and build on various poetic devices – most strikingly, on the rhetoric of contrast – to give voice to contemporary experience and its historical roots. Thus the opposed concepts of productive work and wage labor, one associated with Setswana (Tswana ways) and the other with Sekgoa (European ways), are major tropes through which Tswana construct their past and present. It is argues that this excursion into the poetics of history in South Africa illuminates very general questions concerning the connection between consciousness, culture, history, and the poetics of representation.

  • Sui Genderis

    Sui Genderis

    This essay explores the ways in which gender relations in colonial African societies have conventionally been portrayed in classical anthropological studies – and how, in turn, those descriptive analyses, largely male-centric and normative, have been subjected to critique from various feminist perspectives. Based on ethnographic and historical work among Tswana peoples in Southern Africa, an approach is suggested that treats gender – in relation to generation, status, and other structural considerations – as a living construct that may be experienced and performed in a range of different, sometimes contradictory, ways by women at different life stages and in different social situations.

  • Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa

    Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa

    Christian evangelists were intimately involved in the colonial process in southern Africa.

    This essay distinguishes two dimensions of their historical role, each associated with a
    different form of power. In the domain of formal political processes, of the concrete
    exercise of power, the effect of the nonconformist mission to the Tswana, as elsewhere
    in Africa, was inherently ambiguous. However, in the domain of implicit signs and
    practices, of the diffuse control over everyday meaning, it instilled the authoritative
    imprint of Western capitalist culture. But there was a contradiction between these
    dimensions: while the mission introduced a new world view, it could not deliver the
    world to go with it. And this contradiction, in turn, gave rise to various discourses of
    protest and resistance. [South Africa, Tswana, colonialism, Christianity, missionaries,
    power, domination and resistance, historical agency and cultural discourse]

  • The Closed Society and its Critics

    The Closed Society and its Critics

    How most persuasively to conceptualize and theorize indigenous African societies, past and present? This essay begins by interrogating the confrontation in the 1980’s – a time of paradigmatic shift in both anthropology and African Studies – between “classical” (structural functionalist) and “critical” (Marxist) approaches, noting the strengths and weaknesses of both. Reviewing four important books published in 1982, each of which staked out new perspectives on old themes in African Studies, it draws together the most productive insights from each of them to argue for an altogether different, dialectical-systems approach to the analysis of economy and society in colonial and post-colonial Africa. This dialectical approach treats “local” African worlds as internally dynamic formations, in which social, economic, and political structures are inherently mobile and capable of endogenous transformation – while simultaneously engaged in constant, shape-shifting interactions with worlds (plural) beyond them.